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Today’s fast-evolving global economy accompanies rapid economic 
power shifts. Some developing countries are emerging as economic pow-
ers. Others are becoming new poles of growth. But many are still strug-
gling to attain their potential in this new era. With economic destinies 
no longer defi ned by north or south, east or west, the world is in the 
process of rebalancing economic, political, and social power.
In this multipolar world only multilateral approaches can provide 
global solutions to global problems. The Group of 20’s rapid response to 
shore up confi dence in the wake of the fi nancial crisis is a perfect exam-
ple of the continuing need for international economic cooperation and 
coordination. There is little doubt that the actions by the G-20 prevented 
the global economy from sliding into another Great Depression. Despite 
evidence of economic improvement, however, the global recovery 
remains fragile, making international economic policy coordination all 
the more important.
Now that many of the G-20 countries are recovering, it is time to 
think about those countries that are not part of this forum, but whose 
growth and development prospects are of equal importance in reestab-
lishing and ensuring global prosperity. 
For this, the world needs a more strategic approach to development—
and a more inclusive leadership structure. The G-20 has both the 
convening power and the legitimacy to assume a leadership role and 
put forth key issues that require immediate global attention. By tack-
ling the most pressing issues and those with the greatest potential 
benefi t to human well-being, it can fulfi ll its role as a provider of 
global public goods.
xvi Foreword
The developing world is accruing an increasing share of world output 
and helping to drive recovery with sustained demand for imports. As 
growth rebalances, emerging economies will provide new and robust 
markets for capital goods, investment, and knowledge. Yet it is impos-
sible for the world to sustain balanced growth as long as there are persis-
tent gaps in development. As the Toronto Summit Leaders’ Declaration 
states: “Narrowing the development gap and reducing poverty are inte-
gral to our broader objective of achieving strong, sustainable, and bal-
anced growth and ensuring a more robust and resilient global economy 
for all.”
The Republic of Korea—which just turned from an aid recipient to a 
donor country in the OECD Development Assistance Committee—
shows that being a developing country is not a permanent state of nature 
and is thus well positioned to serve as the bridge between advanced 
economies and developing countries. And as the host of the November 
2010 G-20 Summit in Seoul, Korea is bringing development issues to the 
fore at the G-20, convening multilateral institutions and development 
experts from around the world to help formulate multiyear action plans 
for the Group to adopt. 
In the runup to the summit, Korea collaborated with the World Bank 
to host a high level conference, Post-Crisis Growth and Development, on 
June 3-4, 2010, in Busan, Korea. The conference covered areas critical to 
the global development agenda and central to the G-20’s mandate to 
foster “strong, sustainable, and balanced growth.” This volume is a sum-
mary of that conference, a record of the conference proceedings, and a 
repository of information from leading experts on some of the most 
pressing global development issues.
The volume covers such cross-cutting topics as the emergence of 
multipolar growth in the postcrisis period, an analysis of Korea’s devel-
opment experience on how to transform from a low-income country to 
an advanced economy, and the impact of the global crisis on achieving 
the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. Other topics include infra-
structure and sustainable development, promoting aid for trade, ensur-
ing food security, and advancing inclusive fi nance. 
The book makes a strong case for integrating critical development 
issues relating to global growth, as well as human development issues more 
broadly, into the G-20 agenda and for bringing non-G-20 developing 
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countries on board to ensure their participation in the global recovery and 
to enhance the legitimacy and credibility of the G-20 process. It endorses 
the concept of multipolar growth, concluding with a strong consensus that 
developing countries have an important role to play in sustainable global 
growth and will become increasingly more important in the world econ-
omy. In order for this to happen, however, there must be a greater focus on 
removing obstacles to growth.
The G-20 can help foster stronger growth in developing countries by 
focusing on the following areas within its mandate and development 
agenda:
•  Facilitating the development of an action plan for increasing public 
and private fi nancing of infrastructure, as well as improving the effi -
ciency and environmental sustainability of infrastructure projects 
through technical assistance.
•  Recognizing the importance of trade capacity and market access and 
considering the implementation of specifi c measures, such as aid for 
trade and “duty free, quota free” access for least developed countries.
•  Encouraging agricultural productivity and supporting the fi ght against 
malnutrition by providing additional resources to scale up agricultural 
and food security assistance to eligible developing countries. 
•  Convening a global partnership with the relevant stakeholders around 
access to fi nance and fi nancial services to establish a common global 
fi nancial goal that not only focuses on credit, but also on a range of 
fi nancial products, including payments, savings, remittances, and 
insurance. 
Responding to the world’s economic development challenges clearly 
requires thoughtful leadership and globally coordinated responses. We 
hope this volume will be used as a tool and a reference in this process.
Justin Yifu Lin Il SaKong
Senior Vice President and Chief Economist Chairman 
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1The 2008 global economic crisis is arguably the deepest and most com-
plex since the Great Depression. The crisis, which originated in the small 
U.S. subprime housing market, quickly spread across fi nancial institu-
tions, markets, and countries. In the early stages of the crisis, most 
experts believed that its negative impact would be confi ned to developed 
countries. As the crisis progressed, however, developing countries felt the 
effects through various transmission mechanisms such as trade, com-
modity prices, capital fl ows, and remittances. By the end of 2008, there 
was widespread recognition that the crisis was global and that actions by 
the Group of 7 (G-7) advanced economies alone would not contain the 
rapidly spreading global economic meltdown.1 
As a result, in November 2008 and for the fi rst time, the Group of 20 
(G-20) leaders convened in Washington, D.C., to consider cooperative 
efforts to cope with the fi nancial crisis, to begin consideration of critical 
fi nancial and regulatory reform to avoid similar crises in the future, and 
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during the crisis has confi rmed it as a legitimate forum for addressing 
economic issues in this context. 
Responses of the G-20 to the Crisis
Due in part to a timely and coordinated policy response among the G-20 
member countries, a global recovery has been underway since the last 
quarter of 2009. The recovery remains fragile, however, and the reper-
cussions from the crisis have changed the landscape for economic growth 
and fi nance, particularly for developing countries that could face reduced 
access to global capital fl ows (World Bank 2010a). Sustaining the recov-
ery, reestablishing economic stability, and rebalancing global growth will 
require coordinated policy responses and inclusive multilateral institu-
tions with suffi cient legitimacy to agree on and implement solutions to 
long-term global challenges. 
In 2009, leaders at the G-20 summit in Pittsburgh offi cially endorsed 
that goal when they declared as their offi cial objectives the achievement 
of “strong, sustainable and balanced growth” among G-20 members and 
“raising living standards in emerging markets and developing countries” 
(G-20 2009). The G-20’s Toronto summit in June 2010 subsequently 
confi rmed and reemphasized the inclusion of development issues on the 
agenda. According to the Toronto declaration, “Narrowing the develop-
ment gap and reducing poverty are integral to our broader objective of 
achieving strong, sustainable and balanced growth and ensuring a more 
robust and resilient global economy for all (G-20 2010).” 3
While the fi nancial crisis provided the immediate impetus for con-
vening the G-20 at the leaders’ level, the broader G-20 membership also 
refl ected the growing weight of the dynamic emerging economies. 
Whereas the gross domestic product (GDP) of developing countries rep-
resented about 17 percent of global GDP in 1980, as of 2008 their share 
had increased to 29 percent, with a contribution to global growth of 
about 50 percent. Despite this progress, development challenges remain 
daunting and gaps persist, with the current crisis further complicating 
efforts to reduce poverty and meet the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). Because of the global economic crisis, an estimated 64 million 
more people in developing countries will be living on less than $1.25 a 
day (76 million more on less than $2 a day) in 2010. Even by 2015, the 
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additional number of poor attributable to the impact of the crisis could 
be 53 million and 69 million, respectively, based on these two poverty 
lines. The immediate impact of the crisis on development indicators in 
low-income countries could have been worse, but sounder policies and 
improved macro cushions allowed spending on social sectors to be 
maintained in many countries (World Bank 2010b).
The Korea–World Bank High Level Conference on Development
As a response to the uncertain economic environment, concern over its 
long-term impact on the MDGs, and the Pittsburgh commitment to 
raising living standards in developing countries, the Republic of Korea, 
as host of the November 2010 G-20 summit in Seoul, approached the 
World Bank in early 2010 with a proposal to organize a joint high-level 
conference on development. As a country that had transformed itself 
from a developing to a developed country within a generation, Korea is 
uniquely positioned to add legitimacy and to serve as a bridge between 
developing countries and high-income countries. For the World Bank, 
the collaboration provided a natural extension of its efforts to apply its 
expertise to pressing development issues and ensure greater attention to 
non–G-20 developing countries issues within the G-20 process. 
The Korea–World Bank high-level conference “Postcrisis Growth 
and Development,” held in June 2010, in Busan, Republic of Korea, suc-
cessfully brought a range of key development issues to the forefront, 
laid the groundwork for setting global development priorities, and 
helped advance the discussion among the international community, 
the G-20, and the non–G-20 countries on development policy options 
and priorities. The papers, commentaries, and discussion from that 
conference—which was cohosted by the Presidential Committee for the 
G-20 Seoul Summit and the World Bank, with support from the Korea 
Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)—form the basis of 
this volume. Figure 1 shows the key areas of development policy that 
are covered in the following chapters.
About This Volume
This volume draws together the papers and proceedings presented at the 
Korea–World Bank High Level Conference on Postcrisis Growth and 
Development, which took place in Busan, Korea. The starting point for 
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these contributions was the emerging global consensus on two impor-
tant issues. First, as globalization proceeds, the growth prospects of 
developing countries become more closely tied to the overall evolution 
of the global economy. Second, while the G-20 countries have a poten-
tially important role to play in the coordination of international devel-
opment policy—in cooperation with international organizations—they 
can address only a limited number of issues. The three criteria used to 
guide the selection of priority development issues and policies for con-
sideration by the G-20 (and thus for inclusion in this volume) were: (a) 
whether they can help promote strong, sustainable, and balanced growth 
and thus help support economic recovery in developing countries, as 
well as in advanced economies; (b) whether international cooperation, 
international fi nancing, and specifi c actions are needed; and (c) whether 
they lie within the G-20 mandate of international economic and fi nan-
cial cooperation.
The volume is organized as follows. In chapters 1 and 2, Il SaKong, 
chairman of the Presidential Committee for the G-20 Seoul Summit, and 
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, managing director of the World Bank, provide 
convincing arguments on the importance of integrating development 
into the G-20 agenda, the need to give voice to non–G-20 developing 
Figure 1. Key Pillars for Policy Action to Achieve Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth
Source: Authors.
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countries, and the key role Korea can play as a bridge between developed 
and developing countries. 
Chapters 3–6 cover broad development themes. Justin Yifu Lin’s paper 
(chapter 3) examines the emergence of multipolar growth in the postcri-
sis period and the reforms needed to support regional spillovers; Zia 
Qureshi’s paper (chapter 4) argues for including development issues in 
the G-20 growth framework and mutual assessment process and there-
fore more systematically into G-20 policy discussions; Wonhyuk Lim 
(chapter 5) provides an in-depth analysis of Korea’s development expe-
rience that illustrates how a low-income country can transform itself 
into an advanced economy; and the papers by Delfi n Go and Hans 
Timmer and by Jomo Kwame Sundaram (chapter 6) provide differing 
but complementary views on the impact of the global crisis on achiev-
ing the MDGs by 2015 and what it will take to regain momentum 
toward their completion. 
Chapters 7–10 review specifi c sectoral policies and actions needed to 
achieve strong, sustainable, and balanced growth. Chapter 7 by Bernard 
Hoekman and John Wilson discusses aid for trade and recommitting to 
the Doha agenda; chapter 8 by Marianne Fay, Michael Toman, and 
co-authors looks at infrastructure and sustainable development; chap-
ter 9 by Christopher Delgado and co-authors argues for multilateral 
action on agriculture and food security. Finally, chapter 10 by Peer 
Stein, Bikki Randhawa, and Nina Bilandzic advances inclusive fi nance 
as a topic for the G-20 agenda. The volume concludes with a matrix of 
proposed policy actions summarizing the main action points pre-
sented in the sectoral papers (appendix A) and data tables of selected 
economic and social indicators for both G-20 and non-G-20 countries 
(appendix B). 
The G-20: A New International Economic 
Forum for Global Cooperation in the 21st Century
Economic and fi nancial crises exact a heavy toll in lost output and, 
more ominously, in human suffering. The current global crisis is no 
exception. Moreover, crises also have been historically associated with 
the end and beginning of new economic arrangements and institu-
tions. The current crisis is, again, no exception. Even though the G-20 
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was originally an offspring of the 1997–98 East Asia crisis, its perfor-
mance during the current global economic and fi nancial crisis has 
shown that it has been accepted as a legitimate forum for addressing 
economic and fi nancial issues. To this end, the G-20 has been successful 
in delivering concrete measures that avoided another Great Depression 
and has taken onboard long-term issues to ensure strong, sustainable, 
and balanced growth.
The Path to the G-20
The post–World War II global economy has been associated with the 
Bretton Woods Conference, which provided a structure for addressing 
reconstruction and stable growth in the postwar period. 4 Bretton 
Woods resulted in the birth of a group of institutions—the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (IBRD), and the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade  (GATT)—that were charged with maintaining international 
economic cooperation.5
Yet the adoption in the early 1970s of fl oating currencies in the 
industrialized economies, along with the impact of the 1973 oil crisis, 
highlighted the need for a forum for economic coordination among 
the world’s major industrial economies. In 1974, the United States cre-
ated an informal gathering of senior offi cials from France, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany called the 
Library Group. A year later, France invited these leaders, plus Italian 
offi cials, to a summit where they agreed to an annual meeting and a 
rotating presidency, giving birth to the Group of Six (G-6). The follow-
ing year Canada joined, and the group became the G-7. This forum 
became the primary economic policy coordinating group, as the G-7 
comprised about 70 percent of world GDP in 1975 (60 percent in 
2008), in constant 2000 U.S. dollars. In world population, however, the 
G-7 represented a small percentage, accounting for only 15 percent of 
people worldwide. 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the G-7 recognized that the 
economic and political landscape had started to change. G-7 leaders 
began to hold separate meetings with the Russian Federation, the larg-
est of the Eastern European countries. In 1997, the Russian Federation 
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formally joined the group, resulting in the formation of the G-8. With 
the East Asian crisis of 1997–98 and the 1998 Russian fi nancial crisis, 
the G-7/G-8 was put to the test, and it became clear that the body was 
beginning to lose legitimacy for solving the problems facing the global 
economy. Thus, the G-20 was created in 1999, both as a response to the 
fi nancial crises of the late 1990s and in recognition that key emerging-
market countries were not adequately included in the core of global 
economic discussion and governance. Furthermore, new global chal-
lenges were emerging—such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic and global 
warming—that affected both developed and developing countries. 
Despite these shifts, the G-7/G-8 remained the main economic forum 
until the 2008–09 global economic and fi nancial crisis. 
The 2008–09 crisis brought to the forefront the growing recognition 
that the G-7/G-8 was a limited forum to respond to a rapidly spreading 
and truly global economic crisis. As a result, in November 2008, G-20 
leaders convened in Washington, D.C., to discuss how to cooperate so as 
to strengthen economic growth, cope with the fi nancial crisis, and lay 
the foundations for reform in order to spark recovery and avoid similar 
crises in the future. The November 2008 summit was triggered by the 
fi nancial crisis, but it also refl ected decades-long shifts in the global 
economy in which emerging economies have been acquiring more eco-
nomic and political preponderance at the global level. 
Decades Long Shifts: The Rise of the G-20
These decades-long shifts in the global economy are illustrated in fi gures 
2–6. The increasing globalization that the world has experienced in 
recent decades—supported by multilateral trade policy reforms, broad 
liberalization in domestic trade and investment environments, and tech-
nological advances—has facilitated the acceleration of growth in devel-
oping countries and, by extension, the importance of these countries in 
the global economy. 
Developing countries have been growing at a much faster average rate 
than high-income countries have, and their weight in the global econ-
omy has been rising. In 2010, developing countries are projected to grow 
at 6.2 percent. These countries contributed around 40 percent of global 
growth in the past decade, and in 2010 their projected contribution will 
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Figure 2. Real GDP Growth in Developing and High-Income Countries, 1991–2010 
Source: World Bank Development Prospects Group.
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approach 50 percent. Because developing countries are growing faster, 
they are also increasing their share in global GDP. Whereas developing-
country GDP represented about 17 percent of global GDP in 1980, as of 
2008 that share had increased to 29 percent, when measured at market 
exchange rates and close to 45 percent if purchasing power parity weights 
are used. Those that are contributing the most to this new global eco-
nomic landscape are the developing countries that are also members 
of the G-20; China and to a lesser extent India have been the main 
drivers of these shifts. In 1980, China accounted for 1 percent of global 
GDP. As of 2008, China’s share had increased to 6 percent of world 
GDP (11 percent in PPP terms), accounting for a larger share in the 
global economy than the economy of Germany or the United Kingdom. 
India has also emerged as a player, with a 2 percent share in world GDP 
in 2008, similar to Canada’s and Korea’s shares. Still other developing 
countries that represent only a small share of the global economy have 
 Postcrisis Growth and Development: A Development Agenda for the G-20: Overview  9
Figure 3. Contributions of Developing and High-Income Countries to World 
GDP Growth, 1991–2010
Source: World Bank Development Prospects Group. 
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experienced a new dynamism and have acted as growth poles in their 
respective regions (see chapter 3 of this book).
Developing countries’ share of global exports has also grown quickly, 
rising from 22 percent in 1980 to 31 percent in 2008. Developing-
country members of the G-20 have led this shift: their share in global 
exports, which accounted for 6 percent of world exports in 1980, rose 
to 19 percent in 2008, with China, Brazil, India, and Mexico leading the 
way. The same can be said of net foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Developing countries’ share in global FDI was 7 percent in 1980, and 
by 2008 their share was 32 percent (with 21 percent coming from the 
developing-country members of the G-20). 
Closing the Development Gap: The Inclusion 
of Development Issues in the G-20 Agenda
Although in the global economic transformation of the past decade the 
world’s economic center has shifted away from high-income countries 
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Figure 4. Developing and High-Income Countries’ Share of World GDP, 1980–2008
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Figure 5. Developing and High-Income Countries’ Share of World Exports, 
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toward developing countries, in particular developing-country mem-
bers of the G-20, the nine middle-income countries in the G-20 con-
tinue to face major development challenges. With large concentrations 
of poverty (table 1), they are home to 54 percent of the world’s extreme 
poor (58 percent based on a $2-a-day poverty line) and account for 
more than half the estimated increase in global poverty resulting from 
the crisis. Moreover, several of these countries, based on trends to date, 
are not on track to achieve some of the Millennium Development Goals 
(fi gure 7).
An estimated 64 million more people in developing countries will be 
living on less than $1.25 a day (76 million more on less than $2 a day) in 
2010 because of the global economic crisis. Even by 2015, the number of 
additional poor attributable to the impact of the crisis could be 53 million 
and 69 million, respectively, based on these two poverty lines (World 
Bank 2010b). In addition, growth contractions are particularly  damaging 
for human development because the deterioration during downturns is 
larger than the improvement during upturns and the full severity of 
Figure 6. Developing and High-Income Countries’ Share of World Net FDI, 
1980–2008
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Table 1. Percentage of Poverty in Developing Countries, 1981 and 2005
Population $1.25/day Population $2.00/day
    1981 2005 1981 2005
G-20 developing countries 61.5 23.1 79.1 46.4
 Argentina (urban) 0.0 4.5 1.2 11.3
 Brazil 17.1 7.8 31.1 18.3
 China (rural) 94.1 26.1 99.4 55.6
 China (urban) 44.6 1.7 91.5 9.4
 India (rural) 62.5 43.8 88.5 79.5
 India (urban) 51.0 36.2 80.4 65.8
 Indonesia (rural) 73.0 24.0 92.8 61.1
 Indonesia (urban) 63.8 18.8 87.7 45.8
 Mexico 9.8 1.7 24.1 5.9
 Russian Federation 0.7 0.2 5.9 1.5
 South Africa 34.8 20.6 51.2 37.0
 Turkey 4.5 2.7 18.6 9.0
Non–G-20 developing countries 36.2 29.9 54.8 50.2
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on PovcalNet.
the effects manifest with a lag. According to estimates, 1.2 million more 
children under the age of fi ve may die between 2009 and 2015, 350,000 
fewer students will complete primary school in 2015, and about 100 mil-
lion more people may remain without access to safe water in 2015 as a 
result of the crisis (see fi gure 8).
In summary, while the outlook for closing development gaps and 
achieving many of the MDGs was worrisome before the crisis, its impact 
has imposed a further challenge and has sparked a new sense of urgency 
in addressing both human development and economic growth issues. 
Global growth is indeed central to development. The most important 
action that the G-20 can take for development is to restore strong, sus-
tainable, and balanced growth. As the recovery matures, the long-term 
growth agenda should be at the center of G-20 policy coordination and 
approached in a manner that allows developing countries (G-20 mem-

















Figure 7. Progress of the Nine G-20 Developing Countries toward the MDGs
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on most recent data available in World Development Indicators.
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Multipolar Growth and Development
In the recent past, we have witnessed three major crises: a food, a fuel, 
and a fi nancial crisis. We have learned that the world is much more 
fragile and interdependent than previously thought. It is a world of 
increasing multipolarity, with multiple sources of growth and with 
powerful reverse links between developing and developed countries 
and among developing countries themselves. It is a world in which the 
closing of development gaps and achieving many of the MDGs will 
require strong, sustained, and balanced growth and economic coordi-
nation by the G-20. 
Development and the G-20
In chapters 1 and 2, Il SaKong and Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala cite the 
importance of integrating development into the G-20 agenda, as well as 
the key role Korea can play as an intermediary between developed and 
Figure 8. Effect of Growth Acceleration and Deceleration on Key Human Development and 
Gender Indicators in All countries, 1980–2008
Source: Global Monitoring Report 2010.
Note: Differences in the means of these variables for growth accelerations and decelerations (all country-year observa-
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developing countries. In chapter 1, SaKong echoes the point acknowl-
edged during the Pittsburgh summit that the G-20 must have the sup-
port of the 160+ United Nations member countries that are not members 
of the group to maintain the legitimacy and credibility of the body. He 
emphasizes that it is necessary to have a realistic and pragmatic approach 
to development to gain support for the development agenda in the 
G-20, as well as help the world regain economic stability. In chapter 2, 
Okonjo-Iweala highlights the fact that economic resilience in emerging 
economies and low-income countries is vital to achieving the G-20’s 
goal of rebalancing the global economy, given that nearly half of global 
growth comes from developing countries. To enhance this resilience, 
she advocates strongly for international efforts directed at closing devel-
opment gaps and at implementing growth-oriented policies that will 
benefi t developing countries and pull the world out of the crisis.
A Global Economy with Multiple Poles of Growth
The main message of chapter 3, by Justin Yifu Lin, is that support of 
stronger multipolar growth in developing countries should be seen as an 
important and integral element of the global recovery and strong, sus-
tainable, and balanced growth in the global economy. Lin develops three 
main points in support of his argument.
First, the recovery from the global fi nancial crisis masks wide variation 
in postcrisis economic performance across countries. During the current 
crisis, high-income countries’ growth relied signifi cantly on government 
policies. Over the medium term, however, high-income countries will 
need to rely on the growth of middle- and low-income countries to stim-
ulate their exports. This interdependence and the spillovers between 
developed and developing countries will become even more important as 
the developed countries unwind their stimulus packages.
Second, developing countries have the potential to become engines of 
global growth, as multiple poles emerge as centers of regional growth. 
Conditions for strengthening these growth poles need to be improved, 
however. The following fi ndings give evidence of the emergence of these 
multiple poles of growth:
•  Developing-country GDP growth has been higher than that of high-
income countries every year from 2000 to 2008. This phenomenon 
has not been restricted to a single country or region: every region of 
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the developing world grew faster than the high-income countries, 
with the average gap over the period ranging from 1.4 percentage 
points (Latin America and the Caribbean) to 6.5 percentage points 
(East Asia and the Pacifi c). 
•  Accompanying these growth patterns have been increasing trade links, 
with the dollar amounts for merchandise exported from developing 
countries to developed countries tripling from 2000 to 2008. More-
over, the share of developing-country imports from high-income 
countries has declined, indicating that trade among developing coun-
tries has grown even faster. 
•  The G-7’s share of global gross national income shrank from roughly 
two-thirds in 1970 to just over one-half in 2008.
The evidence presented by Lin suggests that strengthening regional 
growth would be good for global growth. But in order for new growth 
poles to take root some conditions need to depend on satisfying certain 
conditions: (a) developing countries should undertake structural 
reforms that help them mobilize domestic fi nancial resources and attract 
foreign direct investment; (b) some developing countries will need 
external assistance; and (c) developing countries need to improve their 
implementation capacity and governance. Lin argues that developing 
countries represent a timely and profi table investment opportunity for 
high-income countries, especially in areas such as critical infrastructure 
that remove bottlenecks to growth. Eliminating such bottlenecks could 
allow for increased imports of capital goods by developing countries 
from high-income countries where a large unused capacity in the capital 
goods sector exists.
In his conclusion, Lin notes that the G-20 can help create benefi cial 
opportunities for both developing and high-income countries. The mul-
tipolar growth of the future requires a new multilateralism in interna-
tional relations. The G-20, international fi nancial institutions, and other 
major global players have room to work together to promote innovative 
new fi nancing mechanisms, consolidate best practices in the design of 
public-private partnerships for infrastructure, and share information 
and knowledge on economic growth and development.
In the discussion, Ifzal Ali argues that Lin’s approach is much too broad 
and interventionist. First, Ali believes that the argument for instituting a 
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broad, permanent multilateral governance system for economic coordi-
nation based on the G-20’s effective policy coordination in response to the 
crisis has yet to be substantiated. Second, he calls for the G-20 to prioritize 
its work and focus on areas where the known or perceived externalities are 
so large and pervasive that they require global coordination by the G-20. 
Third, he argues that private companies, and not countries or their policy 
makers, are the real growth poles and that the underlying dynamic of eco-
nomic activity does not require G-20 involvement. According to Ali, the 
role of the G-20 should not be to collaborate directly to lead or determine 
economic performance across different growth poles. 
The G-20 can play a role, suggests Ali, in the establishment of a global, 
strategic pooling of public and private knowledge to accelerate scientifi c 
breakthroughs and develop new technology related to renewable energy 
effi ciency. 
Jong-Wha Lee focuses on Asia’s role in creating sustained regional 
and global growth. Lee argues that Asia has weathered the fi nancial crisis 
well, helped by the decisive and large-scale fi scal and monetary action 
taken by the countries in the region. As such, Asia has made and will 
make a signifi cant contribution to multipolar growth. Nevertheless, the 
critical issue is whether future private demand can take up the slack as 
public demand wanes amid a sluggish external environment. This rebal-
ancing will depend on the capacity of the regional governments to 
employ a combination of policy measures to reinforce domestic demand. 
According to Lee, several components are necessary in the long run to 
enhance the region’s long-term growth potential: infrastructure, human 
capital, external trade, long-term fi nance, governance, institutional qual-
ity, and a well-developed fi nancial sector, among others. Finally, he calls 
for improved cooperative efforts to ensure balanced and sustainable 
growth for the region and for the world. 
In his comments, Tunde Lemo asks what a global economy with mul-
tiple growth poles implies for Africa. Lemo emphasizes that for multipo-
lar growth to fl ourish on the continent, a new multilateralism must 
evolve in international relations, with the G-20 playing a catalytic role in 
food security and sustainable development, facilitating the development 
of infrastructure, and addressing problems of fi nancial constraint. As 
Lemo vividly summarizes, “Africa does not need pity, but a deliberate 
implementable plan of action.”
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Finally, in his chair’s remarks Trevor Manuel teases out more specifi c 
points for further examination. In particular, what does capacity utiliza-
tion mean for development going forward? How will it infl uence the 
immediate future? How should we think about multipolarity, given the 
fact that high-income countries have historically been the global engine 
of growth, fueled largely by consumption?
He also highlights the balance between G-20 and non–G-20 countries 
as an important issue in defi ning the G-20 agenda, as well as in under-
standing its limitations and sustainability. Moving forward, he points to 
fi ve issues for the G-20 development agenda: infrastructure, trade and 
FDI, quality of public and private institutions, quality of governance, 
and fi nancial sector inclusion.
The G-20 and Global Development
Chapter 4 by Zia Qureshi is based on the report that the World Bank pre-
pared for the G-20 meetings in Busan as part of the G-20 Growth Frame-
work and Mutual Assessment Process. The author argues that global growth 
is central to development as the recovery matures and that the longer-term 
growth agenda should be at the center of G-20 policy coordination. Growth 
in developing countries increasingly matters for global growth. Developing 
countries are now contributing about half of global growth. South-South 
links are also becoming more important, with South-South trade now 
accounting for one-third of global trade. Promotion of stronger multipolar 
growth in developing countries should thus be seen as an important and 
integral element of the G-20 framework.
Another theme in this chapter concerns fi nancing for development. 
Some major emerging markets are now seeing a strong rebound in capi-
tal infl ows, but most developing countries face the prospect of scarcer 
and costlier capital. With tighter capital markets, offi cial fl ows to devel-
oping countries take on added importance, both in directly providing 
development fi nance and in leveraging private fl ows. The need for con-
cessional fi nance has risen as fi scal space in low-income countries has 
come under pressure and social spending needs have increased in the 
aftermath of the crisis. These developments reinforce the need to ensure 
adequate offi cial development assistance (ODA), achieve satisfactory 
replenishment of multilateral development banks’ concessional win-
dows, and follow through on capital increases for those institutions. The 
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tighter outlook for private capital fl ows and the fi scal stress in donor 
countries imply the need for supplementing traditional fi nancing with 
innovative approaches. These include, for example, risk-mitigation 
guarantees, sovereign wealth fund investments, innovations such as the 
international facility for immunization, public-private partnerships in 
development-linked global programs such as for food security, carbon 
fi nance, and South-South investments. 
The scale of resource needs calls for both a renewed commitment of 
G-20 members to key global programs and a renewed vigor and creativity 
in exploiting the potential of innovative approaches that leverage private 
capital. The fi nancing outlook also implies the need for stronger mobili-
zation of domestic resources by developing countries and the need to 
strengthen developing countries’ own fi nancial systems. Expanded tech-
nical and capacity-building assistance to fi nancial sector reforms in devel-
oping countries could be a signifi cant area for G-20 collective action. It is 
important to ensure that regulatory reforms in fi nancial systems in 
advanced economies do not have unintended adverse effects on fi nancial 
fl ows to developing countries or their fi nancial sector management. 
A mechanism is also needed to assess the implications of these reforms 
for countries that are not members of the Financial Stability Board and 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. A number of countries have 
embarked on national reform initiatives, which, if not well coordinated, 
risk creating fi nancial protectionism, regulatory arbitrage, and inconsis-
tency across jurisdictions. Regulations designed for banks in advanced 
economies may not be appropriate for banks in low-income countries, 
especially smaller banks that cater to smaller enterprises, or may require 
a longer phase-in period. The G-20 could help by supporting a program 
of expanded technical assistance to developing countries to enhance 
their capacity to implement fi nancial sector reforms.
The last theme in this chapter, which is also discussed in more detail 
in chapter 7 on aid for trade, is open trade as an engine of growth and 
facilitator of global rebalancing. The chapter calls on the G-20 leaders to 
renew their commitment to refrain from protectionist measures. The 
author argues that an even stronger signal would be a collective pledge 
to unwind the protectionist measures that were put in place at the 
onset of the crisis. Strengthening multilateral trade discipline and 
moving ahead with the Doha Round are therefore important. To 
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improve poor countries’ market access, Qureshi recommends that the 
G-20 consider extending 100 percent duty-free and quota-free access to 
the least-developed countries, with liberal rules of origin. Improved mar-
ket access for poor countries needs to be complemented with a strength-
ening of trade facilitation and aid-for-trade programs to enhance these 
countries’ trade capacity.
Danny Leipziger, the fi rst discussant of this chapter, concurs with the 
author that development should be an item on the G-20’s agenda and 
offers additional reasons why this would be so. In particular, he men-
tions the “innocent-bystander” problem, given that developing countries 
had little or no involvement in the events that precipitated the crisis but 
nonetheless were negatively affected by its impact.
In his comments, Leipziger also highlights what he thinks are the les-
sons learned from the crisis. He enumerates four: the importance of fi s-
cal space to cope with the impact of the crisis; the establishment of new 
normal levels of growth and slower global growth prospects for many 
countries; the fact that sources of growth shifted before, during, and 
after the crisis and they will not revert soon; and, fi nally, the effectiveness 
of institutions matters everywhere. Regarding what is the new develop-
ment thinking, Leipziger points out that the reliance of developing 
countries on the developed world is not the only strategy but rather that 
there are increasing opportunities for South-South economic support. 
He also points out that there is a general acceptance that greater distinc-
tion among various types of capital fl ows is smart policy and a revived 
public appreciation for government action. Commenting on what the 
G-20 can contribute to enhance the prospects for growth in developing 
countries, Leipziger lists: (a) that some G-20 members need to reduce 
their potential output gaps and caution against an early exit from expan-
sionary fi scal policies; (b) that G-20 countries should resist the urgency 
to impose trade restrictions and should also champion the conclusion of 
Doha; and (c) that G-20 countries should be concerned about the provi-
sion of global public goods. 
Mahmoud Mohieldin commends the paper for shifting the focus 
from short-term crisis response to sustainable long-term growth and 
ponders four themes in the paper. First, the G-20 needs to be concerned 
not only with recovery from the recent fi nancial crisis but also with the 
issues related to the food and fuel crises that preceded it. Food and fuel 
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issues continue to be relevant as volatility in food prices and lack of food 
security persist, as does fuel price volatility. Second, a critical component 
of the multipolar growth strategy is infrastructure development, and 
while infrastructure development often has win-win aspects, particu-
larly in developing countries, many elements require careful attention, 
such as the exceeding confi dence that public-private partnerships may 
bridge funding gaps in the short run. 
On issues of fi nance and fi nancial development, Mohieldin stresses 
the importance of recognizing that, in countries that aspire to average 
growth rates of 6–7 percent, governments may face a funding gap of 
8–12 percent of GDP a year, in the face of low savings rates in developing 
countries. Furthermore, this situation may worsen given the crowding 
out of capital fl ows to developing countries and the debt crises of some 
sovereign bonds. Regarding inclusive fi nance, Mohieldin sees an over-
emphasis on the stability side of the Financial Sector Assessment Pro-
gram rather than the promotion of development fi nance.6 Finally, on the 
issue of trade, he shares Qureshi’s view on the need to complete the Doha 
Round of trade negotiations and the link between trade promotion and 
infrastructure development.
The fi nal discussant, Robert Vos, focuses on four issues that he 
believes need further refl ection. The fi rst topic is the notion of multipo-
lar growth and decoupling. Indeed, in modern economic history the 
world has never experienced a situation in which major developing 
countries have become the principal engine of world growth, and the 
relevant question is whether the current and future capacity of develop-
ing countries is suffi cient to transmit their growth dynamics to the rest 
of the world. China holds the largest share of global trade among devel-
oping countries and therefore will be the test case. Its ability to spark 
growth in the rest of the world, however, inevitably depends on its capac-
ity to turn a large trade surplus into a balance or a trade defi cit. The 
more desirable scenario is that China transmit its stimulus to the rest of 
the world through rising imports generated by the income effect rather 
than the substitution effect (exchange rate appreciation). The subse-
quent question is whether multipolar growth will include further income 
divergence among developing countries. He argues that this issue will 
require serious thinking on how the most dynamic poles of the develop-
ing world will generate spillover effects to the developing world at large.
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A related issue is the implication of multipolar growth for global 
imbalances. Vos suggests that moving toward a world of multipolar 
growth consistent with income convergence across all nations and with 
broad-based poverty reduction will not require rebalancing but rather a 
reversal in the pattern of global imbalances. Achieving this state will 
require stronger international policy coordination, major reforms in the 
global fi nancial system, and faster progress and coordination on reforms 
of fi nancial regulation and supervision. Vos presents a parallel set of 
questions related to trade and provides two possible future scenarios for 
years to come: (a) a continuation of the rapid recovery of trade that 
started in mid-2009; and (b) a situation in which trade is not particularly 
dynamic and not necessarily because of protectionism. Vos asserts that 
the latter scenario is not as undesirable as it seems, as large surplus econ-
omies try to focus more on the domestic economy or poorer economies 
direct their economies away from their high dependence on primary 
exports. Finally, all these trends imply a world more dependent on devel-
oping countries and the need for major reforms of the existing mecha-
nism for global economic governance.
In his summary, Graeme Wheeler highlights several questions raised 
in the discussion. First, can the G-20 be effective in a postcrisis environ-
ment? Second, how will countries make the transition from fi scal stimu-
lus to consolidation? Third, is it wise for one policy instrument—fi scal 
policy—to carry so much of the burden? Fourth, the issue is not whether 
G-20 policy makers should support multipolar growth but rather how 
they can do it more effectively.
From Developing to Developed Country in 
a Generation: The Case of Korea
Korea’s development experience over the past half-century has been a 
source of inspiration for many developing countries. Korea’s GDP per 
capita in 1960 was US$1,258 in 2000 constant dollars. As of 2004, it had 
increased to US$18,224. Even among successful countries characterized 
by sustained high growth, Korea stands out with its impressive industrial 
upgrading and ability to recover quickly from external shocks. In fact, 
unlike some countries caught in “a middle-income trap,”7 Korea has 
managed to achieve export-led growth by transforming its economic 
structure and systematically increasing the domestic value-added or 
local content of its exports. 
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In chapter 5, Wonhyuk Lim conceptualizes Korea’s development as 
the result of synergies between enhanced human capital and new knowl-
edge, involving complementary investments in physical and social capi-
tal with the state, nonstate actors, and markets working together to meet 
the development challenge. Lim’s chapter highlights fi ve key issues that 
underpin Korea’s success in transforming itself from a developing to a 
high-income country.
First, Korea’s development took place through joint discovery and 
upgrading of comparative advantage. To promote development, the gov-
ernment and the private sector made joint efforts to address innovation 
and coordination externalities. They developed “a big-push partnership” 
in which the government shared the investment risks of the private sec-
tor and provided support based largely on performance in competitive 
global markets. The reinforcement of successful experiments through 
the feedback mechanism of performance-based rewards led to dramatic 
changes over time. 
Second, the government formulated multiyear development plans 
but delegated much of the implementation to business groups, which, in 
turn, tried to coordinate productive activities at the group level in addi-
tion to engaging in market transactions. To monitor progress, identify 
emerging problems, and devise solutions, the government held regular 
consultations with the private sector on relevant topics. 
Third, Korea used international trade as an essential component of 
its development policy. Trade helped Korea discover its comparative 
advantage and alleviate coordination failures, overcome the limits of 
its small domestic market, exploit economies of scale, learn from best 
practices around the world, and upgrade its economy. Through trade, 
Korea was able to use the market to test-run its government policies, as 
well as its corporate strategies, and devise performance-based reward 
schemes. In fact, for Korea, export promotion served as the engine of 
growth and the organizing principle under which industrial upgrad-
ing, infrastructure development, and human resource development 
could be pursued. While relying on global markets, Korea made con-
scious and concerted efforts to move into higher–value-added areas 
along the value chain by making complementary investments in human 
capital and infrastructure. 
Fourth, although state intervention in the economy was extensive in 
Korea in the 1960s and 1970s, Korea managed to contain corruption and 
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rent seeking. Most important, making government support contingent 
on performance in competitive global markets helped reduce the poten-
tial for corruption. 
Finally, as the capacity of markets, the state, and nonstate actors to 
meet innovation and coordination challenges changed, their respective 
roles began to shift as well. While the division of labor between the 
government and the private sector has changed, joint discovery and 
upgrading of comparative advantage have continued to operate as a 
fundamental development principle for Korea. The implementation of 
postcrisis reforms, including the adoption of a more fl exible exchange 
rate policy, has made it easier for Korean fi rms to rely on price signals 
to discover profi table business opportunities even as they continue to 
engage in consultations with the government to identify promising 
technologies and deal with bottlenecks.
In the discussion, Danny Leipziger’s comments focus on what we can 
learn from Korea as a development success story, from its Green Growth 
initiative to its success in the use of public policy. Based on Korea’s expe-
rience, developing countries can take away the lesson that economic fun-
damentals matter, not just to satisfy donors but also to position the 
economy on a path toward progress. Second, income distribution and 
social programs are important to maintain broad-based public support 
for reforms. Third, the private sector need not necessarily fear the role of 
the government if the actions of the government and the private sector 
can be aligned. Fourth, taxes fi nance social infrastructure and replace 
aid, while paying taxes builds a social contract between citizens and the 
government. Fifth, government-led economic planning, which has been 
the template for all East Asian success stories, could potentially provide 
similar results in other countries. Donors and aid agencies can also 
learn that substantial transfers of resources are a waste of money with-
out fi rst building up the domestic institutions to handle and disburse 
funds effi ciently. 
In response to Korea’s green growth initiative, Leipziger applauds the 
combination of short-term fi scal stimulus with a longer-term growth 
agenda. The initiative has set ambitious goals, concrete targets, and a 
national vision for how the economy will adapt long term. All these 
characteristics have been part of Korea’s development process for 
decades. Some of the country’s successful use of public policy stems 
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from its meritocratic bureaucracy. External learning is encouraged, and 
within the general population higher education is fostered and excel-
lence promoted.
 Finally, Leipziger discusses additional actions that Korea could take 
as a G-20 leader to help developing countries. He suggests that Korea 
combine its increase in ODA with green technology transfers to foster 
sustainable growth, mobilize developing countries to take up the Doha 
mantle, and share its economic planning experience in infrastructure 
spending and public-private coordination to improve capacity and prac-
tice elsewhere.
Klaus Rohland centers his comments on fi ve issues deserving of 
attention. First is the importance of policy coordination. In the early 
1960s, the Korean government took a pragmatic approach: the strategy 
was state led, but its implementation was to a large extent left to the pri-
vate sector. What also makes Korea stand out is the decision to merge 
development planning and resource allocation in one agency, the Eco-
nomic Planning Board, and therefore avoid the coordination failures 
between separate planning and budget agencies that have been so waste-
ful in many other countries.
Second, Korea’s development strategy was not only about industrial-
ization, but also about agriculture. Its agricultural policies, which helped 
address the needs of the rural population, resulted in a shift away from 
agriculture as the predominant economic sector, allowing the industrial 
sector to take its place. Third, in the early 1970s, Korea replaced its focus 
on light industry with one on heavy industries and chemicals. This 
change was based on the Japanese experience, a model that Korean offi -
cials believed to be suitable for their country as well. Fourth, the role of 
state-led economic planning evolved gradually from direct to indirect 
planning through tax incentives and preferential credits, taking into 
account the increasing complexity of the economy. Finally, Korea’s peo-
ple and policy makers have been remarkably fl exible and ready to adjust 
to new realities and avoid the middle-income trap. 
In his chair’s remarks, Yoon Je Cho draws attention to the signifi cant 
agreement that the discussants have with Lim’s paper and how they have 
amplifi ed his interpretation by highlighting the meritocratic Korean 
bureaucratic system, which has a strong capacity for policy planning, 
implementation, and monitoring, as well as for making adaptive policy 
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reforms. The discussants also cited the importance of building institu-
tions and promoting primary-through-tertiary education, ingredients 
that allowed Korea to transition from being a technology importer to a 
technology innovator.
In the general discussion, the focus was not only Korea’s impressive 
economic growth but also the country’s rapid and successful transition 
from a heavily state-controlled economy to an open and liberalized one. 
The discussion identifi ed many ingredients in Korea’s successful eco-
nomic development. However, participants and researchers do not yet 
fully understand whether a country’s successful development experience 
can be replicated in countries with different social, political, and eco-
nomic environments or how important noneconomic factors are in the 
development process.
Achieving the MDGs Remains a Daunting Challenge for 
Many Non–G-20 Countries
Even before the crisis, international actors were concerned about the 
ability of developing countries to meet the MDGs by the 2015 deadline. 
In fact, in July 2009, the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
called on world leaders to gather in New York to discuss the ambiguous 
progress toward MDG completion. The global crisis has made the task 
facing developing countries that much more daunting and the role of 
the international community even more urgent. Chapter 6 discusses the 
major implications of the current global economic and fi nancial crisis 
on the MDGs from two somewhat different, although complementary, 
perspectives. First, Jomo Kwame Sundaram provides the perspective 
from the United Nations (UN), and then Delfi n Go and Hans Timmer 
provide the perspective from the World Bank.
Sundaram argues that many countries have achieved major successes 
toward a number of MDGs, with much advancement made in some of 
the poorest countries; their success has demonstrated that progress 
toward the MDGs is possible when the right policies are followed and 
when funding and international support are adequate. For example, 
Sub-Saharan Africa has made marked improvements in child health and 
primary school enrollment over the past two decades. However, Sun-
daram cautions that some of the achievements are also threatened by 
multiple crises, food and energy price hikes, in particular, as well as by 
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long-term development challenges, such as climate change and confl ict, 
which affect poor and vulnerable people disproportionately. Overall, 
progress has been uneven, and several goals and targets are unlikely to be 
achieved by 2015. 
According to Sundaram, as the UN reassesses the MDGs in light of 
the global crisis, the outcomes in developing countries will likely show 
certain characteristics: uneven progress on halving poverty and hunger; 
some progress on education but the goal still unmet in many poor coun-
tries; insuffi cient progress on gender equality; progress on some health 
targets but little progress on maternal mortality; and limited progress on 
environmental sustainability. In the face of the global economic crisis, 
Sundaram argues that developing countries, especially the poorest ones, 
need more concessional fi nance and grants if they are to meet the MDG 
targets. 
Taking the global context into account, as well as the lessons from 
the United Nations experience, Sundaram proposes several items for 
inclusion in the G-20 development agenda: prudential risk manage-
ment, including capital controls; enlarging both fi scal and policy space 
to pursue countercyclical macroeconomic policies; developing alterna-
tive macroeconomic policy frameworks for productive employment 
creation and sustained growth; encouraging development fi nance for 
investment and technology; fostering greater multilateral tax coopera-
tion for generating revenues, as well as equitable and effective debt 
workout mechanisms; and strengthening international economic gov-
ernance reform to refl ect the changed global economic balance. Finally, 
Sundaram argues that if these issues are not urgently addressed, the 
international community will miss a historic opportunity that some 
have termed the “Bretton Woods moment.”
The second part of chapter 6, by Go and Timmer, is based largely on 
the latest edition of the World Bank’s Global Monitoring Report. The 
thrust of their argument is that, until recently, the international com-
munity has paid little attention to policies that can help low-income 
countries absorb the consequences of the crisis and sustain progress 
toward long-term human development goals. Go and Timmer argue 
that, although production contracted less in low-income countries than 
in advanced economies, real incomes (that is, GDP adjusted for changes 
in terms of trade) in low-income countries declined more signifi cantly 
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when commodity prices fell sharply as the crisis hit the world economy. 
In addition, they argue that the medium-term impact of external shocks 
tends to be larger in low-income countries because they have fewer pol-
icy options to help their economies rebound. 
Addressing the problems of low-income countries—and therefore 
giving voice to developing countries that are not members of the G-20—
shifts the focus of policy makers to the mid- and long-term consequences 
of the crisis on human development outcomes. From the early 1990s 
until the outbreak of the crisis, the acceleration of economic growth in 
many developing countries tended to support signifi cant progress in 
most human development indicators. In fact, when the crisis hit, global 
poverty had fallen by nearly 40 percent since 1990, and developing coun-
tries as a group were on track to reach the target of cutting poverty in 
half by 2015. Beyond poverty, progress on the MDGs has been uneven, 
with gains in certain targets and losses in others. For example, while 
many developing countries were on track to achieve gender parity in 
primary and secondary education, the progress has been slower in ter-
tiary education, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.
The authors used historical examples and indirect evidence to 
assess the immediate effects of the current crisis. They fi nd that, his-
torically, the impact of economic cycles on human development indi-
cators has been highly asymmetric; the deterioration in bad times is 
much greater than the improvement during good times. They fi nd 
that vulnerable groups, particularly in poor countries, are dispropor-
tionately affected. For example, during contractions, female enroll-
ment in primary and secondary education drops more than male 
enrollment, and once children are taken out of school, future human 
capital is permanently lowered.
Go and Timmer also fi nd that the declines during crises in public 
spending, household spending, and even aid fl ows are critically disrup-
tive, while the increased spending during boom periods results in 
gradual improvements. The authors’ key fi nding is that human devel-
opment impacts of a global crisis of the magnitude experienced in 
2008–09 will be long lasting. The authors conclude by arguing that the 
crisis has interrupted the MDG progress, even if some of the effects 
will not be apparent for many more years and even though the rapid 
response of the global community helped avoid an even more negative 
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outcome. The authors claim that decisive leadership is still required to 
ensure a rapid and balanced recovery and that achieving the MDGs is 
a key part of the strategy to put the world back on a path of fast and 
sustainable development. 
In his chair’s remarks, Shahrokh Fardoust emphasizes that the key 
message from this chapter is pragmatic: achieving the MDGs is possible, 
even though not all countries will reach all targets by 2015. We can learn 
important lessons from countries that have tried and tested a wide range 
of economic and social policies that could ensure progress, provided that 
they are implemented well and backed by strong global partnerships. 
But, with only fi ve years remaining before the 2015 deadline, efforts to 
achieve these targets need to be intensifi ed, as evidenced by increasing 
policy attention and investment to close existing MDG gaps. 
He also notes that a key point made both by Sandaram and by Go and 
Timmer is that, despite the strong efforts of many developing countries, 
the fi nancial crisis and subsequent global recession have slowed progress 
toward the MDGs through their impact on commodity prices, export 
volumes, tourism earnings, remittances, and private capital fl ows. Fail-
ure to make signifi cant progress toward the MDG targets will no doubt 
have long-lasting impacts on human development indicators such as 
education and health, which can affect entire generations and infl uence 
how economies develop over the long run. Because of progress during 
the period leading up to the crisis, however, many higher-income devel-
oping countries with the required policy space were able to at least partly 
offset the negative impact of the crisis on the MDGs with countercyclical 
macroeconomic policies and maintain service delivery and effectively 
use their social safety nets. The support by the international community 
was timely and helpful. 
He adds that going forward regaining momentum in reaching the 
MDGs will require ambitious efforts to improve access to health, educa-
tion, and basic infrastructure, particularly for the most disadvantaged 
groups. A dynamic and more resilient global economy—powered by 
strong and sustainable multipolar growth, infrastructure investment, 
more open trading systems, and recovery of private capital fl ows to 
developing countries—is a prerequisite for mobilizing the resources and 
generating the jobs and opportunities necessary to achieve the MDGs, 
particularly in the poorer countries.
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Development: An Imperative in the G-20 
Global Agenda—Key Pillars for Policy Action 
to Accelerate Economic Growth
At the November 2010 summit in Seoul, the G-20 leaders are likely to 
focus on major policy issues for medium- to long-term global economic 
management that will foster strong, sustainable, and balanced growth. 
Therefore, the issue of rebalancing within the context of the G-20 frame-
work, which was agreed on in Pittsburgh in September 2009, will need 
to be taken up again at the Seoul meeting. The G-20 leaders will likely 
consider topics such as resisting protectionism, recommitting to the 
Doha trade agenda, aid for trade, structural reforms and rebalancing 
growth, fi nancial fl ows to developing countries, energy subsidies, agri-
culture and food security, accelerating private sector–led growth, inclu-
sive fi nance, infrastructure and sustainable development, generating 
employment and reducing poverty, and regaining momentum toward 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Bringing non–G-20 
developing countries on board is critical to enhancing the legitimacy 
and credibility of the summit as it considers development-related issues, 
including re-accelerating growth and development in the postcrisis 
period. 
By addressing development topics in an economic context, the G-20 
can demonstrate its ability to provide leadership that is both inclusive, 
incorporating the voices of non–G-20 countries, and comprehensive, 
addressing a wide range of economic issues as countries transition 
from immediate crisis management to the postcrisis period and beyond. 
Figure 9 provides a simple depiction of how the development agenda 
and the G-20’s role as the premier forum for international economic 
cooperation are interconnected.
Criteria for Selection of Development Topics 
It is widely agreed that the G-20 cannot be expected to take on a very 
wide range of development issues. Yet, the G-20 members, as well as 
multilateral institutions and think tanks, generally agree that the group 
will need to focus on a few critical and interrelated development topics 
consistent with the overall mandate of the group. As it will be argued in 
this volume, that means pushing the development agenda forward in the 
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postcrisis world. In the selection of development areas, the conference 
organizers used the following criteria to set development priorities and 
policies for consideration by the G-20:
•  Whether the development policy area can help promote strong, sus-
tainable, and balanced growth and thus support economic recovery 
in developing countries, as well as in advanced economies
•  Whether international cooperation, international fi nancing, and spe-
cifi c actions are needed to address the development policy area
•  Whether the development policy area under consideration lies within 
the G-20 mandate of international economic cooperation, already 
considered under existing G-20 agreements (that is, in the previous 
summits) and could result in tangible outcomes, including specifi c 
action plans or measures that could be agreed on at the Seoul summit 
and beyond. 
Based on these criteria, the following sections cover aid for trade, 
infrastructure and sustainable development, agriculture and food secu-
rity, and inclusive fi nance.
Aid for Trade
In chapter 7, Bernard Hoekman and John Wilson broadly defi ne aid for 
trade as fi nancial and technical assistance that facilitates the integration 
of developing countries into the global economy through initiatives that 
expand trade, particularly through fi nancing of transportation and logis-
tics infrastructure. By furthering economic growth and development, the 
Figure 9. The G-20’s Approach to Development
Source: Based on Rhee 2010.
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benefi ts of aid for trade are shared by all—not only the poor in the 
least-developed and other low-income countries but also citizens in 
middle-income countries and those in the most-developed nations of 
the world. 
The global initiative on aid for trade was launched at the 2005 G-8 
meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland, where leaders committed to an increase 
of nearly 50 percent in aid-for-trade funding by 2010 (to US$4 billion), 
which was reconfi rmed at global aid-for-trade review meetings hosted by 
the World Trade Organization in 2007 and 2009 and in G-8 communiqués. 
In addition, the G-20 summit in London in April 2009 included a state-
ment of continued support for implementation of the commitments made 
on aid for trade by members. The authors emphasize that delivering on 
these commitments is particularly important in the current global eco-
nomic situation. 
The authors review recent trends in the delivery of aid for trade—its 
allocation by country and type of assistance—and analyze its impact 
and effectiveness. They cite 2008 data reported by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that shows about 
 25 percent of ODA and 35 percent of sectoral-based donor funds were 
directed to aid for trade. For bilateral donors, this type of aid to low- 
income countries amounted to about US$15.6 billion in 2008. The authors 
also indicate that developing mechanisms and concrete initiatives for 
transferring resources from middle-income G-20 members (such as 
investment and knowledge) as well as galvanizing the private sector could 
do much to enhance the effectiveness of aid for trade in supporting trade 
and employment growth in low-income developing countries.
The authors argue that the importance of G-20 leadership on aid 
for trade is even greater in the current global economic environment, 
because trade is a powerful mechanism for helping countries overcome 
the shock of the crisis. It can help countries diversify into new markets 
and products, and it can improve productivity in recipient countries by 
lowering costs and enhancing growth prospects. In addition, the authors 
provide a fairly comprehensive summary of the evidence of the economic 
impact of aid for trade in both middle-income and low-income coun-
tries. According to the authors, aid for trade can help low-income coun-
tries address their competitiveness and productivity agenda and overcome 
government and market failures “without targeting specifi c industries or 
potentially distorting policies to support product-specifi c investments.”
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G-20 leadership can make a major difference in enhancing the effec-
tiveness and visibility of the aid-for-trade effort, according to Hoekman 
and Wilson, who identify four areas for priority consideration by the 
G-20: (a) providing a strategic action plan for capacity building and 
transfer of knowledge on policies and regulatory options to improve the 
effi ciency of producer services and the rate of return on infrastructure 
investments; (b) promoting market access for low-income countries 
through a commitment by all G-20 members to eliminate import 
restrictions for least-developed countries, thus leveraging the fi nancial 
aid-for-trade resource transfers; (c) creating a new aid-for-trade public-
private partnership to leverage the dynamism in the private sector to 
strengthen trade capacity in the countries that most need it; and (d) 
launching a G-20 strategic global initiative to provide dedicated fi nan-
cial support for the collection of cross-country data sets that will allow 
more effective monitoring and evaluation of aid for trade.8
In the discussion, Arancha González supports the main arguments 
made by Hoekman and Wilson and emphasizes that the economic crisis 
underscored the critical role that aid for trade can play in helping the 
recovery of the trade performance of developing countries, adding that 
aid for trade will have a critical role to play in the future, given the 
expected uneven rates of recovery from the crisis and the change in the 
pattern of demand both globally and across sectors. She argues that sig-
nifi cant progress has been made in making aid for trade a global part-
nership in the relatively short time that it has been on the agenda of 
international organizations. Support and collaboration between actors 
like the World Trade Organization and the World Bank will be more 
important in the postcrisis period. 
Alan Winters comments on both analytical and policy aspects of the 
arguments of Hoekman and Wilson. He fi nds their coverage of trade in 
services particularly useful. Services, which account for up to 75 percent 
of the economy in some advanced countries such as Britain, are growing 
rapidly in developing countries and becoming more central to their 
development, as well as an important source of income and employment. 
Winters notes, however, that reforming services is far more diffi cult than 
reforming goods markets. Their intangible nature makes problems of 
asymmetric information more important, implying that in most markets 
a degree of regulation is essential. He argues that donors and govern-
ments will need to commit resources and attention to these areas if they 
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expect to reap rewards. He also raises important points on regional inte-
gration. He argues that trading among neighbors is good, as long as it 
does not come at the expense of other trade relationships. Aid for trade, 
however, does not call on countries to reduce their tariffs preferentially 
on imports from their neighbors. 
On Hoekman and Wilson’s policy recommendations, Winters strongly 
endorses the recommendation to establish a G-20 platform for capacity 
building and transfer of knowledge on policies and regulatory options to 
improve the effi ciency of producer services and the operation of net-
work infrastructures. He also endorses expanding market access to poor 
countries and increasing South-South trade through the extension of 
duty-free, quota-free access for the least-developed countries by all G-20 
countries. Winters cautions, however, that these policy changes will be 
challenging for the G-20 countries, especially for the developing-country 
members of the group. Last, he endorses facilitating a stronger engage-
ment with the private sector over aid for trade and enhancing monitor-
ing and evaluation in aid-for-trade projects.
In his summary, Ernesto Zedillo explains that it is now generally 
accepted that achieving development is a much bigger task than simply 
opening markets and expanding trade. However, it is also well estab-
lished that if trade is properly supported by the right human and physi-
cal infrastructure, as well as a propitious regulatory environment, it can 
indeed be a powerful tool for growth. He considers aid for trade a 
response to “two extremes that became most poignant during the debate 
over the launching of the Doha Development Round agenda.” On the 
one hand, policy makers in some countries continue to hold the view 
that there should be “perpetual, unconditional, special, nondifferential 
treatment” toward the least-developed countries. On the other hand, 
another policy position holds that there should be immediate and full 
trade reciprocity. Zedillo argues that aid for trade is a response to these 
two extremes and “can provide a doable and effi cient compromise.” He 
warns, however, that the promotion of aid for trade should not come in 
lieu of completing Doha. Nevertheless, he believes that it is important to 
support trade, particularly among developing countries and between 
developed and developing countries. In this respect, Zedillo predicts that 
aid for trade will take an even more prominent role as countries move 
into the postcrisis period. For that to happen, however, the G-20 will 
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need to provide support for additional research into the value proposi-
tion of aid for trade and its rates of return on investment. 
Infrastructure and Sustainable Development
In chapter 8, Marianne Fay, Mike Toman, and their co-authors argue 
that infrastructure is essential for increasing economic development and 
reducing poverty. The choices made on the type and scale of infrastruc-
ture investment also have profound implications for environmental sus-
tainability. Despite some progress, most developing countries still suffer 
from insuffi cient infrastructure access, quality, and reliability, with the 
notable exception of the newly industrialized East Asian economies, 
China and Vietnam. Moreover, infrastructure expansion has often come 
at the expense of the local environment and has further complicated 
policy responses to the longer-term challenge of climate change. Never-
theless, while more infrastructure may not necessarily lead to increased 
economic growth, since other conditions may also be constraining, 
poor infrastructure performance is affecting competitiveness, slowing 
improvements in health and education, and disproportionately harm-
ing the poor. 
The authors show that slow progress in expanding the availability of 
infrastructure has signifi cant adverse effects on households, particularly 
poor households and those in poor countries. They estimate that more 
than 25 percent of households in developing countries have no access to 
electricity. The situation is particularly diffi cult in Africa, where nearly 
70 percent of the population remains unconnected. Although access to 
power has increased, nearly 900 million people are still without access to 
an improved water source. The sanitation situation is much worse, with 
2.6 billion people worldwide still lacking access to improved sanitation. 
Connectivity, particularly in the rural areas, also remains low. Only 
70 percent of the rural population in developing countries has access to 
an all-weather road. In Africa, this proportion is only 33 percent. The 
authors argue that these massive infrastructure defi cits also affect pro-
ductivity and thus fi rms’ ability to compete in domestic and interna-
tional markets. Unreliability of the existing infrastructure further affects 
fi rms’ profi tability and ability to invest and expand. The authors provide 
a “guesstimate” of developing countries’ infrastructure needs at between 
US$1.25–1.5 trillion by 2013. 
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The authors list several causes of the generally disappointing level of 
investment in infrastructure to date. Infrastructure is expensive: in Africa, 
some 15 percent of GDP would be needed to achieve even relatively 
modest improvements. Public infrastructure spending is often ineffi cient 
and suffers from many of the shortcomings associated with public man-
agement. Private investment also has its limits: the private sector has 
contributed substantially through public-private partnerships, helping 
increase both effi ciency and access, but it cannot replace public involve-
ment and fi nancing. In addition, limited data are available to monitor 
what is being spent, how effective those expenditures have been, and 
what condition infrastructure is in. This lack of information, in turn, 
reduces the impetus to improve on the status quo. However, the private 
sector has an important role to play in infrastructure expansion and is 
generally associated with a sizable increase in effi ciency. The authors esti-
mate that fl ows of capital associated with private participation in infra-
structure amount to 1.2 percent of developing countries’ GDP. 
The authors explain that environmental concerns complicate this pic-
ture. Addressing them can increase the cost and complexity of infra-
structure investment, even though the additional social benefi ts can well 
offset these costs. Improved energy effi ciency in infrastructure design 
can also return higher longer-term benefi ts from lower costs. Striking 
the appropriate balance between environmental benefi ts and costs in 
planning infrastructure investments depends on a number of comple-
mentary policy issues. These include the establishment of sound envi-
ronmental performance standards and the removal of environmentally 
damaging subsidies that affect infrastructure demands (especially in 
energy and water). The challenge is greater still when infrastructure 
options are weighed in the context of concerns about mitigating the 
longer-tem threats of climate change. 
On the internalization of environmental externalities, the authors 
argue that over the past few decades a profound shift has taken place 
toward the use of economic incentives to limit harmful environmental 
impacts, including taxes on emissions or tradable emission allowances. 
These policies tend to create powerful incentives not only to curb envi-
ronmental damages in a cost-effective manner using existing technologies 
but also to induce innovations that lower the cost of avoiding future envi-
ronmental damage. The authors cite estimates provided by the World 
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Bank’s 2010 World Development Report that substantial progress toward 
greenhouse gas mitigation would require investments on the order of 
US$140–175 billion a year by 2030, with a need for signifi cant invest-
ments well before then to mitigate possible “locking in” of high-carbon 
infrastructure that would be much costlier to reverse subsequently. The 
authors believe that lowering these high costs would require major 
advances in low-carbon technology.
Fay, Toman, and co-authors also argue that the existing impediments 
to private sector investment in infrastructure can impede adoption of 
newer green technologies. They argue that the private sector inherently 
underinvests in research and development (R&D) because not all bene-
fi ts can be appropriated back. Increased public support for R&D is thus 
generally warranted at the global level since many environmental prob-
lems transcend national borders. Therefore, large public investment in 
green R&D and subsequent public support for private investment in the 
development of environmentally sustainable products and processes, 
including infrastructure services, could be part of a broader investment 
policy for gaining international market leadership in the provision of 
new and improved green technology. Some countries, notably in East 
Asia, have taken this general approach to gain a strong position in mar-
kets for consumer goods that depend on technological innovation. The 
authors conclude that key steps forward include improving the condi-
tions for infrastructure investment and environmental management in 
developing countries, greatly expanding funding for cost-reducing green 
innovation, and supporting its diffusion from more developed to devel-
oping countries. 
The authors then turn to a number of measures that could be pro-
moted through the G-20 to facilitate such efforts: (a) developing an action 
plan for increasing public and private fi nancing of infrastructure, as well 
as improving its effi ciency and environmental sustainability; (b) develop-
ing an action plan for providing increased technical and fi nancial assis-
tance to developing countries in their efforts to improve infrastructure 
effi ciency, enhance the investment climate, and integrate environmental 
with economic concerns (a platform for enhanced collaboration among 
developing countries could be part of this effort); and (c) promoting col-
laborative efforts to collect and share data on infrastructure coverage and 
quality, as well as on investments and their impact.
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On measures for increasing technical and fi nancial assistance to 
developing countries for improving infrastructure (the fi rst two points 
above), the authors propose that the World Bank and other multilat-
eral development banks provide public sector fi nance and technical 
assistance in several specifi c ways: (a) by reviewing their guidelines for 
infrastructure investment and technical assistance, with a view toward 
encouraging further streamlining and integration across objectives 
while maintaining effectiveness and transparency; (b) by examining 
mechanisms for improving the development and fi nancing of regional 
infrastructure projects; and (c) by initiating new efforts to use private 
capital most effectively, including better leveraging of public sector 
fi nance and offi cial development assistance and improving the cost 
effectiveness of public-private partnerships, including an analysis of how 
to tap nontraditional investors such as domestic investors (whose role is 
on the rise), domestic pension funds, and sovereign wealth funds.
In his comments, Haeryong Kwon notes that private investment in 
infrastructure has been highly concentrated, with 60 percent going to 
the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and Turkey. Despite 
increases in investment in low-income countries, levels are still insuffi -
cient for adequate development. Consequently, additional research is 
needed to explore policy alternatives for increasing private participation 
in infrastructure for low-income countries. Options could include, for 
example, tax exemption or government guarantees for infrastructure 
investment. 
The second major point he highlighted was South-South coopera-
tion. In private participation in infrastructure, for example, large-scale 
involvement of OECD countries is increasingly being replaced by 
developing-country investors who have emerged as a major source of 
investment fi nance for these projects. Further studies are needed to 
identify the policies and mechanisms that can facilitate infrastructure 
investment in low-income countries.
Helen Mountford commented that economic development and 
environmental protection can no longer be considered in isolation. 
The recent economic, food, and fuel crises—together with the looming 
climate crisis—have made the interconnections clear. Fay, Toman, and 
co-authors show that these links are particularly important with 
respect to investment in infrastructure. Increased and better-targeted 
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infrastructure investments are badly needed both to achieve develop-
ment objectives and to move toward cleaner, lower-carbon, and more 
resource-effi cient economies. 
Mountford presented evidence that about two-thirds of OECD coun-
tries used their stimulus packages for investments specifi cally aimed at 
contributing to green growth, with some, such as Korea, placing green 
growth at the center of their stimulus packages. Many invested in increas-
ing the energy effi ciency of public buildings, upgrading or extending 
public transport (for example, high-speed rail and urban public transit), 
and promoting renewable energy generation. Some also included invest-
ments in water infrastructure. About half of OECD countries also 
took green fi scal reform actions as part of their responses to the crisis, 
introducing or increasing taxes on pollution and energy consumption 
and giving tax breaks for environment-related R&D. Another key win-
win approach for the economy and the environment is removing 
environmentally harmful subsidies. Subsidies to water use, including 
undercharging and undercollection of tariffs, also distort infrastruc-
ture choices. 
In addition to the action points that Fay, Toman, and co-authors put 
forth, Mountford adds more possibilities that include providing a forum 
where countries can work together on diffi cult national policy reforms 
affecting infrastructure decisions; identifying key gaps in information 
common among countries and coordinating the relevant organizations 
to work on fi lling those gaps; and setting policy priorities for infrastruc-
ture and agreeing on action plans for how to ensure the necessary tech-
nical and fi nancial assistance. The G-20 could help move forward on 
designing and testing innovative fi nance tools, which could be impor-
tant in delivering on Copenhagen fi nance commitments but would need 
to be carefully framed so that they contribute to negotiations rather than 
interfering with them.
Kiyoshi Kodera agrees with the proposals put forward by the authors 
for further G-20 attention. He found the argument interesting, with 
sound theoretical and conceptual frameworks. From a practitioner’s 
point of view, he wanted to reinforce and complement the proposals. On 
fi nancing of infrastructure, he held that governments should continue 
to seek increased revenues and that donors should increase grant or 
concessional funding for low-income countries. It is important for the 
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multilateral development banks to fulfi ll their countercyclical role and 
maintain appropriate ongoing investment. In this context, he welcomed 
the recent series of agreements for general capital increases for the mul-
tilateral development banks pushed by the G-20. He indicated that the 
international community should continue efforts to secure concessional 
funding for the International Development Association and the Africa 
Development Fund. Finally, he argued that, with a view to cost savings 
and proper sequencing of actions, it is time to broaden impact assess-
ments at the medium-term strategic planning stage. 
Agriculture and Food Security
In chapter 9, Christopher Delgado and his co-authors argue that uncer-
tainties over the availability of food staples—which account for about 
half of household expenditures—hamper  economic growth in poor 
countries. Despite massive progress in the cultivation of rice, wheat, and 
maize during the Green Revolution between 1950 and 1997, the world is 
witnessing declining trends in the growth of cereal yields in developing 
countries, especially in the most populous poor ones. For the fi rst time 
ever, more than 1 billion people are undernourished worldwide, accord-
ing to the Food and Agricultural Organization. This number is about 
100 million more hungry people than before the global economic crisis 
started in 2008. Sub-Saharan Africa has the largest prevalence of under-
nourishment relative to its population size, at about 32 percent. 
The authors provide estimates showing that at least 3.5 million pre-
ventable under-fi ve deaths per year are due to the poor quality of the 
dietary intake of children and mothers. And many more infants who sur-
vive every year are permanently disadvantaged through stunting and 
reduced cognitive development. Besides the obvious tragedy for those 
involved and the moral implications for a globalizing world, malnutri-
tion imposes a prodigious tax on future growth for all. Growing food 
insecurity also risks jeopardizing social stability and openness to market-
led development in the majority of developing countries.
The authors indicate that the outlook for food security in developing 
countries with rapidly growing populations remains uncertain. Food 
prices are expected to remain volatile because of structural changes that 
have occurred in commodity futures markets since the late 1990s and 
policy distortions such as mandates for the use of food crops as biofuel 
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or feedstock. On the supply side, land and water constraints, coupled 
with the impact of climate change, are likely to result in more unpredict-
able food production.
Delgado and co-authors argue that it is essential to invest more, and 
more wisely, in agricultural productivity. The share of agriculture in ODA 
declined sharply from a high of 18 percent in 1979 to 5 percent in 2006–08, 
which equates to about a 50 percent decline in the real dollar value of 
support. The annual rate of growth in yields for major cereals in develop-
ing countries has also declined from 3 percent to 1 percent over the past 
30 years, a rate well below projected demand growth. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the rates of growth in cereal yields declined from 1.8 percent in the 
1970s to 1.1 percent in the 2000s. In Asia and Africa, population pressures 
and rapid urbanization have greatly reduced the land available for agri-
culture, and productivity of available land is undermined by desertifi ca-
tion, salinization, soil erosion, and deforestation. According to World 
Bank estimates provided by the authors, up to 10 million hectares of agri-
cultural land worldwide are being lost annually to severe degradation. At 
the same time, competitive pressures for the production of biofuels are 
adding stresses to agricultural land. Governments and private investors 
from rich and middle-income countries are buying up land in developing 
countries in an effort to secure their own long-term food and raw mate-
rial supplies, which has triggered concern for the livelihoods and food 
security of people currently living on those lands. 
According to the authors, the priority interventions in agriculture 
include research and extension relevant to smallholder farmers, better 
management of land and water resources, investment in rural infrastruc-
ture to reduce transaction costs, efforts to secure property rights of the 
poor, better access of the poor to markets, and institutional improve-
ments that allow the public and the private sectors to mobilize resources 
and share costs. Promoting rural nonfarm employment in secondary 
towns and strengthening links between urban and rural areas are essen-
tial pathways out of poverty. They require improving the rural invest-
ment climate, expanding rural infrastructure, and upgrading the skills of 
the rural population to facilitate transition out of agriculture.
The authors add that it will be equally necessary to reduce the vulner-
ability of poor people, who are increasingly exposed to volatility from 
markets stemming from wide fl uctuations in both supply and demand. 
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Although it is diffi cult to promote growth and poverty alleviation with-
out promoting increased market exposure, increased market exposure 
will also heighten vulnerability to changes in food prices and incomes. 
Investing in access to food, safety nets, and nutrition is crucial to pro-
tecting the most vulnerable parts of the population. It is both costly, and 
often too late, to recreate safety net structures every time they are needed, 
and countries with effective programs with a wide coverage of the poor 
have been able to curtail the human cost of recent crises. 
Concluding the Doha Round of trade negotiations is also vital to 
achieving food security. Competitive markets lower the cost of basic 
staples to consumers and also provide a variety of food types that per-
mit, if not ensure, dietary diversity. Measures required to make domestic 
food markets work better for the poor include investment in appropriate 
infrastructure, competition and regulatory policy, and enforcement and 
strengthening of information fl ows. At the global level, a comprehensive 
and ambitious conclusion of the Doha development agenda would 
strengthen the international trading system, considered essential for 
lowering the volatility of cereal prices and increasing long-term food 
security. From a food security perspective, grain-based biofuel mandates, 
export bans on cereals, and similar policy interventions that reduce the 
ability of international markets to stabilize domestic markets in import-
dependent countries should be on the agenda for discussion. 
Delgado and co-authors argue strongly for multilateral action and 
suggest a number of principles that could guide the G-20’s collective 
action on food security. First is the need to retain a focus on economic 
growth through several specifi c actions: (a) supporting the productivity 
growth of a sector such as agriculture that directly accounts for about a 
third of economic growth in poor countries; (b) improving the agricul-
ture sector’s resilience to climate change through support for develop-
ment and adoption of more drought-tolerant crops and better water 
management; and (c) creating better market links, which can help 
dampen the volatility of food prices, reduce the risk of civil unrest 
induced by food price spikes, lower the associated need for precaution-
ary savings, and raise consumption and growth of the nonfood sector. 
Second, the G-20’s collective action should be complementary to 
existing aid effectiveness initiatives: (a) support to country-led invest-
ment plans; (b) provision of a more fl exible pool of unallocated donor 
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resources to complement what donors as a group are already doing for 
agriculture and food security; and (c) use of existing entities and processes 
to support design, appraisal, and implementation of country programs.
Third, the G-20’s collective action should be outcome-oriented and 
inclusive: (a) by giving priority to investment proposals with strong 
results frameworks; (b) by giving priority to countries with greatest need 
(assessed against MDG indicators), with policy environments more con-
ducive to generating higher investment returns; and (c) by incorporat-
ing the results of extensive consultation with relevant civil society and 
private sector organizations to mobilize all the resources of a country to 
produce common results. 
According to the authors, actions that the G-20 can and should under-
take are fourfold: (a) provide additional resources to scale up agricultural 
and food security assistance to eligible developing countries; (b) ensure 
immediate availability of additional resources to multidonor funds for 
agriculture and food security so that these funds are more rapidly avail-
able and do not depend on the next replenishment cycle; (c) improve 
donor alignment with country programs; and (d) reinforce country-led 
processes by limiting parallel planning and prioritizing to those already 
in place in-country. 
Delgado and co-authors note that the Global Agriculture and Food 
Security Program managed by the World Bank was launched as a multi-
lateral fund to support innovative, strategic, and inclusive agricultural 
and food security investment in low-income countries. The new mecha-
nism is run jointly by donors and recipients. To date, the program has 
been generously supported by pledges of over US$900 million and dis-
bursements of US$264 million from Australia, Canada, Ireland, the 
Republic of Korea, Spain, and the United States and by the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation. 
In the discussion, David Nabarro elaborates on the challenges faced 
by developing countries in the aftermath of the crisis, characterized by 
high commodity prices and extreme price volatility. Agriculture and 
rural-based transformation are the engines of growth and resilience 
for the majority of people in the face of these challenges, with food 
security key to social stability and to individual survival, educational 
attainment, and prosperity. He emphasizes that leadership on agricul-
ture and food security issues is coming from within countries, with 
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recognition that government must play a strong stewardship role and that 
external support systems, including research, must be aligned. Responses 
are also being better coordinated at all levels, from governments, to non-
state actors, to the private sector. G-20 actions have increased interna-
tional investments and aid fl ows to food and nutrition, and Nabarro 
predicts that these investments are likely to increase. He contends that 
future investors will pursue comprehensive and evidence-based strategies 
and focus on the application of new technologies to ensure the impact and 
effi cient use of their funds. This approach will also require robust in-coun-
try coordination, the pooling of fi nancial assistance where possible, a high 
degree of accountability, and effective supervision and management of 
funds. The G-20 has an important role in catalyzing food and nutrition 
security worldwide through a combination of political, economic, and 
fi nancial actions. These include advocating for and supporting collective 
multilateral action, encouraging changes in accountability and governance, 
supporting continuing reform of multilateral institutions so that they can 
better serve a multipolar world, and backing pooled fi nancing systems 
such as the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program.
Cheikh Sourang agrees with the authors’ main arguments and sees 
their paper as a timely and richly documented contribution to food 
security that provides a historical perspective on issues and options, as 
well as a discussion of workable solutions and related tensions and trade-
offs in addressing food security issues. From the perspective of the Inter-
national Fund for Agricultural Development as a UN agency and inter-
national fi nancial institution exclusively dedicated to combating hunger 
and poverty in rural areas, the chapter provides an opportunity to illus-
trate what is happening on the ground and to stress the importance of a 
joint refl ection on opportunities for scaling up successful interventions, 
including social protection, productivity increase, and a conducive pol-
icy and institutional environment.
The scaling up of what already works well requires a systematic and 
proactive approach to identifying pathways, drivers, and spaces for 
expansion in fi nance, policies, institutions, partnerships, and learning. 
In other words, systematic scaling up involves a common vision of agri-
culture as a multifunctional activity affecting economic growth, poverty 
reduction, and environmental management; early consultations during 
project design; mobilization of champions; and opening of policy and 
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institutional space in country, regional, and international forums in 
response to market failures and emerging issues. Sourang also proposes 
a number of measures for multilateral action, standards setting, and 
efforts to enhance institutional effectiveness, including maintaining the 
current momentum in partnership development, to which he thought 
the G-20 could add much value.
Joachim von Braun comments that the world’s food crisis has not yet 
entered its postcrisis phase. Food and nutrition insecurity increased dur-
ing the interlinked food and economic crises of 2007–10. Not only food 
and energy markets but also food and fi nancial markets have become 
closely linked, and these links pose new and added risks and uncertain-
ties for the poor. On the key policy actions, the global governance system 
for agriculture, food, and nutrition needs to be redesigned, since global 
public goods are not being suffi ciently delivered to meet demand. The 
current governance system lacks accountability, effectiveness, and inven-
tiveness. He argues that a redesign should aim for a new architecture for 
governance of the global public goods related to agriculture and food. 
An independent strategic body is needed to overcome the global gover-
nance vacuum related to food security. The G-20 ought to ensure that 
this body has the authority and resources it needs to be effective. 
On the need to reduce extreme price volatility, he comments that 
price volatility affects the poorest most and undermines the health and 
nutrition of many more. To prevent future global price shocks, food 
markets must not be excluded from the appropriate regulation of the 
banking and fi nancial system, because the staple food and feed markets 
(grain and oil seeds) are closely connected to speculative activities in 
fi nancial markets. In this context, von Braun proposes a number of 
measures: (a) better regulation to reduce excessive speculation oppor-
tunities in food commodities; (b) innovative grain reserves policies; 
(c) incentives for private sector investment to facilitate agricultural 
technology for the poor; and (d) expanded social protection and child 
nutrition programs. He concludes that prioritization, sequencing, 
transparency, and accountability are crucial for successful implemen-
tation of agriculture, food, and nutrition policy. More and better 
investment is needed, but investment will make its full contribution 
only when the governance of agriculture, food, and nutrition is being 
strengthened at international levels. Trying to counter institutional 
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failures mainly with investments in technical solutions will not work. 
Food and nutrition security must have high priority among the devel-
opment issues on the agenda of the upcoming G-20 summits.
Hak-Su Kim summarizes that the piece by Delgado and co-authors 
rightly focuses on long-term policies to ensure food security in devel-
oping countries by scaling up efforts to spur agricultural productivity, 
improve links from farmers to markets, and reduce risk and vulnerabil-
ity. However, he argues that demographic dynamics are highly relevant 
to this discussion as population will reach about 7 billion in 2010 and 
the United Nations estimates that in approximately 35 years the popu-
lation could be as high as 10 billion. With this rapid increase in global 
population, Kim contends, we may expect shortages in aggregate food 
availability and a growing threat of hunger and malnutrition in relation 
to food requirements. The Asian solution to the food security problem 
was the Green Revolution. Kim concludes that the agricultural land-
scape can change in unpredictable ways and that no general strategic 
body can pick up new agenda items and assign them to organizations. 
The G-20’s role should be to facilitate the creation of a body indepen-
dent of current institutions to avoid creating a confl ict of interest which 
could be structured along the lines that Sourang proposes.
Inclusive Finance
In chapter 10, Peer Stein, Bikki Randhawa, and Nina Bilandzic present 
a comprehensive analysis of inclusive fi nance by reviewing key trends, 
challenges, and opportunities for advancing fi nancial inclusion and pro-
pose major high-level policy recommendations for consideration by the 
G-20. They show that the global gap in access to and use of fi nancial 
services remains a challenge. Two-thirds of the adult population in devel-
oping countries, or 2.7 billion people, lack access to basic formal fi nan-
cial services, such as savings or checking accounts. The largest share of 
the unbanked live in Sub-Saharan Africa (only 12 percent of population 
is banked) and South Asia (only 24 percent of population is banked). 
Stein and his co-authors argue that the gap in access to fi nance is equally 
important for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which are the main 
drivers of job creation in emerging markets. SMEs are 30 percent more 
likely than large fi rms to rate fi nancing constraints as a major obstacle to 
growth. Small fi rms are at the highest disadvantage: only 18 percent of 
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small enterprises in low-income countries use fi nance. SMEs represent a 
key target segment for fi nancial inclusion, as they are one of the largest 
employers in emerging markets (contributing to GDP growth) and they 
employ a growing share of women (25–40 percent worldwide), who rank 
high among the most fi nancially disadvantaged groups.
The empirical evidence the authors present suggests that improved 
access to fi nance is not only pro-growth but also pro-poor, reducing 
income inequality and poverty. Finance performs two key functions 
benefi cial to households and fi rms: risk management and intertemporal 
consumption smoothing. These functions yield multiple direct and indi-
rect benefi ts to households and fi rms, allowing them to take advantage 
of investment opportunities, smooth their consumption, manage day-
to-day resources, and insure themselves against future uncertainty. 
The authors argue that fi nancial inclusion needs to go beyond credit: 
the need for safe and secure savings and payment products is almost 
universal, and the demand for insurance and international remittances is 
high. Several emerging-market countries have demonstrated commit-
ment and urgency around the goal of universal access to fi nancial ser-
vices. More remains to be done in advancing fi nancial inclusion in a 
responsible fashion globally through consumer protection regulations, 
industry practices, and fi nancial capability training.
The authors explain that fi nancial inclusion needs to leverage all 
fi nancial services providers. There is much to learn from the microfi -
nance industry, as well as from recent innovations in delivery of fi nancial 
services outside of conventional bank branches. Closing the fi nancial 
services gap will require signifi cant commitment from a wide variety of 
bank and nonbank fi nancial institutions, including commercial banks, 
credit unions, savings banks, microfi nance institutions, postal banks, 
and mobile banking operators. 
To make progress and build the foundations for sustainable growth, 
the authors recommend that the G-20 convene a global partnership with 
the relevant stakeholders around a common global fi nancial goal that 
focuses not only on credit but also on a range of fi nancial products: pay-
ments, savings, remittances, and insurance. The target would step up 
pressure to close existing data gaps—in particular the SME fi nance gap 
and policy-related indicators—ensuring that the basic elements are in 
place to measure annual progress against the target. The implementation 
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will require an integrated and concerted effort leveraging four key driv-
ers: the global development community, the fi nancial services industry, 
national governments, and centers for knowledge sharing. The G-20 is in 
a unique position to convene those forces for economic development 
and complement the effort with the creation of a funding mechanism to 
provide the resources needed for the implementation of the fi nancial 
inclusion agenda. 
A focus on inclusive fi nancial services promotes a variety of develop-
ment goals, including technological innovation, which is required for 
adequate fi nancial service delivery, North-South and South-South 
knowledge sharing, consumer fi nancial education, public-private coor-
dination, and infrastructure development. However, the authors note 
that the mandate for fi nancial inclusion must be funded if the issue is to 
be addressed. 
In the discussion, Alfred Hannig indicates that he and his colleagues 
at the Alliance for Financial Inclusion believe that most of the successful 
policy approaches for increasing access to fi nancial services for the poor 
have been innovated in developing countries. The recognition of fi nan-
cial inclusion innovations spearheaded by developing-country policy 
makers from both G-20 and non–G-20 countries is therefore critical. He 
recommends a new “polylateral development” approach. Possible actions 
that could be taken to expand fi nancial inclusion include targets self-set 
by countries and new funding mechanisms that can serve the different 
countries’ needs. Hannig also welcomes the particular emphasis that the 
G-20 is putting on non–G-20 developing countries. He concludes by 
highlighting three possible actions that the G-20 could take: establish a 
global partnership for fi nancial inclusion, create a global funding mech-
anism under this partnership, and encourage developing countries to set 
their own targets for fi nancial inclusion that can be combined and used 
as global targets for 2020.
Yongbeom Kim commends Stein and his co-authors for a compre-
hensive treatment of the topic and argues strongly for the incorporation 
of fi nancial inclusion as a key agenda item for the G-20. He provides the 
following evidence in support of his position:
First, fi nancial inclusion is important because it leads to balanced 
economic growth. In this context, the potential for economic growth is 
maximized when existing resources are effi ciently and optimally allo-
cated. To achieve balanced growth, the current underserved population 
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must have an opportunity to access and make use of the available 
resources in a safe environment. 
Second, fi nancial inclusion also facilitates innovation as it is often led 
by entrepreneurs and SMEs, which are key drivers of enhanced produc-
tivity and growth. An inclusive fi nancial system that goes beyond credit 
and includes access to a broad range of appropriate fi nancial services is 
one of the most important conditions for unlocking the huge potential 
of currently untapped growth. 
Third, a substantial body of literature shows that fi nancial inclusion is 
a cornerstone for economic development. What is needed to facilitate 
economic growth in poor countries is not more capital but rather the 
transformation of so-called dead assets into liquid capital to provide 
better access to fi nance. 
Finally, fi nancial inclusion provides the counterbalance required 
against the tightening of fi nancial regulation that is currently under way. 
In response to the recent crisis, national regulators and international 
standard setters have been concentrating their efforts on tightening 
fi nancial regulations. It is crucial to maintain the goal of fi nancial inclu-
sion at a time when stricter regulation is being introduced so that the 
overall fi nancial system can balance the need for greater stability with 
the need to ensure greater accessibility. 
However, Kim argues that a more nuanced and specialized market 
structure is needed that allows large, medium, and small banks and non-
bank fi nancial institutions to cater to customers of different income 
brackets with affordable and tailor-made fi nancial products.
Princess Máxima of the Netherlands agrees with the authors and 
discussants that fi nancial inclusion is a critically important component 
of stability, equitable economic growth, and poverty reduction. She 
defi nes fi nancial inclusion as universal access, at a reasonable cost, to a 
wide range of fi nancial services for everyone needing them, provided by 
a number of sound and sustainable institutions. 
She commends the G-20 for its leadership on fi nancial inclusion and 
for mandating a fi nancial inclusion experts group to identify lessons 
learned on innovative approaches for improving access and to focus on 
access by SMEs. Innovations in the fi eld are already drastically reducing 
the costs of delivery and creating products catering to the unbanked. Ser-
vices like M-Pesa in Kenya, which uses mobile phones to make payments 
and deposit small savings, demonstrate that fi nancial services that poor 
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individuals and businesses need can be delivered in an affordable and 
sustainable manner. She argues that, to make progress and build the 
foundations for sustainable growth, the G-20 should convene a global 
partnership with the relevant stakeholders around a common global 
fi nancial goal that could be approached from both a bottom-up and a 
top-down perspective with different advantages and motivations for 
progress. The G-20 is in a unique position to bring together major drivers 
of fi nance—the fi nancial services industry, national governments, the 
global development community, and centers for knowledge sharing—and 
to complement implementation with political and policy leadership. Solu-
tions need to be sustainable and to provide accessible and affordable 
fi nancial products that poor clients and SMEs need. Developing a success-
ful global mechanism for cross-country learning, both North-South and 
South-South, would advance that goal. Princess Máxima concluded her 
remarks by underscoring the importance of G-20 leadership, noting that 
fi nancial inclusion requires long-term commitment by all stakeholders. 
The Road Ahead: The G-20 Development Agenda
Despite the recent fi nancial instability, global economic recovery is con-
tinuing. In many developing countries, the economic prospects remain 
strong, albeit growth is likely to move at a more moderate pace than 
before. Recovery in advanced economies, however, remains fragile. 
Unemployment continues to be high in many advanced and developing 
countries, and fi nancial markets remain vulnerable. Moreover, according 
to recent forecasts by both the World Bank and the IMF, the near-term 
global outlook shows signifi cant risks. Nevertheless, developing coun-
tries as a group—especially the developing-country members of the 
G-20—have sustained their growth by strengthening domestic demand 
and restoring activity in international trade. Major economies in Asia 
(such as China, India, and Indonesia), as well a few other economies 
including Brazil, have continued to act as growth poles and are helping 
sustain the global recovery. Given the critical importance of economic 
growth to continued global recovery, to generating employment in both 
developed and developing countries, to reducing poverty, and to making 
progress in achieving the MDGs (particularly in low-income countries), 
the framework for “strong, sustainable, and balanced growth” must 
remain one of the central elements of the G-20 agenda going forward.
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The G-20 is the premier global economic forum, and its development 
approach is consistent with its core mandate of international economic 
and fi nancial cooperation. It is in this context that the newly established 
G-20 Working Group on Development has focused its activity on the eco-
nomic growth aspects of development—particularly economic growth in 
low-income countries. The recognition that economic growth is needed 
for achieving sustained poverty reduction is a critical component in clos-
ing the development gap. 
Key Messages
The Korea–World Bank High Level Conference “Postcrisis Growth 
and Development”—followed by the work of Korea’s Presidential 
Committee for the G-20 Seoul Summit, the G-20 members, and a 
number of international fi nancial institutions, including the World 
Bank, the UN agencies, the OECD, and regional development banks—
has resulted in broad support for integrating critical development 
issues, as well as human development issues more broadly, into the 
G-20 agenda. 
Also endorsed is the concept of multipolar growth, with the confer-
ence concluding with a strong consensus that developing countries, 
whose share of global output, trade, FDI, and population has been rising 
relative to those of advanced economies, have an important role to play 
in the global recovery and will become increasingly more important in 
the world economy. However, another key message from the conference 
and follow-up work is that for developing countries, including low-in-
come countries, to play a more important role in the global economy, 
there must be a greater effort to remove obstacles to growth through 
trade, infrastructure development, progress on the MDGs, increased 
food security, and enhanced access to fi nance—all of which require sub-
stantial and continued FDI, as well as innovative fi nancing from interna-
tional fi nancial institutions, ODA, and domestic resources. Knowledge 
sharing (South-South, as well as North-South and South-North) will 
play a key role. 
The focus on economic growth-cum-development fi ts well with the 
G-20 framework. The main challenge facing the G-20 is how to help 
the world economy achieve “strong, sustainable, and balanced eco-
nomic growth” that is underpinned by stronger and more diversifi ed 
sources of aggregate regional and global demand. As discussed earlier 
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in this overview, the G-20 can help foster stronger growth in develop-
ing countries by focusing on the following areas within its mandate 
and development agenda:
•  Provision of infrastructure is critical to growth and sustainability over 
the long term in both middle- and low-income countries. To facilitate 
such efforts, the G-20 could develop action plans for increasing public 
and private fi nancing of infrastructure, as well as for improving its 
effi ciency and environmental sustainability, and for providing increased 
technical and fi nancial assistance to developing countries to improve 
infrastructure and energy effi ciency. 
•  Recognizing the importance of trade capacity and market access for 
economic growth, the G-20 summit in Seoul should consider mea-
sures, such as aid for trade and “duty free, quota free” access for the 
least-developed countries. As the global economy recovers from the 
crisis, trade is one of the most powerful mechanisms for helping 
developing countries (as well as advanced economies) recover more 
quickly from the adverse effects of the external shock that hit them. 
•  Given the critical importance of agricultural productivity to eco-
nomic growth and the fi ght against malnutrition in developing coun-
tries, multilateral action is needed. Among the actions that the G-20 
can and should undertake in this area is to provide additional resources 
to scale-up agricultural and food security assistance to eligible devel-
oping countries. 
•  Highly inequitable and lopsided access to fi nance and fi nancial ser-
vices is one of the most serious challenges developing countries face, 
particularly the poorer countries. Greater access to fi nance will have a 
strong positive impact on economic growth and employment genera-
tion, which is why it has a central place on the G-20 agenda. The G-20 
could contribute to progress and to building the foundations for sus-
tainable growth by convening a global partnership around a common 
global fi nancial goal with the relevant stakeholders that should focus 
not only on credit but also on a range of fi nancial products: payments, 
savings, remittances, and insurance. 
Strong and balanced economic growth is also key to speeding up prog-
ress and achieving the MDGs. The G-20 must promote an agenda that 
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provides a robust platform for the MDGs and thereby facilitate eco-
nomic and human development goals in low-income countries. 
The strong links between balanced and sustainable economic growth, 
sectoral developments (for example, infrastructure, health, and education), 
and the MDGs indicate that the critical areas of potential intervention by 
the G-20 are likely to have important and positive impacts on developing 
countries, particularly the poorer non–G-20 developing countries. In fact, 
the key messages in the World Bank’s recent report on the MDGs prepared 
for the UN MDG summit (World Bank 2010c) are fully consistent with the 
key messages of this conference:
•  Achieving the MDGs requires a vibrant global economy, powered by 
strong, sustainable, multipolar growth, underpinned by sound policies 
and country reforms. 
•  Improving access for the poor to health, education, affordable food, 
trade, fi nance, and basic infrastructure is essential to accelerating prog-
ress toward the MDGs. 
•  Developing countries need to continue to strengthen resilience to global 
volatility to protect gains and sustain progress toward the MDGs. 
•  The international community must renew its commitment to reach 
the “bottom billion,” particularly those in fragile and confl ict-affected 
countries. 
•  Global support for a comprehensive development agenda—including 
through the G-20 process—is critical. 
In the wake of the recent global crisis, and with the 2015 deadline 
approaching, business as usual is not enough to meet the MDGs. The 
international community needs to do more by providing the needed 
fi nancing and ensuring that increased funds translate into results on the 
ground. The global fi nancial crisis has prevented many donor countries 
from meeting their earlier aid commitments to low-income countries.
The recovery in advanced countries is likely to take some time, given 
the depth and scale of their recent economic and fi nancial setbacks. 
Therefore, it is unlikely in the short run that advanced countries will 
provide the needed stimulus to the global economy through increased 
aggregate demand. At the same time, the growing consumption by 
large middle-income countries, combined with investment fl ows to 
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low-income countries, points to a new direction in the global economy, 
as developing countries together act as a major source of additional 
global demand. Increasing growth in low-income countries should thus 
be viewed as an integral part of the larger G-20 framework objective to 
achieve a more resilient and balanced global economy. Low-income 
countries could therefore become an important part of the emerging 
multipolar world. 
Rethinking Development Policy?
The Growth Commission Report identifi ed “fi ve striking points of resem-
blance” among all 13 highly successful countries in the world, that, for 
more than 25 years, had grown at rates exceeding 7 percent a year: open-
ness to the global economy, macroeconomic stability, high saving and 
investment rates, reliance on a functioning market system, and credible 
leadership and good governance (Commission on Growth and Develop-
ment 2009). Although these generalizations remain valid, the current 
crisis has resulted in serious rethinking of macro-fi nancial policies, as 
well as some aspects of development policy. On the latter, new directions 
in research on development economics are emerging. For example, four 
signifi cant questions need to be addressed (World Bank 2010d): 
•  Understanding the roles of states, markets, and the private sector in 
promoting economic and structural transformation9 
•  Knowing how to broaden access to economic opportunities to ensure 
rapid poverty reduction and human development 
•  Meeting new global challenges, many related to dealing with unin-
sured risks facing economies and people (for example, the fi nancial 
crisis and climate change) 
•  Formulating a broader approach to assessing development effectiveness. 
However, a preliminary assessment of possible lessons from the crisis 
does not point toward a revolution in policy. Instead, the crisis may help 
accelerate the shift toward a more pragmatic policy framework that con-
tinues to give primacy to a competitive private sector and a dynamic 
export sector as drivers of growth, employment, and productivity.
Therefore, in the aftermath of the largest global economic crisis since 
the Great Depression, it is not surprising that considerable attention 
has been directed toward extracting the appropriate lessons from the 
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experience, both what went wrong and what needs to be done differ-
ently in the future. One immediate outcome of the crisis may be a more 
realistic view of global economic and fi nancial conditions. 
In the face of glaring failures of markets and governments, developed-
country economists and policy makers may think twice before assuming 
that either markets or states function smoothly in a developing-country 
context. This restraint could reinforce the trend in development think-
ing toward a post-Washington Consensus. Reasoning along these lines 
may still be strongly market oriented but also “less ideological, more 
pragmatic, and more empirically grounded” (Rogers 2010).
It will undoubtedly take time—several years, perhaps longer—for 
researchers and policy analysts to sift through the events more carefully. 
Nevertheless, in a few areas where action and rethinking are necessary or 
are already underway, it may be possible to identify specifi c policy mea-
sures, at both the country and the international level, that will enhance 
the prospects for strong, sustainable, and balanced growth.
Conclusion: Postcrisis Growth and Development
The conference in Busan ended with a roundtable discussion of policy 
makers and practitioners (a summary of these discussions is presented 
in box 1). Clearly, policy makers with diverse views have reached a 
strong consensus on a development agenda that could be considered 
and supported by the G-20 members when they meet in Seoul in 
November 2010. 
The key policy recommendations coming out of this conference’s ses-
sions on the key pillars of development—namely, aid for trade, food 
security, infrastructure and sustainable development, and inclusive 
fi nance—are presented at the end of each chapter and summarized in 
appendix A. 
All roundtable panelists were concerned that the actionable topics 
fl oated by the G-20 members would sink when faced with obstacles in 
the implementation phase. So far the G-20 has been successful in deliv-
ering not just rhetoric but also concrete commitments. At the three pre-
vious G-20 summits in 2008–09, members agreed on implementable 
measures and tangible deliverables. In its role as the catalyst for fi nan-
cial regulatory reform, the G-20 issued 47 specifi c agenda items and 
timetables upon which countries agreed to deliver. The G-20’s work on 
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Box 1. A Summary of the Roundtable Policy Discussion
The conference concluded with a roundtable discussion, chaired by Il SaKong, Chairman of the 
Presidential Committee for the G-20 Seoul Summit. Trevor Manuel, minister in the presidency, 
South African National Planning Commission, began by discussing the importance of Africa, ask-
ing, “What is in this for the least-developed continent in the world?” and questioned the scope of 
the G-20 development mandate, encouraging the participants to be realistic about which targets 
are achievable. He drew attention to the topic of food security as it relates to energy and the 
trade-off between using crops for food as opposed to biofuel production. He stressed that the 
G-20 must work on the real economic issues that will beneﬁ t developing countries the most. 
Princess Máxima of the Netherlands said that ﬁ nancial inclusion is an important component 
of stability and growth, particularly for generating jobs and increasing opportunity. Inclusive ﬁ nan-
cial systems are critical to an efﬁ cient and stable ﬁ nancial infrastructure. Financial inclusion enables 
and accelerates progress on development goals, such as education and reducing rural poverty. She 
emphasized that the mandate for ﬁ nancial inclusion must be supported with policy leadership 
and funds and that the global community must move to implement the G-20 development 
agenda with a sense of urgency. 
Jomo Kwame Sundaram of the United Nations suggested that the G-20, with the help of the 
large multilateral development organizations, should focus on three priorities: ﬁ rst, fostering and 
promoting international cooperation on tax initiatives, as the existing arrangements are biased 
toward developed-country concerns; second, working on sovereign debt issues by instituting a 
multilateral framework that balances the needs of the creditor and the borrower; and, third, 
ensuring that the “Green New Deal” is a global new deal that adequately balances the food secu-
rity and climate change issues.
Ernesto Zedillo, former president of Mexico, discussed aid for trade and commented that 
trade is only part of the solution for global growth but that it plays a very important role. He cited 
preliminary numbers that suggest that in 2008 US$40 billion of all aid could be linked to aid for 
trade. He adamantly stressed the importance of working through the WTO on trade issues, rather 
than through other bodies that may have overlapping mandates. In particular, he argued that the 
Doha Round is the place to agree on agricultural reform because “there can be no real food secu-
rity without addressing the distortions created by agricultural support programs,” particularly sub-
sidies in the United States and the European Union. Successfully concluding the Doha Round is 
vital to enhancing global trade and maintaining the credibility of the trading system. 
Reza Moghadam of the IMF spoke about how strong growth in low-income countries 
depends on growth-friendly macroeconomic policies in these countries, together with robust 
global growth—in which the G-20 has a major role to play. The G-20 Mutual Assessment Process 
is a critical part of improving global coordination of economic policies to achieve strong, sustain-
able, and balanced growth. The challenge will be to agree on policies that collectively lead to a 
better outcome than policies pursued by each country individually. He also underlined that in 
scaling up investment to address critical growth bottlenecks, low-income countries need to 
strengthen their capacity to invest efﬁ ciently and borrow safely, as well as to improve public 
ﬁ nancial management. He called on international organizations and donors to make available 
large-scale concessional ﬁ nancing, and encouraged G-20 members to provide technical assistance 
and support for capacity building. He emphasized the importance of building resilience to shocks, 
including through social safety nets.
(continued)
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Justin Yifu Lin of the World Bank spoke about multiple growth poles and discussed the 
G-20’s role in facilitating coordinated policy responses to crisis management, which helped avert 
worst-case scenarios for the global economy. He noted that the G-20’s mandate in the postcrisis 
global environment must include promoting sustainable and inclusive growth in developing coun-
tries by removing major bottlenecks to growth and related issues. He emphasized the importance 
of infrastructure, education and training, knowledge sharing (including South-South), and ﬁ nancial 
inclusion, among others.
Changyong Rhee, the G-20 Sherpa from Korea, made the point that the G-20’s mandate must 
be different from that of the G-8 and others. He asked how, if slow growth and ﬁ scal consolidation 
are necessary, can we generate global demand? For their part, the Sherpas have already established 
a list of key development issues—including aid for trade, food security, infrastructure, inclusive 
ﬁ nance, and others. The hope for the Seoul summit is to establish overarching development prin-
ciples and ﬁ nalize the list of G-20 issues for its development agenda. From that list, members will 
select several items for concrete delivery. Rhee stressed that the Korean government is committed 
to delivering on the developmental outcomes. 
Il SaKong concluded by saying that inclusion of development in the Seoul agenda was not 
initially supported by all G-20 members but that it now has the full support of the body. He 
believes the development community must be very strategic in sequencing policy priorities for 
development. He emphasized that it is important to think past the Seoul summit, since the 
development agenda will likely remain on the table. In that regard, he assured the conference 
that France, the 2011 G-20 chair, will work closely with Korea to ensure that development is part 
of the ongoing discussions. Since G-20 members have already achieved so much progress on the 
development front, SaKong is optimistic about the future of the development agenda within the 
G-20. 
Source: Authors. Based on the proceedings of the Korea–World Bank High Level Conference in 
Busan, Korea, June 3–4, 2010.
Box 1. A Summary of the Roundtable Policy Discussion (continued)
development will likely take this form, setting a clear multiyear develop-
ment agenda that will keep the G-20 accountable and effective. 
Despite some initial misgivings, all G-20 members are fully support-
ive of including development issues on the Seoul G-20 agenda, built 
around the key development pillars identifi ed by the G-20: infrastruc-
ture, private investment and job creation, knowledge sharing, human 
resources development, trade, fi nancial inclusion, governance, growth 
resilience, and food security. At the June 2010 Toronto summit, G-20 
leaders endorsed the creation of a working group that would spearhead 
efforts to further defi ne the G-20 development agenda and specify the 
means for achieving the specifi c objectives. 
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The overall outlook for progress on the G-20 development agenda is 
good: G-20 members have already demonstrated a capacity to work 
together, as evidenced by the cooperative efforts on the Mutual Assess-
ment Process as part of the implementation of the G-20 framework for 
strong, sustainable, and balanced growth. Early success in this regard can 
help solidify the G-20’s development role, ensuring that development 
issues remain an integral part of the G-20 agenda in the years to come 
and continue to be championed by other G-20 members. 
Sometimes it takes adversity to realize that the world has changed. It 
took the fi nancial crisis for the world to wake up to the fact that devel-
oping countries, particularly large middle-income countries like China 
and India, are fully integrated into the global fi nancial and economic 
system. Hundreds of millions of people have entered the market econ-
omy, and the global economic landscape no longer has a fi xed center of 
gravity but rather a set of magnetic poles that are attracting investment, 
trade, and migration and are generating growth at different points 
around the globe.
As indicated above, however, the global recovery is fragile. If the 
advanced economies were to experience a “double-dip” recession or 
other large-scale economic setback, it would be devastating for devel-
opment progress. For developing countries that are less resilient to 
economic shocks, experiencing another crisis in close proximity could 
lead to deeper negative effects on growth and human well-being. 
Thus, global economic policy coordination is likely to become even 
more important. For global growth to be sustained and for poverty 
reduction to continue in both low- and middle-income countries, a 
number of international policy actions will be necessary in aid for 
trade, infrastructure investment, food security, inclusive fi nance, and 
the MDGs. 
As evidenced by the discussion of development challenges raised in 
this volume, it is of the utmost importance not only for developing-
country governments to address these issues (in partnership with the 
private sector) but also for the G-20 to offer a coordinated response. The 
G-20’s development agenda stems from its core mandate of international 
economic and fi nancial cooperation. The membership is, therefore, 
uniquely positioned to address constraints to economic growth in low-
income countries and take the lead in sketching out the future landscape 
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for economic development. As the recovery matures, the longer-term, 
inclusive growth agenda should be at the center of G-20 policy coordi-
nation, since economic interdependence between the developed and the 
developing world is likely to increase, as well as between developing 
countries themselves, in trade, fi nance, migration, and infrastructure, 
among other issues. Furthermore, the body’s convening power and 
composition make it the ideal protagonist in global governance and 
multilateralism.
All the issues taken up in this volume are linked and are essential 
components of sustained economic growth in the developing world. 
Without adequate infrastructure, inclusive access to fi nancial services, 
more open trade, improved food security, and progress toward the 
MDGs, development gaps will persist. Addressing these issues will 
require North-South, and increasingly South-South, learning, interac-
tion, and coordination.
Everyone recognizes that this is a heavy agenda. Some prioritization 
has already taken place in the selection of development-related topics 
for this volume. What will likely prove most diffi cult is identifying and 
arriving at consensus on the next steps forward, which include the 
implementation of action items and recommendations. It is therefore 
necessary to be strategic about the approach, especially in the sequenc-
ing of priorities. Is it best to reach for the low-hanging fruit that can 
improve lives immediately? Or tackle more systemic issues? When the 
G-20 convenes in Seoul in November 2010, some broad questions will 
still need to be answered:
•  Can the G-20 continue to be effective in a postcrisis environment? 
•  What is the scope of the G-20 mandate on development issues, and 
who defi nes the future agenda for action? 
•  What criteria should be used to determine which issues end up on 
that agenda? 
•  What targets are achievable and realistic, and who will implement 
and monitor their progress?
•  What kind of assistance can the G-20 provide for the least-developed, 
fragile, and confl ict-affl icted countries?
This is the time to be visionary about how the world would look in 
the medium and long term. What are economic best practices, and 
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where can developing countries look for inspiration and guidance? 
How can developed and developing countries cooperate on sensitive 
issues and fi nd ways to come together over the provision of global 
goods? In the face of scarce resources and fi scal constraints, priorities 
and trade-offs are inevitable, but where and how are governments and 
donors willing to make cuts? 
Elaborating this vision and fi lling in the details will not occur over-
night. But the chapters and discussion presented in this volume drawn 
from the Korea–World Bank High Level Conference in Busan provide an 
initial step in that direction. When G-20 leaders meet in Seoul, they will 
continue to defi ne and refi ne the G-20’s development agenda and recom-
mendations for action going forward, which in turn will lay the ground-
work for faster progress toward key global development objectives. 
Notes
 1.  The G-7 includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States.
 2.  The G-20 includes the G-7 plus Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, 
Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa, Turkey, and the European Union. 
 3.  In regard to the development issues, the declaration states: “We agree to estab-
lish a Working Group on Development and mandate it to elaborate, consistent 
with the G-20’s focus on measures to promote economic growth and resilience, 
a development agenda and multi-year action plans to be adopted at the Seoul 
Summit” (“Toronto Summit Declaration 2010,” 9).
 4.  The paper by Sudaram in chapter 6 of this book addresses the role of Bretton 
Woods in global governance.
 5.  The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that emerged in 1947 became the 
World Trade Organization in 1995.
 6.  The Financial Sector Assessment Program, a joint IMF and World Bank effort 
introduced in May 1999, aims to increase the effectiveness of efforts to promote 
the soundness of fi nancial systems in member countries. 
 7.  The middle-income trap refers to countries that grow rapidly for a couple of 
decades and then stall, or continue growing at a signifi cantly slower pace, a cir-
cumstance that has affected a number of countries in Latin America, such as 
Brazil and Mexico. As a result, these countries are not able to jump to be a high-
income country.
 8.  The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations used the following three 
criteria for the identifi cation of least-developed countries: (a) a low- income 
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 criterion, based on a three-year average estimate of the gross national income per 
capita (under US$750 for inclusion; above US$900 for graduation); (b) a human 
resource weakness criterion, involving a composite human assets index based on 
nutrition, health, education, and adult literacy indicators; and (c) an economic 
vulnerability criterion, involving a composite economic vulnerability index 
based on indicators of the instability of agricultural production, the instability of 
exports of goods and services, the economic importance of nontraditional activ-
ities, merchandise export concentration, the handicap of economic smallness, 
and the percentage of population displaced by natural disasters.
 9.  From the perspective of “new structural economics,” the fi rst three of the Growth 
Commission’s stylized facts are the results of a comparative advantage following 
strategy at each stage of development, which allows developing economies to be 
open, competitive, and well positioned to exploit the opportunities of globaliza-
tion. Such a strategy also generates high profi tability and high rate of return on 
investment. The fourth stylized fact is a necessary condition for an economy to 
follow comparative advantage in its development. The last point is the charac-
teristics of a facilitating state and a condition for a country to adopt a develop-
ment strategy that is consistent with its comparative advantage. For a discussion 
of new structural economics, see Lin 2010.
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Let me fi rst of all thank the World Bank and the Korea Institute for Inter-
national Economic Policy (KIEP) for organizing and supporting this 
very timely conference in close collaboration with the Republic of Korea’s 
Presidential Committee for the G-20 Summit. It is indeed a great privi-
lege for me to have this opportunity to speak before this distinguished 
audience.
As you all know, the Group of 20 (G-20) leaders fi rst met in Washing-
ton, D.C., in November 2008 to deal with the current global fi nancial 
crisis. Subsequently, they met twice in 2009, in London and Pittsburgh. 
In Pittsburgh in September, the G-20 leaders agreed to make the G-20 
the premier forum for international economic cooperation. Indeed, it was 
a historic event that laid the foundation for a new system of global eco-
nomic and fi nancial governance, shifting away from the Group of 7 (G-7).
Certainly, the G-20 is more representative and inclusive and thus 
more legitimate and operationally more effective than the G-7 as the 
global, albeit informal, economic steering committee.
The G-20 so far has been generally viewed as being successful in deliv-
ering concrete measures. In fact, thanks to the internationally concerted 
policy responses led by the G-20, the current crisis did not turn into 
Il SaKong
Presidential Committee for the G-20 Seoul Summit
Why Development Should 
Be a Priority Agenda for 
the G-20
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another Great Depression. To continue being successful going forward, 
the G-20 should make every effort to bring about a durable global recov-
ery and ensure that it turns into sustainable and balanced global growth 
in the postcrisis era. 
In pursuit of this objective, the G-20 leaders in Pittsburgh agreed to 
implement the Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth 
of the global economy. Toward this end, the G-20 has been focusing on 
rebalancing the global economy, paying particular attention to current 
global macroeconomic imbalances. 
In addition to this rebalancing effort, it is our strong belief that for 
sustainable global growth the G-20 has to turn its attention to closing 
the development gap. The rationale for this is simple—it is just not pos-
sible for the world to achieve sustainable and balanced growth so long as 
there is a persistent gap in development. 
There is another important reason why development should be put 
on the G-20 agenda. There are 172 member countries of the United 
Nations outside the G-20. Understandably, those countries are mostly 
from the developing and emerging world. We all know that the G-20 
cannot claim to be the credible and legitimate premier forum for 
international economic cooperation, and thus win their support, if it 
fails to take into account the policy priorities and concerns of these 
countries. 
Besides, addressing development is probably the most effective way 
for the G-20 to contribute to the achievement of the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals (MDGs). 
Development should be a priority agenda for the Seoul G-20 Summit 
in November 2010 for yet another critical reason. 
The current crisis took a heavy toll, especially on the emerging and 
developing world. According to a recent World Bank report, 64 million 
more people will be living in poverty by the end of 2010 as a result of the 
crisis. Nonetheless, in troubled times like today, especially when aggre-
gate demand in the developed world is weak, the world fi nds it much 
more diffi cult to grow without a strong push from the emerging and 
developing world. 
For these reasons Korea has been actively promoting the addition of 
development to the agenda of the November Seoul Summit. 
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At the recent G-20 “sherpas” meeting, agreement was reached not 
only to include growth-oriented development in the summit agenda but 
also to initiate a working group for development. 
As you are well aware, there is a whole range of issues regarding devel-
opment and different approaches in dealing with development. And 
there is no question that development means more than just aid. Korea, 
which just turned from an aid recipient to a donor country upon joining 
the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development, vividly illustrates the develop-
ment needs that go beyond aid.
Much as we would like to pursue every angle, we will have to be prag-
matic and realistic in our approach to development. Therefore, the G-20 
process has to prioritize within the wide range of development issues 
and customize them commensurate with the needs of the emerging and 
developing countries concerned.
Some of the key drivers of development include education, human 
resources development both for public and private sectors, physical and 
institutional infrastructure building, promotion of private investment 
and entrepreneurial activities, and of course the right development strat-
egies and policies. These dimensions of development are likely to have a 
great impact on stimulating economic growth and improving the lives of 
the people in the emerging and developing world.
The G-20 leaders will come to Toronto in June prepared to give direc-
tion on development to be pursued in a focused manner by the G-20. We 
will closely follow up on the leaders’ mandate to produce substantive 
outcomes in Seoul. 
I must say it cannot be more appropriate for the G-20 to put develop-
ment on its agenda, especially when Korea holds the presidency.
I am sure you would agree with me in saying that Korea is better posi-
tioned than any other OECD member country to serve as a bridge 
between the advanced countries on one hand and the developing and 
emerging economies on the other throughout the G-20 process. We are 
determined to do our best in carrying out the role.
In doing so we will consult not just our G-20 colleagues but also the 
non-G-20 countries, through ongoing engagement. That way we will 
be able to better refl ect their policy priorities and concerns in the G-20 
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process. This process will also contribute toward making the G-20 more 
credible and legitimate. 
Needless to say, our close engagement with relevant UN agencies in 
addition to the World Bank and other multilateral institutions will also 
enrich the process.
In closing I must say that it is my sincere hope that this volume will 
provide concrete ideas and valuable insights for the development agenda 
for the Seoul G-20 Summit.
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Good morning, and welcome to this high-level conference on Postcrisis 
Growth and Development organized jointly by the government of the 
Republic of Korea and the World Bank. I would like to pay tribute to our 
host country and to thank Dr. Il SaKong and all those who have worked 
hard to make this conference happen. This meeting is timely. Tomorrow, 
fi nance ministers from the Group of 20 nations will meet here in Busan, 
and in November Korea will become the fi rst country outside the Group 
of Seven to host a G-20 leaders’ summit. 
Korea: From Developing to Developed Country 
I want to commend Korean President Lee Myung-Bak for his leadership 
in the G-20 process and for his foresight in helping ensure that develop-
ment issues are on the G-20 agenda even as the whole world remains 
preoccupied with a smooth exit from the most serious economic and 
fi nancial crisis since the Great Depression. 
In the space of less than half a century, Korea transformed itself from 
a poor nation into an industrial country by building on its comparative 
advantage—in the face of scarce natural resources—moving to export-
oriented industries and investing in its people.
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala
World Bank
Why the G-20 Should Be 
Interested in the Development 
of the G-160
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The World Bank played a role in Korea’s development effort through 
economic analysis, policy advice, and a diversifi ed lending program 
that responded to the changing needs of a fast-growing economy. This 
was a clear win-win. We learned from Korea’s development experience, 
gaining lessons in areas such as planning and investing in scientifi c and 
technological excellence in education, industrial sector restructuring, 
technology acquisition, and fi nancial development.
In 1973 Korea graduated from IDA, the International Development 
Association, the arm of the World Bank that today helps the 79 poorest 
countries on the globe, which it had joined in 1961. It became an IDA 
donor in 1977. In the last replenishment round, Korea pledged a wel-
come $285 million. In January this year, Korea became the fi rst country 
to advance from being one of the original recipients of aid from IDA to 
join the DAC, the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Korea’s remarkable history should serve as a reminder at the G-20 table 
of the importance of development, even though the G-20 we see today was 
a child of the global fi nancial and economic crisis. This crisis has exacted 
a heavy toll on poor people everywhere. The World Bank estimates that an 
extra 64 million people will be living on less than $1.25 a day by the end of 
2010 as a consequence of the crisis. These are people who live not just in 
the poorest countries in the world but also in middle-income countries, 
now home to 70 percent of the world’s poor.
Weathering Crises
When called on to play a historically large role to protect the poor and 
lay the foundation for recovery, the World Bank Group rose to the chal-
lenge. Between July 2008 and May 2010, the Bank Group’s fi nancial 
commitments amounted to a record $105 billion. Learning from past 
crises, the Bank targeted this support toward social safety nets for the 
most vulnerable; productive investments in agriculture, infrastructure, 
and innovation; and assistance to the private sector as an engine of 
growth. 
We have devised new ways to help our clients—from the food crisis 
response to the IDA Crisis Response Facility and the International Finance 
Corporation’s (the private sector arm of the World Bank) special vehicles 
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for trade fi nance, microfi nance, bank capitalization, infrastructure, and 
distressed debt. Many of these initiatives involve close partnerships with 
donors, including Korea. 
While huge rescue packages by wealthy countries staved off another 
Great Depression, the world is now confronting the hangover of fi scal 
imbalances. Gross general government debt in many rich-country econ-
omies is projected to rise from an average of 75 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP) at the end of 2007 to 110 percent of GDP at the end of 
2014, even assuming that the crisis-related stimulus measures are with-
drawn in the next few years. 
Confronted with this problem, many governments are rushing to 
reduce their budget defi cits, which, unfortunately, could jeopardize the 
already weak global recovery.
High levels of public debt in parts of the Euro Area, sparked by Greece, 
pose the risks of contagion, not just within Europe but beyond, as shown 
by movements in asset prices all over the world. This represents a new 
threat for the global economy. 
Just when we thought we had turned the corner, there are new clouds 
on the horizon. Nelson Mandela, who is no stranger to overcoming 
adversity, warned, “After climbing a great hill, one only fi nds that there 
are many more hills to climb.”
Engines for Growth in the Developing World
The G-20’s objective is “strong, sustainable, and balanced growth.” With 
the inevitability of a large fi scal consolidation in the advanced econo-
mies and renewed uncertainty as a result of the European debt crisis, the 
economic resilience of emerging economies as well as low-income coun-
tries is vital to achieving the G-20’s aims.
The strong growth already evident in emerging and developing econ-
omies should serve as a reminder to all of us of the increasing power and 
potential of these countries on the global stage. There are dynamic poles 
of growth in Latin America, Asia, and Africa that need to be recognized—
even if they are not at the G-20 table. 
Asia offers a powerful example. The region’s share of global output in 
purchasing power parity terms has tripled in less than two decades, 
increasing from 7 percent in 1980 to 21 percent in 2008. The region’s 
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stock markets now account for 32 percent of global market capitaliza-
tion, ahead of the United States at 30 percent and Europe at 25 percent. 
And the share of developing countries as a whole in global output has 
increased from 34 percent in 1980 to 43 percent in 2010 in purchasing 
power parity terms. 
 Almost half of global growth now comes from developing countries. 
The statistic alone illustrates the changing dynamics of the world econ-
omy. That is why I want to talk today about why the G-160+ matters to 
the G-20.
Why the G-160+ Matters
There are four concrete reasons why the G-20 should be interested in the 
G-160+. 
First, while some of the increased global demand needed to sustain 
global output and jobs can come from emerging G-20 economies, a big 
part of it can also come from low-income countries! Some numbers 
from Africa make the point.
•  Incomes are rising. Per capita GDP growth went from 0.7 percent a 
year over 1996–2001 to 2.7 percent a year over 2002–08. 
•  Sub-Saharan Africa has a growing consumer market. Its population 
rose from 672 million in the year 2000 to 820 million in 2008. It is 
only a matter of time before its population numbers rival those of 
China and India. 
The same dynamic of rising incomes and increasing demand is being 
reproduced in many low-income countries around the world, countries 
that can now play a role as new sources of global demand. 
Second, there is money to be made! Increasingly companies investing 
in low-income countries are reaping disproportionately higher returns, 
compared to those investing in traditional markets. New research by the 
Boston Consulting Group shows that “Africa’s top 40 companies are 
emerging as competitors on the global stage, propelled by economies 
whose performance now rivals the BRIC nations”—Brazil, the Russian 
Federation, India, and China (Wallis 2010). We can now begin to envi-
sion not just East Asian tigers, but African lionesses.
With Africa’s recent growth, it should be in the interests of G-20 pol-
icy makers to get the word out to their own multinationals about new 
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opportunities, not just in the African lionesses like Mauritius and South 
Africa but also in other fast-growing low-income countries like Ghana 
and Armenia. 
Another vital area of focus is trade. Advanced economies need extra 
sources of demand to support recovery and create jobs. But they also 
need inputs for their products such as minerals, agricultural products, 
and fossil fuels. And developing countries need access to overseas mar-
kets to grow faster through expansion and rising productivity. This can 
be a win-win situation, but we need to work hard to make it happen.
The global contours of trade have been changing. Developing coun-
tries have accounted for about half of the increase in world import 
demand since 2000. Many low-income countries are more open today 
than they were in 2000. 
Five years ago, at the Group of Eight meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland, 
world leaders launched a global initiative on “aid for trade” to help the 
integration of developing countries into the global economy through 
initiatives to expand trade. Delivering on these commitments has proven 
diffi cult. There is currently no central entity or global fi nancial coordi-
nation mechanism that takes the lead on or is the focal point for deliver-
ing aid for trade. Yet this aid is crucial not only to improve productivity 
of fi rms and farmers in poor developing countries but also to foster 
global growth. 
Developing countries need to play their part too. They tend to have 
more and higher barriers to trade and investment in services. Remov-
ing such restrictions can generate substantial benefi ts, leading to lower-
cost and higher-quality producer services for fi rms and farmers in these 
countries. 
A fourth reason the G-20 should be interested in the G-160 + relates 
to the pervasive and costly effects of climate change in our globally 
linked world. While all countries will be adversely affected, the biggest 
impact will be on the poorest countries and the poorest people within 
them. Even if efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions succeed, some 
degree of global warming and climate change is unavoidable. South 
and Southeast Asia are likely to have even bigger and more frequent 
fl oods than before, while increased storm activity will likely have its 
greatest effects in the hurricane belt of the Pacifi c and Indian Oceans. 
Sub-Saharan African countries are expected to suffer the most from 
drought and reduced agricultural productivity. 
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The costs of adapting to a changing climate will increase over time. 
A recent study (World Bank 2009) estimates that the cost of adaptation 
by low-income countries will be around $24 billion to $26 billion a year 
over the next 10 years (in 2005 prices). But these costs could be offset by 
increases in productivity over time, job creation, and technology trans-
fer from countries like Korea and Japan to those in need. It is better to 
act now than pay more later. In Bangladesh, for example, the cost of 
reinforcing embankments and dykes in coastal areas is small compared 
with the expected damages. Similarly, the cost of addressing Bolivia’s 
irrigation challenges today is lower than if kept for later. 
Weather changes in developing countries, including those in the G-20, 
could slow growth not only for these countries but also for their neigh-
bors and possibly for the developed world. Imagine the potential impact 
on businesses in the developed world of a potential shortage of soybeans 
or coffee from Brazil, cotton from Egypt and Central Asian countries, or 
rice from Thailand, Bangladesh, or India. Therefore, it is in the G-20’s 
interest to act early on climate change to help low-income countries 
secure sustainable long-term growth. 
In this context, I want to commend Korea’s commitment to green 
growth, both via its Green New Deal Stimulus Package—regarded as the 
greenest among all stimulus packages—and its launch of the Global 
Green Growth Institute in June. 
Grappling with Key Constraints such 
as Infrastructure, Education, and Skills
To enhance the G-160+’s contribution to the global economy even fur-
ther, it will be important to remove some constraints to growth. Here too 
there can be win-wins for the G-20 by, for example, investing in infra-
structure. This is about a $900 billion plus business, which is estimated 
to be the total annual infrastructure investment and maintenance needs 
in developing countries, representing about 6–8 percent of developing 
countries’ GDP. Nearly every investment climate survey for a developing 
country points to the lack of infrastructure as a constraint on private 
investment and the competitiveness of private fi rms. But action does pay 
off. We have all heard about how information and communications 
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technology (ICT) and the widespread availability of cell phones have 
transformed the lives of poor people working in agriculture, forestry, or 
fi shing by giving them access to information about market prices and 
demand from nearby markets. 
But the basics—the lack of paved roads, electrical power, and 
ports—are a problem. In some cases, if you fi x the roads, you can avoid 
losing goods to spoilage because they cannot get to market on time. 
Countries such as Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and 
Tajikistan all provide examples where investment in infrastructure can 
give a much needed spur to growth, helping those countries to realize 
their potential. 
The second major constraint has to do with education and skills. The 
developed world benefi ts if there is an educated, skilled workforce in 
the developing world. Governments of developing countries can play a 
role here by investing more in education and improving its quality. 
Quality is critical because it is cognitive skills and learning, not years of 
schooling, that matter (Hanushek and Woessman 2008).
Governments must also ensure that their workforce is adequately 
trained and that young people leaving secondary school are employ-
able. This requires investment in technical and vocational education 
training. Such investments are critical if governments hope to attract 
foreign direct investment in labor-intensive manufacturing. Large 
investments in education and skills underlay the growth miracles in 
Korea and other East Asian nations. Developed countries have a stake in 
this as well. One of the main motivations for fi rms to move their ser-
vices offshore is the lower cost of workers. And increased foreign direct 
investment fl ows in this area are a win-win for both developed and 
developing countries. 
The big question is how to fi nance the needed investment in infra-
structure, education, and skills. 
Clearly, developing countries need to increase their own domestic 
resource mobilization. But the G-20 can also help with additional sources 
of funds. These funds provide important leverage for supporting public 
sector basic service delivery in all low-income countries. I call upon the 
G-20 to throw its full support behind the upcoming IDA-16 replenish-
ment round. These resources are needed to support the development 
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agenda in the 79 poorest countries in the world. The replenishment 
comes at a time of signifi cant fi scal constraints in many donor countries 
and renewed uncertainty about the global economic recovery. But these 
diffi culties need to be weighed against the imperative of supporting the 
fragile recovery in these IDA countries and the need for redoubling 
efforts in pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals, with the over-
all aim of halving poverty by the year 2015.
The G-20 can also help by exploring new modes of front-loading and 
delivering development fi nance for infrastructure, as the donor commu-
nity has done through the Advance Market Commitment (AMC) mech-
anism for vaccines and other mechanisms that effectively eliminate 
uncertainty about fi nancing essential development services. In a similar 
vein, exploring development bonds, diaspora bonds (debt instruments 
issued by a country to raise fi nancing from its overseas diaspora), or 
other forms of securitizing assets can help deliver the large resources 
needed for infrastructure in developing countries. 
An important spin-off of such approaches could also be changes in 
perceptions about doing business in low-income countries, and in par-
ticular, Sub-Saharan Africa.
Finally, world leaders must not overlook the repatriation to low-
income countries of public monies that were corruptly stolen and are 
sitting in the fi nancial centers of developed countries and emerging 
markets. This is an important issue for the G-20 and for developing 
countries alike. 
Big sums are involved. By conservative estimates, every year around 
$20 billion to $40 billion is stolen from developing countries through 
bribery, misappropriation of funds, and corrupt practices. Preventing 
such theft and repatriating stolen public assets stashed abroad can be a 
signifi cant source of development fi nance—especially at a time of fi scal 
constraint in rich countries. For example, $20 billion can fi nance about 
48,000 kilometers of two-lane paved road in an average low-income 
country. That is why the World Bank Group has been partnering with 
the United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime on the Stolen Asset 
Recovery (StAR) initiative to go after corrupt gains. 
As part of its anticorruption agenda, the G-20 can support the StAR 
initiative by adding “no safe havens for the proceeds of corruption” to 
its cause. 
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Sink or Swim Together
In conclusion, the G-20 needs the G-160 + for reasons of self-interest. 
G-20 countries need new sources of demand. The developing world has 
the potential and the people. It can help in the building of a world of 
jobs, not joblessness; hope, not hopelessness. The G-20 must recognize 
this and give development a central place in its agenda. 
Aid needs to move more in the direction of assistance for investment 
and long-run growth in developing countries. This reorientation is not 
going to happen overnight; and it might take a whole generation to 
deliver tangible results. But as an ancient Korean proverb reminds us, 
“A 1000-li journey starts with one step.”1 When we look back on events 
20 years from now, this conference with its rich agenda spanning topics 
from growth, to the development lessons from Korea, to aid-for-trade 
and inclusive fi nance—to mention a few topics—could be that one 
step.
Note
 1.  A “li” is an old Korean length unit, about 0.4 km.
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Globalization has been a powerful force for economic development 
over the last three decades. One of the historically largest declines in 
poverty was led by developing countries that successfully integrated 
into the global economy.1 During a period when trade and fi nancial 
fl ows across borders increased at a much faster pace than national gross 
domestic product (GDP), these countries used globalization as an 
opportunity to expand production and income opportunities in their 
home countries.
As the world emerges from the global economic crisis, however, policy 
makers need to remind themselves that globalization also means inter-
dependence across nations. During 2009 interdependence became the 
carrier of economic ruin. Systemic fi nancial distress spread across many 
countries, and global trade links collapsed precipitously. 
One of the primary lessons of the recent global crisis is that coordi-
nated economic policy responses are necessary in an interdependent 
world. We should remind ourselves of the severity of the situation at the 
start of the crisis. Equity markets were in a tailspin, there was the risk of 
bank runs in the world’s largest fi nancial centers, and trade and industrial 
production plummeted. This all was occurring at a faster pace than in 
Justin Yifu Lin
World Bank
A Global Economy with 
Multiple Growth Poles
78 Postcrisis Growth and Development
1929, at the start of the Great Depression. Indeed, without a rapid interna-
tional policy response, the global economy faced a looming depression.
The Group of Twenty (G-20) served as a key policy coordination 
forum, and the coordinated actions of G-20 members—along with the 
efforts of the international fi nancial institutions and many non-G-20 
governments—have all helped avert a global fi nancial meltdown and 
establish the basis for an incipient economic recovery. Central banks 
and governments in G-20 economies engineered fi nancial rescues and 
rapid liquidity support. These were complemented by fi scal packages 
that enhanced aggregated demand and expanded social protection dur-
ing the recession. The G-20 made an overall commitment to avoid trade 
protectionism that could have triggered a continued downward spiral in 
global trade fl ows.
As fi nancial markets recover and growth resumes, we cannot be com-
placent about the need for coordinated policies to assure a sustainable 
recovery and renewed growth over the medium-term. The risks of a slug-
gish recovery or even a “double-dip” recession are not negligible. The crisis 
has infl icted heavy costs on economies around the world. Unemployment 
is at record levels, fi scal fragility is a legacy of the crisis, and capacity utili-
zation rates in industry remain substantially below precrisis levels in many 
countries. The events in Europe of the spring of this year provide a clear 
indication of the risk for renewed economic and fi nancial stress globally.
More than ever before, there is the need for capital to fl ow to the 
highest productivity investment. That requires a global view and mecha-
nisms to ensure that fi nancial, trade, and knowledge fl ows are not inhib-
ited by borders. Countries at lower stages of development generally have 
the investment opportunities with the highest rates of return. Many 
emerging market economies are able to fi nance these investments 
through improved mobilization of local savings, improved domestic 
fi nancial intermediation, and substantial stockpiles of international 
reserves. Many other developing countries are more constrained, and 
there may be additional institutional characteristics that inhibit foreign 
investment. Domestic reforms are needed in these cases. In addition, 
international organizations may play a critical role in ensuring fi nancial 
fl ows in areas where private investors still see risks that outweigh the 
potential for profi table investment. 
In addition to fi nance, the reforms alluded to above can benefi t greatly 
from the diverse experience of G-20 countries. The best practice and 
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experience of reform for economic development are generated by suc-
cessful developed and developing countries. This experience can, and 
needs to, be shared with other countries. The globally representative 
nature of G-20 policy experience can be an ideal forum to promote 
knowledge sharing, and the World Bank can be a knowledge exchange to 
facilitate the process of sharing development experiences.
In summary, the G-20 could help design and implement a mutually 
benefi cial strategy to achieve sustained global recovery: a framework 
whereby policy coordination, knowledge sharing, and fi nancial assistance 
from high-income countries are channeled to promote productivity-
enhancing investment in developing countries. Complementary public 
investment strategies across all countries (in areas such as science and 
technology, green technology, aid for trade, and infrastructure) can sup-
port a strong recovery and the transition to sustained growth.
This chapter discusses how to initiate this mutually benefi cial strategy 
within the G-20 framework and how the World Bank and other multilat-
eral development institutions can assist the realization of this strategy. 
But fi rst it sets the stage with some views on where the global recovery 
stands, and what might be required to reignite a sustained multipolar 
pattern of growth in the coming years.
The Global Crisis and the Challenge Ahead
The world economy is recovering from the global fi nancial crisis, which 
many called the Great Recession. This recovery process began to take 
shape in the middle of 2009 in developing Asia—particularly in China—
where manufacturing production has already returned to precrisis lev-
els. However, postcrisis economic performance varies greatly across 
countries. This heterogeneity can be explained by the degree of direct 
exposure to the fi nancial roots of the crisis as well as to its main trans-
mission mechanisms and by the condition before the crisis and thus the 
ability (or feasibility) to implement countercyclical policies to mitigate 
the effects of the crisis.
Excess Capacity and Fragility
Most countries in developing Asia had little exposure to the fi nancial 
derivatives that triggered the crisis, and they had the fi scal space as well 
as the foreign reserves necessary to apply strong policy stimulus 
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programs. Developing countries that were hit the hardest at the onset 
of the crisis—those that had enormous short-term capital infl ows 
through multinational bank branches, large current account defi cits, 
overpriced housing markets, or limited fi scal space to implement coun-
tercyclical measures—are still struggling to regain momentum. Growth 
in advanced countries (many of them directly related to the fi nancial 
origins of the crisis) remains modest, with fi scal stimulus components 
still playing a signifi cant role. Households, fi nancial institutions, and 
fi rms are still in the process of deleveraging and cleaning their balance 
sheets, and hence private consumption and investment demand are 
not yet likely to be strong driving forces behind the recovery process. 
With signifi cant excess capacity in most countries, the world economy 
is still fragile, and unemployment is likely to remain high relative to 
precrisis levels. Despite the revival of industrial production displayed 
in fi gure 3.1, many high-income countries continue to have relatively 
low levels of capacity utilization. For example, in the fi rst quarter of 
Figure 3.1. Industrial Production Index, 1993–2009
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Figure 3.2. Interest rates in the Euro Area and the United States, 1999–2010
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2010, capacity utilization rates in manufacturing were at 73 percent in 
the United States and at 72 percent in the Euro Area (aggregate 
index).2 
Strong policy responses and international coordination by interna-
tional fi nancial institutions and governments prevented a global eco-
nomic meltdown and helped buffer the impact of the crisis. Central 
banks provided the required liquidity to avoid a fi nancial system melt-
down by using a wide array of instruments. Both the Federal Reserve and 
the European Central Bank eased their monetary stances (fi gure 3.2). 
Signaling the severity of the situation, unconventional instruments, such 
as capital injections, purchase of fi nancial derivatives, and special liquid-
ity facilities, were used successfully to provide liquidity to the fi nancial 
system. While providing important liquidity support, monetary policy 
has limited effectiveness for stimulating an economy with excess capac-
ity; that is, near-zero interest rates in an environment of excess installed 
capacity and highly leveraged economic agents are unlikely to stimulate 
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private investment or consumption demand. Overindebted households 
and fi rms fear taking on additional loans for purchasing consumer dura-
bles or expanding their businesses. In uncertain times, it is more prudent 
for fi rms to await additional demand and reemploy existing capacity 
than invest in new capacity.
Fiscal Policy Dilemma: Continue or Exit from Stimulus
Countercyclical fi scal policies during the crisis (in most cases accom-
panied by accommodative monetary policy, as mentioned earlier) 
helped buffer the negative impact on output and aggregate demand. 
The overall change in the fi scal balance for advanced G-20 economies 
for 2009 (relative to the precrisis year 2007) is estimated to be around 
6.3 percent of GDP, of which crisis-related discretionary measures 
account for 1.9 percent of GDP, whereas for emerging G-20 economies 
the corresponding numbers are 5.4 percent and 2.2 percent, respec-
tively. Fiscal stimulus packages contributed one-third of the total 
increase in the aggregate fi scal defi cit of the G-20 countries (IMF 
2009). 
Additional fi scal stimulus might be needed to cement the recovery 
process, since economic agents have yet to clean their balance sheets, 
and consumption and investment demand remain weak relative to pre-
crisis levels. However, political economy considerations as well as future 
infl ation risks represent signifi cant constraints in the continuous use of 
fi scal stimulus packages, especially in the United States and Europe. 
Tightly linked to these factors is the rapid accumulation of government 
debt, accentuated by the current situation of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Por-
tugal, and Spain and by concerns regarding the increasing level of the 
U.S. government debt. According to the International Monetary Fund, 
for advanced G-20 economies, gross general government debt is expected 
to rise from 78 percent of GDP in 2007 to over 118 percent of GDP in 
2014. The situation in emerging G-20 economies is less worrisome, with 
the ratio of general government debt to GDP expected to stay around 
precrisis levels (IMF 2009).
Growth: A Solution to the Fiscal Dilemma 
If governments can identify and make investments in key areas that repre-
sent binding constraints to growth, then current spending not only will 
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have a short run effect, but may also pave the way toward a brighter future 
of sustained strong economic growth. Increased infrastructure is estimated 
to have contributed an additional 2–2.5 percentage points to per capita 
income growth during the early 2000s in Latin America.3 Developing 
countries are already an engine of global growth, but a further strengthen-
ing of their supply potential could further increase their demand for the 
products of high-income countries. Such strengthening would, at the same 
time, help reduce the gap between high-income and low-income coun-
tries, signifi cantly lower poverty, and make the world a more equitable 
place. Furthermore, support for investment and growth in the developing 
world is in the interest of the high-income world. Historically, a one unit 
increase in investment is accompanied by a half unit increase in imports, 
and given the high-income country share of traded capital goods, a US$1 
increase in developing-country imports is associated with a US$0.35 
increase in the production of high-income country capital goods.4
The Emergence of Multiple Growth Poles
The World Economic Landscape
After the Industrial Revolution, the world was economically polarized. 
Growth accelerated strongly in the industrial countries. For most of 
the 20th century, only a few developing countries were able to acceler-
ate growth and eventually catch up with the developed countries. The 
Republic of Korea is a notable example of this phenomenon; however, 
most developing countries failed to have sustainable growth.
Strengthening regional growth spillovers would be good for the world 
economy. During the past quarter century, the world has been witness-
ing only a gradual shift in economic power from the traditional high-
income countries of the Group of Seven (G-7) to emerging markets, and 
we see this in the transition of global policy debates from the G-7 forum 
to the broader G-20. At the start of the 21st century, the G-7 still domi-
nated the global economy, as noted in table 3.1.
Before the global crisis, developing countries were growing faster than 
high-income countries and provided the main source of increased 
demand for high-income countries’ exports. GDP growth was higher in 
developing countries than in high-income countries every year from 
2000 to 2008, and the difference widened over the period to an average 
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of 3.7 percentage points. This phenomenon was not restricted to a single 
country or region. Every region of the developing world grew faster 
than the high-income countries, with the average gap over the period 
ranging from 1.4 percentage points (Latin America and the Caribbean) 
to 6.5 percentage points (East Asia and the Pacifi c). Accompanying 
these growth patterns were growing trade links—developing-country 
merchandise imports from developed countries tripled in dollar terms 
from 2000 to 2008. Despite this rapid growth, the share of developing-
country imports from high-income countries actually declined as a 
share of all imports—indicating that trade among developing countries 
grew even faster. As part of that dynamic, intraregional trade links 
expanded and growing economic ties—through trade, fi nance, and the 
movement of people—were established across regions among lower- 
and middle-income countries. As an example, Latin American and 
Caribbean imports sourced from within the region increased their 
share from 15 to 20 percent over the period, and total developing-
country-sourced imports increased from 21 to 38 percent of the region’s 
total merchandise imports.5
The multiple poles of growth can contribute signifi cantly to the 
global economy’s sustained recovery and dynamic growth, especially if 
the policy response is adequate and the remaining risks avoided.
Table 3.1. G-20 Shares of Global Gross National Income and Global Exports 
(percent)
Category 1970 1980 1980 2000 2008
Share of Global GNI (USD)
G-7 67 61 66 66 53
“Other” G-20 13 13 14 16 23
Share of Global GNI (PPP)
G-7 52 51 49 42
“Other” G-20 16 24 26 32
Share of Global Merchandise Exports (USD)
G-7 55 47 52 46 35
“Other” G-20 8 14 11 17 24
Source: Derived from World Development Indicators.
Note: G-7: United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and Japan. “Other” G-20: Argentina, 
Brazil, China, Australia, India, Indonesia. Korea (Rep.), Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey.
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In the current decade the shift in economic growth has accelerated 
dramatically. Clearly, the rise of China and India are part of this process, 
but other large emerging markets have grown vigorously: Brazil, the 
Russian Federation, and Indonesia are examples, but the Africa region— 
while still a small share of the global economy—has experienced a new 
dynamism. Figure 3.3 displays the higher levels of growth of developing 
countries relative to high-income countries and shows that the differ-
ence is important for every region of the developing world.
This growth acceleration of the past decade has resulted in a rebalanc-
ing of the global economic landscape. While shares of global gross 
national income were fairly stable in the fi nal decades of the past cen-
tury, these shares started to change more strongly during the fi rst decade 
of the 21st century (fi gure 3.4).
Figure 3.3. Gap in Growth Rates between Developing Regions and High-Income 
Countries, 2000–08 (Average)
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Figure 3.4. G-20 Shares of Global Gross National Income
Source: World Development Indicators.
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity. G-7: United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, 
and Japan. “Other” G-20: Argentina, Brazil, China, Australia, India, Indonesia, Korea (Rep.), Mexico, Russian 
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The growth acceleration was facilitated by trade and capital fl ows. 
International economic relations across countries multiplied dramati-
cally over this period. Merchandise trade as a proportion of GDP increased 
from about one-third in the mid-1980s to just over half of world GDP in 
2008, and the increase was even larger for developing countries than for 
high-income countries. Net foreign direct investment to developing 
countries (as a share of GDP) increased almost fi vefold between the 1980s 
and the fi rst decade of this century (from an average of 0.6 percent of 
GDP during the 1980s to an average of 2.9 percent of GDP in 2000 –08) 
(fi gure 3.5).6
Figure 3.5. Increasing Trade and Capital Flow Links
Source: World Development Indicators.
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Import numbers tell a revealing story: the developing world is becom-
ing a driver of the global economy (table 3.2). Much of the recovery in 
world trade stems from strong demand for imports among developing 
countries. Developing-country imports are already 2 percent higher than 
their precrisis peak in April 2008. In contrast, the imports of high-income 
countries are still 19 percent below their earlier high. Even though devel-
oping world imports are about half the imports of high-income coun-
tries, they are growing at a much faster rate. As a result, they have accounted 
for more than half of the increase in world import demand since 2000.
Why does the world need multipolar growth?
Many high-income countries need to rebalance their growth path 
toward greater exports, higher domestic savings and less domestic con-
sumption. Growth in developing countries would add new sources of 
growth to global demand and new markets for capital goods produced in 
high-income countries. For this demand to accelerate, fi nance and knowl-
edge need to fl ow from high-income countries to developing countries.
The Emergence of a Multipolar Growth World
The Growth Commission Report identifi ed 13 economies that had an aver-
age growth rate of 7 percent or higher for 25 years or more following World 
War II. The conditions for those economies to achieve this remarkable level 
of economic growth were identifi ed as openness; macroeconomic stability; 
high rates of saving and investment; market mechanism for resource allo-
cation; and a committed, credible, and facilitating government. Before the 
global crisis, 29 economies achieved this outstanding growth rate over the 
2000–08 period—including 11 countries from Sub-Saharan Africa.





Rest of the 
World Total
1980s 59.7 20.7 19.6 100
1990s 67.0 15.2 17.8 100
2000s 47.9 27.3 24.8 100
2005–2009 46.6 27.9 25.5 100
2010f 45.8 40.5 13.7 100
Source: World Bank Development Prospects Group.
Note: G-20 high income: G-20 member countries with an “atlas” GNI per capita greater than US$11,906 in 2008.
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From the perspective of low-income countries, the emergence of 
growth poles in middle-income countries is benefi cial for several rea-
sons. First, strong growth in middle-income countries creates large 
demand for natural resources from low-income countries. Second, 
investment from middle-income countries to low-income countries 
(from China into Africa, for instance, or from Thailand into Cambodia) 
is highly productive in that it effectively transfers labor-intensive activi-
ties that the middle-income investor countries have outgrown. Both 
natural-resource-intensive and labor-intensive manufacturing generally 
fi t the comparative advantage of low-income countries. Third, fostering 
South-South manufacturing links can enhance the potential benefi ts 
from outsourcing (for example, business-process outsourcing in Kenya 
and Ghana), which in turn can increase economic opportunities in low-
income countries and enhance productive effi ciency globally. 
Another element of multipolar growth is the high-income countries’ 
role as a source of new technology. At the technological frontier, these 
countries need to create new products, new production processes, and 
new organizational techniques in order to sustain economic growth. 
These technologies can later be adopted and imported by both middle- 
and low-income countries.
Knowledge fl ows are critical to spreading the understanding of suc-
cessful cases of development. It is an issue not only of technology 
transfer but also of understanding how development strategies can be 
successfully implemented.
The story of Korea is a particularly good illustration of successful 
industrialization. The Korean government took a proactive approach to 
industrial upgrading. It adjusted its strategy to enter industries that were 
consistent with the country’s latent (and evolving) comparative advan-
tage. In the automotive sector, for example, early in Korea’s growth 
period, domestic manufacturers concentrated mostly on assembly of 
imported parts—a labor-intensive process that was in line with Korea’s 
comparative advantage at the time. Similarly, in electronics the focus 
was initially on household appliances, such as televisions, washing 
machines, and refrigerators; it then moved to memory chips—the least 
technologically complex segment of the information industry. Korea’s 
technological ascent has been rapid, as has been its accumulation of 
physical and human capital, because of the conformity of Korea’s main 
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industrial sectors to the existing comparative advantages even as its 
underlying comparative advantage changed over time (Lin and Monga 
2010). As a result, Korea has achieved remarkable GDP growth rates in 
the past 40 years and has performed impressively on industrial upgrad-
ing into such industries as automobiles and semiconductors. 
The experience of Korea and other East Asian countries provides evi-
dence that low-income countries can transform themselves into dynamic 
high-income countries and create new growth poles that help the global 
economy and contribute to world stability. While each country should 
design a development strategy that is rooted in its own reality, other low-
income countries in various parts of the world can learn from East Asian 
successes. In particular, three key features of these success stories can be 
emulated: a country can develop industries that are consistent with its 
comparative advantage in each stage of its development; it can use the 
market as the basic mechanism for effective resource allocation at each 
given stage of development; and it can build a facilitating state to upgrade 
the industrial structure and move from one stage of development to 
another (Lin 2010).7
The G-20 and a Multipolar Growth World
During the current crisis growth in developed countries relied signifi -
cantly on government policies. Output is still substantially below precri-
sis levels, and consumption demand remains weak. Precrisis growth was 
supported mainly by consumption growth, which was the result of 
wealth effects from capital gains in real estate and housing markets. But 
over the medium term, the developed countries need to rely on develop-
ing-country growth to stimulate their exports. This interdependence 
will become even more important as more developing countries expand 
their role as growth poles.
While developing countries as a group are thriving, there is a lot of 
heterogeneity among them. Developing countries still represent a small 
fraction of the global economy. Emerging markets, on the one hand, are 
recovering strongly. Recovery there takes the form of a rebound in invest-
ment demand, which creates demand for investment goods that are pro-
duced by high-income countries. Low-income countries, on the other 
hand, have the potential to contribute substantially to global growth. 
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Sub-Saharan Africa could become a growth pole if certain conditions are 
met. The region’s precrisis performance offers evidence of this potential. 
Reforms can deliver concrete results, as witnessed for example in the 
telecommunications reforms that have spurred important growth in the 
information and computer technology sector.8
Different growth poles do not compete for the same slice of global 
demand—rather they reinforce each other. Growth in a given pole is 
likely to spill over to other poles and to other surrounding regions, 
through export demand, capital fl ows, or worker remittances. Trade is 
not a zero-sum game, and neither are investment or migration fl ows. 
Trade allows for mutually benefi cial transactions, and it leads to the cre-
ation of supply chains across countries where production effi ciency can 
be maximized globally. Factor fl ows represent movement of factors to 
locations where they can earn a higher return. These fl ows are all part of 
realizing the growth potential from distinct locations and the links across 
different poles of economic activity.
Prospects for capital fl ows are a source of concern, however (fi gure 3.6). 
In the medium term, private capital fl ows to developing countries 
Figure 3.6. Evolution of Net Capital Flows to Developing Countries
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(especially for smaller economies) are likely to be quite different from 
the past, both in volume and in pattern. The extraordinary growth lev-
els recorded in developing countries in 2002–07 (averaging 6.6 percent 
over the period) were possible partly because of the low cost of borrow-
ing and the excess liquidity in the United States. With low interest rates 
and excess liquidity, large capital outfl ows emanated from the United 
States and other high-income countries to the rest of the world in search 
of higher yields. The recent crisis has led to increased risk aversion and 
mounting uncertainty, convincing fi nancial institutions to withdraw 
credit from risky assets in emerging economies, even though macroeco-
nomic conditions in many of these economies did not show any signs 
of instability and their fi nancial systems were relatively healthy (fl ight 
to safety). Moreover, liquidity needs of many of these fi nancial institu-
tions caused by the credit crunch in advanced economies also contrib-
uted to reducing capital fl ows (and hence the availability of private 
fi nancial fl ows) and to raising the cost of capital. Capital fl ow volatility 
and higher risk premiums may constrain growth prospects in many 
developing countries. 
There is a need to rethink some of the sources for long-term growth. 
The key is to avoid a “new normal” low level of growth, but the outcome 
depends upon discovering new sources of global demand in the medium 
term. Many developing countries can fi ll this vacuum and become the 
new growth poles of the global economy. This is a unique opportunity 
to accelerate the changing dynamics of the global economy. Developing 
countries have played a signifi cant role in global investment and growth. 
Some of the most vibrant growth poles are in the developing world, 
and that is likely to remain so in the future. Such a new pattern of source 
of growth is a win-win for both the developing and developed worlds. 
It is time to enhance even further the developing countries’ role in the 
global economy.
Fiscal defi cits and increasing general government debt may have an 
impact on interest rates, increasing costs of servicing debt, as the recent 
case of Greece has shown. As government spending increases, economic 
agents might foresee that current spending will have to be paid off by 
tax or infl ation hikes in the future. If agents behave as if “Ricardian 
equivalence” holds, then they will save more in the present in anticipa-
tion of future tax increases, rendering government efforts ineffective. 
 A Global Economy with Multiple Growth Poles  93
But fi scal stimulus money can be directed appropriately toward invest-
ments that not only support current aggregate demand but also increase 
future productivity. In this case the so-called “Ricardian equivalence” 
can be broken (Lin 2009). Therefore it is very important to focus fi scal 
stimulus spending on projects that provide the largest social rate of 
return. The other required characteristic is that these investments be 
for public or quasi-public goods that would not be provided by the 
private sector.
The strategy for high-income countries differs from the strategy for 
developing countries. Developed countries are at the technology fron-
tier, and few profi table investment opportunities are immediately 
available when their manufacturing sectors have large excess capacity 
and there are few bottlenecks in their infrastructure. Therefore in high-
income countries the Ricardian equivalence problem may arise (as it 
did in Japan in the 1990s). But high-income countries could channel 
fi scal stimulus money toward enhanced research and development 
expenditure, especially in investments related to climate change and 
renewable energy, energy effi ciency improvement, and technologies 
with lower carbon paths.
The situation differs in developing countries, which present more 
opportunities to funnel fi scal stimulus money toward investments that 
directly enhance future productivity. Major infrastructure bottlenecks 
exist. Power shortages and constraints in electricity generation are com-
mon. There is ample room for technological adaptation and industrial 
structure upgrading. 
Some conditions must be fulfi lled for new growth poles to take 
root. While emerging economies are likely to maintain their growth 
momentum by themselves, most middle-income countries and almost 
all low-income countries with the potential to grow dynamically need 
to implement internal reforms and receive external assistance to real-
ize that potential. The key reforms are the following:
•  Developing countries should undertake structural reforms that help 
them mobilize domestic fi nancial resources and attract foreign direct 
investment. An important area of focus is the development of their 
own domestic fi nancial markets, which will counteract expected tight-
ness in global fi nancial markets (the World Bank’s Global Economic 
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Prospects 2010 stressed the point that costs of intermediation still can 
come down signifi cantly); and will also mobilize domestic and foreign 
savings and allocate them in productive investment opportunities. 
•  Some developing countries will need external assistance. In some 
countries access to global fi nancial markets is extremely limited, and 
the economies are so poor that domestic savings will never be ade-
quate for fi nancing development.
•  Developing countries need to improve their implementation capacity 
and governance, so they can provide a favorable investment climate 
for foreign direct investment in infrastructure projects.
Five Areas of Collaboration
Developing countries represent a timely and profi table investment oppor-
tunity for high-income countries. The main challenge for a sustained 
global recovery is the existence of large unused capacity in the capital 
goods sector in high-income countries. A logical solution to escape from 
the downward pressure created by this excess capacity—while avoiding 
the problem of debt sustainability and Ricardian equivalence—is to invest 
in productivity-enhancing projects. In high-income countries, the “green” 
economy is one area of such investments; however, it may not be enough 
to absorb the current large excess capacity. Investment and technical 
assistance in developing countries to release bottlenecks can unleash 
potential growth in developing countries and create demand for high-
income-country exports.
The multipolar growth of the future requires a new multilateralism 
in international relations. The multipolar growth based on the invest-
ment and knowledge fl ows described here requires actions by a multi-
tude of countries across the spectrum of development status. Global 
cooperation to promote the needed actions must be based on a new 
more inclusive leadership structure. The G-20 represents an excellent 
starting point; however, G-20 members need to reach out to their 
neighbors and trading partners to exchange ideas and create the learn-
ing community that can help create the environment for mutually 
benefi cial economic exchange.
Taking the G-20 as a starting point, then, allow me to elaborate briefl y 
on fi ve key areas for G-20 collaborative efforts. 
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Infrastructure
Investing in bottleneck-releasing infrastructure projects in developing 
countries is an important way of creating demand for capital goods. There 
are many such opportunities in developing countries. Such investments 
will contribute to the global recovery as well as to a sustainable and inclu-
sive global growth. However, many developing countries are constrained 
by their fi scal space and limited availability of foreign reserves. From an 
external perspective, of the 95 developing countries for which there are 
data for 2008, 39 had current account defi cits exceeding 10 percent of 
GDP.9 Like their high-income counterparts, developing countries also 
increased their budget defi cits in response to the global crisis. This occurred 
in low-income countries as well; however, an increasing number of coun-
tries are exhibiting a moderate to high risk of debt distress (see fi gure 3.7).
If infrastructure and other constraints can be removed, developing 
countries, including those in Africa, could become growth poles. Exter-
nal assistance could be channeled to economically profi table investment 
in developing countries. Public investment can remove bottlenecks to 
growth caused by a limited stock or low quality of infrastructure. Both 
Figure 3.7. Risk of Low Income Countries Debt Distress (Number of Countries in 
Each  Category)
Source: World Bank, Staff estimates. 
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private and public investment can play a key role in this regard. The state 
has a dual facilitating role both in directly producing some infrastruc-
ture and in providing the regulatory framework for private investment 
in infrastructure. 
What are the implications for multipolar growth? The empirical evi-
dence is strong that the quantity and quality of infrastructure has an 
important impact on economic growth, and a number of regions of the 
world have lagged in infrastructure investment in recent decades. For 
example, past estimates indicate that if Costa Rica, the top performer in 
infrastructure in Latin America were to have the quantity and quality of 
infrastructure in Korea, then Costa Rica’s growth would accelerate by 1.5 
percentage points (Calderón and Servén, 2004, 2010). For other countries 
in the region, the payoff would be substantially higher. More recent 
research showed that if African countries could “catch up” to the infra-
structure quantity and quality of regional leader Mauritius, then Sub-
Saharan African countries could grow 2.3 percentage points faster, on 
average (Calderón 2009). These results illustrate the growth potential 
that could be achieved in new growth poles through the elimination of 
infrastructure bottlenecks to growth. The same research also indicated 
that infrastructure investment also has a positive impact on reducing 
inequality within countries. From either an international or national per-
spective, infrastructure investment thus can promote inclusive growth.
Infrastructure investments are generally lumpy and costly and thus 
require fi nance. Government access to fi nance for public sector invest-
ment will depend upon progress in the G-20 fi nancial reform agenda to 
ensure that global fi nancial markets continue their recovery from the 
diffi cult circumstances of the past two years. Developing economies—
both within the G-20 and beyond—have an important reform agenda 
focused on improving the functioning of domestic fi nancial systems. 
The knowledge and best practice accumulated within the G-20 could be 
critical in this regard. 
In addition to fi nance, there is the need for consolidating best practice 
in the design of public and private partnerships for infrastructure devel-
opment. Many of these partnership projects have been implemented 
over the last few decades and economists and policy makers are reevalu-
ating the conditions under which public-private arrangements can be 
most effi cient and effective in delivering infrastructure services (Engel, 
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Fischer, and Galetovic 2008; Guasch, Laffont, and Straub 2008). The 
appropriate regulatory structure and contract design will depend upon 
the nature of the physical investment, the scope for monitoring quality 
of services, and the nature of risks with regard to demand and mainte-
nance costs over time. 
Finally, there may be room for international fi nancial institutions and 
the G-20 to work together to promote innovative new fi nancing mecha-
nisms. One possibility is to leverage sovereign wealth funds and global 
long-term investment funds more generally through mechanisms like 
the International Finance Corporation’s Asset Management Company.10 
Such a mechanism can play an important informational role by being a 
“fi rst mover” that demonstrates how to construct stable and profi table 
investment portfolios in emerging markets. 
Another new initiative could be the further development of indexed 
sovereign debt instruments (Perry 2009; Shiller 2003, 2004). Both the 
volatility of international commodity prices over the last decade and the 
recent fi nancial crisis are reminders of the risk of external shocks that 
developing countries face. One way to reduce that risk—at least for idio-
syncratic shocks to particular countries or groups of countries—would 
be to issue government debt that is indexed either to national GDP 
growth or to the terms of trade. With such instruments, governments 
would face lower debt service costs during times of stress. If enough 
countries issued these instruments, then investors would be able to 
diversify their holdings based on the different risks faced by countries 
(such as commodity exporters versus commodity importers, or diverse 
regions). To make diversifi cation possible, international cooperation 
would be needed in order to get a large enough group of countries to 
issue these instruments. This coordinated effort should lower costs, given 
the diversifi cation benefi ts to investors. The G-20 could be a forum for 
assisting a group of countries to take these steps—perhaps with the 
assistance of the international fi nancial institutions. With lower (diversi-
fi ed) risk, there could be better access to global capital markets to fi nance 
infrastructure and other investments.
Human Capital
Many developing countries lack suffi cient qualifi ed labor, a constraint that 
poses a bottleneck for multipolar growth. A number of middle-income 
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countries have experienced positive results with conditional cash transfers 
for improving attendance at primary and lower secondary education; 
however, the results in educational achievement have been less promising. 
In addition, in poorer countries, basic access to schooling remains a chal-
lenge even at the primary education level.
Since the pioneering work of Barro and Lee (1993, 2001), there have 
been improvements in the measurement of educational attainment and 
its role in economic growth. A recent survey highlights the importance 
not only of attending school but of acquiring cognitive skills, as measured 
by performance on internationally comparable test scores (Hanushek and 
Woessmann 2008). The survey provides compelling empirical evidence 
to support the impact that cognitive skills have on individual incomes as 
well as on macroeconomic growth. This work provides evidence of the 
need to promote both quality of education and years of attendance. 
Many countries require improvements in this area if they are to contrib-
ute to multipolar growth over the medium term.
There is also increasing evidence of the need for attending to human 
development at the early stage of life. The World Bank has launched a 
new funding program to promote the multidimensional package of 
interventions—in health, nutrition, and preschool education—to assure 
that the potential human capital of the very young is not handicapped 
before entering primary education systems. 
As industries in developing economies upgrade, the need for tertiary 
and vocational training in developing countries increases. The G-20 can 
set up partnerships for improving educational outcomes across the 
group as well as models for improving education globally. There are also 
opportunities for increased trade in educational services across the G-20. 
Certifi cation programs for international tertiary and vocational educa-
tion could be an important tool for ensuring the quality of educational 
services received internationally. As fi rms integrate production across 
countries, the supply of labor becomes more globalized, despite limits to 
labor mobility. Global growth then becomes dependent upon the skills 
of the global labor force. Education improvements in developing coun-
tries can help remove constraints to industrial expansion globally.
A key feature of human capital development in developing countries 
is to prepare the labor force for production of goods and services that 
are consistent with their comparative advantage. Governments need to 
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maintain this focus when addressing reforms to their education and 
social welfare systems.
Trade
Trade was a motor for multipolar growth before the crisis, with global 
exports growing at about four times the pace of global GDP during 
2003–08. Going forward, the G-20 can promote completion of the Doha 
Development Round for trade liberalization along with institutional 
reforms for trade facilitation. In addition, during the crisis many coun-
tries increased the use of antidumping measures, countervailing duties, 
and safeguards provisions to restrict imports (Brown 2009). While these 
measures have been applied to only a small share of global trade, the 
G-20 can be an effective forum for discussion of these measures and 
work toward ensuring that they are applied in only a limited and legiti-
mate manner. Another issue of critical importance is continued efforts 
to open up duty- and quota-free access for goods originating in the 
world’s least developed economies.
The empirical evidence on trade and economic growth is mixed. Part 
of the diffi culty may lie in the need to combine openness with other 
complementary policy and institutional reforms to prepare economies 
to take advantage of the opportunities provided by trade. These reforms 
may span “traditional” areas of hard infrastructure, human capital, and 
the business climate. In fact, recently published empirical research has 
identifi ed the importance of these complementary reforms in inter-
acting with trade openness in promoting economic growth (Chang, 
Kaltani, and Loayza 2009). 
For many low-income countries to participate in emerging growth 
poles, additional policy reforms may be needed to promote the type of 
structural transformation required for producing new tradable prod-
ucts. Developing practical approaches for countries to identify these 
potential products and the policies needed for relieving binding con-
straints to their production is not the topic of this chapter; however, the 
main thrust is to use the experience of past successful countries to guide 
low-income countries’ progress in industrial upgrading (Lin and Monga 
2010). A growing literature explores the structure of exports and how 
the resulting structure affects economic growth (Hausmann, Hwang, 
and Rodrik 2007).
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In addition, many countries need assistance for trade facilitation. 
Some progress has been made on this front; however, more needs to 
be done to improve the quantity and quality of aid for trade. This 
issue is discussed in chapter 7. At this point, however, allow me to 
highlight several areas for G-20 action. The G-20 should lead efforts 
to improve data to better monitor and evaluate aid for trade; create a 
knowledge exchange for best practice in improved regulation and 
infrastructure for facilitating trade fl ows; and develop a forum for 
joint government and private sector dialogue on the need for trade 
facilitation.
Governance and Anticorruption
G-20 countries have a mutual responsibility to promote strong gover-
nance and anticorruption measures. These are key elements affecting the 
investment climate and essential for the effi ciency of fi nancial fl ows and 
investment across countries. Domestically, developing countries need 
strong governance mechanisms to enhance the effi ciency and effective-
ness of government spending, whether it be for infrastructure invest-
ment or social spending for enhancing human capital. 
It is a diffi cult and evolving fi eld of study to measure the quality of 
governance, more broadly, and the extent of corruption, more specifi -
cally. A variety of research results identify a strong link between quality 
of governance and economic growth—in particular, if one defi nes gov-
ernance to include the quality of regulation and other factors (Loayza 
and Servén 2010). A further challenge is to understand the channels 
through which governance affects growth and identify the priorities for 
reform (Kraay and Tawara 2010). 
The World Bank is actively engaged in governance reforms through 
institutional development lending and knowledge services to help coun-
tries improve the quality of government regulation and spending. On 
the pure corruption front, the World Bank has been active in investigat-
ing and sanctioning fi rms that are involved in corrupt activities related 
to Bank-fi nanced projects, and the Bank has taken a leadership role in 
promoting the joint disbarment agreement across multilateral develop-
ment banks. Based on this experience, the Bank looks forward to work-
ing closely with G-20 countries in implementing international efforts to 
eliminate corruption from assistance programs.
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Governance, broadly speaking, is a key element for developing 
countries to ensure that markets can allocate resources effi ciently. 
Effective regulation and effi cient government spending are needed to 
ensure that the state facilitates rather than inhibits the functioning of 
this market mechanism.
Information and Knowledge Sharing 
Because its members are leading economic powers, the G-20 is an ideal 
forum for sharing information and knowledge on economic growth and 
development. Asia—and in particular, Korea—has a special role to play 
given the recent success of a number of Asian economies; chapter 5 is 
devoted to the lessons from the Korean experience. The World Bank 
would like to partner with the G-20 in sharing the lessons from develop-
ment experience globally. In fact, the Bank is undergoing a set of reforms 
to enhance the “knowledge bank” aspects of its work. The Bank is 
uniquely placed for this role, given the combination of global breadth, 
country-specifi c depth, and in-house analytical capacity in terms of 
knowledge on development topics. The objective is to maximize the 
sharing of development solutions across countries and also to make the 
best use of the skills and experience of international expertise, both 
within the Bank and from national research institutions.
Governments can play an active role in bringing global knowledge 
to the business community and thus encourage industrial upgrading. 
Box 3.1 provides examples from “emerging” Asia and Latin America.
In summary, providing assistance (both fi nancial and knowledge) to 
middle- and low- income countries to help them realize their growth 
potential would yield mutually benefi cial opportunities for all categories 
of countries. Such assistance would require global coordination and coop-
eration, and the G-20 is an appropriate forum to design and implement a 
framework for this global cooperation. With this global cooperation in 
place, developing countries can accelerate their development progress, 
following the three principles set out here: 
•  Develop industries that are consistent with comparative advantage. 
•  Use the market as the basic mechanism for effective resource alloca-
tion at each given stage of development.
•  Build a facilitating state to upgrade the industrial structure and move 
from one stage of development to another.
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Concluding Remarks
The global recovery during 2010 is stronger than expected, but the recovery 
may be fragile. Fiscal risks are at center stage in developed countries, and 
there is a risk that capital fl ows to developing countries may not be suffi -
cient to support the superior investment opportunities that exist there.
A multipolar growth world is forthcoming. It was already taking 
shape during the years leading up to the crisis. The multipolar nature of 
future growth is likely to be more stable and result in stronger global 
poverty reduction. It represents a global win-win for all.
Box 3.1. Examples of Knowledge Sharing for Export Development
Government support to foreign direct investment in new products. When local Asian ﬁ rms had 
no historical knowledge in a particular industry of interest to the country, the state often attracted 
foreign direct investment or promoted joint ventures. After its transition to a market economy in 
the 1980s, China, for instance, proactively invited direct investment from Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, 
China, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. This promotion policy helped the local economy to get 
started in various industries. Bangladesh’s vibrant garment industry also started with the direct 
investment from Daiwoo, a Korean manufacturer, in the 1970s. After a few years enough knowl-
edge transfer had taken place and the direct investment became a sort of “incubation.” Local 
garment plants mushroomed in Bangladesh, and most of them could be traced back to that ﬁ rst 
Korean ﬁ rm (Mottaleb and Sonobe 2009; Rhee, 1990; Rhee and Belot 1990). The booming cut-
ﬂ ower export business in Ecuador from the 1980s onward also started with three companies 
established by Colombia’s ﬂ ower growers (Sawers 2005). The government can also set up an indus-
trial park to incubate new industries. The Hsingchu Science-based Industrial Park in Taiwan, China, 
for the development of electronic and information technology industries (Mathews 2006) and 
the Fundación Chile’s demonstration of commercial salmon farming (Katz 2006) are two successful 
examples of government incubation of new industries.
Government support to local discoveries, combined with international knowledge. Aspara-
gus farming in Peru is a good example. The possibility of growing asparagus, a foreign crop, was 
discovered by Peruvian farmers in the 1950s. However, the industry and exports did not take off 
in earnest until 1985 when the U.S. Agency for International Development provided a grant for a 
farmers’ association to obtain expert advice. A key piece of information was received from a 
specialist from the University of California, Davis, who had recently invented the UC-157 variety of 
asparagus that was suitable for the U.S. market, and another expert showed the members of the 
association’s experimental station how to set up seedbeds for large-scale production and how to 
package the products for export. The state also supported cooperative institutions such as the 
Peruvian Asparagus Institute and the Frio Aéreo Asociación Civil for engaging in research, technol-
ogy transfer, market studies, export drives, and quality promotion. Furthermore, the state invested 
in the freezing and packing plants that handled 80 percent of fresh asparagus exports. With these 
interventions, Peru has overtaken China to become the largest asparagus exporter in the world 
(O’Brien and Rodriguez 2004). 
Source: Lin and Monga, 2010
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The G-20 can play a major role in supporting the multipolar growth 
and strengthening the global recovery. Potential new mechanisms for 
infrastructure fi nance, knowledge sharing for economic development, 
openness in trade and investment, fi nancial sector reforms, and gover-
nance reforms are critical to the success of future multipolar growth and 
development. They depend upon the leadership of the G-20 for the 
promising opportunity for multipolar growth to become a reality.
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 1. See, for example, World Bank 2002.
 2.  Index numbers from the World Bank’s Development Prospects Group (DECPG) 
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 3.  Calderón and Servén, 2010. While the focus of the paper is the Latin America 
region, a global empirical model is estimated to provide the quantitative infor-
mation for the regional discussion.
 4.  Bank staff estimates made by the Development Prospects Group.
 5.  World Development Indicators data catalog (http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog).
 6.  Net FDI data is from the World Development Indicators catalog.
 7.  One of the key differences between the New Structural Economics and past 
“structuralist” approaches is the focus on industrial structures that are compat-
ible with a country’s comparative advantage. One of the failures of past struc-
turalist policies was the desire to force industrialization into modern goods that 
were not compatible with the country’s factor endowments and comparative 
advantage. A facilitating state plays an important role in providing an adequate 
business climate, providing key public goods, and addressing coordination fail-
ures and other externalities.
 8.  See Obiageli Ezekwesili’s speech at Harvard, April 17, 2010, and World Bank 
president Robert Zoellick’s speech at TICAD IV in Tokyo. Both at http://www
.worldbank.org.
 9.  Data from World Development Indicators.
 10.  The Asset Management Company (AMC) was set up in 2009 as a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank 
Group. The idea is that private investors can take advantage of IFC experience 
in investing in emerging markets and low-income countries. The AMC houses 
a new initiative—the IFC Capitalization Fund—with initial capital of US$1 bil-
lion from the IFC and US$2 billion from the Japan Bank for International Coop-
eration—that is designed to provide support to systemically important banks in 
developing countries. The AMC also houses the US$1 billion Sovereign Fund Ini-
tiative that allows for global sovereign wealth funds to co-invest in IFC transac-
tions—starting with the Africa and Latin American and Caribbean regions.
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Comments by Ifzal Ali
Islamic Development Bank
Justin Lin’s paper conveyed the following key messages to me. The Great 
Recession of 2009 has unleashed forces that will lead to the emergence of 
a multipolar global economic order. Coordination played a pivotal role 
in the short-term rescue of the world in 2009. In the medium term 
high-income countries need to rely on middle- and low-income coun-
tries to stimulate their exports. In the long-term developing countries 
will be able to become the engines of global growth. A new multilater-
alism will be needed in international relations to ensure sustained 
growth. And there is a broad and interventionist role for the G-20 in 
the emerging new economic order. The broad thrust of my comments 
is to challenge the much-too-broad and much-too-interventionist roles 
advocated for the G-20.
It is a huge leap of faith to extrapolate from the G-20’s effective policy 
coordination in response to a specifi c crisis to permanent, multilateral, 
and broad economic governance. We don’t want to see a G-20 that has an 
agenda that is “too big to succeed.” However, what the paper is suggesting 
is a truly “visible hand” of government(s) to oversee the distribution of 
national and international investment in physical and human capital, 
trade, and knowledge sharing, as well as to set international rules for good 
governance. What is it, other than the number of actors, that suggests the 
G-20 would be any more effi cient and effective than the G-7 or the G-8 
(too small a number) or the Asian-Pacifi c Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
forum (too large a number) in handling a quite diverse set of policy issues? 
Isn’t there a real risk that the approach Justin Lin sets out will result in the 
G-20 becoming a set of permanent standing committees of experts look-
ing at a wide range of issues in isolation and on different time frames 
(APEC) or making numerous commitments on many issues but with 
limited accountability over time for meeting them (G-7/G-8)? Would it 
not be better to identify a maximum of three issues—over any given 
medium-term period—where the known or perceived externalities are so 
large and pervasive that they defi ne the unquestionable need for G-20 
Comments on the paper “A Global Economy with Multiple Growth Poles” by Justin Yifu 
Lin in chapter 3 of this volume.
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engagement? I don’t think investment in infrastructure and human capital 
or information and knowledge sharing fall into that category. However, I 
do think macroeconomic stability, fi nancial regulation, trade, intellectual 
property rights, climate change, arms control, biodiversity, combating the 
source and spread of pandemic diseases, and managing the oceans do fall 
into that category. But there is only so much the G-20 can do at any point 
in time, and paramount externality considerations should lead the deci-
sion. In that regard we don’t need the G-20 to get involved in the incuba-
tion of pioneer fi rms or in partnerships to improve educational outcomes 
or to promote awarding some fi rms special recognition for their contri-
bution to a country’s development.
Private companies (not countries or their policy makers) are the real 
“growth poles” in the global economy. No government policy ever cre-
ated or sustained a “value chain” or served as the engine of sustained real 
increases in returns to labor or capital. Private economic activity does 
that. True, the vast pool of global liquidity is looking for countries with 
macroeconomic stability and good corporate governance, but that 
liquidity will be invested in individual fi rms that generate growth. In 
almost all high-income countries we saw differential performance across 
industries and companies (and within an industry) during the Great 
Recession. Companies that are at the frontier of new technology or that 
use new technology to achieve high productivity in established indus-
tries fl ourished. Even within a “frontier industry,” the best-managed 
companies succeeded and poorly managed ones did not. And growth in 
sales in high-income countries for the products of frontier companies 
was as strong if not stronger than in emerging markets. In contrast, Chi-
na’s lack of internationally recognized brands (that is, Chinese-owned 
companies that could demand premium economic rents based on brand 
name recognition and preference) results in a prevailing industrial struc-
ture that is relatively low value added. But that is a fi rm- or industry-
level problem of a lack of product innovation and a “bank” of patent 
ownership. The underlying dynamics of that economic activity and 
growth performance do not require G-20 involvement. The chapter 
reads as if the role of the G-20 is not simply to level the playing fi eld in 
terms of the essential “rules of the game” and their fair enforcement (its 
proper role) but to somehow collaborate directly to lead or determine 
future economic performance across different “country poles.” 
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No country, be it a high-, medium-, or low-income one, should let 
its comparative advantage be defi ned predominantly in terms of the 
“comparative advantage” of another country. Any given national stock 
of natural resource endowments and human capital can serve multiple 
economic purposes, albeit within limits defi ned by technology. Leave 
regional and international economic competition and reinforcement 
and the identifi cation of appropriate factor and product markets up to 
individual companies in terms of their relative competitive advantages. 
It is fi rms that compete, not nations. Government should put in place an 
economic development plan that does not discriminate against any par-
ticular industry while also encouraging some degree of industry hetero-
geneity and complementarity in the use of the country’s resources. 
For the future we should think of the sources of multiple growth poles 
in terms of new technology and the industries they spawn (rather than 
demand from developed versus emerging economies). The world badly 
needs new industries based on new technologies. Currently, continued 
growth of the information and communications technology industry is 
founded primarily on the ability to bring the silicon chip ever closer to 
the limits of Moore’s law. What future global economic growth needs is 
a set of truly revolutionary technological breakthroughs (similar to the 
silicon chip) that can generate new industries. Otherwise, all that will 
happen is greater investment and associated economic competition 
from established technological bases, plus greater consumption that is 
often environmentally unsustainable—and that is a zero sum game. 
The G-20 could play a useful role by establishing a truly global and 
strategic pooling and funding of public and private knowledge entities 
to accelerate scientifi c breakthroughs and new technology in relation to 
developing renewable energy effi ciencies; environmentally sustainable, 
high-productivity food production; and safe synthetic organisms that 
could recycle unsafe wastes into safe materials (such as genetically engi-
neered saltwater algae) as well as ending highly infectious diseases, can-
cer, and diabetes. If these are achieved as a result of the G-20’s public 
good leadership and other support, then there would be a sound argu-
ment that these technologies should be made available like open-source 
software and thus vastly expand the potential for inclusive multipurpose 
economic use by the private sector and civil society everywhere (truly 
multipolar). 
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The underlying principle here is this: if paramount externalities are 
the criterion for deciding the G-20’s agenda, then the products of the 
G-20’s efforts should be an enlarged global public good—from which a 
myriad of other abundant private and civil society economic growth and 
human welfare benefi ts could be derived. That is how we should con-
ceive multipolar growth in relation to the G-20. 
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Comments by Jong-Wha Lee
Asian Development Bank
Justin Lin’s paper made several important points. First, the recovery 
from the global fi nancial crisis remains fragile, particularly because of 
prevailing excess capacity in the high-income countries. Second, devel-
oping countries have the potential to lift growth in a faltering global 
economy, but their multilateral relations need to be further strength-
ened. And third, an expanding role for the G-20 will create mutually 
benefi cial opportunities for developed and developing countries and 
can pave the way for stronger cooperation with international fi nancial 
institutions in creating innovative fi nancing mechanisms.
My comments will focus on these issues, emphasizing Asia’s role in 
creating sustained regional and global growth. Let me begin with a snap-
shot of the region’s recent performance.
Developing Asia weathered the harsh global environment of 2009 well. 
It was the fi rst region to emerge from the turmoil, helped by decisive and 
large-scale fi scal and monetary policy measures. Domestic demand has 
been resilient, especially in the region’s larger economies, and the eco-
nomic cycle clearly suggests that economies have troughed and begun to 
recover. A number of Asian economies posted double-digit GDP growth 
in the fi rst half of 2010. 
We are therefore optimistic that economic recovery in the region 
will be robust, supported by the sustained impact of the stimulus mea-
sures. We project growth to rebound to 7.5 percent in 2010, a strong 
acceleration from 5.2 percent in 2009, though still below the record 
9.6 percent growth of 2007 (ADB 2010). As such, Asia will make a sig-
nifi cant contribution to multipolar world growth. Nonetheless, it faces 
the challenge of maintaining this momentum as governments gradu-
ally unwind the expansionary measures and as external demand picks 
up only slowly. 
The critical issue is whether private demand can take up the slack as 
public demand wanes amid a sluggish external environment. This rebal-
ancing depends on the region’s governments employing a combination 
Comments on the paper “A Global Economy with Multiple Growth Poles” by Justin Yifu 
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of policy measures to reinforce domestic demand and revitalize domestic 
economies. For example, more government spending on health, educa-
tion, and housing will reduce the precautionary motive for savings 
among households. Governments should also give priority to enhanc-
ing the investment climate rather than to a quantitative expansion of 
investment. Supply-side policies that promote small and medium 
enterprises and service industries will increase the relative importance 
of production catering to domestic demand. Policies encouraging 
fi nancial development and adjustment of the exchange rate can also 
better balance domestic supply and demand and help sustain the 
regional recovery.
Asian exports remain heavily dependent on global demand, as seen in 
the highly synchronized movements between Asian export growth and 
the major advanced economies’ nonoil imports. China clearly plays an 
important role as Asia’s main assembly and production center in this 
regional production network. But its role as a regional and global con-
sumer is also becoming increasingly important. Indeed, China’s imports 
from East and Southeast Asia have gradually shifted to fi nal goods in 
recent years—from the initial dominance of parts and components—
implying that it is consuming more Asian products.
In the long run measures are needed to ensure that the region enhances 
and realizes its economic growth potential. The theme of this volume—
postcrisis growth and development—is very important in this context. 
In my view, raising developing Asia’s growth potential requires fi ve key 
components (Brooks et al. forthcoming).
First is infrastructure investment. Infrastructure is vital to the pro-
duction of goods and services, facilitates trade and factor mobility, 
reduces business costs, allows the exploitation of economies of scale, and 
improves effi ciency and productivity. 
Second is human capital. Education improves labor productivity, 
facilitates technological innovation, and increases returns to capital.
Third is external trade and long-term fi nance, which developing 
countries depend on for stable long-term growth. 
Fourth is governance and institutional quality. Governance and 
institutions drive economic growth through the enforcement of 
property rights and contracts that allow market exchange, investment, 
and innovation.
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Fifth, a well-developed fi nancial sector supports economic growth by 
mobilizing and pooling savings and allocating resources effi ciently. 
Likewise, greater cooperation is crucial to the long-term sustainabil-
ity of economic growth. The G-20 world leaders recently affi rmed their 
commitment to reforming the global fi nancial architecture, bringing 
down macroeconomic imbalances, and narrowing development gaps. 
Such global cooperation is needed to avert future crises. We must there-
fore make sure the promise is kept.
Better policy coordination is also vital to sustaining the recovery and 
to lifting the global economy to new heights. This requires a rebalancing 
of growth toward greater domestic demand, particularly consumption 
and investment, and greater regional demand for fi nal goods.
Trade and fi nancial openness must continue. We must shun protec-
tionism, particularly during crises. And we must work together to bridge 
the income and nonincome development gaps. Despite many years of 
high growth in developing Asia before the global crisis, signifi cant devel-
opment gaps remain. There are considerable differences in health and 
education outcomes across regions and countries. 
The importance of knowledge sharing cannot be overemphasized. We 
must learn from the lessons and experiences, the successes and failures, 
of others. The Republic of Korea, as the fi rst emerging economy to chair 
a G-20 summit, can play an active role in strengthening capacity to share 
its development experience, so that low- and middle-income countries 
can benefi t from accumulated knowledge. 
In summary, the key messages of my discussion are as follows. First, 
we see a sustained rebound in Asia in 2010–11 as the recovery takes fi rm 
hold. Second, some rebalancing of growth toward domestic demand 
sources is needed. While this rebalancing is widely accepted as a require-
ment for sustained growth, actually putting it into practice is a major 
challenge. Third, several components are necessary to enhance the 
region’s long-term growth potential. As I mentioned earlier, these 
include human capital accumulation, infrastructure investment, exter-
nal trade and fi nancial openness, fi nancial sector development, and 
governance and institutional quality. Finally, we need to improve coop-
erative efforts to ensure balanced and sustainable growth for the region 
and the world.
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Comments by Tunde Lemo
Central Bank of Nigeria
The initiative of the World Bank and the Korean government is to be 
commended. Multiple growth poles can be regarded as developing clus-
ters in a global system.
The world is witnessing the beginning of a new era of global growth 
based on multiple growth poles. It is apparent that poverty and inequal-
ity have become major challenges for the global agenda. A fair distribu-
tion of failed states and pseudodemocracies exist, and their impact on 
regional and global growth is becoming substantial. Calamities (man-
made or natural) now have global impacts and must be addressed. Global 
and social economic failures exist and must be tackled.
Issues Central to Balanced and Sustainable Growth: 
Africa’s Perspective
•  Failure of infrastructure in Africa and other developing countries 
•  Water shortages and food security
•  Environmental degradation
•  Diseases and death
•  Migration and unemployment
•  Demographics and lopsided deployment of global resources
•  War, disarmament, and terrorism
•  Drugs and growing social tension
•  Corruption and other governance issues
African Countries Need to Be Assisted
The G-20 must play a catalytic role in the following arenas:
•  Ensuring food security and sustainable development. The G-20 must 
lead countries in making a more concerted effort to address food 
security, availability, access, and nutrition. 
•  Developing and strengthening the private sector for sustainable 
growth.
Comments on the paper “A Global Economy with Multiple Growth Poles” by Justin Yifu 
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•  Increasing public investment in infrastructure across Africa; such invest-
ment has been insuffi cient and is critical to economic development.
•  Facilitating development of infrastructure through public-private 
partnerships in order to boost productivity in various sectors and 
facilitating technological breakthroughs in physical infrastructure.
•  Addressing problems of fi nancing constraints in Africa, where fi nanc-
ing gaps remain large.
•  Diversifying the export base by opening economies for export growth 
in low-income countries, enhancing capacity for trade development, 
and adopting policy and regulatory reform to support diversifi cation 
of exports.
•  Recovery from the fi nancial crisis, which has weakened many African 
economies, needs to be fast-tracked.
•  African economies are overly dependent on export of primary prod-
ucts, which has made them vulnerable to external shocks. African 
countries should therefore trade more with each other.
•  The African share of foreign direct investment infl ow is very low and 
African domestic savings is low as well, coupled with the fact that 
Africa lacks institutional transparency.
Conclusion
It is no longer feasible to solve big global problems with global consen-
sus. Articulate economic groupings to generate synergy for action are 
needed in evolving a new consensus. The multilateral trading system 
epitomized by the World Trade Organization is under threat. More 
inclusive openness in trade must be ensured and Doha revisited as 
G-20 countries must help Africa. Emerging economies must gear up to 
higher responsibilities and stop being mere onlookers. For multipolar 
growth to fl ourish, there must be a new multilateralism in international 
relations. The G-20’s role will be to create mutually benefi cial global 
opportunities and provide the necessary support in promoting a more 
innovative fi nancial mechanism for the needed fi nancial inclusion 
agenda. Developing countries must fi x infrastructure, become more 
transparent, and drive private sector growth. The global fi nancial system 
needs stronger regulation. Africa does not need pity but a deliberate, 
implementable plan of action.
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Chair’s Summary by Trevor Manuel
South Africa National Planning Commission
My fi rst question is whether the paper presented by Justin Yifu Lin should 
simply set the scene for the rest of the papers, or if we should tease out 
more specifi c points for further examination. Mr. Lin presented a con-
jectural analysis that gave voice to the debate that arose before the crisis 
on decoupling. Now new questions are being raised. Where are we now? 
What does the capacity utilization issue mean for development going 
forward? How would this infl uence the immediate future? What oppor-
tunities do we stand to lose? How should we think about multipolarity 
going forward, given the fact that high-income economies historically 
have been the global engine of growth, largely fueled by consumption? 
The issue of rebalance arises, followed by the questions: Who defi nes the 
future agenda for action? What should be on the agenda of G-20, and 
what criteria should be used to determine what the G-20 talks about? 
During the question and answer period, a participant asked whether 
peace and reconciliation efforts are within the mandate of the G-20. This 
observation provides a nice transition to the question of whether the 
G-20 has within itself the capacity to take on these issues. How limited 
or broad should the remit of the G-20 be as opposed to the United 
Nations? 
There was a constant refrain heard from Dr. Il SaKong, chairman of 
the Presidential Committee for the G-20 Summit; Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, 
managing director of the World Bank; and the discussants that the G-20 
is a very important forum but that it needs to be mindful of the other 
172 countries that are outside its membership. This balance between 
G-20 and non-G-20 countries is becoming important in defi ning the 
agenda and understanding the limitations and the impact on sustain-
ability. Other important questions were raised concerning public goods 
and social goods, as well as an interesting split on state versus the private 
sector. 
Summary on the paper “A Global Economy with Multiple Growth Poles” by Justin Yifu 
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From my perspective, there are fi ve issues for the G-20 development 
agenda going forward: 
•  Infrastructure development, both physical and human, which serves 
as the undergirding of growth. Future questions will likely include: 
How will infrastructure investment be made? Where will it be made? 
With what speed will it be made so that rebalancing can take effect? 
•  The expansion of trade and foreign direct investment. These activities 
are fundamental to growth and raise important questions about 
whether the World Trade Organization is useful to us at the present 
moment. If not, what are more appropriate institutions that can carry 
these issues forward?
•  The quality of institutions, both public and private.
•  The quality of governance.




The G-20 Growth Framework and Mutual Assessment Process (MAP), 
launched at the group’s summit in Pittsburgh in 2009, has emerged as the 
key means for members of the Group of 20 to coordinate their economic 
policies to achieve their shared growth and development objectives. These 
shared objectives include the achievement of “strong, sustainable and 
balanced growth” among G-20 members. They also include “raising liv-
ing standards in emerging markets and developing countries.” Growth 
and development in the developing world are seen as “a critical element 
in achieving sustainable growth in the global economy.”1 The inclusion of 
development as part of the G-20 Growth Framework and MAP provides 
a valuable opportunity to incorporate development issues more system-
atically and integrally into G-20 policy discussions.
Against this background, and as an input into the consideration of 
development issues as part of the G-20 Growth Framework and MAP, 
this chapter assesses the links between G-20 economic prospects and 
policies and growth and development in developing countries. It identi-
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Four Key Themes
The chapter is organized around four main themes that emerge from the 
analysis. First, global development needs robust global growth. As a 
result, the most important thing that the G-20 can do for development 
is to secure a strong recovery in growth. Second, “reverse linkages” 
between developing and high-income countries have become increas-
ingly important. Promotion of strong multipolar growth in developing 
countries would be a global win-win. It would support development in 
poorer countries and contribute to strong growth at the global level. It 
would also contribute to rebalancing of global growth. Third, the out-
look for fi nancing for development will be more challenging in the post-
crisis environment and will require creative, innovative approaches. 
Fourth, keeping trade open will be essential for sustained recovery and 
enabling the growth rebalancing to work. Trade, together with invest-
ment and associated fl ows of technology, is a key channel for multipolar 
growth and diversifi cation of global demand.
Theme I: Centrality of Global Growth 
to Development
Global growth is central to development. Through trade and fi nance 
links, economic outcomes in advanced economies have a signifi cant 
effect on developing countries. As the recovery matures, the longer-term 
growth agenda should increasingly be the focus of G-20 policy coordina-
tion. In advanced economies this agenda includes fi scal, fi nancial, and 
structural reforms that enhance long-term growth potential. In develop-
ing countries growth prospects will depend on building on past progress 
on reforms in macrofi scal management, investment climate, and gover-
nance and on achieving requisite investment levels in infrastructure and 
human capital underpinning growth. Priorities across countries will of 
course depend on country-specifi c circumstances.
Postcrisis Economic Outlook for Developing Countries
Economic Growth. Improved macroeconomic policies and structural 
reforms helped developing countries overall cope with the recent crisis 
with greater resilience than in some past crises. Nonetheless, the impact 
was signifi cant. Growth in developing countries fell from an average of 
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about 7 percent in the fi ve years preceding the crisis to 1.6 percent in 
2009. A lingering impact of the crisis response is that a number of coun-
tries face fi scal sustainability concerns that could constrain core, growth-
related spending.
At the global level the current outlook is for a moderate recovery over 
the coming fi ve years as economies gradually close output gaps and 
return to potential growth rates, with the strength of the recovery vary-
ing across countries and country groups. From a developing-country 
perspective, there is concern that the recent crisis could impact potential 
GDP growth over the medium term for a variety of reasons. For exam-
ple, increased public sector fi nancing needs in high-income countries 
could raise the cost of development fi nance, and fi scal stress might also 
reduce fl ows of concessional fi nance.
The outlook for developing countries is for average growth recover-
ing to about 6 percent in 2010–12, with a relatively strong economic 
recovery in the more dynamic emerging markets and a more gradual 
recovery in other developing countries, including most low-income 
countries (fi gure 4.1, table 4.1). Growth in middle-income countries, 
which were more seriously affected by the fi nancial crisis given their 




























Source: World Bank staff calculations.
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2005–07 2008 2009 2010f 2011f 2012f
Developing Countries 7.5 5.9 1.6 6.1 6.0 6.2
Middle-Income Countries 7.5 5.9 1.5 6.1 5.9 6.2
- Of which: G-20 Members 8.0 6.3 2.2 7.2 6.6 6.7
Low-Income Countries 6.4 5.8 4.6 5.1 6.3 6.3
East Asia and Paciﬁ c 10.2 8.5 7.1 8.7 8.0 8.3
Europe and Central Asia 7.0 4.8 –5.3 4.2 4.3 4.3
Latin America and Caribbean 5.1 4.1 –2.4 4.3 3.9 4.2
M iddle East and North Africa 5.1 5.8 3.0 3.4 4.2 4.8
South Asia 8.8 4.9 6.3 7.3 7.8 7.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.3 5.0 1.6 4.4 5.0 5.3
Memo:
Developing Countries excluding 
China and India 5.9 4.6 –1.8 4.3 4.4 4.6
Source: World Bank staff projections.
deeper integration with international capital markets, is projected to 
recover quickly from the low of 1.5 percent in 2009 to around 6 percent, 
strong but still below average growth of precrisis years. Low-income 
countries were affected by the crisis more through the trade channel. 
They were initially less affected by the crisis because of their weaker cap-
ital market links, but their growth dropped, though by less than in 
middle-income countries, as the resulting recession depressed demand 
for their exports and caused export volumes and commodity prices to 
decline. Countries with a heavier dependence on a few commodity 
exports felt the recession more severely. Low-income country growth 
could return to about 5 percent in 2010, again with some ground to 
cover to return to the precrisis growth rates.
Among developing regions the recovery is projected to be most robust 
in Asia. The Europe and Central Asia region is expected to see more 
moderate growth, because several countries in the region were among 
the hardest hit by the crisis. Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to return to 
growth on the order of 5 percent in 2011, with prospects in several coun-
tries in the region tied closely to recovery in commodity markets.
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Progress in developing-country policies over the past decade or so accel-
erated trend growth. There is evidence of some decoupling in trend growth 
between developing and high-income countries, with the former for a 
number of years now achieving appreciably higher average growth than the 
latter. But this does not necessarily mean cyclical decoupling (fi gure 4.2). As 
the recent crisis confi rmed, the impacts on developing countries of signifi -
cant cyclical developments in high-income countries remain strong. But 
the crisis also showed that countries with better policies and economic fun-
damentals are better positioned than others to withstand shocks.
Even as the recovery gathers strength, growth is expected to be insuf-
fi cient to close output gaps for several years (fi gure 4.3). As a result, 
progress in raising average incomes in developing countries will remain 
below the precrisis expected levels, and poverty will be higher than had 
been expected before the crisis. In this sense, there has been a long-last-
ing impact on the pace of development progress.
Poverty and the MDGs. An estimated 64 million more people in devel-
oping countries will be living on less than US$1.25 a day (76 million 
more on less than US$2 a day) in 2010 than would have been the case 
without the crisis. Even by 2015 the number of additional poor attribut-
able to the impact of the crisis would be 53 million and 69 million, based 
on these two poverty lines, respectively (table 4.2).
Figure 4.2. Trend, but Not Cyclical, Growth Decoupling
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Figure 4.3. Output Gaps Projected to Decline Only Gradually
Source: World Bank staff calculations.
developing countries high-income countries












































Table 4.2. Outlook for Poverty in Developing Countries 
1990 2005 2015f 2020f
Percentage of population living on less than US$1.25 a day
Postcrisis base case 41.7 25.2 15.0 12.8
Precrisis trend 41.7 25.2 14.1 11.7
Number of people living on less than US$1.25 a day (millions)
Postcrisis base case 1,817 1,371 918 826
Precrisis trend 1,817 1,371 865 755
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on PovcalNet.
Labor market developments have been a driving force behind the 
increase in poverty. The International Labor Organization (ILO) esti-
mates that over the 2007–09 period, unemployment increased globally by 
34 million people, of which 21 million were in developing countries (those 
covered in ILO surveys). In addition, youth unemployment has increased 
sharply, a troubling development for future employment prospects.
Growth collapses are particularly damaging for human development 
outcomes. There is an asymmetric response to the economic cycle, with 
deterioration during downturns being larger than the improvement 
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during upturns. In addition, the impacts reach full severity only after a 
lag. As a result of the crisis, it is estimated that 1.2 million more children 
under fi ve may die between 2009 and 2015, and 350,000 more students 
may not complete primary school in 2015 (fi gure 4.4). About 100 million 
more people may remain without access to safe water in 2015 as a result 
of the crisis impact. In brief, the outlook for achieving many of the 
Figure 4.4. Impact of Slower Growth on Selected MDGs
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Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) was worrisome before the 
crisis, and the crisis has imposed a further setback.
The impact of the crisis on poverty and human development out-
comes is not confi ned to low-income countries. A large part of the rise in 
poverty occurred in middle-income countries, which still account for 
about two-thirds of the world’s poor people. Nine G-20 members are 
middle-income developing countries that continue to face major devel-
opment challenges, such as large infrastructure and human development 
needs and in some cases large concentrations of poverty. They are home 
to 54 percent of the world’s extreme poor (58 percent based on a US$2 a 
day poverty line). These nine countries account for more than half of the 
estimated increase in global poverty resulting from the crisis. Several of 
these countries, based on trends to date, are not on track to achieve some 
of the MDGs (fi gure 4.5).
Risks in the Outlook
The growth outlook for developing countries summarized here is sub-
ject to risks and uncertainties. Domestically many countries face 
increased fi scal strains. Externally the risks pertain to the prospects for 
the global economy and fi nancial markets. 
Fiscal defi cits in developing countries rose by an average of 3 percent 
of GDP in 2009 (fi gure 4.6). While some countries have put stimulus 
measures in place, in most countries the widening defi cit resulted mainly 
from declining revenues. Although some emerging markets rapidly 
regained access to international capital, in developing countries with 
more limited external fi nancing, about half of the defi cit increases on 
average were fi nanced domestically, mainly through bank borrowing. 
These developments have raised fi scal sustainability concerns in many 
countries. The risk of debt distress has risen in low-income countries.
Countries were able to cushion the initial crisis impact on core spend-
ing—health and education, social safety nets, infrastructure—even 
though spending growth slowed. But restoring growth in core spending 
to precrisis levels will be a challenge, especially in infrastructure and in 
those countries with limited access to capital markets (fi gure 4.7). Core 
social and infrastructure spending is critical for poverty reduction and 




















































































































































































achieved on track off track seriously off track no data
MDG
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on most recent data available in World Development Indicators.
Note: Poverty headcount rate at US$2 a day is included in view of its greater relevance for middle-income countries. Developing-country G-20 members are Argentina, Brazil, China, India, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Russian Federation, South Africa, and Turkey.
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The debt situation in some European countries poses risks to the 
developing-country growth outlook. A crisis of confi dence, default, or 
major debt restructuring could have serious consequences for the global 
economy, because the directly affected countries are likely to enter into 
recession, with potential knock-on effects on the fi nancial health of cred-
itor banks elsewhere in the world. The immediate effects of a deepening 
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Source: IMF and World Bank staff estimates. 
 The G-20 and Global Development  129
Figure 4.7. Core Spending at Risk
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and spreading of the problems facing Greece are likely to be contained 
to other highly indebted high-income countries in Europe. However, 
the secondary effects of the crisis would have much wider consequences, 
including impacts on developing countries. Bank staff have conducted 
simulations of the possible implications of a crisis of confi dence stem-
ming from Greece that spreads to other high-income countries in 
Europe that have been the subject of market concern. These simulations 
show that the wider impact could be signifi cant: world GDP could be 
3–4 percent lower in 2011–12. For developing countries, the impact 
could be 2–3 percent lower GDP in 2011–12.
Theme II: Multipolarity—A Dynamic Force in 
Global Growth and Rebalancing3
The second theme that emerges from the analysis is that reverse linkages—
that is, how developing-country outcomes in turn affect the global econ-
omy—also are becoming more important. As noted earlier, developing 
countries have been growing at a much faster average rate than high-
income countries have, and their weight in the global economy has been 
rising. Whereas their GDP represented about 18 percent of global GDP in 
1980, as of 2009 their share had increased to 28 percent of world GDP 
when measured at market exchange rates (close to 45 percent if purchas-
ing power parity weights are used). Their weight in global trade has grown 
even faster, rising from 20 percent in 1995 to nearly 30 percent estimated 
for 2010. Not only has their share in activity increased, their faster growth 
rates mean that their overall contribution to global growth is larger still. 
Developing countries contributed around 40 percent of global growth 
in the past decade. In 2010 their projected contribution will approach 
50 percent (fi gure 4.8). Since 2000 developing countries have accounted 
for more than 40 percent of the increase in world import demand. They 
are leading the recovery in global trade, with their import demand rising 
at twice the rate of that in high-income countries (fi gure 4.9).
Links among developing countries, or South-South links, also are 
becoming more important. South-South trade has risen to a third of 
world merchandise trade. Within regions trade among developing 
economies has increased substantially, further strengthening regional 
growth poles. For example, the share of imports originating from 
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other developing countries within the importers’ own region (in 2008) 
was 29 percent, 20 percent, and 15 percent in Europe and Central Asia, 
Latin America and the Caribbean, and East Asia and the Pacifi c, 
respectively. South-South foreign direct investment has accounted for 
a third or more of all such investment going to developing countries 
in recent years. South-South migration is larger than South-North 
migration.
Developing countries possess a large potential for future growth. They 
offer abundant opportunities for high-return, high-growth-potential 
investments (such as in critical infrastructure and human capital that 
remove bottlenecks to growth), and they have undertaken important 
reforms in recent years to improve the development effectiveness of their 
programs and investments. Many, however, face a fi nancing constraint 
in fully exploiting these growth opportunities. Promotion of growth in 
these countries through more support for investment that removes bot-
tlenecks to their growth would be a global win-win. It would support 
their development, and it would contribute to stronger growth at the 
global level and to the postcrisis rebalancing of global growth by creating 
new markets and investment opportunities and hence more sources of 
growth in global demand. 
Rebalancing needs to look beyond a narrow focus on external bal-
ances and macroeconomic policy adjustments to include structural 
rebalancing. Supporting multiple growth poles is a key element of struc-
tural rebalancing. Promotion of growth in developing countries should 
be seen as an integral element of the G-20 framework for strong, sustain-
able, and balanced growth.
The potential to contribute to global growth and rebalancing is not 
limited to the rapidly growing emerging market growth poles. Better 
policies have improved growth performance and opportunities in many 
low-income countries, including in Sub-Saharan Africa (where regional 
growth averaged about 6 percent in the fi ve years preceding the crisis). 
These countries offer markets for investment, not just destinations for 
aid. Net foreign direct investment to Sub-Saharan Africa more than dou-
bled from US$14 billion in 2001 to US$34 billion in 2008, and there is 
much potential for further growth in these investment fl ows.
Infrastructure is a key area for investment, because of its high poten-
tial for spurring growth in agriculture, manufacturing, and services. For 
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example, research shows that raising infrastructure services in Africa to 
the level in the Republic of Korea could increase the region’s growth rate 
by up to 2.6 percentage points. Infrastructure investment and mainte-
nance needs in developing countries amount to over US$900 billion 
(6–8 percent of GDP) annually. Actual spending reaches only about half 
that level (box 4.1 shows the infrastructure investment needs and actual 
spending for Sub-Saharan Africa). Alleviating the fi nancing constraint 
can boost local growth and support global demand. It could be a high-
return investment in a win-win global growth outcome. Research also 
shows high returns on sound investments in human capital—education, 
health, and nutrition.
In addition to fi nancing, the G-20 can be instrumental in promoting 
the sharing of development knowledge and support for capacity building 
in developing countries. The accumulated richness of national develop-
ment experiences offers considerable opportunities for sharing develop-
ment knowledge and expertise—not just North-South but increasingly 
also South-South and South-North.
Box 4.1. Infrastructure Investment Needs in Africa
Africa’s infrastructure investment needs relative to GDP are particularly large, at 15 
percent. But more ﬁ nancing is not the only answer. Improvements in “soft infra-
structure” (such as improvements in governance, regulation, and cost recovery) can 
yield signiﬁ cant efﬁ ciency gains. Even with such efﬁ ciency gains, however, the 
region’s annual funding gap would remain sizable at about 5 percent of GDP, or 
about US$31 billion.
Infrastructure Investment and Maintenance (% of GDP)
Needs Spending Efﬁ ciency gap Funding gap
Middle-income 10 6 2 2
Resource-rich 12 5 3 4
Low-income 22 10 3 9
Fragile states 36 6 5 25
All of Africa 15 7 3 5
$ (billions) 93 43 19 31
Source: Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010.
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Theme III: Financing for Development: Challenging 
Outlook Demands Creativity
Outlook for Financing for Development 
A third theme that emerges from the analysis is that the outlook for 
fi nancing will be more challenging and will demand creativity. Although 
the global fi nancial markets are recovering, the recent crisis will have 
longer-lasting implications for fi nancial fl ows to developing countries. 
While some major emerging market countries are now seeing a strong 
rebound in capital infl ows, especially nondebt fl ows, most developing 
countries face the prospect of scarcer and more expensive capital. The 
rise in fi scal defi cits and debt in advanced economies and related con-
cerns about crowding out, tighter fi nancial sector regulation and bank-
ing system consolidation, and a repricing of risk are all likely to limit 
developing countries’ access to fi nancing and raise the cost of capital. 
Net private capital fl ows to developing countries fell precipitously in 
2008–09 as a result of the fi nancial crisis, dropping from a peak of about 
US$1.2 trillion (8.7 percent of developing countries’ GDP) in 2007 to 
US$480 billion (3 percent of GDP) in 2009. They are likely to recover 
only slowly, reaching a projected level of about US$770 billion (3.3 per-
cent of GDP) by 2011 (fi gure 4.10).
While developing countries’ access to capital markets is projected to 
decline in the postcrisis period, their fi nancing needs are likely to be 
larger. Developing countries’ external fi nancing needs rose sharply dur-
ing the crisis and are expected to decline only gradually. Even by 2011 the 
projected ex ante external fi nancing gap (current account defi cit plus 
amortization minus expected private capital infl ows) will be high at 
about US$180 billion (fi gure 4.11). Relative to GDP, the projected fi nanc-
ing gap is particularly large in low-income countries.
Bank staff estimate that the tighter conditions in international fi nan-
cial markets refl ected in scarcer and costlier capital could depress invest-
ment and lower economic growth in developing countries by up to 
0.7 percentage points annually over the next fi ve to seven years compared 
with the precrisis trend. Potential output in developing countries could 
be reduced by up to 8 percent in the long run relative to its precrisis path. 
This baseline outlook is subject to further downside risks, in view of the 
situation in Greece and increased concerns about sovereign debt in 
advanced economies.
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Figure 4.11. Developing-Country Financing Gaps Will Remain Large 
Source: World Bank staff estimates.
The stakes are high. Even relatively small declines in growth can have 
cumulatively large impacts on poverty. Our simulations suggest that a 
0.5 percentage point decline in the developing-country growth rate, 
resulting, say, from higher capital costs and lower investment, can mean 
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nearly 80 million additional people living on less than US$2 a day in 10 
years (fi gure 4.12).
Fiscal Consolidation, Financing for Development, 
Growth, and Rebalancing
With high and rising public debt, fi scal consolidation is a key priority for 
the advanced economies. It would also benefi t developing countries. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects that debt-GDP ratios in 
advanced economies will exceed 100 percent of GDP in the next two to 
three years, some 35 percentage points higher than before the crisis. Sov-
ereign debt issuance by the United States, Japan, and the Euro Area alone 
exceeded US$2.5 trillion in 2009, more than seven times total net capital 
fl ows to developing countries. Simulations show that a stronger, quicker 
fi scal consolidation in advanced economies would produce a win-win 
outcome. Two scenarios were constructed to explore the impact of fi scal 
consolidation in advanced economies. In the fi rst, the improvement in 
primary balances is calibrated so that, if applied gradually between 2011 
and 2020 and then held there through 2030, the debt-to-GDP ratio 
would fall to 60 percent by 2030. In the second scenario, the same 
improvement in primary balances is achieved in the fi rst four years and 
Figure 4.12. Impact on Poverty of a 0.5 Percentage Point Decline in GDP Growth 
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Source: World Bank GIDD Model simulations for developing countries.
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then held at that level through 2030. The results were then compared 
with a scenario that assumes no proactive fi scal consolidation. The 
results show gains in growth for developing countries in both fi scal con-
solidation scenarios but larger gains in the scenario with quicker adjust-
ment; in the latter scenario, the gain in GDP in the medium to long term 
reaches about 6 percent. The loss for developing countries through 
weaker demand for their exports is more than offset by benefi ts from 
lower real interest rates and higher investment. Long-run growth out-
comes also improve in the advanced economies, although the fi scal 
adjustment implies a loss of output in the short run. The simulations 
suggest that the fi scal consolidation would also go a long way in helping 
to reduce global trade imbalances.
Rebalancing of global growth and fi nancing for development can be 
linked in a virtuous circle. Three-quarters of developing countries are 
net importers of capital. In aggregate, however, developing countries, 
including emerging markets, have in recent years run a surplus, mainly 
refl ecting large surpluses of saving over investment in a few countries—
notably China and oil and mineral exporters. So, considered as a whole, 
developing countries have recently been net exporters of capital to 
high-income countries—a phenomenon sometimes referred to as capi-
tal fl owing uphill. Capital infl ows from the BRIC countries (Brazil, the 
Russian Federation, India, and China) fi nanced about 75 percent of the 
U.S. current account defi cit in 2008, up from 13 percent in 2001. Suc-
cess in rebalancing in advanced defi cit economies, thereby reducing 
their borrowing requirements, would allow more of the surplus global 
savings to fl ow to support investment and growth in developing coun-
tries, which in turn would generate more import demand (and from 
multiple sources) to reinforce rebalancing. 
Implications of Financial Sector Reforms in 
Advanced Economies
It is important to ensure that ongoing and planned fi nancial sector 
reforms in advanced economies do not have unintended adverse effects 
on fi nancial fl ows to developing countries or their fi nancial sector man-
agement. There is a need for a mechanism to assess the implications of 
these reforms for countries that are not members of the Financial Stabil-
ity Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. A number 
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of countries have embarked on national reform initiatives that, if not 
well coordinated, risk creating fi nancial protectionism, regulatory arbi-
trage, and inconsistency across jurisdictions. Some of the proposed 
reforms that require compliance with liquidity requirements at the 
branch level, as opposed to a consolidated group level, might constrain 
global banks in funding operations in emerging markets and vice versa. 
Proposed reform of securitization and derivatives should not choke 
off fi nancial innovation that has been benefi cial for development, for 
example, use of these innovations to hedge crop and weather risks. On 
trade fi nance the Basel Committee could review the appropriateness of 
a 100 percent credit conversion factor in its proposed leverage ratio for 
off-balance-sheet trade fi nance items with a maturity of less than a year, 
taking into account the largely self-liquidating, low risk, and short matu-
rity characteristics of such trade fi nance products. Regulations designed 
for banks in advanced economies may not be appropriate for banks in 
low-income countries, especially smaller banks that cater to smaller 
enterprises; some countries may require a longer phase-in period.
Ofﬁ cial Financing for Development
With tighter capital markets, offi cial fl ows take on added importance, 
both in directly providing development fi nance and in leveraging private 
capital. This includes ensuring adequate offi cial development assistance 
(ODA) and supporting multilateral lending with enough capital. While 
ODA rose modestly in real terms in 2009, overall it is falling short of 
commitments and declining relative to the GDP of low-income coun-
tries for which it constitutes an especially important source of fi nancing 
(fi gure 4.13). It would be desirable to have a coordinated position among 
the G-20 to maintain or increase aid levels as fi scal consolidation strate-
gies are designed and implemented. At the same time, more can be done, 
by donors and partner countries working together, to further progress 
on the Accra Agenda for Action to improve aid effectiveness—better aid 
alignment and harmonization, improved aid predictability, and a stron-
ger focus on results.
Multilateral development bank (MDB) fi nancing rose appreciably in 
response to the crisis, complementing IMF fi nancing in providing coun-
tercyclical support to developing countries. Between July 2008 and June 
2010 MDBs committed about US$235 billion, of which more than half 
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came from the World Bank Group. Thanks to recent agreements on 
MDB capital increases, average postcrisis commitments could reach 
about US$65 billion a year, compared with the average precrisis level of 
about US$38 billion a year (see fi gure 4.13). In terms of net fl ows, how-
ever, MDB lending will remain small compared with developing-country 
needs for long-term capital.
Much of the increase in MDB fi nancing during the crisis was in non-
concessional fi nancing. Concessional fi nancing rose more modestly. 
Adequate replenishment of the MDB concessional windows, especially 
the International Development Agency (IDA) and the African Develop-
ment Fund, would enable them to meet the increased needs of low-
income countries responding to the fi nancial crisis, as well as to the 
aftermath of the food and fuel crises that preceded it. The need for con-
cessional fi nance has risen as fi scal space in low-income countries has 
come under pressure, while social spending needs, including expansion 
of social safety nets for poor and vulnerable groups, have increased as a 
result of higher poverty and unemployment. Innovations such as the 
IDA crisis-response facility have improved the responsiveness of conces-
sional fi nancing to crises.
Supplementing Traditional Financing with 
Innovative Forms of Finance 
The conjuncture of tighter capital markets and fi scal stress in donor 
countries implies the need for supplementing traditional modes of 
fi nancing with innovative forms of fi nance. Ensuring adequate fi nancing 
for development in these circumstances will require innovations in 
leveraging private capital. With a rise in market perception of risks, 
demand for guarantees and insurance mechanisms (multilateral and 
bilateral) to mitigate the risk faced by long-term private investors in 
developing countries will rise. Such instruments can provide signifi cant 
leverage. For example, the World Bank Group issued about US$7.7 bil-
lion in guarantees between 2000 and 2008 to support investments in 
fi nancial and productive sectors of developing countries. These guaran-
tees leveraged total investments of about US$20 billion, a leverage ratio 
of roughly 2.6. Public-private partnerships offer much potential and a 
variety of possibilities. A potentially important source of development 
fi nancing is the multitrillion-dollar-strong sovereign wealth funds 
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(SWFs). An innovative example that offers scale-up possibilities is the 
recent investment by several SWFs in an International Finance Corpora-
tion (IFC) equity fund. A complementary element is the strengthening 
of international fi nancial safety nets to reduce the demand for reserves as 
a form of self-insurance against risks of economic volatility and capital 
fl ow reversals, which could help free up more of developing countries’ 
own resources for investment.
There are increasing possibilities for South-South fi nancing and 
investment from SWFs, corporations, and governments. Some countries, 
such as China, are trying to improve the standards governing these fl ows. 
For example, China has outsourced several environmental assessments 
to European fi rms to gain experience with global best practice in this 
area. It has also worked with the IFC to introduce Equator Principles 
into its operations. China and the World Bank are collaborating on 
investments in infrastructure, industrial zones, and health in Africa.
At about US$330 billion annually, offi cially recorded remittance fl ows 
to developing countries are almost three times as large as ODA. The 5x5 
initiative that followed from the 2008 G-8 summit in Hokkaido and that 
aims to reduce remittance fees by 5 percentage points in fi ve years can 
increase remittance fl ows by an estimated US$15 billion annually. 
Diaspora bonds are another innovation that seeks to tap into the wealth 
of the stock of migrants from developing countries.
Financing of Global Public Goods and Programs 
Innovation and partnerships will be particularly important in the fi nanc-
ing of global public goods and development-linked global programs. 
Private aid, which on some estimates approached US$50 billion in 2007 
(close to one-half of ODA in that year), has been playing an increasingly 
important role in partnership with public funding in programs to com-
bat communicable diseases (such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunizations). Other important innovations include the International 
Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm) that front-loads fi nancing 
needed for immunization programs in poor countries, the Advance 
Market Commitment (AMC) mechanism that subsidizes private costs of 
vaccine production for developing countries, and voluntary solidarity 
contributions such as the UNITAID international solidarity levy on air 
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travel. There are good examples of innovation and public-private part-
nerships in other areas as well, such as the Global Agriculture and Food 
Security Program. Carbon markets are emerging as a potentially impor-
tant source of development fi nance, especially in helping to meet the 
large investment needs to increase developing countries’ access to afford-
able and clean energy. 
Estimated fi nancing needs in some of these areas are large. For exam-
ple, the High Level Task Force on Innovative Financing for Health Sys-
tems estimates that, in addition to current domestic and external health 
fi nancing, about US$36 billion annually is required to achieve the health 
MDG and support national health systems to address communicable 
diseases in the 49 poorest countries. The International Food Policy 
Research Institute estimates the incremental public agricultural invest-
ment needed to reach the MDG on reducing hunger to be about US$14 
billion a year. The World Bank’s World Development Report 2010 esti-
mates that current climate-dedicated fi nancial fl ows to developing coun-
tries cover less than 5 percent of what these countries will need to spend 
on climate change mitigation and adaptation in coming years. The scale 
of the resource needs, especially in the postcrisis environment for fi nanc-
ing, calls for both a renewed commitment of support by the G-20 to such 
key global programs and for renewed vigor and creativity in exploiting 
the potential of innovative approaches in development fi nancing and 
partnerships that leverage private capital. 
Domestic Resource Mobilization and 
Financial Sector Development
The fi nancing outlook also implies the need for stronger domestic 
resource mobilization by developing countries themselves, including 
continued progress on reforms to improve public resource management 
and the environment for private investment, domestic and foreign. 
Tighter and costlier access to external fi nance reinforces need to strengthen 
developing countries’ own fi nancial systems. Strong fi nancial systems are 
important both for effective engagement with globalized fi nance and for 
better mobilization and allocation of domestic resources for develop-
ment. Ineffi ciency in domestic fi nancial sectors can make borrowing 
costs in developing countries as much as 1,000 basis points higher than 
in advanced economies. Simulations suggest that if developing countries 
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can improve domestic fi nancial intermediation to lower interest rate 
spreads by an average of 25 basis points a year, they can raise their long-
run potential output by 7.5 percent, with the largest gains accruing to 
countries and regions currently facing the highest spreads.
Some aspects of fi nancial sector development, such as improving 
access of the poor to fi nancial services and strengthening small and 
medium enterprise (SME) fi nance, have already been the subject of 
attention in the G-20 under the theme of inclusive fi nance. This is 
important: almost 70 percent of the adult population in developing 
countries, or 2.7 billion people, lack access to basic fi nancial services, and 
surveys show that SMEs are at least 30 percent more likely than large 
fi rms to rate fi nancing constraints as a major obstacle to growth. But 
there is also the need to strengthen fi nancial systems in developing coun-
tries more broadly. Expanded technical and capacity-building assistance 
to fi nancial sector reforms in developing countries can be a key area for 
G-20 collective action in support of development—including, for exam-
ple, expanding participation in and contributions to the Financial Sector 
Reform and Strengthening (FIRST) Initiative.
Theme IV: Open Trade—Engine of Growth 
and Facilitator of Rebalancing
Finally, the fourth theme holds that an open trade environment is essen-
tial for a sustained economic recovery and for enabling the growth rebal-
ancing to work. Keeping trade open will be important for sustaining the 
recovery as the fi scal and monetary stimuli are withdrawn. Trade, sup-
ported by investment and associated technology fl ows, is a key channel 
for multipolar growth and diversifi cation of global demand.
Trade Flows: Changing Patterns, Collapse, and Recovery
The recent crisis made clear how the evolution of international trade 
patterns has created more economic interdependence. Parts and compo-
nents are now one-third of all manufacturing trade, and this share rises 
to nearly one-half in East Asia. These more integrated supply chains 
imply that trade shocks in one country transmit more rapidly and 
strongly across countries. Trade fell fast after the onset of the fi nancial 
crisis. The low point was in the fi rst quarter of 2009, when the value of 
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global trade was down about 30 percent from the same quarter in the 
previous year. To place the collapse in historical context, fi gure 4.14 com-
pares trade growth (month over same month in the previous year in 
constant US$) in this crisis with previous downturns in 1975, 1982, 1991, 
and 2001. Data are matched so that year zero is the lowest point of each 
contraction. Growth leading up to the crisis was higher and the fall 
deeper in this episode than in previous downturns. The recovery also 
appears to be much steeper in this crisis than in previous episodes. The 
fi gure shows that a V-shaped recovery is well under way, although the 
global trade value still remains below its precrisis level.
The trade collapse was primarily the result of a large demand shock, 
which affected trade more than it affected GDP. The bulk of traded goods 
are manufactures (80 percent of nonoil trade), where inventories can be 
cut and consumption can be postponed. Global supply chains and lean 
retailing contributed to spreading the shock rapidly across countries. 
While the drop in trade was synchronized across countries, the recovery 
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has been less balanced. The recovery in Europe is particularly fragile, 
where worries over increasing debt in the Euro Area have raised uncer-
tainty about future growth. The rest of the world shows strong and 
steady growth. A number of Asian countries, including China, India, and 
Indonesia, have demonstrated remarkable resilience, with imports now 
above precrisis levels. These large and growing emerging markets may be 
the future engine of trade growth.
The fi nancial crisis and resulting trade collapse have brought about a 
reversal in the large global trade imbalances that characterized trade pat-
terns in recent years. In part this reversal is purely mechanical. If both 
imports and exports decline by a given percentage, then the difference 
must also shrink by the same percentage. The value of global trade 
declined by about 15 percent in 2009, suggesting there should be a simi-
lar drop in imbalances. In fact, the global trade imbalance—measured as 
the sum across countries of the absolute value of the trade balance—
plunged 30 percent (this fi gure is calculated using data from 58 countries 
that reported data through 2009 and that make up over 75 percent of 
world trade). This fi nding implies that in addition to the drop in trade, 
net rebalancing of exports and imports accounted for half of the 
improvement in trade imbalances. In other words, trade defi cit coun-
tries tended to experience relatively larger declines in imports, and trade 
surplus countries larger declines in exports. This is important because as 
trade recovers, improvement in imbalances attributable to the trade 
drop alone is likely to disappear, while adjustment attributable to rebal-
ancing is likely to be sustainable.
Trade Policy Response
Notwithstanding the diffi cult circumstances of the recession and rise in 
unemployment, G-20 members have by and large adhered to the com-
mitment made at the outset of the crisis to avoid protectionism. Although 
restrictive actions have been taken by practically all G-20 countries, the 
trade coverage of these actions has been small. However, while open pro-
tectionism has been resisted relatively well, there is concern that opaque 
or murky protectionism has been on the rise.
Between November 2008 and May 2010 governments worldwide have 
implemented close to 700 trade measures, including about 500 discrimi-
natory measures. G-20 members have imposed close to two-thirds of the 
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discriminatory measures (fi gure 4.15). More recently, quarterly data 
show a declining trend in the imposition of discriminatory measures: in 
the fi rst quarter of 2009 a total of 120 measures were taken; in the same 
quarter of 2010 the number had declined to 63 measures.
Among the trade measures implemented, there has been a sharp rise in 
the incidence of antidumping actions, use of safeguards, preferential treat-
ment of domestic fi rms in bailouts, and discriminatory procurement. Alto-
gether, the major G-20 users of antidumping, countervailing duties, and 
safeguards made 25 percent more import product lines subject to these 
trade barriers than they did in 2007 (fi gure 4.16). Such actions are not just 
North-South. About half of such barriers in 2009 were South-South in 
nature. Another risk to watch out for is that, as fi scal retrenchment occurs, 
countries might be tempted to replace subsidies and preferential treat-
ments granted in bailout programs with new trade barriers.
Priorities in the Trade Agenda
G-20 leaders recognized early on the potential systemic risks stemming 
from protectionist policy responses. They can boost market confi dence 
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by renewing their commitment to refrain from protectionist measures. 
An even stronger signal would be a collective pledge to unwind the pro-
tectionist measures that have been put in place since the onset of the 
crisis in August 2008.
Trade rules matter. Areas that are not subject to multilateral discipline 
or where the coverage is unclear or limited are the ones that have seen 
more restrictive actions. Strengthening multilateral trade discipline and 
bringing the Doha Round of trade negotiations to an early and successful 
conclusion therefore are important. Conservative estimates put the global 
real income gains from a successful Doha agreement at US$160 billion.
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Harmonizing the programs of trade preferences granted by developed 
and emerging countries to the least developed countries would help 
increase their overall usefulness. Currently, trade preference programs 
provide high levels of product coverage but with important exceptions, 
mostly related to agricultural products and apparel. The G-20 could 
consider extending 100 percent duty-free and quota-free access to the 
least developed countries, with liberal rules of origin.
For less developed countries, building trade capacity can be at least as 
important as improved market access in boosting trade. So a comple-
mentary priority is the strengthening of support for trade facilitation to 
address behind-the-border constraints to trade—improvement of trade-
related infrastructure, regulations, and logistics such as customs services 
and standards compliance. Research shows that raising logistics perfor-
mance in low-income countries to the middle-income average can boost 
trade by 15 percent or more. In support of trade facilitation, aid for trade 
should be scaled up substantially. Aid-for-trade public-private partner-
ships can make the resources go further by leveraging the dynamism of 
the private sector in strengthening trade capacity.
Conclusions
Global growth is central to development. The most important thing that 
the G-20 can do for development is to restore strong growth. As the recov-
ery matures, the longer-term growth agenda should increasingly be at the 
center of G-20 policy coordination, with a shift in focus from demand to 
supply stimulus—fi scal, fi nancial, and structural reforms that enhance 
medium- to long-term potential growth. Successful collective action by the 
G-20 along these lines would boost global growth with benefi ts for all.
Growth in developing countries increasingly matters for global 
growth. Led by the fast-growing emerging markets, developing countries 
are now contributing about half of global growth. They are leading the 
recovery in world trade. South-South links also are becoming more 
important. Developing countries offer abundant opportunities for high-
return, high-growth-potential investments, such as in critical infrastruc-
ture that removes bottlenecks to growth. Many, however, face a binding 
fi nancing constraint. Promotion of growth in these countries through 
more support for investment that removes bottlenecks to their growth 
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would be a global win-win. It would support their development, and it 
would contribute to stronger growth at the global level and to the rebal-
ancing of global growth by creating new markets and investment oppor-
tunities and more sources of growth in global demand. Promotion of 
stronger, multipolar growth in developing countries should thus be seen 
as an important and integral element of the G-20 framework to achieve 
strong, sustainable, and balanced growth in the global economy. 
The global fi nancial crisis will have long-lasting implications for 
fi nancial fl ows to developing countries. Some emerging markets are see-
ing a strong rebound in capital infl ows, but most developing countries 
face the prospect of scarcer and costlier capital. The rise in fi scal defi cits 
and debt in advanced economies and concerns about crowding out, 
tighter fi nancial sector regulation, and a repricing of risk will all likely 
raise the cost of capital and limit developing countries’ access to fi nanc-
ing, with adverse implications for their growth.
With tighter capital markets, offi cial fl ows to developing countries 
take on increased importance, both in directly providing development 
fi nance and in leveraging private fl ows. The need for concessional fi nance 
has risen as fi scal space in low-income countries has come under pressure 
while social spending needs have increased in the aftermath of the crisis. 
These developments reinforce the need to ensure adequate ODA, achieve 
satisfactory replenishments of MDB concessional windows, and follow 
through on MDB capital increases. They also point to the need to ensure 
more effective use of resources to achieve development outcomes.
The tighter outlook for private capital fl ows and the fi scal stress in 
donor countries imply the need for supplementing traditional fi nanc-
ing with innovative forms of fi nance. These include, for example, risk-
mitigation guarantees; sovereign wealth fund investments; innovations 
such as the IFFIm and AMCs that support global public goods in 
health; public-private partnerships in development-linked global pro-
grams, such as for food security; carbon fi nance; and South-South 
investments. The scale of resource needs calls for both a renewed com-
mitment by G-20 members to key global programs and renewed vigor 
and creativity in exploiting the potential of innovative approaches that 
leverage private capital. 
The fi nancing outlook also implies the need for stronger domestic 
resource mobilization by developing countries, including continued 
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efforts to improve public resource management and the climate for pri-
vate investment. There is a need to strengthen developing countries’ own 
fi nancial systems. Expanded technical and capacity-building assistance 
to fi nancial sector reforms in developing countries can be a key area for 
G-20 collective action. It is also important to ensure that fi nancial system 
regulatory reforms in advanced economies do not have unintended 
adverse effects on fi nancial fl ows to developing countries.
The G-20 can demonstrate leadership in championing an open trade 
and investment regime. Achieving an early and successful outcome on 
the Doha Development Round is one clear priority. For the least devel-
oped countries, extension of 100 percent duty-free and quota-free 
access could be considered. Improved market access for poor countries 
needs to be complemented with a strengthening of trade facilitation 
and aid-for-trade programs to enhance these countries’ trade capacity.
At the Pittsburgh summit G-20 leaders designated the G-20 as “the 
premier forum for our international economic cooperation.” If the G-20 
is to perform this leadership role in the global economy, the global devel-
opment agenda must be an integral part of its remit.
Notes
 1. G-20. 2009. “Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit,” September 24–25.
 2.  This chapter is based on work conducted by World Bank staff as part of the G-20 
Growth Framework and Mutual Assessment Process. Contributions from a 
number of Bank staff are gratefully acknowledged.
 3. Chapter 3 discusses the concept of multipolarity in more detail. 
References
Blanchard, O., and G. M. Milesi-Ferretti. 2009. Global Imbalances: In Midstream?” 
IMF Staff Position Note SPN/09/29. Washington, DC.
Bown, C. 2009. “The Global Resort to Antidumping, Safeguards, and Other Trade 
Remedies amidst the Economic Crisis.” Policy Research Working Paper 5051. 
World Bank, Washington, DC.
Calderón, C. 2009. “Infrastructure and Growth in Africa,” World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 4914. Washington, DC.
Canuto, O. 2010. “Recoupling or Switchover: Developing Countries in the Global 
Economy.” World Bank, Washington, DC. May, 2010.
 The G-20 and Global Development  151
Claessens, S., S. Evennet and B. Hoekman (eds.). 2010. Rebalancing the Global Econ-
omy: A Primer for Policymaking. CEPR London/ VoxEU.org.
Commission on Growth and Development. 2010. Post-Crisis Growth in Developing 
Countries. World Bank. Washington, DC.
Foster, V., and C. Briceño-Garmendia (eds.). 2010. Africa’s Infrastructure: A Time for 
Transformation. World Bank, Washington, DC.
Freund, C. 2009. “The Trade Response to Global Downturns: Historical Evidence.” 
Policy Research Working Paper 5015. World Bank. Washington, DC 
Global Trade Alert. Unequal Compliance: The 6th GTA Report. June 2010. CEPR, 
London.
International Monetary Fund. 2010. World Economic Outlook, April 2010: Rebalanc-
ing Growth. Washington, DC.
International Monetary Fund. 2010. Fiscal Monitor: Navigating the Fiscal Challenges 
Ahead. May 2010. Washington, DC. 
International Monetary Fund. 2010. G-20 Mutual Assessment Process – Alternative 
Policy Scenarios. June 2010. Washington, DC
International Monetary Fund–World Bank. 2010. Preserving Debt Sustainability 
in Low-Income Countries in the Wake of the Global Crisis. April 2010. Wash-
ington, DC.
Lin, Y. 2010. “A Global Economy with Multiple Growth Poles.” Paper presented at a 
High-Level Conference on Post-Crisis Growth and Development, Busan, Korea, 
June 3–4, 2010.
Okonjo-Iweala, N. 2010. “What’s the Big Idea? To Reposition Africa as the Fifth 
BRIC – A Destination for Investment, not just Aid.” Speech delivered at Har-
vard University, May 14, 2010.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2010. Economic Policy 
Reforms: Going for Growth 2010. March 2010. Paris.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2010. Development 
Cooperation Report 2010. April 2010. Paris.
World Bank. 2010. Innovative Finance for Development Solutions. March 2010. Wash-
ington, DC.
World Bank. 2010. Global Monitoring Report 2010: The MDGs after the Crisis. April 
2010. Washington, DC.
World Bank. 2010. World Development Indicators, 2010. April 2010. Washington, DC.
World Bank. 2010. Global Economic Prospects, Summer 2010: Fiscal Headwinds and 
Recovery. June 2010. Washington, DC. 
Zoellick, R. B. 2010. “The End of the Third World: Modernizing Multilateralism for 
a Multipolar World.” Speech delivered at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Inter-
national Scholars, Washington, DC, April 14, 2010.
152 Postcrisis Growth and Development
Comments by Danny Leipziger
The George Washington University
When considering the role of the G-20 in addressing international 
development issues, there are four main questions to be addressed. 
They are: 
1. Why is development a critical G-20 agenda item?
2.  How different is the postcrisis world from the precrisis world as one 
looks at development prospects and policies?
3.  What has changed in development thinking and development policy 
advice?
4.  What can the G-20 contribute to developing economies’ growth pros-
pects? 
Why Is Development Such a Critical Agenda 
Item for the G-20?
Development is a matter to be addressed by the G-20 for at least fi ve 
reasons. First, in reference to the economic and fi nancial crisis, there is 
the innocent bystander problem. While developing countries bore the 
effects of the global recession through increased food prices and 
decreased demand for exports, they had little to no involvement in the 
events that precipitated the crisis. They were, in effect, innocent 
bystanders to an event beyond their control. Second, developing econ-
omies are important centers for future growth. Third, demographic 
trends will mean more people movement in the future, whether this 
process is managed by governments or not. Fourth, issues of the global 
commons (such as those covered by the G-20) involve all countries, not 
just G-20 members. Developing economies could be the ones most 
affected by new international fi nancial and economic agreements. Last, 
the legitimacy and legacy of the G-20 are at stake if the voices of poor 
countries are not suffi ciently recognized or considered in discussions.
Comments on the paper “The G-20 and Global Development,” by Zia Qureshi in chapter 
4 of this volume.
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How Different Is the Postcrisis World and What Have We Learned?
If the international system has learned anything from the crisis, it is that 
countries with good fi scal policy dominated recovery. Those govern-
ments with fi scal space managed to cope better with the impact of the 
crisis than those that were constrained. Finance and treasury ministers 
need to be aware that future borrowing costs will rise because of increased 
regulation, risk aversion, and debt levels in advanced countries. We have 
accepted that slower global growth prospects will be the new normal for 
many countries and that excessive savings may actually impede needed 
rebalancing. We have also learned that sources of growth shifted before, 
during, and after the crisis and that they will not revert soon. Last, and 
perhaps most important for developing countries, we have learned that 
effective institutions matter everywhere. 
What Is New in Development Thinking and Advice?
Developed countries do not have all the answers and are demonstrating 
increased humility in the face of economic recovery. As was witnessed in 
the fi nancial crisis, the high-income countries can actually be the source 
of international economic instability and decline. For the most part, 
governments are being lauded for their quick response in stabilizing 
their economies and stimulating the rebound in growth, steps that have 
revived the public’s appreciation for government action, both in the 
developed and developing world. Focusing just on developing countries, 
there is a greater need for domestic resource mobilization and local 
sources of growth. Reliance on the developed world is no longer the sin-
gular strategy. As the Growth Commission pointed out, however, there is 
still no other alternative to the global market for exports. South-South 
trade, for example, can yield large returns as well as establish a more 
diversifi ed trade portfolio. There is also a general acceptance that greater 
distinction among various types of capital fl ows is smart policy and that, 
rather than impede capital fl ows across the board to protect a competi-
tive exchange rate, for example, countries would be well advised to focus 
on discouraging short-term, reversible, and volatile fl ows. Last, bolster-
ing a country’s fi scal position is perhaps even more important than the 
accumulation of international reserves because, similar to nuclear deter-
rence, once reserves are used, confi dence is affected. Fiscal stances, on the 
other hand, provide stronger international assurances of solvency.
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What Can the G-20 Contribute to Enhance Developing 
Economies’ Growth Prospects?
The G-20 has a signifi cant potential to contribute to the growth of 
developing countries. Some G-20 members can begin by getting their 
own houses in order to reduce large potential output gaps. This implies 
that an early exit from expansionary fi scal policies may be short-sighted, 
particularly since growth generates tax revenues and helps to reduce 
the fi scal defi cits. Meanwhile, other G-20 countries can turn to a more 
balanced pattern of growth that allows for export space for new 
entrants. All G-20 countries should resist the urge to slip into economic 
nationalism and thereby cut out potential new trading partners, as well 
as institute better fi nancial risk management to control speculation, 
rather than impede all capital fl ows. G-20 countries have the responsi-
bility to pave the way for the development of clean technologies in order 
to foster sustainable growth, as well as champion the conclusion of the 
Doha trade agreement. By taking up the Doha mantle, G-20 members 
can kick-start momentum in world trade and help the poorest coun-
tries gain access to international markets. The G-20 members can also 
demonstrate that they are increasingly sharing in the custodianship of 
global public goods.
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Comments by Mahmoud Mohieldin
Arab Republic of Egypt
It is a privilege to be a witness to the emergence of a new world, one in 
which the G-8 is no longer an appropriate representation of the current 
global political and economic power. The G-20 is increasingly refl ecting 
global economic shifts, which have translated into global political shifts. 
While these changes are not a direct consequence of the recent fi nancial 
crisis, their validity was confi rmed by it. The global fi nancial crisis also 
clarifi ed what we have been witnessing during the past 25 years in terms of 
the increasingly important role of the lenders of the G-20, as well as of the 
developing and emerging economies. Despite its mandate, however, the 
G-20 is still a work in progress and its fi nal shape is yet undetermined. 
The paper by Mr. Qureshi is refreshing in its discussion about sus-
tainable, long-term growth, especially after the overwhelming number 
of proposals and suggestions fi nance ministers received for short-term 
measures in response to the crisis. While some of these policies were use-
ful as quick fi xes, they are not suffi cient for more robust growth in the 
postcrisis world. My comments will refl ect and comment on the four 
important themes highlighted by Mr. Qureshi.
The G-20 needs to be clear that it is not singularly concerned with 
recovery from the recent fi nancial crisis. Two other important crises pre-
ceded this one, both of which also had very negative impacts on developing 
countries—the food and the fuel crises. Similar to the fi nancial crisis, those 
two crises required government intervention, but the measures imposed 
were very different in nature and scope. Furthermore, like the fi nancial 
crisis, the issues of food and fuel continue to be relevant and persistent 
problems that are far from being resolved. Volatility in food prices and lack 
of food security persist, as does the issue of fuel price volatility.
Before the fi nancial crisis, developing countries were facing a number 
of related nonfi nancial challenges, one of which was achieving the Mil-
lennium Development Goals by 2015, a target that the crisis made even 
more diffi cult to attain. In addition, some politicians in developing 
countries have used the fi nancial crisis as an excuse for their domestic 
Comments on the paper “The G-20 and Global Development,” by Zia Qureshi in chapter 
4 of this volume.
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problems and delays in reforms. These policy makers argue that reforms 
were proceeding well before the crisis and that external shocks were very 
much responsible for the subsequent derailing of reform efforts. As 
Mr. Qureshi astutely noted, not only those who were responsible for 
the crisis are paying its costs. The burden is falling largely on develop-
ing countries, where the aftermath of the fi nancial crisis is taking a 
signifi cant toll on human welfare. It is projected that millions of people 
will fall into the poverty trap and millions more will be unemployed. 
This outcome is contrary to what was heard at the onset of the crisis, 
when developing countries were said not to be affected. 
While developed countries were suffering massive economic melt-
downs, initial reports indicated that developing countries were holding 
themselves together nicely and experiencing minimal turbulence in their 
economies. There was little evidence of fi nancial sector problems, which 
many viewed as logical given that most developing countries did not 
have fully developed fi nancial markets that would be susceptible to a cri-
sis of this magnitude. This reaction is analogous to a person who is grate-
ful not to have been a victim of a car accident simply because he or she 
does not own a car. Furthermore, the effects of the crisis on developing 
countries were not immediately observed because many of the fi nancial 
institutions were already reformed or were being restructured during the 
crisis; moreover, most of them were not well integrated in the global 
economy, which saved them. 
As global leaders our current challenge is to determine what lessons 
can be distilled from the observed effects and what kinds of measures 
and actions can be implemented going forward to mitigate the nega-
tive outcomes. The fi rst theme of economic growth is clearly central to 
this discussion, but certain concerns must be taken into consideration. 
Some of the cures that were initially put forward to bring about stabil-
ity resulted in increases in public debt. Now public doubts about future 
sustainability of such debts are mounting and are coupled with con-
cerns about protectionism. Mr. Qureshi highlighted both classical and 
new protectionist measures that have been adopted by many coun-
tries, including some of the members of the G-20. In many ways these 
measures are counterproductive to the Group’s agenda, especially 
 considering the fourth theme of the paper on expanding trade in sup-
port of developing countries. 
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The second theme focused on the multipolarity of growth and the 
importance of having more than one source of global growth, which was 
initially discussed in chapter 3 of this volume. A critical component of the 
multipolar growth strategy is infrastructure development, and while there 
are win-win aspects of advancing it, especially in developing countries, 
there are many elements that require careful attention. Infrastructure is 
essential for economic purposes as well as for social needs. The infrastruc-
ture in developing countries, however, is largely underdeveloped and 
requires more investment, particularly in road networks, ports, energy-
producing plants, and natural gas pipelines. To this end, the public-private 
partnerships (PPP) approach has been mentioned. I recall the discussions 
of the Growth Commission and its fi nal output, the Growth Report, which 
stressed warnings of so-called “bad ideas.” The commission contended 
that in times of diffi culty, countries should not compromise or sacrifi ce 
spending on infrastructure in order to control budget defi cits. Despite 
these warnings, that is what is currently happening. 
Policy makers and fi nance ministers are being advised that public-
private partnerships can solve their spending problems by bridging 
funding gaps and compensating for the drop in public outlays on infra-
structure. Unfortunately, in practice these partnerships have not 
addressed such a challenge. While some countries, such as South Africa, 
are advanced in their use of the PPP framework, other countries, includ-
ing my country, the Arab Republic of Egypt, have just started using the 
PPP approach. For newcomers, it takes ages to establish the contractual 
framework, hold discussions with potential developers, and iron out all 
logistical trappings. The concern is that countries often rely on the PPP 
framework and drop infrastructure funding expecting that the partner-
ships will make up the difference tomorrow. This is wishful thinking, at 
least in the short term. Instead of pushing the PPP approach, I think 
there is need for a balanced approach that would require a continued 
level of public fi nance for infrastructure projects, coupled with the pos-
sibility of future PPP implementation. This recommendation is given in 
full recognition and appreciation of the kinds of challenges national 
budgets are currently facing, namely, defi cits. From a policy perspective, 
however, considerations of this kind are important to address.
On the third issue of fi nance and fi nancial development, many 
measures that have been discussed today remind us of the regressive 
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interventions of the past and their effects on the mechanics of the fi nan-
cial sector. While these measures may sound attractive from a regula-
tory perspective, some of them could be distortive in practice. More 
attention should be given to the fi nancial sector even when witnessing 
growth because there are issues related to access and the concentration 
of assets. Mr. Qureshi provides an interesting description of global 
fi nance, not only at the local level but also on fi nancial fl ows across bor-
ders. Despite periods of rapid fi nancial growth, we have not observed an 
increase in funding for investment. In fact, the world fi xed-investment 
rate was almost constant or even declining between 1995 and 2005. 
Meanwhile, the United Nation’s 2010 World Economic and Social Sur-
vey showed that cross-border funds were increasing during this period. 
Hence, the issue becomes one of funding and high incremental capital 
output ratios. For a country that aims to attain an average growth rate 
of 6–7 percent a year (for example, in Africa or the Middle East), an 
investment-to-GDP ratio of at least 24 percent would be required. Given 
very low saving rates in developing countries, governments would face 
a funding gap of roughly 8–12 percent of GDP. Therefore, the problems 
we are seeing today regarding the crowding out of capital fl ows to devel-
oping countries and the debt crises of some sovereign bonds, including 
Greece, are worrying. 
With regard to fi nancial inclusion, we should consider the joint Inter-
national Monetary Fund–World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Pro-
gram (FSAP) as an important tool to increase the effectiveness of efforts 
to promote the soundness of fi nancial systems. The program works to 
identify the strengths and vulnerabilities of a country’s fi nancial system, 
to determine how key sources of risk are being managed, to ascertain the 
sector’s developmental and technical assistance needs, and to help pri-
oritize policy responses. In my opinion, there is an overemphasis on the 
stability side of FSAP, rather than on promoting development fi nance. 
This viewpoint is consistent with statements made by the United Nations 
that the goal for fi nancial sector intermediaries should not be to exist 
simply as stable entities but to also play a role in the intermediation 
between savers and investors. I recognize, however, that in a time of 
fi nancial crisis the issue of fi nancial stability takes priority.
Finally, on the issue of trade, I share the view expressed by Mr. Qureshi. 
In the discussion of chapter 3, I raised the question about excess capacity 
 The G-20 and Global Development  159
and trying to get trade to help growth for developing countries. As the 
author notes, the challenges to expanding trade are not only evident 
after the crisis but had been long-standing agenda items before the 
crisis as well. Trade promotion in developing countries is strongly 
linked to infrastructure development, since one of the main constraints 
to developing-country trade is the high transaction costs associated 
with transporting goods to market. I am also in favor of completing 
the Doha Round of trade agreements. 
Overall, I am very pleased with the work in progress. I believe the 
G-20’s development agenda is both necessary and very promising and 
that the policy measures prescribed here will be extremely useful if taken 
seriously and implemented effectively by policy makers.
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Comments by Robert Vos
United Nations
Let me thank the organizers for inviting me to this conference and for 
giving me the honor of serving on such a distinguished panel. I very 
much liked Zia Qureshi’s presentation and agree with many of the issues 
he raised. For the sake of brevity, let me not reiterate those, but focus on 
four issues that I believe may need some additional refl ection.
Multipolar Growth and Decoupling
Let me fi rst turn to the notions of a multipolar pattern of world growth 
and decoupling of growth between developing and developed countries. 
I have never been a great fan of the concept of decoupling. When decou-
pling fi rst surfaced in International Monetary Fund and World Bank 
documents before the global fi nancial crisis, it gave the suggestion that 
somehow developing countries would be insulated from the slowdown 
of growth in the United States and Europe that had already set in at that 
point. The crisis made clear that was rather misleading. The second rea-
son I do not like the concept is because it could give the false impression 
that global economic interdependencies would become less intense. The 
distinction that is now made between cyclical and structural decoupling 
does not necessarily remove that impression. The heart of the matter is, 
of course, that those interdependencies are changing. In that sense, 
approaching it through the lens of multipolar growth may be more 
promising.
Indeed, in modern history the world has never before experienced a 
situation in which, given the current weakness of industrial countries, 
major developing countries have become the principal engine of world 
economic growth. Continuing expansion of these economies is therefore 
crucial for the world. But that said, the question that needs to be raised 
is about the current and future capacity of developing economies to 
transmit their growth dynamics to the rest of the world. 
China holds the largest share of global trade among developing coun-
tries, which makes it into something like a test case. China’s ability to 
Comments on the paper “The G-20 and Global Development,” by Zia Qureshi in chapter 
4 of this volume.
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induce growth in the rest of the world inevitably depends on its capacity 
to turn its large trade surplus into a balance or even a trade defi cit. This 
problem is absent in other large developing countries, like Brazil and 
India, that tend to run current account defi cits. In the case of China, the 
transition from export-led to domestic-led growth raises a myriad of 
questions, including the capacity to shift domestic demand dynamics 
from investment to consumption and therefore substantially increase 
wage shares and reduce the signifi cant overcapacity generated by the 
highest investment rate ever recorded in history. Also, given that large 
parts of its trade links are associated with the demand for inputs for its 
export sector, the shift from export-led to domestic demand-led growth 
may actually reduce Chinese import demand. 
Under any scenario, however, it is essential that we do not throw the 
baby out with the bathwater as China reorients its pattern of growth. In 
particular, although some real appreciation of the renminbi should be 
part of this process, a very strong and disorderly appreciation could seri-
ously affect Chinese economic growth. Looking back in history, a strongly 
appreciating currency to reduce export surpluses is one, not implausible 
interpretation of how Japan’s dynamic growth came to a halt and its 
costly fi nancial crisis was incubated. In any case, it is the one interpreta-
tion that Chinese authorities seem to have in mind when trying to avoid 
repeating that history. The more desirable scenario is a Chinese economy 
that transmits its stimulus to the rest of the world through rising imports 
generated more by the income effect (through rapid economic growth 
and real wage increases) than by the substitution effect (through strong 
real exchange rate appreciation). Opening more space for Chinese invest-
ment abroad should also be an essential part of this strategy. 
The subsequent question is whether multipolar growth will not 
induce further income divergence among developing countries. In a 
sense, if current trends are projected, East Asia and India (not South Asia 
as whole) are likely to be among the more dynamic poles of the new 
world economy. But that may leave many developing countries behind, 
not only those with weak links with these dynamic poles and those that 
are competitors with them in global markets, but also those that merely 
provide primary commodities to the growth poles and that should 
expect to see volatile growth because of the instability of commodity 
prices in world markets. So, a major issue going forward is to guarantee 
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that the world is not on the verge of another major divergence in devel-
opment, now not between industrial and developing countries but 
among the group of developing countries. Indeed, this has already been 
one part of the pattern of global development in recent decades, which 
can be characterized as one of a “dual income divergence.” This implies, 
in particular, serious thinking about the specifi c mechanism through 
which the most dynamic poles of the developing world are going to dis-
seminate their growth to the developing world at large. 
Global Imbalances
A second and related issue is the implication of current trends for the 
global imbalances. One of the major paradoxes of the current global eco-
nomic crisis is that accumulating foreign exchange reserves in the devel-
oping world contributed fi rst to the buildup of the global imbalances 
during the boom years. Over time this dampened global demand, and 
global demand itself became increasingly dependent on the United States 
as “the consumer of last resort.” The global imbalances that were 
fomented this way formed part of the multiple factors that led to the 
fi nancial bubble that caused the current crisis. When the bubble burst, 
however, the strong external balance sheets subsequently provided a buf-
fer of resilience to many developing economies, thereby becoming an 
important factor behind the recent recovery. Yet, a return to the old pat-
tern of widening global imbalances is undesirable, because it has proven 
to be unsustainable.
Moreover, the counterpart trend has been a sustained pattern of net 
transfers of fi nancial resources fl owing from developing countries to 
industrial countries running large defi cits. In 2008 those transfers bor-
dered US$1 trillion. The major surplus countries in East Asia and the 
Middle East of course contributed most, but Africa also saw more fi nan-
cial resources fl owing out of its region than fl owing in (fi gure 4.17). 
Because of the crisis, the United Nations estimates that net fi nancial out-
fl ows fell back to around US$600 billion in 2009 (United Nations 
2010b). The United Nations expects the outfl ow to rise again in the 
coming years because of the current pattern of the recovery and the 
return of massive, mostly short-term capital fl ows toward emerging 
markets. This return to precrisis patterns of international fi nancial fl ows 
runs the risk of generating future busts, following well-known patterns.
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Going forward, the worst global scenario would be one in which all or 
most countries, including the developed countries, aim at improving 
their current accounts through fi scal consolidation or otherwise, as cur-
rent IMF projections indicate, since this is nothing but a scenario of 
weak global demand and even a new recession.
A more desirable global scenario would be one in which most devel-
oping countries (and not only China) run current account defi cits. 
This scenario would be consistent with the idea of continued strong 
growth in developing countries and efforts to deal with global poverty 
and climate change. For that, not only the large-scale infrastructure 
investments to which Mr. Qureshi referred in his presentation are 
needed. Also needed are substantial increases in public expenditures 
for achieving the MDGs as well as large-scale investments in renewable 
energy and sustainable agriculture so that developing countries can 
address climate change and ensure that high growth is low on carbon 
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emissions. Similarly, all the calls for additional development fi nancing 
needs and enhanced international cooperation point in the same direc-
tion. In other words, moving toward a world of multipolar growth con-
sistent with income convergence across all nations and with broad-based 
poverty reduction and the greening of global growth, would require not 
a balancing but in fact a reversal in the pattern of global imbalances over 
the medium run. 
Achieving such a reversal in an orderly fashion will not be easy. It will 
be demanding on our mechanisms for global economic governance 
(United Nations 2010a).
First, it will require much stronger international policy coordination 
built around common principles and goals and sustained over the long 
run. But, given what I have just said, such coordination cannot be merely 
about managing exit strategies from the extraordinary stimulus measures 
or managing aggregate demand. It is even more important to address such 
issues in conjunction with industrial and energy policies, poverty reduc-
tion strategies, strategies for international development fi nancing and 
cooperation, and trade policies. The G-20 framework for “strong, sustain-
able and balanced global growth” thus should include all of the above.
The second reason why this will be demanding is that it cannot be 
done without major reforms in the global fi nancial system. Reversing 
the pattern of global imbalances will remain diffi cult without touching 
the global reserve system. Continued reliance on the U.S. dollar and the 
perceived need of countries to accumulate strong reserve positions as 
self-insurance against world market instability is bound to sustain the 
current pattern of global imbalances rather than reverse it. A system less 
reliant on one national currency and more reliant on common reserve 
pools and true international liquidity, such as special drawing rights 
(SDRs), likely would be more conducive of a reversal of the current 
unsustainable pattern. Such reforms could also form the basis of inno-
vative development fi nancing such as issuance of SDRs for climate and 
development fi nancing.
Such a reversal will also require more urgent progress in the coordina-
tion of reforms of fi nancial regulation and supervision. Some emerging 
market countries have already responded to the return of speculative cap-
ital fl ows by introducing capital controls, a logical response to avoid their 
macroeconomic policy space being overridden by boom-bust capital 
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fl ows that can be so devastating for growth and poverty reduction, as 
indicated by Mr. Qureshi. Yet a serious discussion of capital account regu-
lations in the world is still surprisingly missing at the forefront of the 
current discussions of global fi nancial reform. 
Trade and Development
A third set of questions relates to what could become the weakest link in 
the current recovery: international trade. There are two possible scenarios. 
The fi rst would be a continuation of the rapid recovery of trade that started 
in mid-2009 and that will generate a return to the situation that prevailed 
in recent decades; that is, world trade that is more dynamic than world 
GDP. The other is a situation in which this does not happen, and we see a 
world in which trade is not particularly dynamic in the immediate future—
and not necessarily because protectionism is back on the agenda. 
The latter scenario may in fact not be as undesirable as it seems. And 
I do not mention this because I do not believe in the benefi ts of open 
trade. Here’s the story: As I already mentioned, large surplus economies 
like China would try to focus more on the domestic economy, which, as 
I suggested earlier, could slow import demand. But also many of the 
poorer economies would need to refocus their economies away from 
their high dependence on primary exports or footloose manufacturing 
export production and toward a strengthening of the backward and 
forward links of their export industries. The Republic of Korea is a 
lighting example of successful export-led growth following a more 
inward-looking stage. As many studies have shown, countries that have 
more diversifi ed trade and stronger links with their own or regional 
economies are less prone to trade shocks (fi gure 4.18) and grow faster 
in the long run as they gain more from trade (fi gure 4.19). Along with 
the increased spending on nontradables (infrastructure and energy 
investments, spending for MDG-related services), creating such links 
may require slowing export growth during the process of structural 
adjustment. In such a scenario a slowing of world trade would be a 
transitory but benign phenomenon. 
For such a scenario to emerge, low-income and a range of middle-
income countries will need to benefi t not only from greater market 
access and the aid-for-trade initiative but also from greater breathing 
space in World Trade Organization rules and regional and bilateral 
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Note: Export specialization is deﬁ ned by shares of 40 percent or more for indicated groups of commodities 
in total merchandise exports.
free trade agreements to apply temporary support measures (such as 
export subsidies) so that they can climb further up the trading ladder. 
Easing impediments to technology transfers, especially those affecting 
access to green technologies, would need to be part of the same pack-
age (see United Nations 2010a, chs. 2 and 4, for further discussion of 
these issues).
Multipolar Growth and the G-20
Finally, what all this implies is that the world we are looking forward to 
is going to be much more dependent in economic terms on the develop-
ing world than any world observed in history. Never before has the call 
of the 2002 Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development to 
increase the participation of developing countries in global economic 
decision making been more important.
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Managing this world will require, therefore, major reforms of the 
existing mechanisms of global economic governance that were invented 
more than 60 years ago and that have not fundamentally changed much 
since. The formation of the G-20 has been a step forward in this regard, 
but its representation is inadequate. In particular, many medium and 
small-size countries are not represented at all, and the currently poor 
economies of Sub-Saharan Africa are heavily underrepresented. To 
acquire the sense of mutual accountability and legitimacy that is needed 
for global consensus building on all these issues that are so critical for 
the world’s future, it will be important to bring these G-20 deliberations 
into the broader multilateral framework. This need not necessarily be 
done on a one-country, one-vote basis, but one could consider doing so 
on the basis of caucuses of groups of countries, as is currently already the 
case in the Bretton Woods institutions. Refl ective of the changing world 
we are discussing today, the voice of developing countries necessarily 
would become predominant with time. The policy coordination chal-
lenges ahead will be no less daunting, however.
Figure 4.19. Per Capita GDP Growth of Developing Countries by Dominant 
Technology-Content of Export Specialization, 1960–2000
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Chair’s Summary by Graeme Wheeler
World Bank
It is a pleasure to chair the session on “G-20 and Global Development,” 
which centers on the paper by Zia Qureshi.
For fi ve years in the middle of the decade, developing countries grew 
at their fastest rate in 40 years. At that time, the main policy debates were 
over the global transfer of skill-enhancing technologies, the scale of 
international capital fl ows, and whether there was decoupling between 
developing and developed countries.
In the last four years we have witnessed three major crises: a food 
crisis, a fuel crisis, and a fi nancial crisis. We have learned that the world 
is much more fragile and interdependent than previously thought. It is a 
world of increasing multipolarity, with multiple sources of growth and 
with powerful reverse linkages between developing and developed coun-
tries and between developing countries themselves. We have witnessed 
large changes in the international architecture—including the reemer-
gence of the G-20, the formation of the Financial Stability Board, and 
substantial new fi nancing for the International Monetary Fund. We have 
seen a signifi cant increase in voice and participation in dialogue and 
decision making in the World Bank Group, and the same process is 
under way with voice and quota in the IMF. 
The G-20 garnered substantial success in London in 2009 when it 
mobilized US$1.1 trillion in fi nancing to help manage the global fi nan-
cial crisis. At the G-20 meeting in Pittsburgh, leaders referred to the G-20 
as the key body for global economic coordination. They committed to 
enhanced multilateral surveillance to help achieve strong, balanced, and 
sustainable growth worldwide. To this end, the primary focus has been 
on the analytical work done by the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank under the G-20 Growth Framework and Mutual Assessment 
Process. Nearly all of the projections and the scenarios (base case, low 
case, high case) have been completed. The next steps will undoubtedly 
be the hardest. Policy makers will need to identify supportive policies 
Summary on the paper “The G-20 and Global Development,” by Zia Qureshi in chapter 4 
of this volume.
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and act collectively to put these policies in place to support and sustain 
strong and balanced growth within the G-20 and to promote develop-
ment and poverty reduction globally. This is a huge test for the G-20. 
The key issues are the maturation of the mutual assessment process and 
whether the G-20 can be effective in “peacetime.” 
Can the G-20 be effective in a postcrisis environment? All eyes are on 
fi scal policy, but can one policy instrument carry so much of the burden? 
As the global economy recovers, attention has been on implementing exit 
policies, particularly from an expansionary fi scal stance. Policy stimulus 
in developed and emerging market countries has been instrumental in 
pulling the world out of global recession. However, government balance 
sheets in developed countries are dangerously overextended, with G-7 
ratios of public debt to GDP projected by the IMF to exceed 100 percent 
on average by the end of 2010. We have witnessed a sovereign debt crisis 
in southern Europe. The IMF is now calling for fi scal consolidation in the 
developed countries, ideally starting in 2011, and the World Bank’s anal-
ysis shows that fi scal consolidation would benefi t developing-country 
medium-term growth as well. A key question is how to make the transi-
tion from fi scal stimulus to consolidation. The IMF has noted the hetero-
geneity among the G-20 countries and the need for a differentiated 
approach (for example, advanced defi cit vs. advanced surplus countries), 
but it also stresses the importance of ensuring coordinated exit strategies. 
A second key question is how to carry out the consolidation. The IMF 
analysis, backed by the OECD, has highlighted the potential of growth-
enhancing policies, such as the shift from taxes on labor and income to 
consumption taxes, while others have pointed out that this shift could 
worsen inequality. What are the trade-offs regarding fi scal policy, and 
how can the many potential pitfalls be avoided?
The multipolar world is already upon us. Developing countries have 
contributed about 40 percent of global growth over the past decade and 
account for more than 40 percent of the increase in world imports. The 
question for G-20 policy makers is not whether to support multipolar 
growth but how to do that most effectively. World Bank analysis points 
to the importance of increased infrastructure investment in the develop-
ing world (see chapter 8), but more roads and bridges need to be com-
plemented by increased investment in human capital. The OECD has 
identifi ed education (years of schooling, international test scores) as the 
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structural reform with the single-highest growth dividend in OECD 
countries. What is an appropriate mix of hard and soft investment in 
developing countries?
Financial fl ows are important to developing countries’ growth, but 
fi nancial inclusion can transform their impact. Financial markets have 
expanded their reach tremendously over the past 20 years, but in most 
developing countries, individuals’ participation is limited to labor mar-
kets and consumption. According to World Bank analysis, two-thirds of 
the adult population in developing countries (2.7 billion people) lack 
access to formal fi nancial services. Evidence shows that fi nancial access is 
not only progrowth but also pro-poor. How can the G-20 support the 
fi nancial inclusion agenda while promoting expanded fi nancial fl ows 
and development of fi nancial sectors in developing countries?
Finally, open trade matters more than ever. The historically sharp fall-
off in trade during the fi nancial crisis demonstrated the increasing 
degree of global integration—the value of global trade declined an 
unprecedented 15 percent in 2009. The collapse in trade was the main 
channel for transmitting the impact of the fi nancial crisis to low-income 
countries. What can the G-20 do now in the recovery phase to promote 
trade that will amplify the impact of the global recovery on the poorest 
countries? Key areas for action include the completion of the Doha 
Development Round and strengthening trade facilitation and aid-for-




The Republic of Korea’s development experience over the past half-
century has been a source of inspiration for developing countries. 
Indeed, as the dramatic increases in Korea’s trade volume and per capita 
gross domestic product (GDP), shown in fi gure 5.1 suggest, Korea may 
represent the face of hope “for all those countries who want to radically 
transform the social and economic conditions of their people in the 
course of a single generation.”1 One of the poorest countries in the 
world at the beginning of the 1960s, Korea became a member of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
in 1996. Even among successful countries characterized by sustained 
high growth,2 Korea stands out with its impressive industrial upgrading 
and ability to recover quickly from shocks.
In fact, unlike some countries caught in “a middle-income trap,” 
Korea managed to achieve export-led growth, not just export growth, by 
transforming its economic structure and systematically increasing the 
domestic value added or local content of its exports. As fi gure 5.2 shows, 
the share of manufacturing in Korea’s GDP more than doubled as Korea 
was able to improve agricultural productivity and reallocate workers 
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Figure 5.2. Sectoral Composition of Korea’s GDP
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Figure 5.1. Korea’s Journey from Poverty to Prosperity
Source: Author.























































from the primary sector. Moreover, as fi gure 5.3 shows, Korea’s exports 
and imports rose in step with investment, suggesting that incentives for 
these activities were strengthened in a similar manner. 
Korea’s development experience also has been a source of fascination 
and contention for economists. Both the neoclassical school and the 
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statist school have cited the example of Korea in support of their theo-
ries. Neoclassical perspectives typically trace Korea’s economic success to 
a set of market-oriented macroeconomic reforms in 1964 and 1965 
(Krueger 1979), whereas statist perspectives point to the pervasive dis-
tortion of microeconomic incentives (“getting the prices wrong”) by the 
Korean government and argue that such government intervention pro-
moted rapid economic growth (Amsden 1989; Rodrik 1995). As these 
competing explanations indicate, Korea’s case has been a rather impor-
tant single data point in development debates. While discussing the 
evolution of “big ideas” in development economics, Lindauer and 
Pritchett (2002) note that “because Korea grew so rapidly for so long, 
any big idea had to encompass Korea before it could become conven-
tional wisdom.”3 Extracting “correct” lessons from Korea’s development 
experience is thus not only a formidable intellectual challenge but also 
a high-stakes game.
Development is conceptualized in this chapter as the result of syner-
gies between enhanced human capital and new knowledge involving 
complementary investments in physical and social capital. Three major 
challenges for development are innovation, coordination, and institu-
tion of performance-based reward system. There may be multiple paths 
Figure 5.3. Korea’s Exports, Imports, and Investment Relative to GDP
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to development, depending on how the state, nonstate actors, and mar-
kets interact with each other to address innovation and coordination 
externalities. The respective roles of the state, nonstate actors, and mar-
kets in meeting these challenges may shift over time, refl ecting changes 
in their capacity as well as historical and political economy factors.
This chapter places Korea’s development experience within this con-
ceptual framework. For Korea the discovery and upgrading of its com-
parative advantage through international benchmarking, public-private 
consultation, and peer-to-peer learning has been critical to its develop-
ment. The memoirs from the architects of Korea’s development, in fact, 
emphasize the role of performance-oriented leadership and suggest that 
export-oriented industrialization and human resource development, 
as encapsulated in the slogans “exportization of all industries” and “sci-
entization of all people,” capture the essence of Korea’s approach.4 
This chapter analyzes how Korea addressed innovation and coordina-
tion externalities while containing negative government externalities to 
promote development. The chapter fi rst introduces a conceptual frame-
work that emphasizes the centrality of innovation and coordination 
externalities and increasing returns for development. It then places 
Korea’s development experience in context by looking at its initial condi-
tions. The next sections focus on Korea’s discovery of its comparative 
advantage and analyze the political economy of Korea’s transition to 
export-oriented industrialization in the early 1960s5 and look at Korea’s 
efforts to upgrade its comparative advantage, especially in conjunction 
with its heavy and chemical industry drive in the 1970s. The chapter then 
discusses the problem of transition from an authoritarian developmen-
tal state to a democratic market economy since the 1980s and concludes 
with lessons for developing countries drawn from Korea’s experience. 
Conceptual Framework for Development
Development may be conceptualized as the result of synergies between 
enhanced human capital and new knowledge, involving complementary 
investments in physical and social capital.6 Two breakthroughs distin-
guish “modern growth” characterized by sustained improvement in pro-
ductivity and living standards: the emergence of a large group of people 
who absorb and assimilate knowledge to improve their human capital 
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and in turn use their improved human capital to apply and generate 
knowledge to raise productivity;7 and the expansion of markets and 
hierarchies to facilitate specialization and coordinate productive activi-
ties, through the invisible and visible hands.8 In short, innovation and 
coordination externalities and increasing returns are central to modern 
growth, which can overcome the Malthusian trap.
The critical importance of knowledge for development begs the ques-
tion of how it should be produced, disseminated, and utilized. Not only 
is knowledge a public good characterized by nonexcludability and 
nonrivalry,9 but it is something like an evolving organism that grows 
through accumulation, synthesis, and innovation. Institutions that 
encourage autonomy, diversity, and experiment are critical to sustained 
knowledge production and economic growth.10 The public good nature 
of knowledge poses a policy challenge: Unless supported by the public 
sector, the private sector is likely to underinvest in the provision of 
knowledge, but excessive state intervention is likely to stifl e autonomy, 
diversity, and experiment that are essential to the growth of knowledge. 
How can the public sector work with the private sector to overcome this 
dual problem? 
Moreover, the importance of complementary investments suggests 
that coordination problems may be formidable, especially when markets 
are underdeveloped.11 The standard “big push” line of argument calls for 
the state’s coordinating role in promoting the concurrent development 
of upstream and downstream industries when these industries depend 
on each other to be viable. As Stiglitz (1996) and others have noted, how-
ever, coordination failure can be addressed through trade to some extent: 
It is possible to develop steel-using industries simply by importing steel 
without developing a steel-producing industry—and without the state 
coordinating investment in “a big push,” even though transaction costs 
involved in ensuring reliable and timely supplies of inputs may constrain 
the effectiveness of international trade as a coordinating mechanism. 
Moreover, individual fi rms, such as large business groups, may be able to 
internalize coordination externalities to a certain extent. However, as 
long as there are essential intermediate inputs that cannot easily be 
traded or internalized, the state’s coordinating role may be justifi ed. To a 
large extent, education, research and development (R&D), and physical 
and institutional infrastructure may qualify as such nontradable and 
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noninternalizable intermediate inputs.12 In particular, although the syn-
ergies between enhanced human capital and new knowledge are critical 
to development, investing in people by itself may not be enough. It has to 
be a part of a comprehensive and integrated program to facilitate eco-
nomic transformation if it is to contribute to sustained growth instead of 
unemployment and emigration among the highly educated. Constrained 
by underdeveloped markets in the early stages of development, a country 
as well as a fi rm may have to rely heavily on nonmarket measures to 
reduce transaction costs and coordinate productive activities (Coase 
1937; Williamson 1975). 
Placed in this context, which emphasizes the role of innovation and 
coordination for development, the long-running “state-versus-market” 
debate in economics had better be restructured in a more pragmatic and 
less ideological direction.13 Externalities in the provision of knowledge 
and coordination of productive activities can justify state intervention. 
The fundamental policy challenge is for the state to work with nonstate 
actors and markets to address innovation and coordination externalities 
while minimizing negative government externalities. Certainly, through 
incompetence and corruption, some governments may create more 
problems than they solve, but “getting the government out of the way” 
does not help resolve innovation and coordination externalities. It basi-
cally amounts to throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Instead of 
dismissing the state from the outset, it would be more constructive to 
examine what needs to be done to increase competence and reduce cor-
ruption on the part of the state as it deals with innovation and coordina-
tion externalities. 
At the most basic level the state must set up a professional bureau-
cracy combined with an effective monitoring system to ensure that 
incompetence and corruption do not become a self-fulfi lling prophesy. 
For instance, recruiting government offi cials through meritocratic 
examinations rather than personal ties would go a long way toward 
improving state capacity. It is also important to defi ne basic principles in 
legal enforcement and policy implementation and strike a balance 
between rule versus discretion in achieving these principles. 
A solution to the development challenge should include an incentive 
system that uses markets and institutions to provide rewards based on 
individuals’ contributions to society in a competitive setting, in a way that 
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addresses information and incentive problems and achieves social cohe-
sion. A performance-based reward system, under the principles of the 
protection of property rights and the equality of opportunity, has to be an 
integral part of this institutional framework. The reinforcement of suc-
cessful experiments through the feedback mechanism of performance-
based rewards can lead to dramatic changes over time. While a regime 
that facilitates resource mobilization can be effective in a catch-up phase 
of development, an institutional platform that fosters autonomy, diver-
sity, and experiment is critical to sustained productivity-led growth.
Dynamically, the development of markets (and their supporting insti-
tutions) reduces at least some innovation and coordination externalities 
over time, and the importance of autonomy, diversity, and experiment in 
sustaining growth also restricts the extent and mode of state intervention. 
These restrictions should be shaped by three factors: the development of 
markets to coordinate productive activities, the level of state capacity 
(that is, competence and integrity) to address externalities, and the avail-
ability of nonstate actors (such as business groups) to internalize exter-
nalities. Clearly, as the capacities of the state, nonstate actors, and markets 
change over time, the implied normative restrictions on the extent and 
mode of state intervention should also change; however, path dependence 
may affect this dynamic and create a problem of transition (David 1985; 
Arthur 1994). There may be multiple paths to development (Rodrik 
2007), depending on how the state, nonstate actors, and markets interact 
with each other to address innovation and coordination externalities. 
Korea’s Initial Conditions
Natural Endowment and Historical Context
Korea is a medium-sized, densely populated, resource-poor, and penin-
sular country in northeast Asia. If reunifi ed, Korea would be the 84th 
largest country in the world with a total territory of approximately 
220,000 square kilometers—slightly smaller than Britain. Reunifi ed Korea 
would also be the world’s 17th most populous country, with a population 
of more than 70 million—slightly larger than France. The Republic of 
Korea by itself, with a territory of 100,000 square kilometers and a popu-
lation of 50 million, comes in at No. 108 and No. 25, respectively—similar 
to Portugal in size and to Spain in population. Although Korea is by no 
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means a tiny country by global standards, its location next to China, 
Russia, and Japan, makes it look like “a shrimp among whales” by com-
parison. Korea’s poor natural resources and limited arable land only 
reinforce this conventional wisdom, even though resource abundance 
per se is not as important for development as access to inputs at interna-
tional prices in an increasingly connected global economy.
Korea achieved national unity and established a centralized rule in the 
10th century, a remarkably early date by any standard. Characterizing 
Korea’s centralist tendencies as “the politics of the vortex,” Henderson 
(1968, 2) noted: “Few if any traditions affecting an entity of this size have 
operated in so uniform an environment of race, culture, and language, 
within geographic boundaries so stable or a political framework so 
enduring. Few states eliminated local power so soon or so completely 
and sustained centralized rule in such unchallenged form so long.” In 
this regard, Korea’s traditional political and social structure was rather 
different from that of Europe or Japan, which operated in a feudal 
system. A pyramid-like structure, with the central government at the 
apex, characterized Korea’s social organization for more than 1,000 years. 
While the state maintained centralized rule in traditional Korea, how-
ever, the monarch typically shared power with infl uential aristocrats or 
scholar-offi cials. What may be called “centralized oligarchy” rather than 
absolutist rule characterized the political structure of traditional Korea 
(Henderson 1968; Palais 1975).
In the economic sphere, the government traditionally allowed little 
room for merchants or other groups to pursue moneymaking ventures 
on their own. In fact, during the Yi (also known as Chosun or Choson) 
Dynasty (1392–1910), the social hierarchy consisted of Confucian lite-
rati, farmers, craftsmen, and merchants from top to bottom. The only 
legitimate route to the top of the social hierarchy was to pass state exam-
inations and join the ranks of scholar-offi cials. These state examinations 
were highly competitive and meritocratic; in practice, however, it was 
diffi cult for the offspring of the non-elite to fi nd the necessary time and 
resources to prepare for these examinations. Thus, in the traditional 
Korean context, with few alternative sources of power available, both 
economic development and stagnation had to be state-led (Cha and Lim 
2000). Ideally, “the best and the brightest,” selected through state exami-
nations, could take advantage of Korea’s homogeneity and centralization 
 Joint Discovery and Upgrading of Comparative Advantage  181
to mobilize resources for development. Alternatively, the elite scholar-
offi cials at the center could easily exploit mass society and engage in fac-
tional rent-seeking competition. In this case, the masses would have little 
choice but to acquiesce in resignation, revolt against the offi cials despite 
the odds, or leave the country in search of a better life.
Isabella Bird Bishop (1897), a traveler-writer who visited the Korean 
Peninsula as well as a Korean settlement in the Russian region of Pri-
morsk in the 1890s, saw a dramatic contrast between the lives of the 
Korean people in the two places and came to appreciate that it was gov-
ernance, not innate culture, that accounted for the difference. With a 
hint of racism, she wrote:
The suspiciousness and indolent conceit, and the servility to his betters, 
which characterize the home-bred Korean have very generally given place 
[in Russia] to an independence and manliness of manner rather British 
than Asiatic. The alacrity of movement is a change also, and has replaced 
the conceited swing of the yang-ban and heartless lounge of the peasant. 
There are many chances for making money, and there is neither mandarin 
nor yang-ban to squeeze it out of the people when made, and comforts and 
a certain appearance of wealth no longer attract the rapacious attentions of 
offi cials, but are rather a credit to a man than a source of insecurity….
In Korea I had learned to think of Koreans as the dregs of a race, and to 
regard their condition as hopeless, but in Primorsk I saw reason for con-
siderably modifying my opinion. It must be borne in mind that these 
people, who have raised themselves into a prosperous farming class, and 
who get an excellent character for industry and good conduct alike from 
Russian police offi cials, Russian settlers, and military offi cers, were not 
exceptionally industrious and thrifty men. They were mostly starving 
folk who fl ed from famine, and their prosperity and general demeanor 
give me the hope that their countrymen in Korea, if they ever have an 
honest administration and protection for their earnings, may slowly 
develop into men.
The exploitation of the peasants and the failure to mobilize resources 
for the nation’s modernization set the stage for the Japanese colonial 
occupation of Korea (1910–45). The Japanese initially attempted to 
develop Korea as a supplier of rice and a buyer of Japanese manufac-
tured products. Subsequently, as Japan set its sight on China in the 
1930s, it developed the northern part of Korea as an industrial base to 
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support its invasion. According to Suh (1978), Korea’s agriculture, for-
estry, and fi shery sector grew annually at 2.1 percent from 1910 to 1940; 
whereas the mining and manufacturing sector grew at 9.5 percent over 
the same period. The two sectors taken together (that is, excluding con-
struction, utilities, trade, and services) grew at 3.2 percent. Overall, 
Korea’s per capita commodity product grew annually at 1.6 percent from 
1910 to 1940. 
Under the Japanese colonial rule, Korea heavily depended on trade. 
Most of Korea’s trade during the colonial period was with Japan. In the 
1930s Japan accounted for 84.5 percent of Korea’s total trade volume and 
Manchuria under Japanese occupation, another 10.5 percent (National 
Statistical Offi ce 1995). The basic pattern of trade was for Korea to export 
food and raw materials and import fi nished goods, because the colonial 
industrialization mostly focused on light manufacturing for domestic 
consumption. The share of food and raw materials in Korea’s exports 
decreased slightly from 86.3 percent in 1910 to 80.8 percent in 1940; 
whereas the share of fi nished goods in Korea’s imports increased slightly 
from 56.3 percent to 62.4 percent over the same period (Song et al. 2004). 
Post-1945 Chaos and Crony Capitalism of the 1950s
The end of the Japanese rule in 1945 was followed by the de facto parti-
tion of the Korean peninsula by the American and Soviet forces along the 
38th parallel. The nation became the battleground for an international-
ized civil war from 1950 to 1953, pitting South Korea and the United 
States against North Korea and China, with the Soviet Union in the 
background. 
Syngman Rhee, the fi rst president of the Republic of Korea, rose to 
power within this political context. A Princeton Ph.D. and longtime exile 
in the United States, Rhee had pro-independence and anticommunist 
credentials but lacked a domestic power base. He initially allied himself 
with the Korea Democratic Party, which was created by wealthy land-
owners and businessmen. After he formed his own Liberal Party, how-
ever, he took a variety of measures to weaken his potential competitors 
and consolidate his power base. For instance, the land reform launched 
in 1949, in response to a previous effort in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, was designed in part to reduce the political power of 
landowners (J. Kim 1975). In fact, Rhee’s use of policy instruments to 
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gain political support played a dominant role in a succession of eco-
nomic decisions during his presidency (1948–60). 
The end of the Japanese colonial rule meant that the “enemy proper-
ties” of the Japanese and their collaborators had to be either nationalized 
or sold off and that the rules governing trade and foreign exchange had to 
be modifi ed to deal with the vacuum created by the severing of relations 
with Japan. Furthermore, given the lack of domestic capital and technol-
ogy, policies designed to attract foreign investment had to be imple-
mented. In this regard, Korea’s economic situation after liberation was 
similar to that of Central and Eastern European countries after the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1990s. In addressing these policy 
challenges, however, Rhee took a rather myopic approach. Instead of for-
mulating a broad-based development program, he chose to use the dis-
cretionary allocation of state-controlled resources to secure and sustain 
his political supporters. 
After the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States reassessed 
Korea’s geostrategic importance and provided generous assistance. In 
fact, foreign aid fi nanced nearly 70 percent of total imports from 1953 
through 1962. The aid was equal to nearly 8 percent of gross national 
product (GNP). Net foreign savings, as measured by the current account 
defi cit, averaged 9 percent of GNP over the same period (Mason et al. 
1980). 
Rhee used the discretionary allocation of foreign exchange and aid 
goods, import licenses, and government contracts as instruments to 
consolidate his power base. U.S. aid goods provided raw materials for 
Korea’s “three-white” industries of the 1950s: sugar, cotton yarn, and 
wheat fl our. Rhee’s politically motivated “industrial policy” created 
huge profi t opportunities. The cost of producing a sack of wheat fl our 
was estimated at 350 hwan,14 but a select group of domestic manufac-
turers were able to charge 1,200 hwan a sack, and shortages sometimes 
pushed prices to 5,000 hwan (S. Kim 1965, 27–30). As long as U.S. pol-
icy toward Korea was dictated by geostrategic imperatives, Syngman 
Rhee could rely on the continued fl ow of U.S. aid to sustain his regime 
(Haggard 1990). 
The sale of vested properties (“enemy properties”) provides another 
good example. The government set the terms of the privatization in 
favor of the politically well-connected, and in return for their windfall 
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gains, business leaders made contributions to Rhee’s Liberal Party. The 
Rhee government typically set the assessed value of the vested industrial 
properties at 25–30 percent of the market value.15
The Rhee government also intervened heavily in foreign trade, espe-
cially in the fi rst half of the 1950s. As part of its foreign exchange control 
program, the government instituted an extensive system of import 
restrictions, designated a group of products as desirable exports, and 
gave their exporters licenses to import restricted items. Thus, a particu-
lar group of exports were linked to a particular group of imports (Cha 
2002). Unfortunately, this system had the effect of discouraging busi-
nesses from discovering promising new exports because the list of desir-
able exports designated by the government mainly focused on primary 
products such as tungsten and sea laver (seaweed). The government 
intervention in trade was reduced after it agreed with the United States 
in August 1955 to bring the offi cial exchange rate in line with the market 
rate. The adjustment of the exchange rate was not suffi cient to persuade 
businesses to develop promising exports, however; instead, as the link 
between exports and imports was phased out, businesses focused on 
importing manufactured products, which offered a higher level of prof-
itability than exports (Cha 2002). 
In the end, what passed for an economic system in Korea in the 1950s 
was primarily shaped by Rhee’s use of policy instruments to secure and 
sustain his power base. The sale of vested properties resulted in windfall 
gains for favored business leaders and an undue concentration of eco-
nomic power. Technocrats genuinely concerned with economic develop-
ment received little support (H. Kim 1999). 
When a student protest in April 1960 fi nally put an end to the Syngman 
Rhee government, Korea was in a dismal state. It was an aid-dependent 
country whose per capita income was one of the lowest in the world. As 
table 5.1 shows, Korea’s per capita GDP in 1960 was lower than such Sub-
Saharan African countries as Senegal—to say nothing of most countries 
in Asia and Latin America. The savings rate was less than 10 percent of 
GNP. The government derived over half of its revenue from U.S. aid; tax 
collection was less than 10 percent of GNP, which was low even by the 
standards of developing countries. Manufacturing constituted only 
slightly more than 10 percent of GNP. The unemployment rate was around 
8 percent.
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In fact, in a cross-country study on economic development, Perkins 
(1997) notes that Korea had a rather unusual economic structure in the 
early 1960s. The share of agriculture and mining in Korean GNP was 
close to 50 percent, nearly 15 percentage points higher than the average 
of other countries of comparable size and per capita income. The share 
of manufacturing was unusually low, nearly 20 percentage points below 
the average. Even more remarkable was the extremely low share of 
exports, which amounted to only 3 percent of GNP, when the average 
was about 15 percent. This was a dramatic departure from the 1930s and 
the early 1940s, when Korea’s exports amounted to about 30 percent of 
GNP. The Rhee government’s myopic policy was largely responsible for 
turning a trading nation into an aid-dependent near-autarky. Overall, 
Korea appeared to face bleak prospects. 
In hindsight, however, a closer examination of Korea’s situation in the 
1950s reveals some strengths that would become critical to its subse-
quent development. First, crony capitalism or not, Korea had a vibrant 
private sector where entrepreneurs were seeking profi t opportunities to 
expand their businesses. In fact, many of Korea’s family-based business 
Table 5.1. Comparative Growth Experience, 1960–2004
Country
Per Capita GDP in 1960 
(2000 US$)
Per Capita GDP in 2004 
(2000 US$)
Average Annual Growth 
Rate (%)
Ghana 412 1,440 2.84
Mozambique 838 1,452 1.25
Senegal 1,776 1,407 –0.53
Korea 1,458 18,424 5.76
Malaysia 1,801 12,133 4.34
Philippines 2,039 3,939 1.50
Sri Lanka 866 4,272 3.63
Taiwan 1,444 20,868 6.07
Thailand 1,059 7,274 4.38
Argentina 7,838 10,939 0.76
Brazil 2,644 7,205 2.28
Mexico 3,719 8,165 1.79
United States 12,892 36,098 2.34
Source: Penn World Table 6.2: Variable: Real GDP Per Capita (Chain). 
Note: Data for Brazil, Malaysia, Mozambique, Senegal, and Thailand is for 2003 rather than 2004.
186 Postcrisis Growth and Development
groups, known as the chaebol, were established in this period.16 Second, 
Korea had a fairly cohesive and egalitarian society characterized by high 
social mobility and cultural and ethnic homogeneity. Although corrup-
tion was widespread, the state had a basic bureaucratic apparatus to 
maintain social stability. In addition, although the national division at 
the end of World War II had led to the Korean War, Korea did not suffer 
from ethnic fragmentation or tribal rivalry that would beset many newly 
independent countries. Moreover, the collapse of the traditional hierar-
chy, combined with the leveling effect of the land reform and war, basi-
cally placed all Koreans at the same starting line and encouraged them to 
believe that they could advance in society if they dedicated themselves to 
education and hard work. That had tremendous implications for human 
resource development. 
The most important development, however, was the great improve-
ment in education during the 1950s (see fi gure 5.4). Korea’s primary 
school enrollment rate had been only around 45 percent at the time of 
liberation from the Japanese colonial rule in 1945. With the introduction 
of universal primary education in 1950, Korea’s primary school enroll-
ment rate increased from 59.6 percent in 1953 to 86.2 percent in 1960. 
The high-school enrollment rate increased from 12.4 percent in 1953 to 
19.9 percent in 1960. The illiteracy rate dropped from 78 percent in 1945 
Figure 5.4. Korea’s School Enrollment Rate
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to 28 percent in 1960 (McGinn et al. 1980). Although investing in people 
by itself was not enough to promote growth in the absence of comple-
mentary industrial and trade developments, it provided the basis for 
Korea’s subsequent takeoff.
Discovering Korea’s Comparative Advantage
Changes in Political Economy in the Early 1960s
The early 1960s saw two dramatic events in Korea’s political economy: 
the student revolution of April 1960 and the military coup of May 1961. 
These two events highlighted the government failures of the past and 
ignited a passionate national debate on development and moderniza-
tion. In the changed political atmosphere, whoever came to power had 
to present a new vision for the nation and back it up with a strategic 
plan. Although it remained to be seen whether this new vision would 
indeed work, the sense of hopelessness that pervaded the 1950s was 
replaced by rising expectations.
On April 19, 1960, students staged demonstrations against the Syngman 
Rhee government in protest of election irregularities and corruption. 
The use of force against student protesters encouraged citizens to take 
their side, and within a course of a week Rhee had to step down to pre-
vent further bloodshed. The student revolution, based on a long tradi-
tion of protest by young students and scholars, showed that the Korean 
people were fed up with crony capitalism.
The new, democratically elected Chang Myun government (August 
1960–May 1961) tried to cope with various political demands following 
the student revolution and to formulate a coherent program to pro-
mote economic development. It prepared a fi ve-year economic devel-
opment plan as well as a blueprint to establish a senior ministry in 
charge of economic development that would have planning and policy 
coordination as well as budgetary functions (H. Kim 1999). In addition, 
the Chang government sharply devalued the Korean currency in Janu-
ary and February of 1961 to bring the offi cial exchange rate close to 
market rates (Frank, Kim, and Westphal 1975). The Chang government 
also reestablished the practice of recruiting civil servants through mer-
itocratic examinations. Under the previous Rhee government, civil ser-
vice recruitment had been based on political and personal connections 
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(Lee 1999). The new merit-based bureaucracy, with a strong work ethic, 
would prove critical to Korea’s subsequent economic development 
(Hasan 2008).
However, the Chang government’s efforts to build growth-promoting 
institutions were short-lived. On May 16, 1961, General Park Chung Hee 
seized power through a bloodless coup. An ambitious and complex fi g-
ure, Park had served as a Japanese army offi cer and, after Korea’s libera-
tion, he organized communist sympathizers in the Korean Army before 
he converted to the cause of anticommunism. In the Revolutionary 
Pledges of May 16, Park and his followers declared that they were deter-
mined to “focus all energy into developing capability to confront com-
munism, in order to realize the people’s long-standing wish for national 
unifi cation.” Park’s overriding concern was the communist regime in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which had successfully carried 
out a series of reconstruction and development programs after the 
Korean War. Park acknowledged that the Republic of Korea was facing 
a formidable adversary who was winning the economic war, which he 
felt took precedence over military or political war (C. Park 1963). In 
fact, in the early 1960s the North’s per capita income was estimated to 
be double that in the South, and it was feared that the income gap was 
growing between the two sides. Park believed that rapid economic 
growth and improved living standards would provide the best antidote 
for communism and decided to channel all national energy into eco-
nomic modernization. Other issues, such as political liberalization and 
national unifi cation, were pushed aside. 
Although Park and his followers had only rudimentary knowledge of 
economics, they believed that the state should take a leading role in devel-
opment. To monitor the economy on a daily basis, Park established an 
economic secretariat in the presidential mansion. Implementing an idea 
that had been around for some time, he also created the Economic Plan-
ning Board (EPB) in July 1961 through a merger of several policy-making 
functions of different ministries. The EPB took over the budgetary func-
tion from the Ministry of Finance and the collection and evaluation of 
national statistics from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The EPB was 
charged with the task of formulating and implementing fi ve-year eco-
nomic development plans, and in 1963 it became a bona fi de supermin-
istry headed by a deputy prime minister (H. Kim 1999).
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In addition to these institutional innovations that centralized eco-
nomic policymaking, the military government took several measures to 
strengthen the role of the state in resource allocation. After the April 
1960 student revolution, prominent businessmen were accused of hav-
ing grown rich through political connections with the Syngman Rhee 
government. Taking over the task of dealing with these “illicit wealth 
accumulators,” the military government accused them of tax evasion 
and other illegal business practices, demanding and receiving their 
equity shares in commercial banks in lieu of fi nes. This drastic measure 
paved the way for the government to exert direct control over commer-
cial banks. 
The government also created a number of “quasi-governmental orga-
nizations” to facilitate communications with business and labor. Various 
business associations were used as channels for government-business 
interaction and were granted special favors such as the right to allocate 
import quotas among member fi rms. Membership in these business 
associations was mandatory. As for labor, all labor unions were dis-
banded following the 1961 coup, and the restructured Federation of 
Korean Trade Unions was forced to take a moderate stance. 
In a little more than a year, the military government thus established 
various levers of control. Although the size of the state—as measured by 
the share of government spending in GNP— remained relatively small, 
the power of the state was overwhelming. Park and his followers clearly 
had in mind an economic system that was dominated by the state. The 
question remained as to what kind of state-led system it would be.
Transition from Inward-Looking to Export-Oriented 
Industrialization
The military government initially tried to pursue inward-looking indus-
trialization under the principle of “guided capitalism.” According to the 
First Five-Year Plan (1962–66) released by the Supreme Council in July 
1961, the government would take charge of investment in manufactur-
ing. According to this plan, Korea would earn hard currency by export-
ing primary products and undertake massive investment projects in such 
basic industries as steel and machinery.17 The plan insisted that such a 
development strategy based on the idea of “industrial deepening” was 
the only way to achieve economic self-reliance (Kimiya 1991). 
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Intended or not, these economic policies bore a striking resemblance 
to those adopted by Latin American countries (Bruton 1998). In the 
1950s Korea had operated a de facto import-substitution regime, marked 
more by cronyism than developmentalism. Now it seemed that Korea 
was about to adopt a development-oriented import-substitution regime. 
A series of “historical accidents,” however, prevented this outcome and 
led the military government to switch to an export-oriented system. 
Strong economic pressure from the United States and decisive reaction 
from the fi ercely nationalistic Korean leaders played a critical role in this 
dramatic transition. 
Once the United States had recognized the new military government 
in Korea, the U.S. authorities were supportive of the development-
oriented Park and his followers, but they became increasingly alarmed as 
the military government pursued an ambitious program of “industrial 
deepening.” The American experts advised the Korean government to 
invest in infrastructure and make the most of human capital and exist-
ing factories instead of carrying out massive projects in heavy industries. 
The military government, however, pushed ahead with its industrial 
deepening program, trying to obtain capital for such projects as an inte-
grated steel mill (Kimiya 1991).
In June 1962 the Korean government even implemented a currency 
reform program without prior consultation with the United States. 
Through a compulsory deposit-for-equity swap measure, a certain por-
tion of existing deposits were to be converted into equity shares in a new 
Industrial Development Corporation, which would then use these cap-
tured domestic savings to invest in heavy industries. The military gov-
ernment would guarantee an annual dividend return of 15 percent on 
these shares. The Americans were not amused. Critical of the antimarket 
nature of this measure and insulted by the lack of consultation, the U.S. 
government forced the Park government to lift the freeze on deposits by 
threatening to postpone economic assistance (C. Kim 1990).
The U.S. aid leverage was strengthened by a poor harvest and a for-
eign-exchange crisis in Korea in the second half of 1962. The U.S. offi -
cials took full advantage of the situation to demand major economic 
reforms and also to press the military leaders to stick to their commit-
ment to restore an elected regime by 1963. To secure an adequate supply 
of grain for the coming months, the Korean government had little choice 
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but to acquiesce to these demands (Mason et al. 1980). In December 
1962 the Korean government revised the First Five-Year Plan to refl ect 
major changes in economic policy,18 but the lessons were not lost on the 
Korean policy makers. Reassessing the import-substituting industrial-
ization strategy that they had initially favored, Park and his followers 
began to search for radically different policies that would save them from 
ever being trapped in such a vulnerable position again. 
Park Chung Hee certainly knew that it would take a monumental 
effort to overcome aid dependence. Deploring that Korea had to depend 
on U.S. aid for 52 percent of the supplemental budget in 1961, Park 
(1963) noted: “Though nominally independent, the real worth of the 
Republic of Korea, from the statistical point of view, was only 48 percent. 
In other words, the U.S. had a 52 percent majority vote with regard to 
Korea, and we were dependent to that extent…. It showed, dramatically, 
that our government would have to instantly close down if the U.S. aid 
were withheld or withdrawn.” Park (1963) added: “From 1956 to 1962, 
we have received, on the average, some 280 million dollars of economic 
aid each year and some 220 million in military aid. In addition, we have 
run a current account defi cit of 50 million dollars. In other words, 
excluding our military sector, 330 million dollars should be earned 
annually to keep the Korean economy on a self-suffi cient footing. Then, 
there is the additional problem of feeding the growing population, 
increasing at an annual rate of 2.88 percent or 720,000 newborns.” In 
1962 Korea’s total exports were only US$54.8 million. Thus, to secure a 
suffi cient level of hard currency, Korea would somehow have to fi nd a 
way to increase exports more than six times over. In the end the Park 
government would go far beyond the orthodox policies prescribed by 
the Americans and adopt drastic measures to promote exports in its 
effort to secure economic and political independence.
The Park government implemented three interrelated sets of economic 
policies that came to defi ne the Korean model of development. First, the 
government accommodated the U.S. demands and instituted a set of 
macroeconomic reforms designed to stabilize the economy. Second, the 
government adopted drastic measures to share the investment risks of the 
private sector, providing, in particular, explicit repayment guarantees for 
foreign loans extended to private sector fi rms. Third, Park himself spear-
headed the effort to boost exports, offering various incentives based on 
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market performance. The resulting government-business risk partner-
ship, for which the export market performance of private fi rms was used 
as a selection criterion, defi ned the core of what later came to be known 
as “the Korean model.”
The macroeconomic reforms ensured that Korea’s state-led develop-
ment model would be a market-based one. Building on the stabilization 
policies of 1963–64, the government devalued the Korean won from 
130 to the dollar to 256 to the dollar in May 1964. Moreover, the previ-
ous multiple exchange rate system, which had applied different rates 
according to the type of goods and their uses, was converted to a uni-
tary fl oating foreign exchange system to refl ect the actual value of the 
won. In addition, partial import liberalization and duty drawback, 
designed to allow Korean fi rms to purchase intermediate goods at world 
prices, gave an additional impetus for exports. Also, to protect deposi-
tors from infl ation and to encourage domestic savings, the government 
raised the ceiling on the one-year time deposit rate from 15 percent to 
30 percent on September 30, 1965 (C. Kim 1990).19 
These orthodox macroeconomic policies were accompanied by 
unorthodox measures that introduced distortions into microeconomic 
incentives. The key issue in the early 1960s was fi nancing. As table 5.2 
shows, the domestic savings rate was less than 10 percent, and Korea had 
to attract foreign capital to fi nance more than half of its investment 
needs. Consequently, Korea adopted proactive measures to facilitate for-
eign fi nancing and earn hard currency through exports.
The Park government knew that Korea lacked the domestic resources 
to carry out its ambitious economic development program, but unlike 
Latin American countries at the time (or Southeast Asian countries in the 
Table 5.2. Investment and Savings in Korea, 1962 –1981 
(percent)
Category 1962–66 1967–71 1972–76 1977–81 1962–81
Annual GNP growth 7.9 9.7 10.2 5.7 8.4
Investment/GNP 16.3 25.4 29.0 31.0 25.4
Domestic savings/GNP 8.0 15.1 20.4 25.5 17.3
Foreign savings/GNP 8.6 10.0 6.7 5.6 7.7
Foreign savings/investment 52.8 39.4 23.1 18.1 30.4
Source: Economic Planning Board.
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1980s), it was not willing to depend heavily on foreign direct investment.20 
Seeking to tap into foreign capital while limiting the infl uence of foreign 
multinationals, the government decided to rely on foreign loans, which 
would allow Korea to take advantage of the domestic-international inter-
est rate differential and be the residual claimant on its investments—if it 
successfully paid back the loans.21 
Because domestic fi rms at the time lacked the credit in the interna-
tional market to raise capital on their own, however, the government 
decided to guarantee private sector foreign borrowing.22 The govern-
ment thus took it upon itself to resolve the information asymmetry 
problem for international fi nancial institutions, which at the time were 
certainly not willing to spend the time and energy on examining the 
credit worthiness of Korean fi rms. This state guarantee became effec-
tive after Korea established a track record of earning hard currency 
through exports and paying back foreign loans; a state guarantee by a 
country with a poor credit rating obviously would not have much 
weight. The state guarantee was extended to foreign fi nancial institu-
tions providing loans to Korean fi rms, not to the owner-managers of 
these Korean fi rms, but subsequent developments in the 1970s blurred 
this distinction (Lim 2000). 
In taking this measure, the Park government signaled that it was will-
ing to form a risk partnership with the private sector. That was a signifi -
cant shift for the government from its earlier disdain for Korea’s business 
leaders, but the government apparently concluded that combining state 
monitoring with private entrepreneurship would be the most effective 
means of carrying out the economic development plans. Through direct 
monitoring and performance-based support, the government tried to 
contain the potential costs of state-backed debt fi nancing. All foreign 
loans had to be authorized by the government and were allocated accord-
ing to the policy priority of investment projects. Korean companies seek-
ing foreign loans had to apply for approval from the Economic Planning 
Board. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry provided its opinion to 
the EPB on the technological merits of projects seeking loans. The Min-
istry of Finance, for its part, reviewed the fi nancial status of borrowing 
fi rms. Through the Deliberation Council for Foreign Capital Mobiliza-
tion, the EPB then determined the appropriate amount of foreign loans 
for each application, based on policy priorities. 
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With a view toward securing economic and political independence, 
Korea also introduced a number of export promotion measures. To pro-
vide institutional support in the area of foreign marketing and technol-
ogy imports, the government established the Korea Trade Promotion 
Corporation (KOTRA) in 1962 while an elaborate network of exporters’ 
associations provided more industry-specifi c services (D. Kim 2008). 
The short-term export credit system had been streamlined as early as 
1961. The essence of the new system was the automatic approval of loans 
by commercial banks to those with an export letter of credit, which 
allowed businesses to have access to trade fi nancing without having to 
put up collateral.
The government also gave exporters various tax deductions, wastage 
allowances, tariff exemptions, and concessional credits. For example, 
exporters were entitled to automatic import rights and to easy customs 
clearance. They also were allowed to import more inputs than was essen-
tially needed as “wastage allowance” to a certain level. Given that the 
value of imports was still very high, this helped to increase the profi t-
ability of exports. The interest rate on export loans was also subsidized 
from the mid-1960s to the beginning of the 1980s (Cho and Kim 1997). 
The role of Korea’s export subsidies should not be exaggerated, however. 
According to Frank, Kim, and Westphal (1975), the average effective rate 
of subsidy on total exports in the second half of the 1960s was basically 
offset by the degree of currency overvaluation. More important, this 
subsidy, consisting of internal tax exemptions, custom duties exemp-
tions, and interest rate reductions, took the form of a performance-based 
reward in a competitive setting rather than a handout with no strings 
attached. For instance, eligibility to receive export credit support was 
limited to only those whose past year’s exports exceeded the target 
amount specifi ed in the loan contract. 
Strong export performers even received medals and national recogni-
tion on Export Day, which was established in 1964 to commemorate the 
day when Korea’s annual exports exceeded US$100 million for the fi rst 
time (C. Kim 1990). Traditionally at the bottom of the social hierarchy, 
merchants were now presented through this annual event as patriotic 
entrepreneurs contributing to the nation’s modernization. 
After Korea’s annual exports reached US$100 million, the minister of 
commerce and industry asked Park Chung Hee to chair monthly export 
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promotion meetings, and after a few trial runs in 1965, the president 
chaired these meetings on a regular basis from January 1966. Attended 
by high-ranking government offi cials and business representatives, 
monthly export promotion meetings provided a forum to monitor prog-
ress and devise institutional innovations and solutions to emerging 
problems. At each monthly meeting, the minister of commerce and 
industry gave a progress report on export performance by region and 
product relative to the targets set out in the annual comprehensive plan 
for export promotion.23 The minister of foreign affairs gave a briefi ng on 
overseas market conditions. Government offi cials and business repre-
sentatives then tried to identify emerging bottlenecks and constraints 
that impeded export performance and devise solutions to these prob-
lems. Subsequent meetings monitored progress. Export insurance was 
one of many institutional innovations that were introduced as a result of 
recommendations from monthly export promotion meetings (Shin 
1994). In short, these meetings between the government and private sec-
tor provided opportunities to secure sustained attention from top lead-
ership, monitor progress on a long-term vision, and detect and mitigate 
constraints as they emerged. Government offi cials had to come prepared 
to respond to queries from the president and business representatives. 
These meetings provided a real-time forum to demonstrate their com-
petence—or lack thereof. 
In addition, the Export Promotion Special Account Fund was estab-
lished within the Korea International Trade Association in 1969 as a 
public-private initiative to secure nongovernment funding for export 
promotion activities. It provided support for collective activities such 
as the dispatch of delegations to international trade fairs, improvement 
of design and packaging, and establishment of quality certifi cation 
facilities. A small levy was imposed on imports to provide the funding 
(C. Kim 1990). 
On the huge electronic billboard mounted on top of its building, 
KOTRA posted the daily and year-to-date export fi gures. The govern-
ment opened an Export Information Center, ran an Export Idea Bank to 
solicit new ideas, and undertook studies to explore promising export 
products and markets. In these ways the government, industries, and 
related support institutions came together to promote exports (Shin 
1994). With the booming world economy, these efforts resulted in Korea’s 
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exports increasing at an average annual rate of 35 percent in real terms 
from 1963 to 1969. 
Exploitation of Latent Comparative Advantage
Although the adoption of export-oriented industrialization in the 1960s 
was dictated more by historical accident than foresight and design, it 
proved an effi cient choice given Korea’s endowment structure at the 
time. In 1965 the primary and secondary school enrollments in Korea 
were similar to the rates in countries with three times its per capita 
income (World Bank 1993). Korea’s efforts to improve education since 
1950, combined with lagging industrial and trade development in the 
1950s, had created a huge education-income gap. Cheap and high-qual-
ity labor could be readily employed to produce a high rate of return on 
investment in labor-intensive manufacturing, if Korea could only tap 
into foreign capital and technology to compensate for the shortage of 
domestic resources and exploit its latent comparative advantage. 
In fact, what Korea did in the 1960s was to correct for both govern-
ment and market failures of the past, which had made it virtually impos-
sible for fi rms to exploit comparative advantage. The student revolution 
of 1960 and the military coup of 1961 dramatically reduced corruption 
and rent-seeking in Korea. The government’s decision to provide repay-
ment guarantees to foreign fi nancial institutions on their loans to Korean 
companies helped to address imperfections in the international capital 
market. In addition, the government alleviated coordination problems 
by making inputs available at international prices for exports and pro-
viding essential infrastructure such as electricity. In other words, inter-
national trade helped to mitigate the need to promote a concurrent 
development of downstream and upstream industries. Compared with 
coordination externalities, innovation externalities constituted much 
less of a problem in the early stages of development because Korea could 
readily import mature technologies embodied in machinery and equip-
ment. With the government addressing coordination challenges as well 
as governance problems, Korean fi rms could invest and export to take 
advantage of unexplored profi t opportunities. 
Although the government did identify labor-intensive manufactures 
as holding a great promise for exports, on the whole, export promotion 
policies in the 1960s did not target specifi c industries or fi rms when 
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 providing incentives. Overcoming the initial export pessimism (“Who 
would buy our products?”), Korea let comparative advantage operate 
and focused on labor-intensive industries.24 It imported raw materials 
and capital goods and used its cheap, high-quality labor to manufacture 
exports such as textiles and footwear, instead of rushing to promote basic 
industries as the Park government had initially wished to do— against 
Korea’s latent comparative advantage in the early 1960s. 
The adoption of the new economic system based on export-oriented 
industrialization encountered little resistance. The infl uence of policy 
makers attached to Syngman Rhee’s corruption-prone system had been 
drastically reduced in the wake of the 1960 student protest and the 1961 
coup. The politicians associated with Syngman Rhee’s regime were 
thrown out of offi ce and put on trial. The military government, while 
not totally free from corruption, certainly could not advocate a return to 
crony capitalism and had to formulate a coherent program of economic 
development to shore up its legitimacy. Initially, some members of the 
military government argued for an “industrial deepening” strategy, but 
they were removed from the top posts after the United States raised 
strong objections. In the end the technocrats and business leaders advo-
cating an export-led growth strategy had few competitors in policy-
making circles in the Park government. The performance-based reward 
mechanism inherent in the export-oriented industrialization strategy 
added to its legitimacy, reinforcing successful experiments and phasing 
out unsuccessful ones in producing goods and services for the global 
market. The new Korean economic system proved a popular choice in 
political economy terms as well. In this regard, it is important to note 
that for a nation that has a comparative advantage in the labor-intensive 
sector, as Korea did in the 1960s, export orientation can improve the 
welfare of workers. An accidental product of strong U.S. pressure and 
nationalistic Korean response, the economic system could thus secure 
wide support.
Upgrading Korea’s Comparative Advantage
If Korea’s transition to export-oriented industrialization in the early 
1960s had mostly to do with discovering its latent comparative advantage 
based on the large existing education-income gap, Korea’s subsequent 
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development had more to do with upgrading its comparative advantage 
with a view toward increasing the domestic value added or local content 
of its exports. Although international trade helped Korea to overcome 
the limits of the small domestic market, Korea was well aware that out-
ward orientation by itself was not enough to sustain growth. Starting in 
the second half of the 1960s, Korea made conscious and concerted efforts 
to move into higher value added areas along the value chain by making 
complementary investments in human capital and infrastructure.
Rural Development and Industrial Upgrading
In drafting the Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1967–71), 
Korea tried to build on the accomplishments of the First Five-Year Plan 
and devise solutions to emerging problems in order to secure sustained 
growth. In the mid-1960s, Korea still sought to achieve basic food secu-
rity. At the same time, as an industrializing economy, Korea had two sets 
of new concerns: a widening urban-rural income gap, and a low level of 
local content in its exports.25 
During the Second Five-Year Plan period, Korea addressed the urban-
rural income gap by launching the New Community Movement, or Sae-
maul Undong. Previous rural development programs had focused only 
on changing the mindset of farmers or providing material incentives, 
and after the failure of these one-sided programs, the government 
decided, in 1970, to take a comprehensive and integrated approach (Goh 
2005). The core elements of the Saemaul Undong included community 
empowerment under the principles of “diligence, self-help, and coopera-
tion”; peer learning and inspiration; and performance-based support 
from the government. In 1970 the government provided each of 33,000 
villages with 335 bags of cement, each weighing 40 kilograms, and let 
each village decide how to use the cement for the good of the commu-
nity. Mobilizing voluntary local labor, some villages built bridges and 
others reinforced river embankments; however, a number of villages did 
not do much with the free cement. In 1971 the government provided 500 
bags of cement and 1 ton of reinforced steel to only those villages with 
substantive accomplishments in the fi rst year. Subsequently, the govern-
ment provided more incentives such as electrifi cation to those villages 
that had demonstrated their willingness to make in-kind contributions 
to improve their communities. In addition, the government arranged 
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study tours and training sessions so that villages could benchmark other 
villages with similar endowments. This peer-learning mechanism, com-
bined with the community empowerment and performance-based 
reward system, was critical to the success of the Saemaul Undong. It 
served as an effective scaling-up mechanism. In addition, to improve 
rural income, the government linked the Saemaul Undong with other 
programs. The green revolution introduced new improved varieties of 
rice and other crops; whereas, the “white revolution” provided vinyl 
houses (greenhouses), which made it possible to grow vegetables out of 
season. A dual grain price system, through which the government pro-
cured rice at higher prices than it subsequently sold the rice for, further 
supported rural income, even though it increasingly became a fi scal bur-
den. Thanks to these efforts, Korea was able to eliminate its urban-rural 
income gap by the mid-1970s and maintain social cohesion (J. Park 
1998; K. Chung 2009). 
In the second half of the 1960s Korea also launched an outward-
oriented “industrial upgrading” program. Compared with the aborted, 
inward-oriented “industrial deepening” program in 1962, the new pro-
gram recognized the link between industry and trade and explicitly 
adopted a science and technology agenda. In pursuing industrial 
upgrading, Korea systematically studied what had to be done to fi ll the 
missing links in the domestic value chain and move up the quality lad-
der, and made conscious and concerted efforts to aim for international 
competitiveness from the outset. In this regard, Korea was different 
from many developing countries that ambitiously rushed to promote 
upstream industries without requisite skill accumulation and econo-
mies of scale. After exploiting its comparative advantage to develop 
labor-intensive downstream industries, Korea sought to indigenize 
intermediate inputs imported from foreign upstream industries through 
technology acquisition, human resource development, and construc-
tion of optimal-scale plants aimed for the global market. For instance, 
in the chemical-textile value chain, Korea systematically built the links 
backward from export of textiles to production of synthetic fi bers, to 
development of basic petrochemicals.
Moreover, instead of settling for a dual economy structure consisting 
of export enclaves and protected domestic markets, Korea consistently 
tried to increase the links between high-productivity sectors and the rest 
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of the economy to maximize positive spillovers. Tariff exemption on 
imported intermediate inputs was operational for all of Korea through 
the duty drawback system. Even when Korea established export pro-
cessing zones to attract foreign direct investment, resident companies 
were encouraged to outsource processing and establish links with local 
companies. Thanks to these efforts, the local content of products pro-
cessed in the Masan Export Processing Zone, for example, increased 
from 28 percent in 1971 to 52 percent in 1979 (Esquivel, Jenkins, and 
Larrain 1998). 
Heavy and Chemical Industry Drive
For Korea a new urgency for industrial upgrading was added in the 
early 1970s when the United States announced that it would reduce its 
forward-deployed troops in Asia in the wake of the Vietnam War. The 
Korean government launched an ambitious campaign to build up its 
military capability.26 The policy makers felt that Korea must develop 
heavy and chemical industries if it was to have the ability to manufac-
ture its own weapons (O 2009; C. Kim 1990). 
The heavy and chemical industry (HCI) drive was formally launched 
in January 1973 with the objective of fi rmly establishing “a self-reliant 
economy” and achieving US$10 billion in exports and per capita income 
of US$1,000 by 1981. A master plan for the HCI drive was drafted with 
annual and sectoral targets (table 5.3). It envisaged that heavy and chem-
ical industries would account for more than 50 percent of manufactur-
ing value added and contribute US$5.63 billion to exports, while light 
manufacturing and primary industries would add US$3.67 billion and 
US$0.70 billion, respectively, in 1981. 
Among heavy and chemical industries, six were selected as leading 
industries: iron and steel, nonferrous metals, shipbuilding, machinery, 
electronics, and chemicals. Machinery in particular was regarded as a 
Table 5.3. Targets for the HCI Drive
Target 1972 1976 1981
GNP per capita ($) 302 488 983
HCI share in manufacturing value added (%) 35.2 41.8 51.0
HCI share in manufacturing exports (%) 27.0 44.0 60.5
Source: HCI Promotion Planning Board, cited in K. Kim (1988).
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critical industry not only for its high value added and extensive links 
with other industries but also for its contribution to defense industries. 
For a reference, Korean offi cials noted that when Japan reached US$10 bil-
lion in exports in 1967, the machinery industry accounted for 43 percent 
of industrial production (K. Kim 1988). 
The amount of capital required to implement the HCI drive from 
1973 to the target year of 1981 was estimated to be around US$9.6 billion 
(table 5.4). In December 1973 the government established the National 
Investment Fund (NIF) to fi nance long-term investment in heavy and 
chemical industries. In 1974 the NIF interest rate was set at 9.0 percent, 
whereas the prevailing three-year interest rate on bank loans was 
15.5 percent. In real terms the NIF provided loans at a signifi cantly neg-
ative rate. The banks also supported the HCI drive by providing policy-
oriented loans on favorable terms. This was a dramatic departure from 
the second half of the 1960s. The interest rate could no longer operate as 
an effective price signal in the resource allocation process (Lim 2000).
Instead of relying on the market mechanism, Korea sought to address 
coordination and innovation externalities through integrated, forward-
looking plans, even as it tried to aim for international competitiveness 
from the outset under the slogan of “the exportization of all industries.” 
To promote heavy and chemical industries, the government essentially 
Table 5.4. Investment Requirement Estimates for the HCI Drive 
(US$, millions)
Foreign Capital Domestic Capital Total Percent Share
Iron and steel 1,502 674 2,176 22.7
Nonferrous metals 222 123 345 3.6
Machinery 1,049 1,137 2,186 22.8
Shipbuilding 416 352 768 8.0
Electronics 593 599 1,192 12.4
Chemicals 1,523 662 2,158 22.8
Subtotal 5,305 3,547 8,852 92.3
(Percent share) (59.9) (40.1) (100.0)
Others 468 273 741 7.7
Total 5,773 3,820 9,593 100.0
(Percent share) (60.2) (39.8) (100.0)
Source: HCI Promotion Planning Board, cited in K. Kim (1988).
202 Postcrisis Growth and Development
had to secure scale economies, make massive complementary invest-
ments, and develop technical manpower with requisite skills. Figure 5.5 
shows an integrated conceptual diagram for the HCI drive.
On scale economies Korea had to make a strategic choice. It could 
play safe and develop heavy and chemical industries for the small domes-
tic market and risk ineffi ciency resulting from suboptimal scales and 
entrenched protectionism. Alternatively, it could promote these indus-
tries for the global market and risk capacity underutilization and fi nan-
cial distress. Korea chose the latter option because, despite considerable 
risks, it promised a dynamically effi cient growth trajectory if Korea man-
aged to develop technological prowess before the fi nancial burden 
became overwhelming. To minimize time and exploit scale economies 
in establishing capital-intensive industries, the government decided to 
rely on a select group of state-owned enterprises and chaebol with a suc-
cessful track record such as POSCO and Hyundai. The government pro-
vided them with extremely generous fi nancial support, restricted entry 
into targeted industries, and used direct monitoring rather than compe-
tition to ensure good performance. It felt that scale economies called for 
Figure 5.5. Conceptual Diagram for the HCI Drive
Source: Y. Kim 2003.
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regulated monopoly or oligopoly in these industries until demand 
became large enough to support effective competition (O 2009). 
To provide infrastructure such as water, electricity, and transporta-
tion and to secure backward and forward links, the government enacted 
the Industrial Complex Development Promotion Law in December 1973 
and set up a machinery complex in Changwon, a petrochemical complex 
in Yeocheon, and an electronics complex in Gumi. Bed towns providing 
housing facilities for workers were also constructed. National universi-
ties located near these industrial complexes were called upon to special-
ize in related engineering fi elds. Before the term was in wide use, “a clus-
ter approach” was evident in the HCI drive. 
Last but not least, Korea greatly expanded technical and vocational 
training, strengthened science and engineering education, and set up 
government labs to conduct R&D. To support the HCI drive, the govern-
ment drafted a manpower development plan. Demand for technical 
manpower was projected to increase from 410,000 in 1969, to 1,090,000 
in 1975, and to 1,960,000 in 1981. In particular, demand for technicians, 
who graduated from technical high school and obtained at least three 
years of job experience, was projected to increase from 340,000 in 1969, 
to 980,000 in 1975, and to 1,700,000 in 1981. Engineers, who graduated 
from engineering college, made up the remainder of the technical man-
power demand. Table 5.5 shows the projected demand and supply of 
technicians from 1977 to 1981. 
To supply high-quality technicians, the government established a 
number of technical high schools and provided incentives such as 
employment guarantees. The curriculum emphasized practical training, 
and students were supposed to acquire technical certifi cates before grad-
uation. The National Technical Certifi cation Law of December 1973 
introduced a system based on the German model. 
As table 5.6 shows, there were four types of technical high schools: 
mechanical, model, specialized, and general. To maximize their impact 
using limited resources, Korea established mechanical technical high 
schools as “centers of excellence” in each province. The most prominent 
among them was Kum-Oh Technical High School, arguably the best of its 
kind in Asia in the 1970s. Using Japanese ODA grants, the school secured 
practical training machinery and equipment for a total of 1.2 billion yen 
from December 1971 to September 1974. It also sent Korean teachers to 
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Table 5.5. Projected Demand and Supply of Technicians 
(thousands) 
Category 1977–81 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Demand 1,179 1,280 1,412 1,548 1,700
Supply needed Total 843 158 147 161 179 198
High-quality technicians 280 49 48 54 61 68
Technicians 280 49 48 54 61 68
Basic technicians 283 60 51 53 67 62
Supply method High-quality technicians
 Technical high schools 259 46 52 52 53 53
 Vocational training 77 14 15 15 16 17
Subtotal 336 63 67 67 69 70
Technicians
 Vocational training 365 59 54 72 79 81
Basic technicians
 On-the-job training 283
Source: HCI Promotion Planning Board, re-cited from K. Kim (1988).






Mechanical To train high-quality skilled workers to improve 
precision in the machinery and defense industries 19 13,920
Model To train technicians for overseas construction work
To serve as a model for general technical high school 
education 11 9,360
Specialized To train high-quality technicians who could adapt to 
specialized industries (such as electronics, chemical, 
construction, iron and steel, railway) 10 5,750
General To train technicians from various ﬁ elds that could adapt 
to general industries 55 56,300
Total 95 65,290
Source: HCI Promotion Planning Board, cited in K. Kim (1988). 
Note: As of 1979, there were 4 national, 50 public, and 41 private technical high schools. 
Japan for training and invited eight Japanese teachers to cover such sub-
jects as casting, welding, machining, forging, and heat treatment for the 
fi rst three years. Offering full scholarships, the school recruited top mid-
dle school students nationwide based on their academic records and rec-
ommendations from principals as well as test scores and interviews.
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Korea also set up model technical high schools to train technicians for 
overseas construction work in the Middle East. In response to the oil 
price shock at the end of 1973, Korea, instead of subsidizing consump-
tion, raised energy prices and instituted various energy conservation 
measures and made a decisive shift away from oil to coal and nuclear 
power. At the same time, Korea went ahead with the massive planned 
investments in heavy and chemical industries and seized upon the new 
construction opportunities in the Middle East to offset the increased oil 
import bill (Hasan 2008). Model technical high schools guaranteed their 
students well-paid jobs in the Middle East and exemption from compul-
sory military service. Specialized and general technical high schools 
served as additional sources of technicians.
Although some policy makers initially questioned if the Korean 
people had the right national character to succeed in sophisticated 
industries that required precision and attention to detail, young stu-
dents at Kum-Oh and other technical high schools soon showed that 
they could develop the requisite skills. They led Korea to place fi rst in 
the International Vocational Olympics from 1977 to 1991. Park Chung 
Hee frequently visited technical high schools to provide personal 
encouragement to young students, calling them, quite appropriately, 
“the fl ag-bearers for the nation’s modernization.”
As for the supply of engineers, Korea sought to improve university 
education through specialization. Universities were called upon to select 
one specialized engineering fi eld, related to a nearby industrial complex 
if possible, and invest intensively in that fi eld to produce engineers with 
both theoretical and practical knowledge. For instance, Busan Univer-
sity, near the Changwon Machinery Complex, specialized in mechanical 
engineering; Gyeongbuk University, near the Gumi Electronics Com-
plex, invested heavily in electrical engineering; and Jeonnam University, 
near the Yeosu Chemical Complex, promoted chemical engineering. 
In the area of R&D, the government had already established the Korea 
Institute of Science and Technology in 1966 and the Korea Advanced 
Institute for Science and Technology in 1971. In addition, it passed the 
Technology Development Promotion Law in 1972, providing tax and 
other incentives to encourage private sector R&D. It also established 
fi ve industry-specifi c government research institutes in shipbuilding, 
electronics, machinery, metal, and chemical industries according to the 
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Specialized Research Institute Promotion Law of December 1973. Subse-
quently, science parks were constructed, and by the end of 1979, four 
specialized research institutes were located in Seoul, one in Gumi, two 
in Changwon, and nine in Daeduk. As for the defense industry, the 
government aggressively expanded the Agency for Defense Develop-
ment by recruiting all available Korean manpower at home and abroad. 
Because the United States was reluctant to share defense technologies, 
Korea had to resort to extensive reverse engineering.27 Through these 
efforts, the government sought to address innovation externalities crit-
ical to sustained growth.
As is frequently observed, industrial targeting and upgrading entails a 
great deal of risk taking; however, lack of conscious efforts to target and 
upgrade industries has its share of risks as well. For example, as fi gure 5.6 
shows, the Dominican Republic had a large and increasing comparative 
advantage in sugar in the early 1970s, when its per capita GDP was on 
par with Korea’s. Its heavy dependence on sugar, however, left it vulner-
able to commodity price swings and lack of improvement in productiv-
ity. Although its garment exports began to take off in the 1980s thanks to 
free trade zones, the local content of these exports has been limited. 
Thailand had a strong comparative advantage in rice and other raw 
materials in the early 1970s. It subsequently developed the garment and 
electronics industries, taking part in the regional division of labor in 
Asia. However, the pace of its industrial upgrading and human resource 
development has been rather slow. 
Korea had a strong and increasing comparative advantage in light 
industries when it made its strategic decision to promote heavy and 
chemical industries in 1973. After benchmarking advanced industrial 
nations with natural endowments similar to Korea’s, such as Japan, Korea 
recognized that it had a potential comparative advantage in machinery 
and equipment industries and began to remove obstacles to achieving 
this objective, such as lack of technicians and engineers with requisite 
skills in sophisticated industries.
The Korean government had to call off the HCI drive when serious 
macroeconomic imbalances and political problems forced it to adopt a 
comprehensive stabilization program in April 1979 (Stern et al. 1995). 
Although this was two years before the target year of 1981, the govern-









Figure 5.6. International Comparison of Revealed Comparative Advantage
Source: J. Kim 2009.
Note: Revealed comparative advantage is computed from the data obtained from world trade ﬂ ow database constructed by Feenstra et al. (2005). A ﬁ gure greater than 1 implies that the 
industry’s share in the country’s exports is higher than the world average and that the country has a comparative advantage in that industry. SITC 0, 1 = food and beverages; SITC 2, 4 = 
crude materials; SITC 3 = mineral fuels; SITC 5 = chemicals; SITC 6, 8 = Manufactures; SITC 7 = machinery and equipment.
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amount, in heavy and chemical industries. Foreign capital fi nanced 39 
percent of this investment. Over the 1973–79 period, heavy and chemical 
industries accounted for 36.5 percent of facility investment in the manu-
facturing sector. Steel and petrochemical industries accounted for two-
thirds of the HCI investment (K. Kim 1988).
Although capacity underutilization was a major problem at the end 
of the 1970s, the HCI drive built the foundation of many of Korea’s lead-
ing industries such as steel, shipbuilding, machinery, electronics, and 
petrochemicals. It greatly strengthened backward and forward linkages 
among these industries, as well as related industries such as automo-
biles, to increase the local content of exports. It also enabled Korea to 
develop its own defense industry. Last but not least, the HCI drive set the 
stage for Korea’s transition to an innovation-driven economy by expand-
ing technical and engineering education and establishing a nucleus of 
R&D labs. 
Technology Absorption, Assimilation, and Innovation
When Korea exploited its latent comparative advantage in labor-intensive 
industries in the early 1960s, it could readily import mature technologies 
embodied in machinery and equipment. As Korea subsequently sought 
to fi ll the missing links in the domestic value chain and move up the 
quality ladder, however, it had to adopt proactive technology acquisition 
strategies to indigenize intermediate inputs it imported. The relatively 
minor role of foreign direct investment in Korea’s industrialization meant 
that Korea had to acquire technologies through other means.28 Combining 
foreign and local technological elements, Korea progressively developed 
local capabilities (Dahlman, Ross-Larson, and Westphal 1985).
Although technology acquisition strategies varied across industries, 
successful Korean companies systematically built their capabilities by 
absorbing, assimilating, and improving upon the acquired technolo-
gies.29 For example, Korean companies in light industries such as apparel 
and footwear initially acquired technologies through original equipment 
manufacturing (OEM) arrangements, as foreign OEM buyers provided 
everything from raw materials to design, production know-how, and 
quality control. Many Korean companies then moved on to original 
design manufacturing by mastering process engineering and detailed 
product design skills. Eventually, some companies successfully made a 
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transition to original brand manufacturing by conducting their own 
R&D and establishing their own brands and distribution networks. In 
chemical industries Korean companies acquired technologies through 
technical training programs linked to the imports of turn-key plants. 
Later, by operating these plants, Korean engineers and technicians 
internalized and improved upon the embodied technologies. In the 
machinery and electronics industries, Korean companies tended to 
resort to formal technology licensing and reverse engineering (S. Chung 
(2009). In such industries as power generation equipment, standardiza-
tion was as important as indigenization efforts in improving Korea’s 
technological capability. 
In the 1960s and 1970s the public sector played a dominant role in 
R&D, mainly through newly established government labs. However, as 
Korean fi rms came to realize that they should go beyond imitation and 
assimilation and do their own innovation to succeed in global markets, 
they drastically increased their R&D spending, in part encouraged by 
government support. For instance, starting in the early 1980s, major 
shipbuilding companies such as Hyundai, Samsung, and Daewoo estab-
lished their in-house R&D labs with more than 300 researchers each. 
As fi gure 5.7 shows, Korea’s gross R&D expenditure increased from 
less than 0.5 percent of GDP in the early 1970s to approximately 3 percent 
of GDP in the mid-2000s. Over the same period the private sector share 
of the R&D spending increased from 20 percent to 75 percent. The num-
ber of researchers also increased from 6,000 to 220,000. As of 2010 there 
are more than 20,000 industrial labs in Korea. In international compari-
son Korea appears to spend much more on R&D than is predicted by its 
per capita income, but the Korean government and companies believe 
that such high R&D spending fl ows are necessary to make up for the low 
initial stock and to secure sustained economic growth. 
Furthermore, as fi gure 5.8 shows, not only did Korean companies 
increase business expenditure on R&D (BERD) as a share of sales but 
they also increasingly conducted their own R&D instead of just relying 
on technology licensing. As a result royalty payments as a share of BERD 
tended to decline over time. Thanks to increased R&D efforts Korea 
trailed only the United States, Japan, and Germany in the production of 
industrial property as measured by the number of U.S., European, and 
Japanese patents registered in 2006 (S. Chung 2009).
210 Postcrisis Growth and Development
Figure 5.7. Korea’s Gross R&D Expenditure
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Korea’s outward-oriented industrial upgrading efforts led to dramatic 
changes in its comparative advantage. As table 5.7 shows, Korea’s top 
exports changed from primary products in 1960 to labor-intensive man-
ufactures in 1970, and increasingly shifted to capital- and knowledge-
intensive products in subsequent decades.
Korea’s Transition to a Democratic Market Economy
Korea successfully exploited its latent comparative advantage in labor-
intensive industries in the early 1960s and systematically developed its 
potential comparative advantage in machinery and equipment indus-
tries starting in the late 1960s. Korea’s authoritarian developmental state 
formed a “big-push partnership” with business and promoted “rapid, 
shared growth” through export-oriented industrialization and human 
resource development. As the capacity of markets, the state, and nonstate 
actors to meet innovation and coordination challenges changed, how-
ever, their respective roles began to shift as well. Some of this transition 
was fairly straightforward, as in the case of R&D. Other changes in the 
respective roles of markets, the state, and nonstate actors proved much 
more problematic. As the power balance in Korea’s business-government 
relations shifted in favor of business groups, for instance, it became 
increasingly diffi cult to contain rent-seeking and moral hazard. 
Figure 5.8. Korea’s Business R&D Expenditure: From Assimilation to Innovation 
Source: J. Suh 2007, 39.









































Table 5.7. Korea’s Top Ten Exports
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
 1 Iron ore Textiles Textiles Electronics Semiconductors
 2 Tungsten ore Plywood Electronics Textiles Computers
 3 Raw silk Wigs Iron and steel products Footwear Automobiles
 4 Anthracite Iron ore Footwear Iron and steel products Petrochemical products
 5 Cuttleﬁ sh Electronics Ships Ships Ships
 6 Live ﬁ sh Fruits and vegetables Synthetic ﬁ bers Automobiles Wireless telecommunication 
equipment
 7 Natural graphite Footwear Metal products Chemicals Iron and steel products
 8 Plywood Tobacco Plywood General machines Textile products
 9 Rice Iron and steel products Fish Plastic products Textile fabrics
10 Bristles Metal products Electrical goods Containers Electronics home appliances
Source: Korea International Trade Association.
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Figure 5.9 shows that Korea’s big-push partnership faced three major 
crises in 1972, 1980, and 1997. The crisis in the early 1970s primarily had 
to do with Korean fi rms’ heavy dependence on short-term “curb” loans 
from the informal domestic fi nancial sector. Speaking for “hard-working 
entrepreneurs” suffering from crushing debt, business leaders at the time 
went so far as to urge the government to reduce taxes, expand money 
supply, and have state-owned banks take over the “usurious” curb loans. 
In the end the government issued an emergency decree in August 1972 
that bailed out the debt-plagued corporate sector by placing a three-year 
moratorium on the repayment of curb loans and converting short-term 
high-interest loans into long-term loans on concessional terms. The gov-
ernment in effect sacrifi ced the property rights of curb lenders to relieve 
the debt burden of entrepreneurs it had come to trust as agents to carry 
out its ambitious economic development plans (Lim 2000). 
Figure 5.9. Debt-Equity Ratio and Interest Coverage Ratio in Korea’s Manufacturing Sector
Source: Bank of Korea.
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The fi nancial crisis in 1980 was largely a product of the ambitious 
HCI drive of the 1970s. As such, the crisis had primarily to do with 
policy-oriented loans provided by state-owned banks, and the govern-
ment could afford to take a gradual approach. In fact, after calling off 
the HCI drive in 1979, the government took a number of industrial 
rationalization measures—spiced with “special loans” from the Bank of 
Korea to commercial banks—and waited for the economy to grow out 
of the problem. 
Starting in the 1980s liberalization and democratization weakened 
government control, while expectations for government protection 
against large bankruptcies remained strong. Even as various entry restric-
tions and investment controls were lifted, institutional reforms and cred-
ible market signals (such as large-scale corporate failures) designed to 
replace weakening government control with market-based discipline 
were not introduced. The chaebol expanded their infl uence in the non-
bank fi nancial sector and took advantage of the government’s implicit 
guarantees to make aggressive investments, systematically discounting 
downside risks. The liberalization of capital markets in the 1990s exacer-
bated the problem by making Korea vulnerable to sudden capital fl ow 
reversals. Moreover, although Korea’s democratization in 1987 ushered 
in a new era of free and competitive elections, it took several years before 
Korea’s civil society became strong enough to effect changes in campaign 
fi nancing rules and introduce other anticorruption measures designed 
to enhance transparency and accountability. 
Much like business-government relations, labor relations faced a 
problem of transition as Korea attempted to move from an authoritarian 
developmental state to a democratic market economy. Strong job secu-
rity in exchange for weak labor rights had been an integral part of the 
imposed social bargain under the authoritarian regime in Korea. This 
arrangement came under attack from both labor and management after 
Korea was democratized. Workers demanded wage increases as well as 
full-fl edged rights to organize and take collective action. Business execu-
tives complained that lifetime employment practices impeded fl exible 
adjustment to changes in the increasingly competitive global market. A 
grand bargain between labor and management would have involved 
enhanced labor rights and social security in exchange for labor market 
fl exibility. However, repeated attempts to reach such a bargain resulted 
in protracted gridlocks. 
 Joint Discovery and Upgrading of Comparative Advantage  215
It took the economic crisis of 1997 for Korea to introduce credible, 
market-based discipline and reach a grand social bargain. In the after-
math of the crisis Korea cleaned up massive nonperforming loans and 
adopted institutional reforms to reduce moral hazard, improve corpo-
rate governance, promote competition, and strengthen the social safety 
net. As a result of the crisis, during which 16 large business groups failed, 
fi rms reassessed default risks in making their investment decisions and 
greatly improved their interest coverage ratio. Korea effectively used the 
crisis as an opportunity to redefi ne the respective roles of markets, the 
state, and nonstate actors and to make the transition to a democratic 
market economy (Lim and Hahm 2006).
Summary and Conclusion
Korea’s development took place through joint discovery and upgrading 
of comparative advantage. To promote development the government 
and the private sector made joint efforts to address innovation and coor-
dination externalities. They developed “a big-push partnership” in which 
the government shared the investment risks of the private sector and 
provided support largely based on performance in competitive global 
markets. The reinforcement of successful experiments through the feed-
back mechanism of performance-based rewards led to dramatic changes 
over time. The government provided implicit guarantees against large-
scale bankruptcies and maintained various entry restrictions and invest-
ment controls to contain moral hazard, to a large extent.
The government formulated multiyear development plans but del-
egated much of their implementation to business groups, which in 
turn tried to coordinate productive activities at the group level in 
addition to engaging in market transactions. To monitor progress, 
identify emerging problems, and devise solutions to these problems, 
the government held regular consultations with the private sector such 
as monthly export promotion meetings. Together with monthly meet-
ings reporting on economic trends prepared by the Economic Plan-
ning Board, these consultations helped to ensure that indicative plans 
would be taken seriously and modifi ed decisively as the objective cir-
cumstances changed.
Korea also used international trade as an essential component of its 
development policy. Trade helped Korea to discover its comparative 
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advantage and alleviate coordination failures, overcome the limits of 
its small domestic market and exploit scale economies, learn from 
good practices around the world and upgrade its economy, and run a 
market test for its government policies and corporate strategies and 
devise performance-based reward schemes. In fact, for Korea, export 
promotion—for which the nation had to change its mindset and mea-
sure itself against global benchmarks—served as the engine of growth 
and the organizing principle under which industrial upgrading, infra-
structure development, and human resource development could be 
pursued. While relying on global markets, Korea made conscious and 
concerted efforts to move into higher value added areas along the value 
chain by making complementary investments in human capital and 
infrastructure. In fact, unlike some countries caught in “a middle-income 
trap,” Korea managed to achieve export-led growth, not just export 
growth, by systematically increasing the local content of its exports.
A dichotomous characterization of industrial policy as being either 
comparative-advantage-conforming or comparative-advantage-defying 
does not do full justice to Korea’s efforts to upgrade its comparative 
advantage.30 For instance, the promotion of heavy and chemical indus-
tries in the early 1970s was not comparative-advantage-conforming, 
because Korea at the time had a strong and increasing comparative 
 advantage in light industries. Nor was it simply comparative-advantage-
defying, because the architects of the HCI drive had benchmarked the 
structural transformation of advanced industrial nations, namely, 
Japan, with similar natural endowments to Korea’s and could reason-
ably imagine what should be done to promote industrial upgrading, 
infrastructure development, and human resource development in an 
integrated manner, with a view toward securing international com-
petitiveness (hence, “exportization of all industries” and “scientization 
of all people”). In short, Korea took premeditated but considerable 
strategic risks in promoting heavy and chemical industries. Korea 
adopted an outward-oriented, bottom-up, and integrated engineering 
approach in its industrial policy and chose an option that promised a 
dynamically effi cient growth trajectory if it managed to develop tech-
nological prowess before the fi nancial burden associated with scale 
economies and complementary investments became overwhelming. In 
contrast, many developing countries failed in their industrial policy 
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because they rushed to promote upstream industries for the domestic 
market without fi rst gaining requisite scale economies and skill accu-
mulation.31
Although state intervention in the economy was extensive in Korea in 
the 1960s and 1970s, Korea managed to contain corruption and rent-
seeking. A student revolution in 1960 that overthrew a corrupt govern-
ment and a military coup in 1961 that placed economic modernization 
at the top of its agenda had changed Korea’s political economy. Merito-
cratic institution-building and monitoring, as well as improved welfare 
for government offi cials, helped to control the negative side effects of 
state intervention. Most important, making government support con-
tingent on performance in competitive global markets helped to reduce 
the potential for corruption. 
As the capacity of markets, the state, and nonstate actors to meet 
innovation and coordination challenges improved, their respective roles 
began to shift as well. While the division of labor between the govern-
ment and the private sector has changed, joint discovery and upgrading 
of comparative advantage has continued to operate as a fundamental 
development principle for Korea. The development of markets and insti-
tution of postcrisis reforms, including the adoption of a more fl exible 
exchange rate policy, has made it easier for Korean fi rms to rely on price 
signals to discover profi table business opportunities, even as they con-
tinue to engage in consultations with the government to identify prom-
ising technologies and deal with bottlenecks. The government has made 
massive investment in information technology infrastructure and pro-
vided generous R&D support. Firms, for their part, have changed their 
investment behavior in the wake of the crisis and focus more closely on 
building and upgrading their core competence. Democracy now pro-
vides the institutional platform for Korea to foster autonomy, diversity, 
and experiment essential to sustained productivity-led growth.
Notes
 1.  Cited from the Preface by Juan Temistocles Montas, Minister of Economy, Plan-
ning, and Development of the Dominican Republic, in Galvan (2008).
 2.  The Commission on Growth and Development (2008) has identifi ed 13 suc-
cessful cases of sustained high growth, ranging from Botswana to Thailand, and 
noted “fi ve striking points of resemblance”—openness: import knowledge and 
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exploit global demand; macroeconomic stability: modest infl ation and sustain-
able public fi nances; future orientation: high investment and saving; market 
allocation: prices guide resources and resources follow prices; and leadership and 
governance: credible commitment to growth and inclusion and capable adminis-
tration. Conspicuously missing from this list is the use of nonmarket measures to 
coordinate productive activities, facilitate industrial upgrading and innovation, 
and cope with external shocks.
 3.  Lindauer and Pritchett (2002) summarize “long and perhaps not entirely fruit-
ful debates” about Korea: “Was Korea outward oriented or protectionist? Export 
promotion policy suggested outward oriented, while import protection sug-
gested protectionist. Was Korea government led or market friendly? Examina-
tion of the mechanics of government direction of the economy, government 
allocation of credit, and promotion of specifi c industries suggested government 
led; the use of the private sector (versus parastatal fi rms or government agen-
cies) as the instrument of investment and the role of business councils suggested 
market friendly. Was Korea’s growth Big Push or private sector and productivity 
led? This issue sparked generations of debate about Korea’s total factor produc-
tivity (TFP)—whether it was low, about that of the OECD countries, or fast by 
cross-country standards. . . . These debates were often less about what Korea actu-
ally did than about what label to apply to Korea and then sell to other nations eager 
to emulate Korea’s success.” (emphasis added)
 4.  Entrepreneurs and workers played an important role in Korea’s development, 
but as far as designing the Korean model of development is concerned, three 
policymakers stand out: Park Chung Hee, who served as president from 1961 to 
1979; Kim Chung-yum, who served as minister of commerce and industry and 
chief of staff to President Park; and O Won-chul, who served as senior eco-
nomic secretary to President Park for the promotion of heavy and chemical 
industries in the 1970s. Each of them has a memoir available in English: Park 
(1963), based on his book of the same title published in Korean in 1961; Kim 
(1994), an abridged version of his memoir published in Korean in 1990, which 
was subsequently revised in 2006; and O (2009), based on his seven-volume 
memoir in Korean.
 5.  The historical account of Korea’s development in the 1950s and 1960s draws 
extensively from Lim (2000).
 6.  In this conceptual framework, “new knowledge” is knowledge that is new in a 
given (local) context. Something as old and simple as a mosquito net may be 
regarded as a major new innovation when it is placed in the context of a fi ght 
against malaria, for instance (World Bank 2010).
 7.  Lucas (2009) has characterized the relationship between economic growth and 
knowledge as follows: “What is it about modern capitalist economies that 
allows them, in contrast to all earlier societies, to generate sustained growth in 
productivity and living standards?. . . What is central, I believe, is the fact that 
the industrial revolution involved the emergence (or rapid expansion) of a class 
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of educated people, thousands—now many millions—of people who spend 
entire careers exchanging ideas, solving work-related problems, generating new 
knowledge.”
 8.  Adam Smith (1776) opens his inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth 
of nations with an observation on the productivity-improving effects of the 
division of labor, which he notes is limited by the extent of the market. Alfred 
Chandler (1977) emphasizes that “modern business enterprise took the place of 
market mechanisms in coordinating the activities of the economy and allocat-
ing its resources,” and observes that “the visible hand of management replaced 
what Adam Smith referred to as the invisible hand of market forces” in many 
sectors of the economy.
 9.  In a letter to Isaac McPherson, a Baltimore inventor, on August 13, 1813, Thomas 
Jefferson wrote: “If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all oth-
ers of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, 
which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but 
the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every one, and 
the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no 
one possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of it. He who 
receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as 
he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.”
 10.  For a comprehensive account of the role of knowledge-promoting institutions 
in the development of the West, see Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986).
 11.  For a seminal discussion on the problem of coordination failure in develop-
ment, see Rosentein-Rodan (1943) and Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989).
 12.  In fact, in an increasingly integrated global economy, a nation’s economic per-
formance largely depends on its ability to enhance its relatively immobile factors 
of production to attract mobile factors of production.
 13.  The contrast between Friedrich von Hayek and Ronald Coase is telling in this 
regard. Criticizing John Maynard Keynes as well as Karl Marx, Hayek asserted 
that state intervention would threaten human liberty and place society on “the 
road to serfdom”—even if this state intervention was supported and demanded 
by a free democratic political process. Hayek also argued that because of infor-
mation and incentive problems, planning would prove inferior to market mech-
anisms in coordinating economic production. By contrast, Coase took a much 
more balanced view on the merits and demerits of markets versus hierarchies 
based on the concept of transaction costs (Lim 2009a). 
 14.  The hwan was converted to the won at the rate of 10 to 1 in June 1962.
 15.  Seol Kyung-dong, treasurer of the Liberal Party, was a benefi ciary of one of these 
privatization deals and took over a textile mill in Taegu. Kang Jik-sun, a busi-
nessman who picked up Samcheok Cement Co., donated a 30-percent equity 
share in the company to the Liberal Party (K. Kim 1990).
 16.  Of the 22 largest business groups in Korea in 2000, only 7 began before 1945. 
The most prominent among these—Hyundai, Samsung, and LG—were little 
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more than small, family-based enterprises until the 1940s. Eleven were founded 
during the American occupation (1945–48) and Syngman Rhee’s presidency 
(1948–60). Four groups founded in the 1960s, including Lotte and Daewoo, 
expanded rapidly enough to be counted among the largest business groups in 
2000. At the end of the 1960s only Samsung and LG had made the list of the top 
10 business groups in Korea (Lim 2003).
 17.  In the 1950s an American economic advisory team to the United Nations Korean 
Reconstruction Agency prescribed a somewhat similar strategy. This group 
argued for a program of infrastructure investment and import substitution that 
would make Korea “self-suffi cient” in fi ve years, to be fi nanced by large infusions 
of development assistance and greatly expanded primary exports (Haggard, 
Kim, and Moon 1991). With the benefi t of hindsight, it is rather interesting that 
both the military government and the American experts called for export expan-
sion in primary products.
 18.  The revised plan advocated a free market economy, scrapping “guided capital-
ism” as the basic principle of economic policy. It also emphasized the impor-
tance of stabilization policy, scaled down economic growth targets, and crossed 
out such investment projects as an integrated steel mill. Last but not least, the 
revised plan called for a shift in export priorities from primary products to 
labor-intensive manufactured goods. 
 19.  This “market-oriented” policy measure had the effect of increasing the govern-
ment infl uence in fi nancial resource allocation because the banks were state 
owned. During the three-month period from July to September 1965, fi xed-
term money deposits increased by 2 billion won; whereas from October to 
December, deposits soared by 12.5 billion won. For maximizing the amount of 
fi nancial resources under state control, an attractive real interest rate turned out 
to be much more effective than forced savings measures.
 20.  In the early 1960s, only a decade removed from the Korean War, foreign multi-
nationals were unimpressed by Korea’s growth prospects and did not consider 
Korea to be an attractive destination for investment, either. However, even after 
Korea’s growth prospects improved and Japanese multinationals, in particular, 
expressed interest in investing in Korea after the normalization of diplomatic 
relations in 1965, Korea maintained a rather restrictive regime on foreign direct 
investment. Korea’s previous experience with Japanese colonial rule, during 
which the Japanese owned more than 90 percent of industrial properties in 
Korea, played a decisive role in this policy stance.
 21.  Korea’s efforts to earn hard currency in the early stages of its development also 
included the dispatch of miners and nurses to West Germany in the early 1960s 
to secure remittances, participation in the Vietnam War to obtain increased 
military assistance, and normalization of relations with Japan in 1965 to receive 
reparations.
 22.  In his memoir, O (1995) recalls that the government was clearly aware of the 
potential moral hazard created by this arrangement from the moment it was 
introduced in July 1962, likening it to “a wild horse.” 
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 23.  At the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, deputy-director-level offi cials 
were tasked to monitor export performance by major industry. The integra-
tion of trade and industry functions in the same ministry enhanced policy 
implementation.
 24.  In 1962 labor-intensive manufactures accounted for less than 15 percent of Korea’s 
total exports of US$54.8 million. In 1963 exports increased by US$32 million, or 
58.4 percent, to reach US$86.8 million, and labor-intensive manufactures such as 
textiles and footwear accounted for more than 80 percent of this increase.
 25.  In fact, the policy priorities for the Second Five-Year Plan were as follows: to 
achieve self-suffi ciency of food, forestation, and maritime development; to lay 
the foundation of industrialization by promoting chemical, steel, and machin-
ery industries, and to double industrial production; to achieve an export target 
of US$700 million and improve the balance of payments through import sub-
stitution; to increase employment and to suppress population growth through 
birth control; to achieve considerable increases in people’s income, in particular 
farmers’ income through farming diversifi cation; and to enhance technical 
capacity and productivity by promoting science, technology, and management 
and by cultivating human resources.
 26.  Korea raised its defense spending from 4 percent of GDP in the 1960s to 6 percent 
in the late 1970s. A new 5 percent ad valorem national defense tax helped to 
fi nance the military modernization program.
 27.  In the early 1970s very few Korean engineers were capable of designing weap-
ons. To solve this shortfall, subcommittees were formed according to weapon 
systems, and those who had some knowledge were appointed as members. As 
advisory bodies to the Agency for Defense Development (ADD), they worked 
with the ADD researchers to reverse-engineer weapon systems. After the ADD 
successfully designed prototypes and came close to the production stage, the 
United States would start negotiating technology licensing agreements with 
Korea. Reverse engineering had strengthened Korea’s bargaining position, and 
the United States apparently felt that it would be better to maintain some con-
trol by signing formal technology licensing agreements (K. Kim 1988). A similar 
pattern regarding technology acquisition would be observed in civilian indus-
tries as well.
 28.  Westphal, Rhee, and Pusell (1981) observe: “Korea’s industrialization has over-
whelmingly and in fundamental respects been directed and controlled by 
nationals. Infl ows of investment resources have largely been in the form of 
debt. Technology has thus been acquired from primarily through means other 
than direct foreign investment. . . . Indeed, for most industries, Korea appears 
to have had little diffi culty gaining access to technology and to export markets: 
that is world markets appear to be competitive, not restrictive, as is frequently 
asserted.” 
 29.  Parvez Hasan (2008), who served as lead economist for Korea in the mid-1970s 
at the World Bank, recalls that “Koreans did not insist on strong backward link-
ages right away and were content to rely heavily on imported technology 
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equipment.” When he visited the Hyundai shipyard for the fi rst time in 1973, the 
skilled labor was “essentially nailing down the steel plates and the equipment.” 
The general manager was from Denmark, and blueprints for the oil tanker were 
all imported. When Hasan made his second visit a decade later and asked the 
Korean general manager whether they had a design department, he was told that 
“of course they had a design department and it employed more than hundred 
engineers.” Over the course of the decade, Hyundai had successfully climbed up 
the quality ladder.
 30.  For a more detailed discussion on the relationship between comparative advan-
tage and industrial policy, see Lin and Chang (2009); Lin (2010); and Lin and 
Monga (2010).
 31.  To understand the dynamic transformation of comparative advantage, it is nec-
essary to analyze how a country’s endowment structure is upgraded through 
economic development and proactive public-private efforts. This discussion 
begs the question of how to operationalize the concept of upgrading compara-
tive advantage. Revealed comparative advantage has serious limitations since it 
is clearly a lagging indicator. Instead, it may be advisable to make a good use of 
benchmarking exercises and consider, for example, targeting “industries that 
have been developed for about 20 years in dynamically growing countries with 
similar endowment structures and a per capita income, measured in purchasing 
power parity, that is about 100 percent higher than their own” (Lin and Monga 
2010). Along this line, a country like the Dominican Republic may take a look at 
Ireland and Singapore, globally connected, smart islands that have effectively 
played the supply chain game (Lim 2009b); whereas Kazakhstan may bench-
mark Australia, a large, resource-rich, sparsely populated country (J. Kim 2010); 
and Ghana may consider Malaysia, an ethnically diverse, medium-sized country 
that has successfully diversifi ed and upgraded its economic structure (Breisinger 
et al. 2008).
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Comments by Danny Leipziger
The George Washington University
Korea’s Success in Hindsight
In retrospect it is clear that a specifi c combination of political and eco-
nomic elements has been the key driver behind Korea’s development 
success. Conventional factors often cited as signifi cant contributors to 
the country’s growth include prodigious savings, a focus on exports, 
investment in human and infrastructure capital, strong macroeconomic 
policies, and a capable government with a long-term development vision. 
In addition to these traditional elements, new factors are increasingly 
being recognized as playing an equally important role. These include 
effective economic planning, strong business-government links, invest-
ment in research and development, global branding of chaebols, adapt-
able economic policies, and an emphasis on tertiary education. Not all of 
these strategies have been without controversy, however. Some of the 
more contentious actions have included direct lending, industrial policy, 
and chaebol policy. More widely accepted, and potentially replicable 
strategies, include strong macroeconomic management, a strong national 
vision, well-aligned economic policies, effective policy implementation, 
and monitoring for impact.
Korea’s Many Accomplishments
Korea has enjoyed an unparalleled rise in income and the quality of 
human welfare. The country has nurtured world-class industries, 
which are characterized by dynamic manufacturing and technology 
sectors. It ascended to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development in 1996 and a decade later initiated actions to join 
the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, thereby making a 
swift transition from a debtor to a creditor nation. Now, at the helm of 
the G-20, Korea continues to press forward as a new international 
leader.
Comments on the paper “Joint Discovery and Upgrading of Comparative Advantage: 
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From Developing-Country Paradigm to OECD Role Model
The fi rst phase of Korea’s ascension on the world stage began in the 
1990s. During that decade, Korea pursued a traditional growth path 
based on an export-oriented economy with strong macroeconomic fun-
damentals, which was only briefl y interrupted by the 1997–98 Asian 
fi nancial crisis. Korea became a poster child for the open trade model 
and consistently ranked high in the World Bank’s Doing Business Indica-
tors. The country established new institutions, including a stock market, 
a competition agency, and a fi nancial supervision agency. Small and 
medium enterprises were fostered and generated signifi cant job creation. 
This, along with a focused education policy, prepared human resources 
to engage in higher value added economic activities. 
The second phase of Korea’s growth began after the 1997 Asian fi nan-
cial crisis and involved some fundamental restructuring of institutions 
and a greater role for regulation and oversight. A little over a decade after 
its recovery from the liquidity crisis of 1997–98, faced with the global 
economic crisis of 2009, the country demonstrated exemplary crisis 
management skills and quickly mobilized its large fi scal surplus to boost 
economic demand and lower interest rates to increase liquidity. The gov-
ernment used public sector banks to access credit and active reserve 
management, which included Central Bank swap arrangements, to add 
to its strong reserve position as well as taking other safety net measures. 
Looking beyond the crisis, Korea’s new Green Growth agenda will pro-
vide the country with an opportunity to deal positively with global cli-
mate change through new technologies, exports, and jobs. This concrete 
initiative is coupled with long-term goals, such as doubling per capita 
income to US$40,000. 
What Can We Learn from Korean Policy Actions of 2009?
The world will likely see that a quick and coordinated policy response, 
which has long been a hallmark of Korean policy makers, will work yet 
another time. Bolstered by a strong initial fi scal position, Korean policy 
makers were able to swiftly implement a countercyclical stimulus. Exces-
sive reserve holdings paid off, as did a diversifi ed export strategy. This 
helped the Central Bank to provide a needed boost to liquidity. Through-
out this time consumer confi dence remained steady, despite turbulence 
abroad. In 2010 Korea has experienced a classic V-shaped recovery. The 
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government has been able to contain the damage to the fi nancial sector 
and maintain stable employment levels. The Central Bank’s ability to 
reverse quantitative easing leaves room to consider interest rate adjust-
ment once growth is restored and credit rollovers assured. 
What Can We Learn from the Green Growth Initiative?
Korea’s Green Growth initiative combines short-term fi scal stimulus 
with a longer-term agenda that was well articulated publicly by Presi-
dent Lee Myung-bak. It sets out ambitious goals and concrete targets 
and provides a national vision for how the economy will adapt long 
term. Big corporations view the program as an opportunity to invest in 
green technologies, giving Korea a chance to establish global leadership 
in these areas, especially in electric car batteries, wind turbines, and 
solar cells. The Green Growth package is composed of internally aligned 
policies that are supported by both public and private investment. 
Implementation will be monitored for effectiveness.
Characteristics of Public Policy in the Postcrisis Environment
Going forward, public policy will need to focus on new job creation given 
large labor market dislocations. Policy makers must also examine fi scal 
incidence since income distribution has worsened in many places. Gov-
ernment spending will need to crowd in private investment since the tight 
fi scal space makes effi ciency of expenditures a major priority. Bridging 
short- and long-term policy goals is paramount and appears to require a 
viable planning mechanism. It is noteworthy that the Green Growth 
agenda revolves around a fi ve-year plan of actions, reminiscent of the 
EPB-monitored economic development programs of previous decades.
How Has Korea Managed to Move Successfully in the Public Space? 
A critical component to Korea’s successful use of public policy is its mer-
itocratic bureaucracy. External learning is encouraged and the knowledge 
base strengthened by the return of expatriates. Even within the general 
population, higher education is fostered and excellence encouraged. 
Social consciousness of the need for good governance is more pronounced 
in Korea because of its proximity to one of the world’s most closed societ-
ies immediately to the north. Bad policy ideas are simply abandoned, and 
the policies that are carried out enjoy national credibility. 
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What Can Korea Do Better? 
There are certainly trade-offs between economic gains and welfare and 
happiness. While Korea was able to act quickly to stabilize its economy 
during the economic crisis, it has been slow to resolve lingering gender 
issues. Furthermore, demographics will take its toll unless retirement 
ages are raised to cope with a longer-living population. Service sector 
productivity must reach levels close to those in manufacturing. Global 
leadership does not end with the G-20. 
What Can Others Learn from the Korean Experience?
There is much that developing countries can take away from the Korean 
experience. The fi rst is that economic fundamentals matter, not just to 
satisfy donors but to actually position the economy to be better man-
aged for the sake of progress. Second, income distribution and social 
programs are important, again not to satisfy donors but to maintain 
broad-based public support for reforms. Third, the private sector need 
not necessarily fear the role of government, especially if the actions of 
government and business can be aligned. Fourth, paying taxes fi nances 
social infrastructure and replaces aid, while contributing to build the 
social contract between citizens and governments; as such it should not 
be a central element of public policy. It is critical that governments solicit 
taxes from their citizens and that citizens demand quality government 
services in return. And fi fth, government-led economic planning has 
been the template for all East Asian success stories and has the potential 
to provide similar results in other countries.
What Can Donors and the International Aid Agencies Learn from 
Korea’s Story?
The primary take-away for donors and aid agencies is that substantial 
transfers of resources are a waste of money without building up the 
domestic institutions to be able to handle and disburse funds effi ciently, 
fairly, and effectively. This goes hand-in-hand with promoting country 
ownership of development strategy, with benefi ts accruing to all sectors. 
Foreign funds must come in large doses and be matched by domestic 
savings and tax collection efforts. Paradigms do require substantial 
customization, however.
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What Additional Actions Can Korea Take as G-20 Leader to Help 
Developing Countries? 
Korea can signifi cantly infl uence the G-20 agenda on behalf of low- and 
middle-income countries, as well as be an example to these countries on 
how to move forward on current international agenda items. Korea can 
combine its increase in ODA with green technology transfers to foster 
sustainable growth. It can mobilize developing countries to take up the 
Doha mantle. Last, Korea can share its economic planning experience 
with infrastructure spending and public-private coordination to build 
capacity and improve practice elsewhere. As a survivor of the last major 
crisis in 1997 and now as an exemplary manager of the 2008–10 crisis, 
Korea has earned the right to speak out forcefully in favor of global 
solutions based on strong domestic economic management.
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Comments by Klaus Rohland
World Bank
Thank you, Professor Cho, for having me on this panel, and my apprecia-
tion and admiration to you, Dr. Lim, for such a concise and comprehen-
sive presentation that covered the story line so comprehensibly. I really 
have not much to add to the observations already made by other discus-
sants and would like to focus on fi ve issues that, in my view, deserve high-
lighting. In doing so let me also recognize and thank the former deputy 
prime minister of Korea, Jin Nyum, whose presentation to Vietnamese 
policy makers in November 2004 in Hanoi on “Policy Coordination 
in Planning Socio-Economic Development” greatly shaped my views on 
Korea’s post-1962 development trajectory and arising lessons for other 
aspiring countries on their long way from low-income status to OECD 
membership.
Policy Coordination Is Important
Many low-income countries struggle to fi nd the best ways of policy 
coordination for socioeconomic development. There are at least two 
dimensions to this. First, what is the appropriate role of government 
and, respectively, business, in a development strategy. Second, how 
should policy planning and budget functions of government be orga-
nized. The Korean government in offi ce in the early 1960s took a very 
pragmatic approach. The strategy was state led, but its implementa-
tion was to a large extent left to private business, mostly Korea’s chae-
bols. This approach stands in marked contrast to the attempts in many 
other developing countries where a socialist government pursued state 
dominance of the economy. The experience of newly independent 
Ghana, which was at the same GDP per capita level as Korea in the 
early 1960s but fared signifi cantly worse subsequently, is often cited in 
this regard. What makes Korea also stand out is its decision to merge 
development planning and resource allocation in one agency, the Eco-
nomic Planning Board. And the EPB was part of the prime minister’s 
Comments on the paper “Joint Discovery and Upgrading of Comparative Advantage: 
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offi ce, fully empowered to coordinate every economic policy in the 
country. Korea avoided getting mired in arguments about coordina-
tion between separate planning and budget agencies that have been so 
wasteful in many other countries’ experience. Korea’s “whole of gov-
ernment” approach was anchored in organizational arrangements in a 
well-considered way.
Complement Industrial Policy with Social Equity 
Korea’s development strategy was not only about industrialization. Its 
agricultural policy helped to address the needs of the rural population 
and manage the shift from agriculture as the predominant source of 
GDP (60 percent in the early 1960s) to the industrial sector. The two-
tiered subsidized price system for rice is a good example of managed 
development that eventually saw the industrial sector emerge as the pre-
dominant source of growth and income. Also, the New Community 
Movement with its focus on rural life ensured that traditional rural 
values and communities were made part in Korea’s way forward.
Be Prepared to Change Tack When the Usefulness of the Original 
Strategy Diminishes
In the early 1970s Korea shifted its focus on light industry to the devel-
opment of heavy and chemical industries. This shift did not derive from 
the Korean experience but was built on the Japanese model that Korea 
believed was suitable for Korea as well. While a risk, it was a calculated, 
well-studied risk that propelled Korea forward.
Shift the Balance of Power between the State, Private Business, 
and Civil Society over Time 
The role of the state and its planning shifted gradually from direct to 
indirect planning through tax incentives and preferential credits. This 
shift took account of the increasing complexity of the economy. Financial 
sector reform and deregulation took place. While economically success-
ful, it also left a void in oversight of business, especially the chaebols. 
Participation and voice for the broader society was brought in following 
the events of 1987. Increasingly civil society’s role in oversight has been 
strengthened and, together with antitrust policies, has provided checks 
and balances in Korea’s new stage of development.
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Development Is Not a Linear Process: Be Prepared to Adjust to 
Newly Emerging Realities
Many countries have moved over time from low- to middle-income 
country status, but only a few have gained OECD status. Korea’s people 
and policy makers have shown remarkable fl exibility and readiness to 
adjust to new realities and have avoided the “middle-income trap” in 
which so many countries in the developing world seem to get stuck. 
Korea’s focus on the development of a broad-based social security sys-
tem in the late 1980s is an example of forward-looking policies that put 
the growth and equity policy into a modern framework. And, looking 
forward, Korea’s efforts and attainments in education are well known, its 
international educational test results are the envy of many countries. Its 
focus on technology and service industries will see Korea successful in 
the new decade when the great global adjustments take place.
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Chair’s Summary by Yoon Je Cho
Sogang University
Korea’s economic development during the past half century has been 
remarkable indeed. Within the short span of 50 years, Korea has trans-
formed from one of the world’s poorest economies to one of its most 
advanced. Korea’s is one of the most impressive postwar development 
stories; however, observers have different interpretations of that success 
story. The opinions vary, from revisionist to neoclassical economic views: 
the revisionist economists argue that the strong state and state interven-
tions for resource mobilization and allocation were key factors, while the 
neoclassical economists point to the export orientation, stable macroeco-
nomic environment, high savings, and open market competition as vital 
elements. A more recent point of view involves the political economy and 
institutional aspects of Korea’s development process. State planning, state 
business coordination, long-term national vision, institutions, social 
equity and cohesion, and fl exibility and adaptability of policy reforms, 
among other things, have been given more close attention. 
Wonhyuk Lim presented a comprehensive study on the Korean eco-
nomic development experience with some fresh interpretations. Although 
he agreed with many previous interpretations, including the importance 
of good macroeconomic policies, export-oriented growth policies, stra-
tegic industrial and technological upgrading, and high savings and 
investment, he shone light on and emphasized factors such as the exten-
sive public-private consultations, initiated by the government, to share 
information on the economy and markets; continuous investment in 
infrastructure and human development; an integrated engineering 
approach in the big push for industrial development; the joint discovery 
and upgrading of comparative advantage through public-private consul-
tation; and so on.
The discussants generally agreed with Lim’s presentation and amplifi ed 
his interpretation by pointing out the meritocratic Korean bureaucratic 
system, which has had strong capacity for policy planning, implementation 
Summary on the paper “Joint Discovery and Upgrading of Comparative Advantage: 
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and monitoring, and making adaptive policy reforms. They also pointed 
to the importance of building institutions and promoting primary as 
well as tertiary education, which allowed Korea to transition from being 
a technology importer to being a technology innovator. The discussants 
provided valuable insight on the interpretation of Korea’s economic 
development in a comparative perspective based on their experiences in 
the World Bank and their personal efforts to help development in many 
other countries across the regions. 
In this session, economic growth was not the only topic of discus-
sion; the successful transition of an economy that was heavily state-
controlled to one that is open and liberalized was also an important 
subject. The challenges of the transition, and of becoming an open, 
emerging market economy in the increasingly interconnected global 
market, were also discussed. The changing dimensions of economic 
policy reform and implementation were discussed in relation to the 
political transition of a country from an authoritarian to a more demo-
cratic system. Korea has gone through all of that within a short time 
span. Its development process was marked not only by high economic 
growth and rapid industrial catch-up but by frustrations and crises. It 
not only was blessed by favorable international environments but also 
suffered from volatile international economic environments. This indi-
cates that the Korean development experience would be valuable to 
other developing countries that are trying to spur their economic 
growth while at the same time facing changes in social, political, and 
international environments. 
At the same time, we are humbled by the fact that we still do not fully 
understand what the key factors are for successful development; whether 
a country’s successful development experience could be replicated 
in other countries facing different social, political, and international 
environments; and how important noneconomic factors such as secu-
rity, culture, region, and political leadership are in the development 
process. We have so far identifi ed many important ingredients for suc-
cessful economic development. However, synthesizing these ingredients 
to create a guide book for successful economic development remains a 
task to be completed.
Nevertheless, the Korean economic development experience is worth 
sharing with other developing countries at this stage. Instead of learning 
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direct lessons from the Korean experience, we will have to seek a best 
possible approach to development for an individual developing country 
by working together with people there, based on the Korean develop-
ment experiences and the unique political and economic situations faced 
by those individual countries. In that connection the Korean develop-
ment experience needs to be further studied, and shared with the devel-
oping community. This session, I believe, was a valuable one in the course 





Millennium Development Goals 




Many countries have achieved major successes in a number of Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) such as combating extreme poverty and 
hunger; improving school enrollment and child health; expanding access 
to clean water; controlling malaria, tuberculosis, and neglected tropical 
diseases; and providing access to HIV/AIDS treatment.1 Encouragingly, 
this progress has been made in some of the poorest countries, demonstrat-
ing that the MDGs are indeed achievable with the right policies, adequate 
levels of funding, and international support. Considering their historical 
experience, some poor countries and whole regions have made remark-
able progress. For example, Sub-Saharan Africa has made huge improve-
ments in child health and in primary school enrollment over the past 
two decades. Between 1999 and 2004 Sub-Saharan Africa achieved one 
of the largest worldwide reductions ever in measles’ deaths.2
Despite some gains, progress has been uneven. With trends to date, 
several goals are unlikely to be achieved by 2015. Furthermore, achieve-
ments in many areas, especially poverty and hunger, are threatened by 
multiple crises, including food and energy price hikes and the global 
recession. Climate change and confl icts are also major challenges, because 




242 Postcrisis Growth and Development
As we reassess the progress of the MDGs in light of the fi nancial crisis, 
some key fi ndings on the status of the goals are outlined below. 
MDG 1: Uneven Progress on Halving Poverty and Hunger 
Progress on poverty reduction is uneven and has been threatened by the 
crisis, but it is arguably still achievable. According to the World Bank’s 
US$1-a-day poverty line (revised to US$1.25 in 2005), 1.4 billion people 
were living in extreme poverty in 2005, down from 1.8 billion in 1990. 
However, many of the gains made with respect to the poverty targets 
result from strong growth in East Asia, especially China. Excluding 
China, the number of poor actually went up over the 1990 –2005 period 
by approximately 36 million. There were 92 million more poor people in 
Sub-Saharan Africa in 2005 than in 1990. The overall poverty rate (using 
the US$1.25-a-day measure) is still expected to fall to 15 percent by 2015, 
with around 920 million people living under the international poverty 
line—half the number in 1990. Further, the effects of the global fi nancial 
crisis are likely to persist: poverty rates will certainly be higher in 2015 
and beyond than they would have been had the world economy grown 
steadily at its precrisis pace.
Hunger is also increasing, according to Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion, World Food Programme, and U.S. Department of Agriculture mea-
sures. The number of hungry people rose globally from 842 million in 
1990–92 to 1.02 billion in 2009—the highest level ever. More than 2 billion 
people are still defi cient in micronutrients, 129 million children are 
underweight, and 195 million children under age fi ve are stunted. There 
is troubling evidence from recent recessions that job recovery lags after 
output recovery has grown. There was “jobless growth” even before the 
crisis, while unemployment and vulnerable employment have risen 
worldwide since the crisis hit. More than 300 million new jobs will be 
needed over next fi ve years to return to precrisis unemployment levels.
MDG 2: Some Progress on Education, but Goal Still Unmet
Education indicators have shown some progress, although the results are 
mixed. Many countries have achieved more than 90 percent enrollment 
rates in primary school, with primary education enrollment increasing 
fastest in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, 126 million mainly poor children 
engage in hazardous work, while more than 72 million children of primary 
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school age are still out of school. The rapid rise in enrollment has put more 
pressure on schools and teachers to deliver quality education. Further, 
dropout rates remain high in many countries, and achieving 100 percent 
primary school completion rates remains a challenge. The MDG focus on 
primary education is adequate, but it is also important to understand 
development more broadly than through the lens of the specifi c indicators 
of the MDGs. For example, it is very diffi cult to see how development will 
be achieved if the need for higher education is not addressed. 
MDG 3: Insufﬁ cient Progress on Gender Equality
Efforts for gender equality are also seeing mixed success. The gender gap 
in primary school enrollment narrowed in the past decade. Progress on 
the gender gap in secondary schooling, however, has been slower. Female 
participation in the labor force has increased, but most women are still 
doing unpaid work and have less employment security and fewer bene-
fi ts than men. In terms of political leadership, women’s share of national 
parliamentary seats has increased slowly to only 18 percent in January 
2009. And despite some encouraging progress on gender equality, vio-
lence against women is still a major blight. 
MDGs 4, 5, 6: Signiﬁ cant Progress on Some Health Targets, 
but Least Progress on Maternal Mortality
In terms of health, there has been signifi cant progress in some areas, 
although many countries are unlikely to achieve the MDG health targets 
by 2015. To highlight a few issues, under-fi ve child mortality fell from 
125 million deaths a year in 1990 to 88 million deaths in 2008. Further, 
we have gone from 99 deaths per 1,000 live births to 72, although this is 
well short of the target of a two-thirds reduction (to 33 per 1,000 live 
births). Deliveries attended by skilled health workers in developing 
regions have increased from 53 percent in 1990 to 61 percent in 2007, 
but the decline in maternal mortality is well short of the target of 120 
deaths per 100,000 live births by 2015. Information on the welfare of 
women, particularly in terms of maternal health, is not readily available 
or reliable; for example, over 40 percent of the countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa have not had censuses in over three and a half decades.
With regard to infectious diseases, important progress has been made 
on reducing measles deaths, as well as on treating tuberculosis and 
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malaria. The number of people receiving antiretroviral therapy for HIV 
increased tenfold from 2003 through 2008. However, progress has not 
yet been enough to reverse the trajectory of the epidemic—for every two 
persons starting antiretroviral treatment, there are fi ve new HIV infec-
tions. Meanwhile, prevention has not received suffi cient priority. 
MDG 7: Limited Progress on Environmental Sustainability 
Environmental sustainability, particularly the issue of sanitation, is still a 
grave concern. Some progress has been made toward halving the per-
centage of people without clean water, but the percentage with improved 
sanitation increased by only 8 percent over 1990–2006, far short of the 
50 percent target. On other environmental sustainability issues, some 
real success has been made in phasing out the production and use of 
more than 98 percent of all controlled ozone-depleting substances, but 
the rate of growth of carbon dioxide emissions was much higher over 
1995–2004 than during 1970–94. Further, the target of reducing the rate 
of biodiversity loss by 2010 will not be met—13 million hectares of the 
world’s forests are lost yearly, including 6 million hectares of primary 
forest.
MDG 7 also includes the goal of improving the lives of at least 100 
million slum dwellers. However, this fi gure grossly underestimated the 
need and falls far short of what it is needed to address the trend of 
increasing slum dwellers. 
MDG 8: Expanding and Strengthening International Partnerships
Most relevant for considering the challenges for multilateral coopera-
tion is MDG 8, which focuses on strengthening international partner-
ships. The MDG 8 Gap Report (United Nations 2009) shows that 
although aid contributions have improved since the Monterrey Con-
sensus in 2002, offi cial development assistance (ODA) as a share of 
developed countries’ gross national income rose to only 0.3 percent in 
2008, far less than the four-decades-old target of 0.7 percent. With fall-
ing commodity prices and exports, debt-to-GDP and external-debt-to-
export ratios have risen in many poor countries since 2008, requiring 
urgent attention. 
Developing countries, especially the poorest, need much more con-
cessional fi nance and grants in the face of the global credit crunch. In the 
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current diffi cult global economic environment, it is especially urgent to 
accelerate delivery on aid and debt relief commitments. It is essential for 
the international community to gradually increase ODA to reach at least 
US$270 billion a year by 2015—the level needed to fulfi ll the fi nancing 
needs of the poorest and most vulnerable countries so they can meet 
their human development targets.
Implementing the 2005 Paris Declaration and 2008 Accra Agenda for 
Action to enhance aid effectiveness and predictability and to reduce aid 
volatility is of urgent importance. Developing countries and their part-
ners need to reduce aid fragmentation and to ensure that ODA supports 
national development strategies through budget support, which will 
require real engagement between donor and recipient countries.
The commitment by developed countries to increase market access 
for exports from developing countries and to remove trade-distorting 
subsidies is also important. The prolonged failure to conclude the Doha 
Development Round is promoting another major delivery gap. 
Former U.S. President Bill Clinton’s March 2010 testimony to the U.S. 
Congress acknowledged that agricultural trade liberalization under-
mined food security. Sub-Saharan Africa, which was a net food exporter 
in the 1980s, has now been transformed into a net food importer. At 
meetings in L’Aquila and Pittsburgh, the G-8 and G-20 respectively 
pledged US$20 billion over three years for food security, which should 
be provided urgently for smallholder farmers. Effective surveillance and 
evenhanded enforcement is urgently needed to check against new pres-
sures for greater overt and covert trade, investment, and migration pro-
tectionism. Aid for trade is especially vital to compensate for the loss of 
tariff revenues and productive capacities, as well as to develop new pro-
ductive and export capacities. 
Developed countries support their farmers with agricultural subsi-
dies for food security and social welfare reasons. Unless such support is 
extended to smallholder farmers in developing countries, it becomes 
important to “level the fi eld” by fulfi lling the 2005 pledge to eliminate all 
developed countries’ agricultural subsidies by 2013.
Lowering pharmaceutical prices in developing countries is also very 
important. The actual prices of pharmaceutical drugs in developing 
countries are about three times what they should be on average and can 
be six times as high. 
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Enhancing developing countries’ affordable access to new technology 
is also key, especially for climate change mitigation and adaptation, as 
well as for agricultural development.
Lessons Learned
Since the adoption of the MDGs, some important, overarching lessons 
have been learned about reducing global poverty and substantively 
improving living conditions around the world. Below are some key les-
sons from the experience since 2001.
National ownership of development strategies is fundamental. One-
size-fi ts-all policies and programs are bound to fail. Successful countries 
have pursued pragmatic heterodox policy mixes, with enhanced 
domestic capacities. 
Sustained and equitable growth based on dynamic structural change is 
crucial for making substantial progress in reducing poverty. Further, 
economic growth is necessary, but not suffi cient, for progress. Growth 
must be accompanied by structural change and be inclusive. 
Developmental macroeconomic policy should support growth of real 
output and employment instead of narrowly focusing on infl ation, bud-
get, and current account defi cits. Public investment, well-managed capital 
fl ows, and support for agriculture and for small and medium enterprises 
are often crucial. 
Universal social provisioning is affordable even for the poorest coun-
tries. The social impacts of crises have often been harshest where social 
protection is weakest. A universal social protection fl oor is needed to 
maintain and regenerate livelihoods, particularly for disadvantaged and 
vulnerable people. This is not only desirable but also necessary for inclu-
sive and sustainable development. 
Addressing inequalities and social exclusion is critical. Inequality and 
social exclusion limit the contribution of growth to poverty reduction, 
as well as to other MDGs. Therefore, inequalities of access, social protec-
tion, assets, and opportunities need to be greatly reduced. 
Adequate, consistent, predictable fi nancial support and a coherent, pre-
dictable policy environment at national and international levels are essen-
tial. Lack of adequate and predictable international fi nancing is a major 
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constraint. There is an urgent need to ensure supportive international 
frameworks for trade, taxation, and technology, especially for climate 
change mitigation and adaptation, to sustain long-term human develop-
ment. Suffi cient, predictable, and well-coordinated fi nancing for devel-
opment and budget support should include ODA, philanthropy, debt 
relief, and new fi nancing sources. 
Crisis Response
Developing Countries
The shock waves of the fi nancial crisis that began with the U.S. sub-
prime mortgage market eventually hit most developing countries 
through a number of channels—declining export earnings caused by 
falling commodity prices and export volume, falling remittances and 
tourism income, and higher borrowing costs. Most developing coun-
tries did not have the fi scal and policy space to respond to the shock 
with strong and sustained recovery packages. Only a handful of emerg-
ing economies could afford fi scal and fi nancial packages that exceeded 
10 percent of GDP. Some constraints faced by developing countries in 
responding to the crisis arose because of:
•  decades of liberalization and deregulation that made these economies 
more vulnerable to systemic and external shocks;
•  decades of macroeconomic stabilization policies narrowly focused on 
repressing infl ation as well as balancing budgets and current accounts, 
which made their macroeconomic policies procyclical;
•  more procyclical monetary policies in countries with independent 
central banks; and
•  the opening of capital accounts, which made economies more 
beholden to global capital markets and further restricted their policy 
space.
Following much criticism, a change of leadership, and signifi cantly 
enhanced fi nancing, thanks to the G-20, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) reduced some of its conditionalities and allowed countercy-
clical macroeconomic policies by countries with fi scal space but required 
fi scal defi cit reduction in most countries. 
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Multilateral Institutions
With the outbreak of the crisis, there has been a signifi cant shift in lead-
ership from the G-7 to the G-20, which is a much more inclusive and 
hence legitimate body in some regards, although the G-7 fi nance minis-
ters retain far more discreet infl uence than most realize. The G-20 had 
been quite successful in crisis management up to its Pittsburgh Summit, 
although its ad hoc arrangements and the reduced sense of urgency fol-
lowing the fragile recovery since mid-2009 threaten to undermine its 
earlier success. Hence, the Korean initiative to put development on the 
agenda for the G-20 is both appropriate and important. 
Since the crisis, there has been greater agreement between the Bret-
ton Woods institutions and the United Nations on many issues. More 
cooperation can be advanced in three major areas: greater interna-
tional tax cooperation; more equitable and effective debt workouts; 
and international economic governance. The Stiglitz Commission, a 
group of experts convened by the president of the United Nations 
General Assembly in 2009 to address the global fi nancial crisis, recom-
mended a number of new institutions to reduce the risk of future cri-
ses and to better handle such crises when they occur. These new insti-
tutions include:
•  Global Economic Coordination Council, an international sovereign 
debt restructuring tribunal independent of the IMF (unlike the Sover-
eign Debt Restructuring Mechanism proposal), which would replace 
the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes
•  Foreign Debt Commission
• Intergovernmental Commission on Tax Cooperation 
• Development of an international reserve currency
Global Green New Deal
The United Nations secretary-general has proposed a Global Green New 
Deal (GGND) to accelerate economic recovery while simultaneously 
addressing development, climate change, and food security challenges. 
Besides investment creation from renewable energy, the proposal involves 
global cross-subsidization and the use of public investments to attract 
private investment.
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The GGND should become a central plank of a broader sustained 
global countercyclical response to the crisis. The international community 
can accelerate economic recovery while addressing the development, cli-
mate change, and food security challenges by front-loading massive public 
investments in developing countries in renewable energy and smallholder 
food agriculture to induce complementary private investments in sectors 
previously lacking the interest of the private sector. Besides contributing 
to sustained economic recovery, such investments would also contribute 
to climate change mitigation while advancing developing countries’ devel-
opmental aspirations and ensuring affordable food security. G-20 coordi-
nation support will ensure not only a more sustainable economic recovery 
but also one that is more equitable and that advances the international 
community’s efforts to address the global warming, food security, and 
development challenges together. 
How do we ensure that this green new deal is really internationalized? 
Following years of easy credit and overinvestment before the crisis, the 
world now faces underused capacity in most profi table economic sectors 
and hence an understandable reluctance for private investment. In this 
situation only well-coordinated cross-border public investments to fund 
the needed green public goods will induce complementary private invest-
ments through public-private partnerships to address global challenges.
G-20 Summits and Beyond
The G-20 Summit in London in April 2009 considered the impact of the 
crisis on developing countries. The fi nancial commitments announced 
at the summit totaled US$1.1 trillion. The breakdown and fate of this 
amount are as follows:
Category Amount (US$) Comment
IMF ﬁ nancing 500 billion No new commitment
Aid for poorest (through 
multilateral development 
banks)
100 billion No matching commitment
SDR (special drawing rights) 
allocation
250 billion 44 percent to G-7; only 
US$80 billion to developing 
countries 
Trade ﬁ nance 250 billion No matching commitment
Total 1.1 trillion
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The G-20 Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009 acknowledged the 
need to accelerate governance reforms of the Bretton Woods institutions 
and increase the quotas and votes of developing countries. The issue of 
executive remuneration was discussed, although there was no agreement 
on limits. Unfortunately, there was no real progress on fi nancial regula-
tion reform, except for some agreement on capital requirements and 
surveillance. 
Canada has proposed fi scal consolidation as the focus of the Toronto 
Summit in June 2010. However, there is a concern that plurilateral coor-
dination will trigger a double-dip recession because the recovery remains 
fragile and uneven. Defi cit reduction also subverts the ODA commit-
ments already pledged. The earlier desire for internationally coordinated 
fi nancial regulation as well as taxation of fi nancial institutions is not 
expected to make much progress in Toronto.
For the Seoul Summit of November 2010, the host country has iden-
tifi ed fi nancial safety nets and development as G-20 agenda priorities. 
Although the G-20 is an expanded forum and more inclusive compared 
with the G-7, it still lacks the legitimacy and inclusiveness of the United 
Nations system, including the Bretton Woods institutions. Until now, its 
focus on crisis management is less inclusive of developmental issues and 
less equitable in orientation. Following Toronto, the Seoul Summit in 
November 2010 may well provide the G-20 its opportunity to provide 
enlightened leadership through plurilateral consensus on global macro-
fi nancial affairs.
Development Agenda
Taking the global context into account, as well as the lessons from United 
Nations experience, some suggestions will be vital to address in the G-20 
development agenda:
•  Adopting prudential risk management principles, including capital 
controls (both the IMF and the World Bank now support these, which 
are in fact a sovereign right under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement).
•  Enhancing both fi scal and policy space to enable consistently countercy-
clical macroeconomic policies, not only in recessionary conditions but 
also in boom times to minimize dangers from bubbles and manias.
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•  Developing alternative macroeconomic policy frameworks for produc-
tive employment creation and sustaining growth.
•  Developing fi nance for investment and technology development to 
accelerate structural change. 
•  Making fi nance inclusive to promote and support productive eco-
nomic activities largely ignored or overcharged by existed credit 
facilities, such as smallholder agriculture and small and medium 
enterprises.
•  Engaging in greater international tax cooperation to enhancing revenue 
and fi scal space for all countries.
•  Implementing more effi cient, equitable, and effective debt workout 
mechanisms for enhancing fi scal and policy space.
•  Adopting international economic governance reform to refl ect the 
changed global economic balance, while ensuring more equitable voice 
and participation, and thus enhancing inclusiveness and legitimacy.
If these issues are not urgently addressed, then we will miss a historic 
opportunity that some have termed the “Bretton Woods moment.” Let 
us recall the ambitions at Bretton Woods in 1944. Fifteen years after the 
1929 stock market crash, at the beginning of the Great Depression, and 
in the middle of World War II, leaders and offi cials from 44 countries (28 
developing countries, including 19 from Latin America) met at the 
United Nations Conference on Monetary and Financial Affairs at Bret-
ton Woods, New Hampshire, for three weeks. They created the IMF and 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development as part of a 
yet-to-be-established UN system to lay the grounds for postwar recon-
struction, postcolonial development, and the unprecedented period of 
sustained growth and job creation referred to as the postwar Golden 
Age. In other words, its emphasis clearly was on sustaining growth, 
employment creation, postwar reconstruction, and postcolonial devel-
opment, and not just monetary and fi nancial stability.3
Notes
 1.  “Keeping the Promise” is the title of the United Nations secretary general’s 
report (A/64/665) for the High-Level Plenary on MDGs held in September 
2010. The section on MDGs is based on this report.
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 2.  It should be noted that accurately measuring progress toward the MDGs is 
sometimes diffi cult when precise data are not available or come with a long 
time lag. Furthermore, progress at the global level obscures uneven progress at 
the regional, country, and local levels. Thus, caution is needed in interpreting 
aggregate data and making judgments about overall progress. Evaluating the 
goals, targets, and indicators by country may understate progress by the poorest 
countries. For example, halving poverty from 60 to 30 percent is much more 
diffi cult than lowering it from 6 to 3 percent, especially as a 20 percent increase 
in annual per capita income from US$1,000 is only a tenth of a similarly pro-
portioned increase from US$10,000.
 3.  For more information, please visit the following Web sites: Secretary General’s 
Report http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/64/665; and UN-
DESA www.un.org.
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Since the fall of 2008 the international coordination of policy reactions 
to the global fi nancial crisis has centered on high- and middle-income 
countries.1 How much macroeconomic demand stimulus is needed, and 
what is the optimal exit strategy for that demand stimulus? How can 
new fi nancial market regulations in high-income countries prevent 
bubbles from emerging again? Little if any attention has been devoted to 
policies that can help low-income countries absorb the consequences of 
the crisis and sustain progress toward long-term human development 
goals. That focus on more advanced countries seemed logical but was 
unfortunate at the same time. 
The focus on high- and middle-income countries seemed logical 
because the crisis started in the fi nancial markets of high-income coun-
tries and hit primarily the manufacturing sectors of the high- and middle-
income countries. Moreover, only governments in the largest economies 
had the tools to reverse the unprecedentedly fast and large decline in global 
demand.
At the same time it was unfortunate, to put it mildly, that the troubles 
in low-income countries were put on the back burner. Although produc-
tion contracted less in low-income countries than in more developed 
economies, real incomes declined signifi cantly as commodities prices 
Delﬁ n Go and Hans Timmer
World Bank
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halved in the fi rst months of the crisis. Moreover, the medium-term 
impact of external shocks tends to be larger in poor countries because 
they have fewer opportunities to rebound quickly. Most important, the 
setback in human development outcomes caused by the crisis can easily 
become permanent.
For these reasons it is more than welcome that the government of the 
Republic of Korea put development on the agenda of the G-20. That 
action provides the opportunity to address the problems of the low-
income countries and shifts the focus of the policy makers to the 
medium- and long-term consequences of the crisis on human develop-
ment outcomes. The importance of a shift in the policy debate from 
short-term stimulus to long-term development strategies surpasses the 
interests of poor countries. That shift has made it increasingly urgent to 
put high- and middle-income countries back on a sustainable growth 
path. This paper aims to contribute to the effort to put development 
center stage again. It focuses on the impact of the crisis on progress 
toward the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and is organized as 
follows. The fi rst section describes why the crisis has created medium-
term challenges in low-income economies. The second section discusses 
the progress towards the MDGs. The third section addresses required 
policy actions. 
The Crisis and Low-Income Countries
The crisis hit at the end of 2008 as many low-income countries were 
experiencing the positive results of economic reforms that started dur-
ing the 1990s. Improved macroeconomic policies that brought infl ation 
and government debt under control, gradual integration into global 
markets, and better domestic institutions had resulted in accelerating 
growth in gross domestic product (GDP). For example, since the mid-
1990s average annual GDP growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding 
South Africa) had been 4.9 percent. This strong performance ended 
disastrous economic developments during two preceding lost decades. 
Between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s annual GDP growth in Sub-
Saharan Africa averaged less than 2 percent. That meant during those 
two decades per capita incomes were falling by an average of more than 
1 percent a year. 
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The direct impact of the crisis on GDP growth was smaller in low-
income countries than in more advanced economies. GDP growth in 
the Sub-Saharan countries excluding South Africa in 2009 was “merely” 
3.4 percentage points lower than it was in 2007. In high-income coun-
tries the deceleration was 5.9 percentage points, and upper-middle-
income countries faced an even larger deceleration of 9.3 percentage 
points. The relatively modest impact of the crisis on GDP growth in 
poor countries is, however, no reason for complacency. It mainly refl ects 
the different way poor countries are affected by an external shock. It 
does not mean that the overall impact of the crisis is smaller in poor 
countries. Poor countries tend to be more affected in subsequent years 
than more developed countries, and the consequences for human devel-
opment are more devastating in poor countries.
The direct impact of external shocks arising from the crisis on poor 
countries does not primarily come in the form of an immediate decline 
in production but manifests itself as a decline in export revenues, caused 
by a fall in commodity prices. In 2009 export revenues in Sub-Saharan 
countries declined 31.7 percent from their 2008 level. That exceeded the 
decline in high-income countries (22.8 percent) and middle-income 
countries (23.1 percent). 
This income loss is the reason why in poor countries, often specialized 
in agriculture and mining, external shocks have medium-term, rather 
than short-term, impacts on GDP levels. This is opposite to middle- and 
high-income countries, with larger manufacturing sectors, where the 
immediate impact on GDP is often larger than the medium-term impact. 
What explains this difference? In agriculture and extractive industries, 
production tends to be determined by production potential, rather than 
by short-term demand. That is why a drop in demand mainly shows 
through falling prices. The fall in (export) revenues forces a drop in 
imports and triggers a fall in investments (and imported investment 
goods), which reduces production potential in subsequent years. Low-
income countries have limited access to (international) capital markets 
and therefore cannot borrow to fi nance the imports that are needed to 
restore investments soon after the crisis. The situation is very different in 
manufacturing, where a fall in demand quickly reduces output, without 
sharp declines in prices. That is why GDP tends to fall quickly and 
sharply in middle- and high-income countries with a relatively large 
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share of manufacturing. Subsequently, in a rebound, production can be 
restored relatively quickly by employing underused capacity and by bor-
rowing in capital markets to fi nance needed investments.
The typical behavior of low-income countries after an external shock is 
clearly illustrated in fi gure 6.1, showing a gradual increase in Sub-Saharan 
production loss after an external shock, with persistent effects. That is 
one reason why one should be worried about the impact of the crisis 
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Figure 6.1. Production Loss from Trade Shocks in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Source: IMF staff calculations; see also World Bank (2010, ch. 3).
Note: Dashed lines are one standard deviation from the mean output loss.
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compared with production losses elsewhere. But there are more reasons 
not to ignore the challenges that poor countries face. 
Like high-income countries, all developing countries, including the 
poorest ones, suffered a sharp deterioration in fi scal balances (fi gure 6.2). 
The main reason for the deterioration is the fall in revenues. Especially for 
poor countries, trade fl ows and mineral revenues are key elements of the 
tax base, while tax incentives are used to mitigate the impact of the crisis 
on investment and consumption. Although revenues declined, many 
developing countries tried to avoid cuts in spending and even initiated 
countercyclical spending. Spending on social safety nets has been rela-
tively protected so far. Lower initial fi scal defi cits and higher priorities for 
social spending have protected education and health spending in most 
countries. Up-to-date information is incomplete, but scattered informa-
tion provides some examples. For example, of 19 programs initiated and 
monitored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and implemented 
in collaboration with the World Bank in 2008–09, 16 budgeted higher 
social spending for 2009 (IMF 2009). Of these, nine were countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: Burundi, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, 
Malawi, Mali, Niger, Togo, and Zambia. Several African countries with 
poverty reduction strategies have protected their funding for social 
 sectors. And some countries with fi scal space (Kenya and Nigeria) have 
protected capital expenditure, mainly for infrastructure. But there are 
also examples of forced contractions in social spending. Countries with 
precrisis fi scal and debt issues (such as Ethiopia and Ghana) had to 
undertake fi scal tightening. HIV/AIDS (human immunodefi ciency virus/
acquired immune defi ciency syndrome) funding has been largely sus-
tained but with a new concern for the effi ciency of resource use (World 
Bank 2010, annex 2.2; Lewis 2009).
The deterioration of fi scal balances implies another medium-term 
danger. As a result of improved macroeconomic policies, fi scal policies 
could be used in the short run to mitigate the impact of the crisis, but in 
coming years the fi scal situation will become increasingly part of the 
problem instead of part of the solution. This situation is potentially 
more severe in the poorest countries because they do not have access to 
bond markets. Instead they rely on bank loans, where the international 
banking sector remains vulnerable, and on aid fl ows, which are also 
under pressure. 
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Even more serious medium-term vulnerabilities in low-income coun-
tries originate from the possibility of a reversal of the reforms that have 
been so successful. The vicious circle of economic decline and deterio-
rating institutions, such as rule of law, political stability, and government 
effectiveness, is historically stronger than the virtuous circle of economic 
progress and improved institutions during boom periods. Moreover, 
because this crisis was not of their own making, low-income countries 
may reconsider their integration in global markets, which would make 
their economies less vulnerable to global events but would also move 
them back in the direction of the lost decades of the 1970s and 1980s.
By far the biggest concern in the medium run concerning low-income 
countries is the impact of the crisis on human development outcomes. 
That impact is not immediately observable, partly as a result of lags in 
data collection, partly because the impact itself comes with a lag. How-
ever, history shows that the deteriorations during crises are much larger 
than improvements during prosperous periods and that the deteriora-
tions tend to be lasting. Therefore, the next section discusses the impact 
of the crisis on progress toward the MDGs. 
The Impact of the Crisis on the MDGS
Linked to the acceleration of economic growth in many developing 
countries since the early 1990s, human development indicators showed 
signifi cant progress before the crisis. When the crisis hit, global poverty 
Figure 6.2. Median Government Fiscal Balance 





















Source: IMF 2010; World Bank 2010, ch. 3.
Note: General government balance data are used, except for Zimbabwe, for which central government bal-
ance data are used.
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had already fallen 40 percent since 1990, and the developing world was 
well on track to reach the global target of cutting income poverty in half 
by 2015. Thanks to rapid growth, especially in China, East Asia had 
already halved extreme poverty. Although Sub-Saharan Africa was 
unlikely to reach the target, poverty had been falling rapidly there since 
the late 1990s. The goal was more ambitious for Africa than for other 
regions, because the 1990 incomes of a large proportion of the African 
population were far below the poverty line. And Africa implemented 
reforms later than other regions and therefore benefi ted later from accel-
erating income growth.
Progress on MDGs outside poverty was uneven. Developing countries 
were on track to achieve access to safe water and gender parity in primary 
and secondary education, although countries were falling behind on 
gender parity in tertiary education and empowerment of women. Prog-
ress was good on primary school completion, nutrition, maternal mor-
tality, and (less so) sanitation, even if results at the global level were 
expected to fall short of targets (fi gure 6.3). The health goals appeared 
most challenging. Most regions were off track, with East Asia, Latin 
America, and Europe and Central Asia doing better than other regions.
The insuffi cient progress in health indicators is striking. It is possible 
that these goals were more ambitious than the other MDGs. It is also 
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Source: World Bank staff calculations from the World Development Indicators database.
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likely that progress in health indicators always lags progress in other 
MDGs because better health outcomes can only be achieved in an overall 
better environment. For example, access to safe water and sanitation is a 
requirement for good health care. Similarly, better education (especially 
of young mothers) helps reduce child and maternal mortality rates. 
Reduction in hunger is obviously also a prerequisite for better health. 
And, more generally, reduction in extreme poverty increases access to 
health care systems. A complication with the analysis of these interde-
pendencies is the limited availability of data, but piece by piece the qual-
ity of the data is improving. The Global Monitoring Report 2011 aims to 
analyze in more depth the reasons why progress in health indicators is 
lagging. 
Even if the performance is uneven, there are many examples of 
impressive improvements in specifi c areas. Figure 6.4 shows the increase 
in net enrollment rates in primary schools in selected low-income coun-
tries between 2000 and 2006. The average increase in those countries was 
17 percentage points in only six years. The example shows that the 
improved economic performance in many poor countries was also 
refl ected in better human development outcomes.
Without doubt the crisis has rudely interrupted this progress, even if 
some of the effects will not be apparent for many more years. Data 
needed to assess the degree of deterioration in development indicators 
will not be available for two or more years, and some impacts—for 
example, on mortality rates and school completion rates—will material-
ize only after several years. Therefore the Global Monitoring Report 2010 
uses historical examples and indirect evidence to assess the effects of the 
crisis on progress toward the MDGs. 
Historically, the impact of economic cycles on human development 
indicators has been highly asymmetric. The deterioration in bad times is 
much greater than the improvement during good times (fi gure 6.5). Vul-
nerable groups—infants and children, especially girls, particularly in 
poor countries of Sub-Saharan Africa—are disproportionately affected 
during crises. For example, during economic contractions, female enroll-
ment in primary and secondary education drops more than male 
 enrollment. And the consequences of this disproportionate impact per-
sist long into the future. Once children are taken out of school, future 
human capital is permanently lowered. 
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Figure 6.4. Net Enrollment Rates in Primary Education, Selected Countries 
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Source: World Bank staff calculations; Arbache, Go, and Korman forthcoming.
Note: We tested for signiﬁ cant differences in the means of these variables between growth accelerations, decelerations, and all country-year observations and ﬁ nd that they are all statis-
tically different at the 1 percent level.
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Apparently the declines during crises in public spending, household 
spending, and even aid fl ows are critically disruptive, while the increased 
spending during boom periods results in gradual improvements. 
Although the recent global crisis was different from previous ones for 
poor countries, partly because it occurred even as policies and institu-
tions in those countries had improved, the Global Monitoring Report 
2010 concludes that even in a baseline scenario, not taking into account 
substantial downside risks, human development impacts will be lasting. 
For example, at a global level 53 million fewer people will have escaped 
extreme poverty in 2015 as a result of the crisis, 20 million of them in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. An estimated 350,000 more students might be 
unable to complete primary school in 2015. Some 25 million fewer peo-
ple may have access to improved water supply. And, the ultimate example 
of irreversible costs: an additional 265,000 infants and 1.2 million chil-
dren under age fi ve might die between 2009 and 2015 as a result of dete-
riorating conditions caused by the crisis. 
Because of these severe consequences and because of the expected 
stress on low-income countries in the coming years, the urgency of com-
mitting to the best possible policy is obvious. That is the subject of the 
next section.
Critical Need for Continued Domestic Reforms 
and Unwavering Foreign Support 
The main challenge for policy makers, in high-income and developing 
countries alike, is to transition from short-term countercyclical measures 
to structural strategies that can make the global recovery sustainable and 
can boost human development for years to come. That is not an easy 
task. These strategies involve diffi cult trade-offs, and sometimes vested 
interests will have to be challenged. Most important, comprehensive 
strategies are needed for the world to get as close as possible to the Mil-
lennium Development Goals during the next fi ve years. Development 
strategies can be successful only if hitherto unexplored synergies are 
realized and if policy makers in developing countries are supported by 
political leaders in high-income countries.
Ultimately, the achievement of the MDGs depends on actions in 
developing countries taken by governments, households, and fi rms. They 
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need circumstances in which the successful improvements in policies 
during the past 15 years can continue. Macroeconomic policies have to 
be brought back on a stable path again; the quality of institutions and 
service delivery has to be gradually improved further; and more coun-
tries have to introduce targeted safety nets that not only support house-
hold incomes during distress but also, for example, help children stay in 
school during times of economic distress. 
In that process of further improvement, diffi cult choices continually 
have to be made to navigate trade-offs. Better service delivery by govern-
ments is required to achieve the MDGs. This necessitates increased 
domestic tax collections and shifting spending patterns. But higher taxes 
can also retard progress on the poverty MDG by reducing household 
income and spending and can slow private sector development. On the 
other hand, productivity increase in the private sector does not bring all 
the MDGs within reach if it is not accompanied by improved service 
delivery by governments. Strong growth in the private sector can push 
up the cost of government wages and government services if at the same 
time productivity increases are not achieved within the government. 
In addition, the further development of social safety nets requires the 
proper balance. Safety net programs in low-income countries are often 
small and fragmented, covering only a small percentage of the poor and 
vulnerable. There are real concerns about whether they are affordable 
and administratively feasible in light of the various negative incentives 
they might create. Understanding what kind of safety nets will serve 
social assistance best, what their implementation challenges are, and 
how to develop such programs for maximum effectiveness should inform 
policy reforms in developing countries.
Without continuously improving domestic policies, more foreign aid 
and increasing market access in foreign countries will not be effective 
because the absorptive capacity to benefi t from increased aid and market 
access will be too limited. But especially under current circumstances the 
converse is also true. Improved domestic policies in low-income coun-
tries are not effective if the international community does not deliver on 
its commitments to increase aid and market access. In the immediate 
aftermath of the crisis, support from the international community was 
substantial, but it is less clear that during the coming years sustained 
support is guaranteed. 
 The Millennium Development Goals after the Crisis  265
Despite widespread fears, developing countries’ market access was not 
signifi cantly reduced. At the end of 2009, 350 trade-restrictive measures 
had been put in place around the world, some 20 percent of them  nontariff 
measures, such as quantitative restrictions, import licenses, standards 
requirements, and subsidies.2 Trade remedies were also on the rise. But in 
the aggregate, protectionism has been contained. The trade-restricting 
or -distorting measures introduced since October 2008 have amounted 
to only about 0. 5 percent of world merchandise trade. Governments and 
multilateral development institutions supported developing countries’ 
exports by bolstering trade fi nance. The G-20 leaders pledged US$250 
billion in support of trade at their April 2009 London Summit; the World 
Bank Group provided guarantees and liquidity for trade fi nance through 
the International Finance Corporation’s Global Trade Finance Program 
and Global Trade Liquidity Program. And export credit agencies stepped 
in to prevent a complete drying up of trade fi nance.
Despite the positive signs during the direct aftermath of the crisis, the 
additional structural progress that is needed is not guaranteed. Comple-
tion of the Doha Round would help governments resist protectionist 
pressures and keep markets open as expansionary policies unwind. 
Beyond Doha, there is a need to broaden cooperation on cross-border 
policy matters that are not on the Doha Development Agenda (climate 
change, and food and energy security). 
Developing countries’ trade logistics need further support. Lowering 
trade costs through better trade regulations, trade logistics, and infrastruc-
ture can make a critical contribution toward development. Sustaining 
efforts to deliver on the commitments at the 2005 World Trade Organiza-
tion Ministerial Meeting (in Hong Kong, China) to expand aid for trade 
should continue to be a priority. And more such aid needs to be directed 
to low-income countries, which receive only about half the total.
With respect to aid the immediate reactions were encouraging, but 
the medium-term outlook is much more worrisome. Responses by mul-
tilateral development banks have sought to protect core development 
programs, strengthen the private sector, and assist poor households 
(World Bank 2010, ch. 5). More than US$150 billion has been commit-
ted since the beginning of the crisis (two-thirds from the World Bank 
Group). Lending by the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) almost tripled in fi scal 2009, and the fi rst half of 
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fi scal 2010 shows the strongest IBRD commitments in history (US$19.2 
billion, up from US$12.4 billion in the same period in fi scal 2009). Com-
mitments by the regional multilateral development banks also increased 
sharply, by more than 50 percent from 2007 to 2009. Low-income coun-
tries tapped more deeply into multilateral concessional resources in 
2009, in part through front-loading multiyear allocations. That obvi-
ously limits the scope for support in subsequent years. 
Donors increased aid volumes in real terms through 2009. Following 
an 11.7 percent increase in 2008, total net offi cial development assistance 
from the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries 
rose slightly by 0.7 percent in real terms in 2009. But in current dollars, it 
actually fell from US$122.3 billion in 2008 to US$119.6 billion in 2009. 
The 2009 fi gure represents 0.31 percent of members’ combined gross 
national income. In 2008 aid from non-DAC donors, led by Saudi Arabia, 
rose 63 percent (in real terms) to US$9.5 billion. Private aid, also sub-
stantial, is rising rapidly. And progress continued in reducing poor 
countries’ debt burden through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. For 35 
post-HIPC-decision-point countries, the debt burden will be reduced 
by 80 percent (IDA and IMF 2009).
But aid is falling behind previous commitments. The expected medi-
um-term impact of the crisis on low-income countries has heightened 
the urgency to scale up aid. Yet current donor spending plans leave a 
US$14 billion shortfall in the commitments to increase aid by US$50 
billion by 2010 (in 2004 dollars). And the Group of Eight Gleneagles 
commitment to double aid to Africa by 2010 has yet to be refl ected in 
core development aid to the region. Aid to Africa has grown 5 percent 
annually since 2000, but much of it has been in the form of debt relief or 
emergency and humanitarian assistance, not new fi nance. Reaching the 
2010 target requires a further increase of US$20 billion. Donor spending 
plans indicate that only an additional US$2 billion is programmed, leav-
ing a gap of US$18 billion. Moreover, considerable scope remains for 
strengthening aid effectiveness by making aid more predictable, ratio-
nalizing the division of labor among donors, untying aid from the provi-
sion of goods and services in the donor country, increasing reliance on 
need and merit to guide aid allocations, and addressing the problem of 
countries that receive too little aid.
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The rapid response of the global economic community to the down-
turn helped avoid a new Great Depression, but decisive leadership still is 
required to ensure a rapid and sustainable recovery. That can be done 
only if the focus shifts from short-term emergency response to long-
term development support. Although sometimes it is thought otherwise, 
even John Maynard Keynes did not advocate digging senseless holes and 
fi lling them up again as a way to increase demand. He favored more pro-
ductive investments. Especially now the focus has to shift toward those 
interventions that increase productivity and make development self-
sustained once again. That can, by the way, include digging holes in low-
income countries to create the wells that are needed to give everybody 
access to clean water. Achieving the MDGs is a key part of the strategy to 
bring the world back on a path of fast and sustainable development.
Notes
 1.  This section on MDGs is based largely on the Global Monitoring Report 2010 
(World Bank 2010). 
 2.  See, for examples, the World Trade Organization’s quarterly monitoring report 
and the Global Trade Alert in February 2010 (www.globaltradealert.org).
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Chair’s Summary by Shahrokh Fardoust
World Bank
Before the global economy was hit by the most severe economic crisis 
since the Great Depression, and with only a few years left until the 2015 
deadline to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), United 
Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called on world leaders to 
gather in New York to discuss the ambiguous progress toward MDG 
completion.1 The global crisis has made the task facing developing coun-
tries that much more daunting and the role of the international com-
munity even more urgent.
The key message from the papers in this chapter is a pragmatic one: 
Achieving the MDGs is possible, even though not all countries will reach 
all targets by 2015. There are important lessons to be learned from coun-
tries that have tried and tested a wide range of economic and social pol-
icies that could ensure progress, provided that they are implemented 
well and backed by strong global partnerships. But, with only fi ve years 
remaining before the 2015 deadline, there is an urgent need to intensify 
efforts to achieve these targets, which is evidenced by increasing policy 
attention and investment to close existing MDG gaps. A strong push will 
be needed regarding girls and women, because of insuffi cient progress in 
reaching goals relating to gender equality and maternal mortality, and 
for Sub-Saharan Africa, where poverty has declined more slowly than 
in other regions and close to 40 percent of the population (or about 
366 million persons) is projected to be still living on less than US$1.25 a 
day by 2015 compared with about 58 percent of the population in 1990.
A key point made by both papers is that, despite the strong efforts of 
many developing countries, the fi nancial crisis and subsequent global 
recession have slowed progress toward the MDGs, including through 
their impact on commodity prices, export volumes, tourism earnings, 
remittances, and private capital fl ows. Failure to make signifi cant progress 
toward the MDG targets will no doubt have long-lasting impacts on the 
human development indicators, such as education and health, that can 
Summary and comments on the papers “Keeping the Promise,” by Jomo Kwame Sundaram, and 
“The Millenium Development Goals after the Crisis,” by Delﬁ n Go and Hans Timmer, in chapter 6 
of this volume.
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affect entire generations and infl uence how economies develop over the 
long run. Because of progress during the period leading up to the crisis, 
however, many higher-income developing countries with the required 
policy space were able to at least partly offset the negative impact of the 
crisis on the MDGs with countercyclical macroeconomic policies and to 
maintain service delivery and effectively use their social safety nets. The 
support by the international community was timely and helpful.
Going forward, regaining momentum in reaching the MDGs will 
require ambitious efforts to improve access to health, education, and 
basic infrastructure, particularly for the most disadvantaged groups. A 
dynamic and more resilient global economy, powered by strong and 
sustainable multipolar growth, infrastructure investment, more open 
trading systems, and recovery of private capital fl ows to developing 
countries, is a prerequisite for mobilizing the resources and generating 
the jobs and opportunities necessary to achieve the MDGs. To sustain 
progress toward the MDGs, developing countries also need to enhance 
the resilience of their economic growth in the face of increasing volatil-
ity and potential adverse shocks at the global level. They could do that 
by implementing adequate policy frameworks, rebuilding policy space 
and other buffers, and ensuring that core public spending on health, 
education, and infrastructure is protected against economic downturns. 
Fragile and confl ict-affected states are doubly challenged in achieving 
the MDGs, with resource and capacity constraints compounded by 
weak institutions, poor governance, and a security challenge. For them, 
international support will be essential to help governments deliver basic 
services to their people and build trust and confi dence.
This chapter is devoted to discussing the major implications of the 
current global economic and fi nancial crisis on the MDGs with two 
excellent papers from two somewhat different, albeit complementary, 
perspectives.
Two Points of View on the MDGs and the Global Crisis
The paper by Jomo Kwame Sundaram provides a wide-ranging perspec-
tive from the United Nations (UN). He argues that many countries have 
achieved major successes in a number of MDG targets, with much 
advancement made in some of the poorest countries, demonstrating 
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that progress toward the MDGs is possible when the right policies are 
followed and when there is adequate funding and international support. 
For example, Sub-Saharan Africa has made marked improvements in 
child health and primary school enrollment over the past two decades. 
However, Sundaram cautions that some of the achievements are also 
threatened by multiple crises, namely, food and energy price hikes, as 
well as by long-term development challenges, such as climate change and 
confl ict, which affect poor and vulnerable people disproportionately. 
Overall, progress has been uneven, and several goals and targets are 
unlikely to be achieved by 2015. According to Sundaram, as the UN reas-
sesses the MDGs in light of the global crisis, the outcomes in developing 
countries will likely show the following: uneven progress on halving 
poverty and hunger; some progress on education but the goal still unmet 
in many poor countries; insuffi cient progress on gender equality; prog-
ress on some health targets but little progress on maternal mortality; 
limited progress on environmental sustainability; and expanded and 
strengthened international partnerships.
In the face of the global credit crunch, Sundaram argues that develop-
ing countries, especially the poorest ones, need more concessional fi nance 
and grants if they are to meet the MDG targets. He notes that when the 
shock waves of the fi nancial crisis hit many developing countries, only a 
handful of emerging economies could afford fi scal and fi nancial packages 
(some exceeding 10 percent of GDP). It is essential, therefore, that the 
international community gradually increase offi cial development assis-
tance (ODA), budget support, and new fi nancing sources in order to ful-
fi ll the fi nancing needs of the poorest and most vulnerable countries to 
meet their human development targets. Sundaram provided a summary 
of some important lessons that have been learned about reducing global 
poverty and improving living conditions: national ownership of develop-
ment strategies is a critical factor; sustained and equitable growth must 
be based on dynamic structural change; developmental macroeconomic 
policies must support growth of real output and employment instead of 
narrowly focusing on infl ation and macro balances; the provision of 
social services is affordable even for the poorest countries; addressing 
inequalities and social exclusion is critical; and adequate, consistent, pre-
dictable fi nancial support and a coherent, predictable policy environ-
ment at national and international levels are essential. There is an urgent 
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need to ensure supportive international frameworks for trade, taxation, 
and technology, especially for climate change mitigation and adaptation, 
to sustain long-term human development. 
Sundaram asserts that some of the constraints faced by developing 
countries in responding to the crisis resulted from earlier liberalization 
and deregulation that made these economies more vulnerable to sys-
temic and external shocks, as well as from macroeconomic stabilization 
policies that often too narrowly focused on repressing infl ation and 
unwinding macro imbalances. 
Taking the global context into account, as well as the lessons from the 
United Nations experience, Sundaram proposes several vital items for 
inclusion in the G-20 development agenda: proposing prudential risk 
management, including capital controls; enhancing both fi scal and policy 
space to enable consistently countercyclical macroeconomic policies; 
developing alternative macroeconomic policy frameworks for productive 
employment creation and sustaining growth; encouraging development 
fi nance for investment and technology development to accelerate struc-
tural change; enhancing the role of inclusive fi nance to promote and sup-
port productive economic activities largely either ignored by or over-
charged by existed credit facilities; fostering greater international tax 
cooperation for enhancing revenue and fi scal space for all countries; sup-
porting more effi cient, equitable, and effective debt workout mechanisms 
for enhancing fi scal and policy space; and strengthening international 
economic governance reform to refl ect the changed global economic bal-
ance, while ensuring more equitable voice and participation and thus 
enhancing inclusiveness and legitimacy.
Finally, Sundaram argues that if these issues are not urgently addressed, 
the international community will miss a historic opportunity that some 
have termed the “Bretton Woods moment,” with an emphasis clearly on 
sustaining growth and employment creation and not just monetary and 
fi nancial stability.
The paper by Delfi n Go and Hans Timmer is focused on the World 
Bank–International Monetary Fund’s assessment of the impact of the 
global crisis on the MDGs and is largely based on the latest edition of the 
Global Monitoring Report. The main argument presented is that, until 
recently, the international community has paid little attention to policies 
that can help low-income countries absorb the consequences of the crisis 
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and sustain progress toward long-term human development goals. The 
paper by Go and Timmer argues that, although production contracted 
less in low-income countries than in advanced economies, real incomes 
(that is, GDP adjusted for changes in terms of trade) low-income coun-
tries declined more signifi cantly as commodities prices fell sharply as the 
crisis hit the world economy. They go on to argue that the medium-term 
impact of external shocks tends to be larger in low-income countries 
because they have fewer policy options to help their economies rebound. 
Most important, the setbacks in human development outcomes caused 
by the crisis can easily become permanent. 
Addressing the problems of low-income countries shifts the focus of 
policy makers to the medium- and long-term consequences of the crisis 
on human development outcomes. From the early 1990s until the out-
break of the crisis, the acceleration of economic growth in many develop-
ing countries tended to support signifi cant progress in most human 
development indicators. In fact, when the crisis hit, global poverty had 
fallen by nearly 40 percent since 1990, and developing countries as a group 
were on track to reach the target of cutting income poverty in half by 
2015. Although Sub-Saharan Africa was unlikely to meet the goal, poverty 
had been falling as a result of the reforms many countries in the region 
had implemented accompanied by an acceleration in income growth.
Go and Timmer argue that outside of poverty, progress on the MDGs 
has been uneven, with gains in certain targets and losses in others. For 
example, while many developing countries were on track to achieve gen-
der parity in primary and secondary education, the progress has been 
slower in tertiary education, particularly in the Sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia regions. Although progress was good on primary school 
completion and nutrition, it was less so on maternal mortality and sani-
tation. The authors’ analysis indicates that reaching the health goals has 
proven to be challenging for many countries. That is perhaps because 
these goals were more ambitious than the other MDGs. Nevertheless, 
even if the performance was uneven, Go and Timmer show many exam-
ples of signifi cant improvements in specifi c areas, indicating that the 
improved economic performance in many poor countries was also 
refl ected in better human development outcomes.
Yet, the data needed to fully assess the crisis’ impact on the develop-
ment indicators will not be available for two or more years, and some 
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impacts—for example, on mortality rates—will materialize only after 
several more years. For this reason, the authors used historical examples 
and indirect evidence to assess the immediate effects of the current cri-
sis. They fi nd that, historically, the impact of economic cycles on human 
development indicators has been highly asymmetric: the deterioration 
in bad times is much greater than the improvement during good times. 
They fi nd that vulnerable groups, particularly in poor countries, are dis-
proportionately affected. For example, during contractions, female 
enrollment in primary and secondary education drops more than male 
enrollment, and once children are taken out of school, future human 
capital is permanently lowered. Go and Timmer also fi nd that the 
declines during crises in public spending, household spending, and even 
aid fl ows are critically disruptive, while the increased spending during 
boom periods results in gradual improvements. 
The authors’ key fi nding is that human development impacts of a 
global crisis of the magnitude experienced in 2008–09 will be long-
lasting. Their calculations show that at the global level 53 million fewer 
people will have escaped extreme poverty in 2015 as a result of the 
crisis, of whom almost half are in Sub-Saharan Africa. They provide 
projections for primary school completion, access to improved water 
supply, and some disturbing (and “irreversible”) costs, such as the 
number of additional infants and children under fi ve who might die 
between now and 2015 as a result of deteriorating conditions caused 
by the crisis. 
Go and Timmer also argue that the main challenge for policy makers, 
in high-income and developing countries alike, is to transition from 
short-term countercyclical measures to structural strategies that can 
make the global recovery sustainable and that can boost human develop-
ment for years to come. That is not an easy task. They argue that these 
strategies involve diffi cult trade-offs, that sometimes vested interests will 
have to be challenged, and, most importantly, that strategies need to be 
comprehensive to realize unexplored synergies. 
The authors conclude their paper by arguing that “without doubt the 
crisis has rudely interrupted this progress, even if some of the effects will 
not be apparent for many more years.” While the rapid response of the 
global economic community to the downturn helped avoid a new Great 
Depression, decisive leadership still is required to ensure a rapid and 
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sustainable recovery. Achieving the MDGs is a key part of the strategy to 
put the world back on a path of fast and sustainable development.
Summing Up
Progress toward the 2015 targets was encouraging until disrupted by 
the fi nancial and economic crisis of 2008–09. According to the World 
Bank–IMF’s Global Monitoring Report and other recent analysis, crises 
disproportionately damage progress in human development. While the 
critical goal of halving extreme poverty still seems likely to be met at 
the global level (and at the regional level in East Asia, South Asia, and 
Latin America) by 2015, the rate of poverty reduction has been signifi -
cantly slowed by the crisis. Furthermore, strong growth and poverty 
reduction in East Asia, particularly in China, has driven much of the 
success to date, and an acceleration in the pace of poverty reduction 
there to compensate for a slowdown elsewhere may not be feasible. 
However, despite the severity of the global recession, its impact on the 
MDGs was moderated by a few factors that had enhanced country resil-
ience: good polices and improved quality of institutions since the early 
1990s; improvements in social safety nets; resumption of trade credit 
and avoidance of protectionism; and a rapid and sizable response by 
international fi nancial institutions. 
While both papers agree on the adverse impact of the crisis on devel-
oping countries and on the MDGs, as well as on some of the key crisis 
remedies (stronger growth, more infrastructure investment, trade 
reform, better food security and nutrition, more inclusive fi nance, more 
aid, and greater focus on low-income countries), they differ in some of 
their policy prescriptions. Sundaram clearly sees an urgent need for a 
fundamental reform in global governance for policy making and coordi-
nation. On the other hand, while Go and Timmer do not explicitly dis-
count the need for more fundamental reforms at the global level, their 
main concern is for continuation of domestic economic reforms in 
developing countries (and some of the potential challenges and policy 
trade-offs), as well as strong rebounds in international trade and capital 
fl ows to developing countries to fuel and sustain high economic growth 
in those countries. This, they argue, would require a shift of focus from 
short-term emergency response to long-term development support.
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While the two papers implicitly address the fragility of the global eco-
nomic rebound, they do not explicitly entertain the full scenario of what 
could result from worsening conditions. A double-dip recession, for 
example, would signifi cantly jeopardize countries’ ability to reinvigorate 
MDG progress since future growth prospects would be curtailed for yet 
a second time. Furthermore, since economic growth and human devel-
opment are self-reinforcing, downturns in growth negatively affect 
human welfare, and, in turn, downturns in human welfare negatively 
affect human capital development and economic growth over the long 
run. Although both papers agree that there has been some improvement 
in gender indicators, Go and Timmer are less positive on the pace of 
progress regarding the empowerment of women. There are some differ-
ences in the interpretation of the indicators for gender and health, par-
ticularly the under-fi ve child mortality rate and the maternal mortality 
ratio.2 For the under-fi ve child mortality indicator, the Sundaram study 
is more positive than Go and Timmer, whereas for maternal mortality, it 
is less positive on progress. For the under-fi ve mortality rate, fewer than 
40 countries are on track to reach the MDG target; however, they account 
for half the population of developing countries. There is some evidence 
that progress has accelerated, even if it falls short of the MDG target. 
Regarding maternal mortality, while revised estimates show that the 
overall level is lower than previously estimated, improvements remain 
slow and well short of the goal.
There is a consensus that setbacks to human development normally 
emerge not during a crisis but rather in the years following. More dam-
age will likely become visible in the medium to longer term through 
secondary effects, which would become stronger in their adverse impact 
as countries exhaust their fi scal space to fund vital public spending on 
social programs and critical infrastructure. Rising public debt and 
reduced fi scal capacity are already affecting some donor countries, which 
may fi nd it increasingly diffi cult to meet their aid commitments. These 
pose important downside risks to attaining the MDGs. 
A key weakness of the existing approach to the MDG targets, which 
was not explicitly addressed by either Sundaram or Go and Timmer, is 
that there is no consensus on the targets for individual countries, whether 
or not the MDG targets are met at the global or regional levels. Thus, a 
key question confronting the international community is whether it 
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would be a satisfactory outcome if the global targets are met because of 
outstanding performances of a few large countries, while many smaller 
countries lag behind.
Last, it was agreed that although the immediate postcrisis reactions 
of the international donor community were encouraging, the medium-
term outlook is more worrisome. For example, low-income countries 
tapped more deeply into multilateral concessional resources in 2009, 
in part through front-loading multiyear allocations. That obviously 
limits the scope for support in subsequent years, as Go and Timmer 
argued. Therefore, going forward, given the promising results from 
many low-income countries in recent years in terms of their progress 
toward the MDGs and improved growth performance, it is important 
that the international community focuses its attention, including aid 
programs, on the poorer countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and else-
where to ensure adequate and timely support for policy reforms and 
attempts to achieve structural change to accelerate growth and the 
development process. 
Notes
 1.  The fi rst call to hold the 2010 meeting came on September 25, 2008, during the 
UN’s High Level Event on MDGs. 
 2.  Sundaram classifi es gender as all the indicators attributed to MDG 3, which 
includes the ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary, and tertiary education; 
share of women in wage employment; and the proportion of seats held by women 
in national parliament. It classifi es health as MDGs 4, 5, and 6, which include the 
infant and under-fi ve mortality rates, the maternal mortality ratio, the number of 
births attended by skilled health personnel, HIV prevalence, the proportion of 
the population with advanced HIV infection with access to antiretroviral drugs; 
and the incidence and death rates of malaria and tuberculosis. In addition to 
these indicators, Go and Timmer include the female primary school completion 
rate in their analysis of gender, and hunger, water, and sanitation indicators for 








Aid for Trade: Building on Progress 
Today for Tomorrow’s Future
Aid for trade is fi nancial and technical assistance that facilitates the integra-
tion of developing countries into the global economy through initiatives 
that expand trade. By furthering economic growth and development, the 
benefi ts of aid for trade are shared by all trading nations. Benefi ts accrue 
not only to the poor in least developed and other low-income countries but 
also to citizens in middle-income countries and those in the most devel-
oped nations of the globe. Trade benefi ts all nations.
Examples of aid for trade include the fi nancing of transportation and 
logistics infrastructure (infrastructure is the largest share of offi cial 
development assistance, or ODA, in aid for trade), assistance to help 
This chapter draws on a work program supported by the Global Trade and Financial 
Architecture project, funded by the U.K. Department for International Develop-
ment, and the Trade Costs and Facilitation project, supported through the Multi-
Donor Trust Fund on Trade. The authors are grateful to Shahrokh Fardoust, Arancha 
González Laya, Ann Harrison, Alan Winters, and Ernesto Zedillo for helpful com-
ments on the conference draft, to Elisa Gamberoni and Richard Newfarmer for valu-
able inputs, and to Marco Antonio Martinez Del Angel, Alberto Portugal Perez, and 
Benjamin J. Taylor for excellent research assistance in the preparation of this paper.
280 Postcrisis Growth and Development
fi rms conform to international product standards, capacity building in 
border management, and implementation of projects that connect rural 
producers to markets. Aid for trade also spans measures to assist workers, 
producers, and communities in adjusting to changes in trade policies or 
in the terms of trade (such as the erosion of trade preference programs).
The global initiative on aid for trade was launched at the 2005 Group 
of Eight (G-8) meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland, where leaders commit-
ted to a near 50 percent increase in aid-for-trade funding by 2010 (to 
US$4 billion).1 Since 2005 donors and multilateral development banks 
have increased the overall value of aid for trade and put in place several 
mechanisms both to channel such aid and to ensure that it refl ects and 
addresses national priorities. The commitment to aid for trade has been 
reiterated repeatedly by major donors at global aid-for-trade review 
meetings hosted by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007 and 
2009 and in G-8 communiqués. The Group of 20 (G-20) Summit in 
London in April 2009 included a statement of continued support for 
implementation of the commitments that members made on aid for 
trade.2 Delivering on these commitments is particularly important in the 
current global economic situation: aid for trade that results in improve-
ments in productivity of fi rms and farmers in poor developing countries 
can both assist countries in recovering from the crisis and enhance 
longer-term growth and development prospects.
This chapter reviews recent trends in the delivery of aid for trade, its 
allocation by country and type of assistance, and analyses of impact and 
effectiveness. Since 2005 signifi cant progress has been made by bilateral 
donors in implementing aid-for-trade commitments and by developing 
countries in identifying aid-for-trade priorities. However, there is still 
insuffi cient awareness and understanding in the broader development 
community of what the aid-for-trade initiative entails and how it works. 
In addition data and analysis are very limited on the impact of aid for 
trade on the ground. The G-20 is uniquely placed to provide greater clarity 
on where the aid-for-trade agenda is moving and how it is being shaped.
By design no central entity or global fi nancial coordination mechanism 
takes the lead on or is the focal point for delivering aid for trade.3 Instead, 
aid for trade is supplied through existing country-based allocation mech-
anisms by bilateral donors and international development agencies. The 
primary vehicles used to raise awareness and monitor progress in delivery 
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of aid for trade by donors are the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) 
for trade-related technical assistance to the least developed countries and 
regional and the global aid-for-trade reviews organized by the WTO.4 The 
main objective of the EIF is to assist governments of least developed coun-
tries in identifying trade projects that can be considered in the overall 
process of defi ning aid allocation priorities at the national level. The 
countrycentric approach is a major strength of the program. It helps 
ensure that aid is directed to priorities identifi ed by governments. How-
ever, the recipient country-cum-donor community-centric focus of the 
initiative also reduces the potential impact of the enterprise. Developing 
mechanisms that increase transfers of resources from middle-income 
G-20 members (investment, knowledge) as well as from the private sector 
of all G-20 members could enhance the prospects for trade and employ-
ment growth in low-income developing countries.
In addition to delivering on the fi nancial commitments made in the 
past, this chapter identifi es four specifi c areas where G-20 leadership can 
make a major difference in enhancing the effectiveness and visibility of 
the aid-for-trade effort: 
•  Providing a strategic action plan for capacity building and transfer of 
knowledge on policies and regulatory options to improve the effi -
ciency of producer services and the rate of return on infrastructure 
investments;
•  Promoting market access for low-income countries through a com-
mitment by all G-20 members to eliminate import restrictions for 
least developed countries, thus leveraging the fi nancial aid-for-trade 
resource transfers;
•  Creating a new aid-for-trade public-private partnership to leverage 
the dynamism in the private sector for strengthening trade capacity in 
the countries that most need it; and
•  Launching a G-20 strategic global initiative to provide dedicated 
fi nancial support for the collection of cross-country datasets that will 
allow more effective monitoring and evaluation of aid for trade.
Why Aid for Trade Matters
A key rationale for launching the aid-for trade initiative was that fi rms in 
many developing countries may be unable to benefi t from existing and 
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prospective market access opportunities that the trading system or specifi c 
countries and regions offer, such as preferential (duty-free, quota-free) 
market access.5 Poor-quality infrastructure and high trade and other oper-
ating and transactions costs in particular act to block many of the advan-
tages of reduced barriers to trade achieved in international and bilateral 
market access talks. A major feature of most aid-for-trade programs aims 
at lowering costs and enhancing the productivity of fi rms in recipient 
countries. By focusing on boosting investment in infrastructure and com-
plementary measures to create the preconditions for improved access to 
higher-quality, lower-cost public and private services, aid for trade can 
help countries to capture more of the benefi ts of existing market access 
opportunities.
The need for G-20 leadership on aid for trade is heightened in the 
current economic environment for at least three reasons: 
•  Trade is a powerful mechanism to help countries overcome the shock 
of the crisis. Given the lack of progress in bringing the WTO Doha 
Development Round to closure, G-20 leadership would provide an 
important signal that the major players in the world economy recog-
nize the importance of taking actions to expand trade.
•  Aid for trade can help countries diversify into new markets and 
products—helping poor countries benefi t from the emergence of a 
multi-growth-pole world economy.
•  Aid for trade, allocated effectively, can improve productivity in recip-
ient countries by lowering costs and enhancing competitiveness, 
thereby enhancing growth prospects.
Trade Is a Channel for Poor Countries to Recover from the Downturn
As economic activity and demand recovers from the fi nancial crisis, 
consumers and enterprises in importing countries can be expected to 
be even more sensitive than before to the prices of the goods and ser-
vices they buy. Aid for trade that supports measures to improve the 
competitiveness of countries with weak trade capacity is therefore 
important. Moreover, as fi scal and monetary stimuli are gradually 
withdrawn, aid for trade can help maintain demand for goods and 
services and attract investment in tradable activities. Thus, aid for 
trade can provide a boost to developing countries during a period 
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when they sorely need it. 6 It can also help reduce pressures for protec-
tionism and increase support for trade reforms in developing coun-
tries, further expanding trade prospects by helping to keep markets 
open globally.
Aid for Trade Can Help Increase Diversiﬁ cation
Trade openness gives rise to risks as well as to benefi ts. The recent crisis 
was exceptional in being truly global in scope: all countries were nega-
tively affected. The crisis, however, also illustrated once again that more 
diversifi ed economies do better than those that rely on just a few prod-
ucts or markets as the source for their foreign exchange. Diversifi cation 
can help reduce output volatility (Haddad, Lim, and Saborowski 2010). 
Many low-income countries are not well diversifi ed, in part because of 
high trade and other costs that aid for trade can help reduce.
Aid for Trade Can Enhance Productivity in Low-Income Countries
There is a long-standing debate regarding developing countries’ capacity 
to effectively absorb increased fl ows of aid. Allocating assistance to 
enhance trade capacity can help avoid the macroeconomic problems 
that can arise as a result of ODA infl ows by focusing on lowering trade 
and other transaction costs and improving the productivity of the econ-
omy as a whole. This can act to offset negative competitiveness spillovers 
generated by aid infl ows, such as Dutch disease and pressures for real 
appreciation. 
As Reis and Farole (2010) note, the postcrisis “competitiveness pol-
icy framework” should tackle the priorities of aligning macroeconomic 
incentives (such as trade barriers, real exchange rates, and labor market 
policies), reducing at-the-border and behind-the-border trade costs, 
and overcoming government and market failures (such as shortages in 
trade fi nance, slow technology diffusion, and inadequate product stan-
dards). Aid for trade can help low-income countries address this 
agenda without targeting specifi c industries or potentially distorting 
policies to support product-specifi c investments. It can do so by 
improving trade policy coordination; trade facilitation, skill forma-
tion, and trade-related infrastructure; and administrative procedures 
(Cali and te Velde 2008).
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Trends in Aid for Trade
What is aid for trade? The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) compiles statistics on ODA in support of trade. 
These data distinguish between four broad categories of support: techni-
cal assistance for trade policy and regulations, productive capacity build-
ing (including trade development), trade-related infrastructure, and 
trade-related adjustment. Examples of support to trade policy and regu-
latory reform include projects at the country level to harmonize regula-
tions to international norms. Capacity building and trade development 
include projects to assist in diversifi cation of exports. Trade-related 
infrastructure projects include investments in roads, ports, and telecom-
munications networks. Trade adjustment assistance involves aid to help 
with costs associated with trade liberalization, including tariff reduction 
and preference erosion, for example.
According to data reported by the OECD, some 25 percent of ODA 
and about 35 percent of aid that donors and governments allocated to 
particular sectors was directed toward aid for trade in 2008.7 Bilateral 
donors provided low-income countries, including least developed coun-
tries, with about US$15.6 billion in aid for trade in 2008. This amounted 
to some 40 percent of the total US$39 billion in concessional aid for 
trade commitments in 2008. The least developed countries received 
about one-fourth of aid-for-trade commitments. Donors provided 
about half of aid-for-trade commitments to middle-income countries, 
mostly from bilateral sources.
The supply of aid for trade increased from 2002–05 to 2008 by 21 per-
cent in real terms. Low-income countries saw their share of total aid for 
trade increase from 44 to 54 percent, with 59 percent (US$4.7 billion) of 
the additional funds going to Sub-Saharan Africa (OECD-WTO 2009). 
The OECD-WTO defi nition of aid for trade is a very broad measure of 
trade-related assistance and therefore overstates the overall magnitude 
of aid for trade. It includes all fi nancing of infrastructure with the excep-
tion of water and sanitation projects. Because infrastructure accounts 
for a large share of total ODA expenditures, counting it infl ates the 
aggregate numbers for aid for trade. The wide defi nition is used because 
it is very diffi cult to determine the extent to which specifi c forms of 
infrastructure support trade rather than nontradable activities.8 
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Trends in aid for trade declined in absolute terms through 2002, after 
which aid levels rose, refl ecting renewed donor interest in growth and 
development such as the launch of the Doha Development round 
(fi gure 7.1). Even so, aid for trade has not kept pace with either total 
development assistance or that portion allocated to particular activities. 
Multilateral providers of assistance—the International Development 
Association (IDA) and the regional development banks through which 
aid is channeled—on average allocate a far higher proportion of their 
concessional aid-for-trade assistance to low-income countries than do 
bilateral donors. Some 93 percent of every aid-for-trade dollar goes to 
low-income countries (US$6.6 billion of a total of US$7.1 billion in 
multilateral donor assistance). Bilateral donors provide 46 percent of 
their aid for trade to low-income countries (fi gure 7.2). This difference 
highlights the importance of multilateral concessional lending for 
trade—and the urgency from an aid-for-trade perspective—of success-
fully completing the replenishment of the IDA’s concessional fund for 
low-income countries (IDA-16).9 
According to the OECD’s most recent comprehensive report, Asia is 
the largest recipient of aid for trade. Aid to Africa, in second place, has 
been closing in year by year. In 2007 Asia received US$10.7 billion, over 
half of which went to Central and South Asia. Although the volume of 
aid-for-trade funds destined for Asia remained stable from 2002 to 2007, 
the region’s share of total aid-for-trade funds dropped from 50 percent 
Figure 7.1. ODA Commitments to Aid for Trade, 1995–2008 Millions of US 
Constant 2008 Dollars
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in the 2002–05 period to 42 percent in 2007, in part, because of the 
increasing share going to Africa. That region received US$9.5 billion in 
2007, representing 38 percent of total aid-for-trade funds, up from 30 
percent in the baseline period. Flows to all other regions were signifi -
cantly smaller. Latin America received US$2 billion and Oceania received 
US$1.6 billion in this period. Europe received the least, at US$1.2 billion, 
and was the only region to register a decrease in aid-for-trade funds from 
the baseline period to 2007 (OECD-WTO 2009).
The increased focus on the trade agenda by developing countries is 
also refl ected in an expansion in trade-related activities and invest-
ments by the World Bank Group. A recent review of trade in World 
Bank country assistance strategies (CASs) found that trade—using 
the World Bank’s narrower defi nition that excludes most basic infra-
structure—is now on the agenda of the majority of the Bank’s clients 
(65 percent of CASs). 
These CASs identify trade as an important priority and present assis-
tance programs with a clear focus on one or more of the following thematic 
areas: regional integration, export diversifi cation, trade facilitation, and 
market access. This emphasis on trade is translating into increased oper-
ational support, through the Bank’s economic and sector work, lending, 
and in some cases technical assistance to help countries achieve their 
Source: OECD CRS database.
Note: Commitments in 2008 to low-income (IDA-eligible) countries. EC = European Commission. 
Figure 7.2. Aid for Trade by Recipient Group, Bilateral vs. Multilateral Donors
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medium-term objectives. World Bank trade-related lending more than 
doubled between 2002 and 2008, rising to some US$1.4 billion (fi gure 7.3). 
Concessional lending to the public sector has increased by more than half 
(World Bank 2009). The trend in terms of the number of projects and 
countries with trade operations has been declining in recent years, however, 
illustrating that expanding aid for trade continues to require high-level 
attention by policy makers.
The rise in aid for trade has occurred against the backdrop of success 
in reducing import tariffs and removing other traditional barriers to 
trade—the long-stalled Doha negotiations at the WTO notwithstanding. 
As formal trade barriers have been eliminated for a signifi cant portion of 
global trade, countries have focused on other impediments to trade 
fl ows—both through domestic and collective action. Global trade reform 
and capacity building is increasingly anchored in an agenda to minimize 
trade transaction costs to further leverage comparative and competitive 
advantages. This shift in the global trade agenda has been accompanied 
by a signifi cant increase in aid-for-trade assistance from bilateral donors 
and multilateral institutions.
Figure 7.3. Trends in World Bank Trade Lending, 2001–09
Source: SAP/Business Warehouse.
Notes: Trade components are deﬁ ned by thematic codes assigned to World Bank projects. The sharp increase 
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As the data illustrate, there is a large supply of aid-for-trade assis-
tance, the bulk of which is provided by multilateral institutions and G-20 
donor countries. The G-20 is well placed to lead in this regard. Of the top 
15 noninstitutional donors of offi cial aid for trade in 2007, 8 are G-20 
members, including the European Community (OECD-WTO 2009). 
The G-20 therefore has an opportunity to provide strong and visible 
global leadership, in partnership with multilateral institutions and devel-
oping countries, to shape the aid-for-trade agenda going forward. Com-
mitments to sustain and grow aid-for-trade commitments at recent 
summits has been encouraging,10 but a more direct and visible approach 
in ensuring concrete action plans on aid for trade is needed to help drive 
the development agenda forward as global recovery continues. 
Does Supply of Aid for Trade Match Demand?
The distribution of aid for trade is as important as the overall amounts. 
There are a number of different perspectives on the question of whether 
the supply of aid for trade aligns with the demand and need for aid. One 
approach is to analyze Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) to 
evaluate whether and how countries are integrating trade policy and 
institutional reforms into development plans. A United Nations Devel-
opment Program (UNDP) study that reviewed 72 PRSPs found that 
85 percent included one or more components devoted to trade (Kosack 
2008). That fi nding marks a signifi cant increase from previous analy-
ses—a 2000 study found that only about 25 percent of completed PRSPs 
had a section relating to trade. Moreover, 52 of the 72 PRSPs included in 
the 2008 UNDP study related trade policies to poverty profi les. This 
development, among other, more specifi c differences across various iter-
ations of PRSPs, suggests that countries are increasingly considering 
links between trade and poverty reduction. These fi ndings are similar to 
other studies, including informal surveys of World Bank country assis-
tance strategies (Strachan 2009).
One of the fi rst attempts to evaluate the balance between supply and 
demand based on empirical evidence and data was undertaken by 
Gamberoni and Newfarmer (2009). The authors fi nd that, in general, 
demand for aid for trade has matched supply, with some exceptions: 
countries that are most in need of aid for trade, as measured by trade 
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capacity and performance, tend to receive relatively more assistance. 
Subsequent analysis by World Bank staff that builds on and extends the 
methodology developed by Gamberoni and Newfarmer has focused on 
the relative impact of hard versus soft infrastructure investments, aim-
ing to obtain a better understanding of where aid for trade funds may 
be best spent to advance capacity-building goals.11
Portugal-Pérez and Wilson (2010a) construct four indicators of trade 
capacity from a set of primary variables that measure the availability 
and quality of trade-related infrastructure and regulation (such as the 
fi xed-line network; quality and capacity of ports, airports, rail, and roads; 
governance and corruption; costs and time to clear trade consignments; 
and various indicators of the business and investment climate). Using 
factor analysis, these variables are condensed into four specifi c factors 
that capture distinct features of the trade environment. Two of these indi-
cators are related to the “hard dimension” of trade capacity—information 
and communications technology, and physical infrastructure—and the 
other two are measures of the “soft” dimension of trade capacity: a busi-
ness environment trade indicator, and a border management and cus-
toms effi ciency indicator.
Building on these four factors Martinez and Wilson (2010) create an 
index that is used as a measure of the demand (need) for aid for trade. 
The authors regress actual supply of aid for trade against this measure of 
demand and fi nd that most of the countries that have the greatest need 
are close to or above the predicted line, indicating an approximate match 
between supply and demand (fi gure 7.4). Moreover, the results are con-
sistent in the sense that countries with the lowest scores on the trade 
capacity indicator (associated with higher values of the index), receive 
higher levels of aid for trade. It is also clear, however, that there is a lot of 
variance around the trend and that many countries are receiving less sup-
port than these various indicators of need suggest would be appropriate. 
Aid for Trade: Impacts and Effectiveness
An extensive literature analyzes the relationship between aid and eco-
nomic growth. The analytical methods employed in these studies and 
the results are subject to signifi cant debate. The literature provides a 







Figure 7.4. Matching Demand with Supply of Aid for Trade, 2005
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Many factors may explain the variation in the fi ndings. It may stem 
from the type of aid delivered (for example, purely humanitarian aid 
as opposed to aid driven by policy change), or it may refl ect differ-
ences in absorptive capacity in developing countries (Radelet, Clem-
ens, and Bhavnani 2006; OECD 2006). One factor that can explain a 
lack of a positive relationship between aid and growth is aid-induced 
appreciation of real exchange rates—with aid infl ows inducing Dutch 
disease.13 A comprehensive review of this literature is beyond the scope 
of this paper. It is useful, however, to outline, in brief, the complexities 
in analyzing and understanding the relationships between aid, trade, 
and growth. Debate continues, in particular, on the causality between 
aid and trade.14
Until the late 1990s a large share of ODA was tied to trade in the sense 
that procurement of goods and services fi nanced by aid was tied to 
sourcing from the donor country. Any positive trade-aid relationship, 
therefore, could be the result of policy decisions made in donor coun-
tries. Many researchers have indeed found strong links between foreign 
aid and donor exports.15 Causality could also run in the other direction—
from trade to aid—insofar as donors allocate aid to those countries with 
which they have the strongest trade ties (Morrissey 1993; Osei, Morrissey, 
and Lloyd 2004). Analyses that test for the direction of causality gener-
ally conclude that it depends on the pair of donor and recipient countries 
(Lloyd et al. 2000; Arvin, Cater, and Choudry 2000). Whatever the precise 
channels, the results do suggest a positive relationship between aid and 
trade.
In light of the commitments and action to increase aid-for-trade 
funding, questions as to how aid for trade specifi cally helps to improve 
the trading performance of developing countries—and how effective 
taxpayer funding is in attaining aid-for-trade objectives—have gained 
increased prominence. That is especially true in a postcrisis environment 
characterized by a much tighter fi scal situation in all donor countries. 
Bilateral donors and international development agencies are actively 
engaged in efforts to go beyond simple monitoring of the fl ows and allo-
cations of aid for trade to an assessment or analysis of its impact.
Evaluation is critical for discovering ways to improve the effectiveness 
of development assistance, and aid for trade is no exception. Evaluation 
can occur at several levels: Do the needy countries get aid (the question 
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asked above)? Are programs, taken as a whole, effective in expanding 
output and reducing poverty (programmatic evaluations)? Are projects 
achieving their stated goals, say, in expanding electric power (project 
evaluation)? Are outcomes different from comparable situations with-
out the project or different from what they would have been in the 
absence of project interventions (impact evaluation)? 
Measuring the impact of aid for trade is challenging, in part because of 
data limitations. Many projects may not have information on defi ned base-
lines against which impacts can be assessed. Trade-related development 
projects often lag behind best practice in not being designed to allow rigor-
ous ex post evaluation of impacts. Often standard impact evaluation meth-
ods cannot be applied to aid for trade because the assistance takes the form 
of general budget support. 
Much of the assessment to date has been at an aggregated level, focus-
ing on whether countries’ trade performance and indicators of trade 
capacity have improved. What is needed is more detailed analysis of the 
impact of specifi c aid-for-trade interventions on the ground, which in 
turn will depend on identifying new ways to support long-term invest-
ment in microeconomic trade cost and outcome data. 
A recent OECD review of project evaluations for trade-related devel-
opment assistance projects found that measurable objectives in project 
documents were often insuffi ciently clear (OECD 2006). Quantitative 
baselines or benchmarks that would allow ex post assessments of the 
degree of improvement in specifi c measures of trade performance or 
trade capacity were frequently not included. This fi nding is important in 
itself because it implies that donors and benefi ciaries have to do a better 
job in identifying objectives. The OECD report concludes that, in half of 
the evaluations, trade-related assistance contributed to raising awareness 
of the importance of trade and knowledge of trade issues, while helping 
to strengthen country dialogues on trade policy. Major project weak-
nesses that were identifi ed included inadequate needs assessments; weak 
project management and governance; a lack of integration into an over-
all trade strategy or development program; weak links to poverty reduc-
tion; inadequate donor coordination; and inadequate communication 
to, and expertise in, fi eld missions.
A 2006 evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Group of World Bank 
trade projects and programs found that in general trade-related adjustment 
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loans performed better than other adjustment loans (86 percent satisfac-
tory versus 78 percent for nontrade loans), while trade-related investment 
loans performed slightly worse (69 percent versus 72 percent satisfactory) 
(IEG 2006). A follow-up review found that in 2007, more than 85 percent 
of trade-related projects were evaluated to have had moderately satisfac-
tory, satisfactory, or highly satisfactory outcomes. These generally per-
formed better than non-aid-for-trade projects (World Bank 2009).
More programmatic forms of evaluation use cross-country data on 
the effects of increasing aid for trade in specifi c areas. Given that aid for 
trade is targeted at specifi c types of activities and interventions, a more 
precise identifi cation strategy can be employed to assess the magnitude 
of effects and direction of causality. 
Helble, Mann, and Wilson (2009) analyze the effects of various cate-
gories of aid for trade—trade development assistance (productive capac-
ity building), trade policy assistance, and infrastructure assistance—by 
assessing their impact on bilateral trade fl ows through the use of a gravity 
equation. The fi ndings suggest very high marginal returns to aid for trade 
targeted at trade policy and regulatory reform projects. Results in this 
paper, which is being extended in new analysis to examine the relation-
ship between aid, trade performance, and private sector perceptions of 
priorities, estimate that US$1 of aid for trade targeted at trade policy and 
regulatory reform could lead to about US$700 in trade. While aid allo-
cated in this area will encounter diminishing returns, this type of analysis 
suggests that the rate of return to aid for trade can be very high. 
Cali and te Velde (2008, 2009) undertake a similar type of analysis and 
fi nd that aid for trade facilitation reduces the cost of trading. A US$1 
million increase in aid for trade facilitation is associated with a 6 percent 
reduction in the cost of packing goods, loading them into a container, 
transporting the consignment to the port of departure, and loading it on 
a vessel or truck. They also demonstrate that aid for trade allocated to 
infrastructure results in an expansion of exports, especially in the min-
ing and manufacturing sectors, with effects being the greatest in Africa, 
where infrastructure is weak. Aid for trade that is allocated to productive 
capacity (as opposed to infrastructure or facilitation) has no statistically 
signifi cant effect on exports.
As noted, impact evaluation is still an incipient endeavor in the aid-
for-trade fi eld—work of this type is far more limited than in health and 
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other fi elds of development assistance. A recent example is Brenton and 
von Uexkull (2009), who undertook an impact evaluation for export 
development projects targeted on specifi c export products. They found 
that such projects have coincided with, or predated, stronger export per-
formance in the targeted commodities and have had a greater impact on 
export growth for products with initially high export levels than on those 
with low export levels (although this may be because technical assistance 
is directed toward industries that are already set to take off). They also 
found that export development projects were likely to be more success-
ful if they addressed specifi c market failures or policy shortcomings in 
activities in which the country had a long-run capacity for global com-
petitiveness (as was the case in Rwanda’s donor-supported strategy to 
move into the high quality, specialty end of the coffee market).
They conclude that, done well, export development programs can 
succeed: cut fl owers had been a growing export industry in Uganda for a 
decade when an export development program was started in 2003. Fol-
lowing implementation of the program, export value almost tripled 
within one year. Although other Ugandan exports also rose strongly at 
this time, cut fl owers signifi cantly increased their export share. In the 
case of Mongolia, a traditional exporter of wool products, exports had 
declined and lost share in the export portfolio in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. After the implementation of an export development program in 
2003, exports of wool products entered a steady growth path, outper-
forming overall export growth in 2005. 
Taken together, the available literature tends to validate central Paris 
Principles: aid for trade can be effective provided that countries own the 
program and incorporate trade objectives thoroughly into their devel-
opment strategies. Nearly all bilateral and multilateral organizations are 
working to improve effectiveness, but not all have recent, comprehensive 
evaluations of their programs.16 With more than 40 bilateral and multi-
lateral agencies involved in trade-related technical assistance, the scope 
for learning from each other is great.17
Challenges and Priorities Looking Ahead
Ensuring timely and continued disbursements of existing aid-for-trade 
commitments to developing countries should be the fi rst priority to 
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guarantee the uninterrupted implementation of ongoing aid-for-trade 
programs, thereby helping developing countries mitigate some of the 
effects of the economic crisis and benefi t more fully from the ongoing 
recovery in trade. We argue, in what follows, that action by the G-20 in a 
number of areas can enhance the effectiveness of aid for trade as an 
instrument to promote inclusive growth. Some of these lend themselves 
to concrete initiatives by the G-20.
Leveraging Investments in Infrastructure: 
The Services “Software” Agenda
An increasing number of countries identify infrastructure as a regional 
priority, as revealed by the self-assessment questionnaires carried out for 
the OECD-WTO (2009) report. As noted above, infrastructure is the 
largest category of aid for trade: infrastructure projects account for about 
54 percent of the global aid-for-trade portfolio. Recent research has 
found evidence on the potential gains to investment in hard infrastruc-
ture, including improved export performance (Francois and Manchin 
2007). There is also evidence of a signifi cant potential for reduced trade 
transaction costs and increased consumer welfare from investment in 
infrastructure, such as new ports (Abe and Wilson 2009). Investment in 
infrastructure may also have a greater impact in countries with lower per 
capita income in terms of generating a higher marginal impact on export 
performance (Portugal-Perez and Wilson 2010a). 
Investment in infrastructure must be accompanied by measures 
that reduce trade costs (Hoekman and Nicita 2010) and by appropri-
ate regulation—policies, for example, that promote competition in 
transport services and improvements in border management.18 The 
quality of public and private services can be an important determinant 
of the size of the payoffs to improvements in hard infrastructure. More 
generally, the effi ciency, variety, and costs of services inputs are critical 
for the competitiveness of fi rms and farmers because they represent an 
important share of the total costs of production. Being able to com-
pete in international markets is increasingly determined by access to 
low-cost and high-quality producer services such as telecommunica-
tions, transport and distribution, and fi nance. Policies that raise oper-
ating costs or preclude innovation therefore can be very detrimental to 
the performance of the national economy. Policy reforms that revolve 
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around increasing the contestability of services markets and facilitat-
ing new entry and the supply of new service products are also cheap in 
fi nancial terms—they often do not require massive investments in 
hardware.
Developing countries tend to have more and higher barriers to ser-
vices trade and investment, as shown by the negative correlation between 
GDP per capita and the restrictiveness of services trade and investment 
policies as measured in Borchert, De Martino, and Mattoo (fi gure 7.5). 
Removing such restrictions can generate substantial benefi ts, leading to 
lower-cost and higher-quality producer services for fi rms and farmers in 
these countries. Global outsourcing and integration into international 
value chains increasingly depend on having access to a variety of ser-
vices. A growing body of research demonstrates that reforms in services 
sectors have a positive effect on the productivity of both foreign and 
locally owned manufacturing fi rms that use services inputs (see Francois 
and Hoekman 2010 for a recent survey of the literature). 
A noteworthy feature of the pattern of services trade and investment 
policies is that landlocked countries apply more restrictive policies than 
coastal countries. That appears particularly true in the air transport and 
telecommunications sectors, in which landlocked countries have no 
inherent disadvantage (Borchert et al. 2010). While there are many rea-
sons why being landlocked might lead to lower availability of services 
and higher prices, restrictive policies contribute to the poor performance 
in services sectors beyond the handicap imposed by geography. This sug-
gests that supporting policy reforms to enhance the contestability of 
“backbone” services in landlocked countries could be a priority area for 
aid for trade. 
To date, however, much of the aid-for-trade effort has emphasized 
support for hard infrastructure and improved productive capacity. Less 
has been done to improve the services-related policies and regulation 
that help determine the effi ciency of (cost of using) infrastructure net-
works. This is one area where the support and leadership of the G-20 
can make a difference—on two dimensions: fi rst, ensuring that aid-for-
trade assistance includes an adequate focus on procompetitive regula-
tion and other policies that affect the functioning of producer service 
markets (Hoekman and Mattoo 2007); and, second, doing more to pro-
vide access to the knowledge and experience on these matters available 
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Figure 7.5. Services Trade Restrictiveness Index
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in the middle-income, emerging market members of the G-20, as well as 
in the developed economies. 
Focusing explicitly on improving the operation and effi ciency of ser-
vices sectors is important in itself from a development perspective, but it 
is also important from a global perspective. As argued by Claessens, Eve-
nett, and Hoekman (2010) and Hoekman and Messerlin (forthcoming), 
rebalancing the world economy—reducing large current account surpluses 
and defi cits—will require improvements in productivity (competitive-
ness) and domestic absorption in defi cit and surplus countries, respec-
tively. In practice these improvements cannot be achieved through 
monetary, fi scal, and exchange rate policies alone. Rebalancing will 
require changes in the structure of economies, more specifi cally a shift 
toward increasing the availability, variety, and effi ciency of services 
inputs and industries.
Expanding South-South Integration through 
Trade Reform and Market Access
Another area where the G-20 can provide important leadership is 
through expanded market access, especially for the least developed coun-
tries, led by reform in middle-income countries to expand trading 
opportunities in a South-South context. This expansion would provide 
an opportunity to low-income economies to increase trade and, just as 
important, help them diversify across a larger number of markets.
South-South trade has been growing rapidly in recent years as a result 
of the high rates of economic growth achieved by many developing 
countries. The BRIC countries (Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, 
and China), for example, had an import share of 12 percent in 2008 
compared with just 6 percent in 1996. Meanwhile, high-income coun-
tries’ share of import demand decreased from 81 percent in 1992 to 
72 percent in 2008 (Haddad and Hoekman 2010).
Signifi cant trade barriers remain in many of the dynamic emerging 
markets. The emphasis in policy forums such as the WTO has been on 
market access conditions in developed countries, including achieving 
duty-free, quota-free access for the least developed countries and 
addressing key constraints, such as rules of origin, that reduce the value 
of preferential access. While these matters are important, they arguably 
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represent a missed opportunity for low-income developing countries 
that confront high barriers against exports in middle-income countries.
Fugazza and Vanzetti (2008) use a general equilibrium model, GTAP, 
to compare the potential effects of the removal of barriers on South-
South trade with the gains from developed-country liberalization and 
from regional free trade areas within Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 
Their simulations indicate that the opening up of Northern markets 
would provide annual welfare gains to developing countries of US$22 
billion. However, the removal of South-South barriers has the potential 
to generate gains 60 percent larger. The results imply that giving greater 
emphasis to removing barriers between developing countries could 
boost trade with low-income countries signifi cantly. 
Overall, research suggests that, whereas traditionally the bulk of 
South-North trade fl ows were in less sophisticated sectors with fewer 
learning opportunities, that may not be the case today, particularly 
among the dynamic Asian economies. Klinger (2009) studies the com-
position of South–South, as opposed to South–North, trade in recent 
years to consider whether the South as a market provides developing 
countries with greater opportunities to transform their productive struc-
tures and move to more sophisticated export sectors than the Northern 
market does. His results show that for many developing countries, 
including countries in Africa and Central Asia, exports within the South 
are more sophisticated and better connected in the product space than 
exports to the North, whereas the opposite is true for the faster-growing 
economies of Asia and Eastern Europe (excluding the Commonwealth 
of Independent States). Klinger also fi nds that the primary source of 
cross-country variation in export sophistication and connectedness is in 
northbound rather than southbound export baskets. 
Postcrisis projections are that middle-income markets will grow more 
rapidly than those of high-income countries. The emergence of multiple 
growth poles in the South offers low-income countries an opportunity 
to diversify both across markets and products given that developing-
country consumers have differentiated preferences and demand. More-
over, increased South-South trade reduces the exposure of developing 
countries to possible prolonged slow growth markets in Europe, Japan, 
and the United States. It also mitigates risk associated with increased 
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market openness and trade-led growth through product and good diver-
sifi cation effects, as mentioned earlier.
South-South trade has already increased at both the extensive and the 
intensive margins. Exports to the BRIC countries from lower-middle-
income countries rose from 7 percent of their total exports in 2000 to 
12 percent in 2008 (fi gure 7.6). The average value of such transactions 
increased 444 percent from 1996 to 2008, while the value of transac-
tions from lower-middle-income countries to high-income countries 
rose only 180 percent. However, developing countries still export substan-
tially fewer varieties than high-income or even middle-income countries, 
which means there is great scope for further diversifi cation (fi gure 7.7).
Middle-income emerging markets also are a source of knowledge and 
foreign direct investment (FDI), which in turn can drive additional trade 
growth in low-income economies. Harnessing these opportunities is in 
part a function of putting in place the appropriate policies, including 
removal of market access barriers. If all OECD countries were to remove all 
duties and quotas, exports of the least developed countries could increase 
Figure 7.6. Developing Countries Account for an Increasing Share of World Trade






















Source: Haddad and Hoekman (2010), drawing on UN-COMTRADE data.
Note: LICs = low-income countries; LMICs = lower middle-income countries; UMICs = upper middle-income 
countries; and HICs = high-income countries.
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by up to US$2 billion more than they would under a 97 percent scenario 
called for in the 2005 WTO ministerial declaration (Bouët et al. 2010). But 
these export gains would be greater still—by up to US$5 billion—if 
major middle-income nations were to offer duty- and quota-free access to 
least developed countries—a fi nding that refl ects the higher tariffs in mid-
dle-income countries. To be effective, such improved market access needs 
to be accompanied by liberal rules of origin and related administrative 
requirements. 
Supporting Regional Cooperation and Integration of Markets: 
Capacity Building
Although most of the aid-for-trade agenda is national in scope, the 
demand for assistance to support regional integration has recently 
increased. One factor driving this increase is a recognition that key con-
straints to a country’s competitiveness may lie outside its borders. This 
is most directly the case for landlocked countries. A number of com-
mon priorities for regional integration lie in areas such as transport 
Figure 7.7. Southern Countries Still Export Fewer Varieties Than Northern Ones
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infrastructure, road corridors, energy and water, and trade facilitation. 
Efforts to integrate neighboring markets for goods, services, and factors 
of production (workers, investment) can help stimulate South-South 
trade by reducing trade costs and allowing economies of scale to be real-
ized. Much of the agenda here revolves around initiatives to lower trans-
action and operating costs for fi rms on both sides of the border. Lowering 
such costs in a cooperative (joint) manner does not give rise to the types 
of welfare-reducing trade diversion that can result from preferential 
reduction of tariffs: lower trade costs benefi t all trade partners, facilitat-
ing trade with the rest of the world as well as with neighbors.19 
The benefi ts of strengthened regional cooperation are evident. The 
Asia Pacifi c Economic Cooperation (APEC) agenda on trade provides 
one example. Based on a computable general equilibrium model, Abe 
and Wilson (2008) fi nd that trade in APEC countries would increase by 
11 percent and global welfare would expand by US$406 billion by reform 
aimed at raising transparency to the average level in the region. 
The simulations suggest that most of the increase in welfare would 
take place in member economies undertaking reform. Evidence also sug-
gests that reform in some of the poorest regions of the world could gen-
erate substantial benefi ts. If Ethiopia, for example, reduced its trade costs 
to twice those of the best performer in the region, the gain would be 
roughly equivalent to a 7.6 percent average cut in tariffs faced by Ethio-
pian exporters in export markets (Portugal-Perez and Wilson 2009).
Cooperation at the regional level poses specifi c challenges in that the 
costs and benefi ts of projects can be very asymmetrical, with most of the 
required investments (and thus costs) accruing to a country that receives 
relatively little benefi t from the investment. Because this asymmetry can 
greatly reduce support for regional projects that are critical to landlocked 
developing countries, one rationale for aid for trade is to increase the 
incentives for joint action in areas where benefi ts are distributed unevenly 
across countries. 
For example, landlocked developing countries in Africa—in which 
more than a quarter of the continent’s population lives—face a substan-
tial competitive disadvantage caused by high trade costs (Djankov, Fre-
und, and Pham Cong 2006; Raballand and Teravaninthorn, 2009; Arvis 
and Raballand 2010; Arvis et al. 2010). These countries also tend to have 
lower levels of foreign direct investment. 
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Portugal-Perez and Wilson (2010b) explore the relationship between 
trade costs and FDI into developing countries, including landlocked ones. 
Preliminary estimates show a negative relationship between trade costs 
and FDI in a North-South context. Indeed, most FDI in developing coun-
tries fi nances operations entailing the transport of goods across borders, 
as in extraction industries, or in industries exporting goods intensive in 
low-skilled labor. In that context, they argue, domestic trade costs can be 
seen as a tax on operations and have an impact on FDI attractiveness. 
Landlocked developing countries are particularly damaged because 
they tend to have higher export costs than their coastal neighbors. For 
these states, domestic problems are augmented by the problems prevail-
ing in transit and coastal countries. But coastal countries also experience 
externalities: a nationally focused strategy often will not be suffi cient to 
maximize trade and growth opportunities if neighboring markets are 
ignored. Policy reforms and actions that can lead to signifi cant improve-
ment of the business environment and attract investment are of a public 
good nature: the associated outputs are nonexcludable (that is, it is dif-
fi cult to prevent countries from using the public good even if they did 
not contribute to producing it) and nonrival in consumption (that is, 
use by a neighboring country does not affect the supply or quality of the 
good); hence the need for a collective action solution at a regional level. 
All stakeholders understand the need for regional cooperation. The 
range of available instruments to support regional projects and coopera-
tion is limited, however, resulting in the underprovision of fi nancing and 
assistance for multicountry trade-related projects (Hoekman and 
Njinkeu 2010). Weak capacity of existing regional secretariats and prore-
form civil society groups and the diffuse nature of the benefi ts of exist-
ing integration mechanisms for the private sector have also resulted in a 
poor implementation track record. Moving the regional integration 
agenda ahead requires addressing frontally the political economy of 
regional cooperation and coordination by increasing the incentives for 
implementation. Engagement must take place on several different fronts, 
with a reward-incentive scheme that targets all relevant actors—national 
governments, subnational entities, and nonstate actors.
Dedicated funds to support regional cooperation, covering both soft-
ware (regulatory institutions, policy changes) and hardware (infrastruc-
ture to support cross-country fl ows of goods, services, and people) could 
304 Postcrisis Growth and Development
help to fi ll the gap that currently exists. A concerted focus on identifying 
and fi nancing regional projects that would help to address national pri-
orities could also help overcome resistance to benefi cial regional market 
integration (benefi cial in the sense of helping to attain the competitive-
ness objective). A practical way forward would be for a greater proportion 
of donor funds for aid for trade to be allocated for regional projects.20 
Most regional and multilateral institutions already have trust funds through 
which such resources could be channeled.
The G-20 can make a direct contribution in support of regional inte-
gration through knowledge exchange and capacity building led by the 
middle-income members of the G-20. From APEC to the Association of 
South East Asian Nations to regional institutions in Africa, a new empha-
sis by the G-20 on knowledge transfer to support the integration of 
neighboring markets through joint projects would represent an innova-
tive step toward cooperation.
Harnessing the Private Sector as a Source 
of Knowledge, Capital, and Information
Given the broad nature of the aid-for-trade agenda—encompassing 
areas from border management to regulatory reform to infrastructure 
investment—a sizable number of stakeholders are involved from both 
the public and private sectors. As such, there is great scope to make effec-
tive use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) that capitalize on private 
sector expertise in prioritizing areas for reform and identifying potential 
solutions. The United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Elec-
tronic Business in October 2001 put forth a recommendation specifi cally 
addressing the purpose, methods of creation, and operating structures of 
such PPPs (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 2001).
Such models have proliferated at the national level, an example being 
national trade facilitation associations that work to connect stakeholders 
in the public and private spheres to carry out work at a broad national 
level or in specialized areas such as border management reform (exam-
ples include TradeNet of Singapore and Tradelink of Hong Kong, China) 
(UNESCAP 2007). These networks serve as important platforms for 
developing national strategies and action plans for reform, in addition to 
providing stakeholders with a mechanism for coordination and harmo-
nization of policy measures across industries and sectors. Much more 
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can and should be done to harness the knowledge and information that 
exists in the private sector, both as a source of data on constraints to 
trade and policies or factors that needlessly increase costs of trading, and 
as a source of potential solutions to specifi c problems. 
The World Bank is developing a new Public-Private Partnership on 
Aid for Trade Facilitation as a platform for an exchange of information 
and learning in the area of trade facilitation. The project will design and 
implement practical and achievable trade facilitation projects that lower 
trade costs by addressing the lack of capacity of developing countries to 
rapidly move goods and services across borders. A central focus of the 
work will be to improve the “software” of trade logistics and border 
management to complement and enhance hard infrastructure invest-
ments. In addition, the partnership will leverage private sector expertise 
in producing real-time trade performance data, which may be used to 
encourage policy-oriented trade facilitation reform. A broader effort 
along such lines that could be considered by the G-20 is outlined in the 
concluding section of this chapter.
Bolstering Monitoring and Evaluation 
of the Effectiveness of Aid for Trade
It is generally recognized that action is needed to strengthen account-
ability of stakeholders in the provision of aid for trade and to assess its 
impact. Effective monitoring of delivery of aid for trade and the extent 
to which it responds to national priorities as defi ned by recipient gov-
ernments is critical. Effective monitoring is also important to allow 
accurate assessments and evaluation of outcomes. Most donors monitor 
and evaluate their aid-for-trade programs in accordance with generic 
evaluation guidelines or with specifi c guidelines for themes and sectors 
falling under aid for trade (OECD-WTO 2009). Much greater efforts are 
needed to expand monitoring frameworks to support aid effectiveness, 
including direct engagement of the private sector and civil society in 
evaluating aid-for-trade fl ows to ensure they are directed toward sound 
and sustainable projects.
More learning could be generated by applying, whenever possible, the 
kind of impact evaluation methods now widely used in the evaluation of 
poverty, health, and education projects. The essence of these methods 
consists of using control groups to benchmark the improvement in the 
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performance of individuals “treated” by particular programs. Clearly, 
not all trade-related programs are amenable to such “treatment-effect” 
methodologies. The easiest are export-promotion programs that target 
individual fi rms, much like medical treatments target individual patients 
(see Volpe and Carballo 2008 for an evaluation of Peru’s export-promo-
tion program). 
Even in the few areas where application is relatively straightforward, 
the few applications of “clinical” impact evaluation methods to trade- 
related programs have so far been limited in scope: they provide no 
evaluation of spillover effects—even though spillovers are key to the 
justifi cation of public intervention—and have, like all clinical impact 
evaluations, uncertain “external validity,” because what works in one 
setting may not work in another. Notwithstanding these and other cave-
ats that have been extensively discussed in the literature, they offer 
a valuable tool for understanding what works and what does not. In 
particular, when carefully thought out, they can help identify which 
components of assistance programs work best. That is, beyond their 
contribution to general accountability, they have the power to generate 
useful knowledge to renew the factual basis on which to base policy 
advice and donor practice. 
A new strategic investment in data and analysis should include work 
at both the macro and micro levels (Wilson 2010). An agenda in this area 
must center on a framework for rigorous evaluation of aid-for-trade 
projects, empirical research on aid impact evaluation, drawing on macro 
datasets from the OECD databases and microdata from projects that are 
implemented by development agencies. Country and regional analyses 
of aid-for-trade effectiveness are needed to assess how types of aid-for-
trade funds, classifi ed according to the OECD Creditor Reporting Sys-
tem, are spent in relation to their returns, as measured by increased trade 
fl ows, lower trade costs, and the like. Data on trade costs could be col-
lected from a variety of sources, including trade support institutions, 
customs authorities, and international transport companies. Detailed 
data will be needed to assess policies related to specifi c aid-for-trade 
interventions, such as support for industrial upgrading, quality certifi ca-
tion of fi rms, or technical assistance for transport logistics. New assess-
ments should include cross-country evidence and in-depth case studies 
to assess the impact of these interventions.
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Moving the Agenda Forward
The G-20 is uniquely positioned to support specifi c actions to expand 
global trade. The fragile economic recovery, combined with the need to 
strengthen the international trading system in support of sustainable and 
inclusive growth and employment, places the aid-for-trade initiative at 
the forefront of policy importance. In addition to delivering on the com-
mitments made in Gleneagles, Scotland, and Hong Kong, China, on 
expanding aid-for-trade fl ows, there are four strategic themes that a 
G-20 Action Agenda on Aid for Trade and Development might support:
•  Establish a G-20 platform for capacity building and transfer of knowl-
edge on policies and regulatory options to improve the effi ciency of 
producer services and the operation of network infrastructure. A 
coordinated program of assistance and knowledge exchange that 
includes active involvement of middle-income G-20 countries could 
do much to increase the rate of return on aid-for-trade investments in 
hard infrastructure by creating a mechanism that focuses on strength-
ening capacity to put in place the associated complementary “soft-
ware” inputs—policies, procompetitive regulation, and so on—that 
are critical both to realize social (equity) objectives and to improve 
the effi ciency of use of network infrastructure.
This agenda goes beyond leveraging investments in infrastructure. 
It encompasses producer and business services more generally. An 
important factor that explains lack of progress in negotiations aimed 
at liberalization of trade and investment in services is uncertainty and 
concerns regarding the possible consequences of making market 
access commitments. Establishment of a forum that is aimed at sub-
stantive discussion and analysis of the impacts of liberalization and 
specifi c regulatory policies and policy changes could do much to build 
a common understanding of where there are indeed large gains from 
liberalization (Feketekuty 2010; Hoekman and Messerlin forthcom-
ing). How such a forum could be designed is a matter that requires 
discussion and consultations among G-20 members. No existing 
institution has an obvious comparative advantage in playing this role. 
One option could be to pursue a consortium approach, in which a 
number of regional think tanks, policy institutes, and networks of 
regulators (such as the International Competition Network) from 
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around the world combine to provide the needed knowledge resources 
and deliver the suggested services, working with or through a central 
or hub entity that would be created. Such a mechanism would need a 
governance structure in which donor governments and other funders 
would be represented. A possible model is the one that was used to 
establish the Global Development Network. 
•  Complement the fi nancial aid for trade provided by high-income 
G-20 members with market access reform by middle-income G-20 mem-
bers to lower barriers to exports from poor countries to expand South-
South trade. Extending duty-free, quota-free access for least devel-
oped countries to all G-20 members, with minimal exceptions, would 
constitute a concrete initiative that would directly promote the trade 
and development prospects of the poorest countries in the world. It is 
an initiative that is completely at the discretion of G-20 members in 
that it can be done at the stroke of a pen. It would come at very low 
“cost” to the G-20 in terms of additional imports given that the pro-
duction and trade structures of the least developed countries and the 
G-20 countries have little overlap and that the poor countries are in 
any event very small suppliers. Any duty-free, quota-free initiative 
would need to be accompanied with liberal rules of origin and rules 
of cumulation—as has now been documented extensively, restrictive 
rules of origin can greatly reduce the effectiveness of such programs. 
Concrete solutions to the rules-of-origin constraint have been devel-
oped by several importing countries and can be emulated by other 
G-20 members (Elliott et al. 2010).
•  Create a new aid-for-trade public-private partnership to leverage the 
dynamism in the private sector for strengthening trade capacity in the 
countries that are recipients of aid for trade. Given the high payoffs 
from improving trade facilitation, encompassing areas from border 
management to regulatory reform to adoption of modern informa-
tion and communications technologies, such a partnership might 
focus initially on capitalizing on private sector expertise in prioritiz-
ing areas for reform and identifying potential solutions, while lever-
aging the coordinating capacities of governments and multilateral 
donor institutions. The World Bank is developing a new public-private 
partnership on aid for trade facilitation that could serve as a model in 
this regard. 
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•  More generally, the private sector is already undertaking numerous 
initiatives to address concrete problems and to leverage ongoing invest-
ments to enhance development impacts. Examples are growth corri-
dor initiatives supported by Yara International in Ghana, Malawi, and 
Tanzania and the Business Action for Africa, which has various focused 
initiatives such as the alliance for Improving Customs Administration 
in Africa. Greater sharing of information on such initiatives and learn-
ing about what works and what does not would enhance the visibility 
of such efforts and boost the role of the private sector in the broader 
aid-for-trade program.
•  Draw up a G-20 “strategic action plan” to provide dedicated fi nan-
cial support for a concerted program of monitoring and evaluation 
of aid for trade anchored in systematic data collection and research. 
All donors and recipients recognize the importance of monitoring 
and evaluation and analysis of trade outcomes and performance. 
The OECD is taking the lead in coordinating efforts to share the 
results of monitoring and evaluation by donors and agencies and to 
learn from experience. There is, however, no dedicated funding to 
ensure consistent cross-country collection of data on trade out-
comes and their determinants on a comparable basis. This is not to 
say that individual projects and programs do not get evaluated or to 
argue that impact evaluation should not be designed into projects 
where possible. A lot of knowledge is generated by ex post evalua-
tion of projects. While such evaluation produces project- and coun-
try-specifi c information, it does not result in datasets that allow for 
benchmarking of countries and tracking of performance over time. 
A concerted effort is needed to ensure that data are collected to 
allow the impacts of policy reform efforts and interventions to be 
compared across countries and over time. This will require agree-
ment among governments and agencies on the specifi c indicators 
for which data should be collected and compiled. Candidates 
include measures of trade costs, such as clearance and waiting 
times; the number of times that trucks are stopped along transport 
corridors; rejection or inspection rates of consignments at borders; 
trade diversifi cation; and trade and investment policies (such as 
services restrictiveness and the prevalence and intensity of nontar-
iff barriers).
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Notes
 1.  See http://en.g8russia.ru/docs/16.html. At the December 2005 WTO Ministerial 
in Hong Kong, China, a new WTO Aid for Trade Task Force was created to pro-
vide recommendations to the WTO director-general on how to best “operation-
alize” aid for trade. The ministerial declaration also included explicit references 
to the importance of aid for trade to assist least developed countries “to build 
the supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure that they need to . . . 
implement and benefi t from WTO Agreements and more broadly to expand 
their trade (WTO 2005).
 2.  “The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform.” http://www.londonsummit.gov 
.uk/resources/en/PDF/fi nal-communique.
 3.  In contrast to other areas recently identifi ed as priorities for development assistance 
at a global level—such as the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program estab-
lished in 2009 with earmarked funding of US$1 billion to US$1.5 billion to scale up 
agricultural assistance targeted to the food security of low-income countries—
donors decided there was no need for such a mechanism in the trade area.
 4. There have been two global reviews to date, in 2007 and 2009.
 5.  See Prowse (2006) and Hoekman (2007) for a discussion of the genesis and 
rationales for the multilateral aid-for-trade initiative.
 6.  Even considering increased aid fl ows and commitments over the past several 
years, the World Bank estimates that developing countries confronted a fi nanc-
ing shortfall of between US$270 billion and US$700 billion in 2009. External 
fi nancing needs for developing countries are likely to increase because of the 
fallout of the crisis. 
 7.  This “sectoral allocable aid” excludes funds for debt relief, administrative costs, 
and budget support, as well as resources that are allocated to support trade 
fi nance. The G-20 mobilized a collective US$250 billion effort to support trade 
fi nance during the crisis. Access to such fi nance is an important determinant of 
the costs of trade and the ability of exporters to operate.
 8.  It should also be noted that the OECD-WTO numbers exclude development assis-
tance provided outside the framework of the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee and thus do not cover assistance provided by countries such as China.
 9.  When references are made to Credit Reporting System data, dollar fi gures are in 
2008 constant terms, whereas statistics attributed to OECD-WTO (2009) are in 
2006 constant terms.
 10.  See “Global plan for recovery and reform,” communiqué issued at the close of 
the G-20 London Summit, April 2, 2009. http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/
resources/en/PDF/fi nal-communique.
11.  Hard infrastructure is largely associated with investment in roads, bridges, or 
telecommunications, for example. Soft infrastructure is associated with policy 
and regulatory reform initiatives, for example.
12.  See Rajan and Subramanian (2005) for a survey and new assessment, and Cali 
and te Velde (2009) for a synthesis of the extant literature.
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13.  The effect is well known: aid fl ows may be used to fi nance expenditures of 
nontradable goods and services, leading to a rise in their relative price with 
respect to tradable goods and thus, to a real appreciation of the exchange rate. 
This appreciation reduces the competitiveness of the exporting sector, because 
resources are transferred from the tradable to nontradable sectors, and drives 
up wages and other input costs. Estimates of whether aid induces a Dutch dis-
ease phenomenon can vary widely. Much depends on assumptions about the 
marginal productivity of additional aid and public expenditures, the comple-
mentarities between public and private capital, and the degree of fl exibility of 
labor costs and other key resources. See, for example, Radelet, Clemens, and 
Bhavnani (2006). 
14.  Suwa-Eisenmann and Verdier (2007) provide a comprehensive review of this 
topic.
15.  For example, Nilsson (1997) observes for trade between the European Union 
and recipient countries that US$1 of aid generated US$2.60 of exports from 
donor to recipient for the period 1975 to 1992. Other researchers have explored 
additional links that may exist between the donor and recipient that may lead to 
additional trade, such as political or economic considerations (Lloyd et al. 2000). 
In a recent analysis Nelson and Silva (2008) obtained much smaller numbers 
using a fi xed effects gravity model estimation. 
16.  Four important bilateral donors have undertaken evaluations relatively recently: 
the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.K. Department for Inter-
national Development, thte Swedish International Development Cooperation 
authority, and the Netherlands.
17.  Donors involved in providing assistance for trade-related analysis or programs 
include the International Trade Centre (Geneva), the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development, the United Nations Development Program, 
the World Bank, the Enhanced Integrated Framework, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, the 
World Customs Organization, and the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion, as well as regional development banks and many bilateral donors. See 
Suwa-Eisenmann and Verdier (2007). 
18.  Raballand and Teravaninthorn (2009) fi nd that a lack of competition in truck-
ing in West and Central Africa results in higher transport prices and lower qual-
ity of services compared with more contestable Africa markets.
19.  As has been discussed extensively in the literature on regionalism, it is impor-
tant that policy not target an expansion in intraregional trade per se as a policy 
objective. What matters is to reduce barriers to trade generally, and regional 
agreements can help do so—especially for landlocked countries. 
20.  While proposals for earmarked funds are controversial, because earmarking can 
be inconsistent with aid effectiveness (the activities for which funding is ear-
marked may not be a priority in individual countries), the creation of a mecha-
nism that earmarks an overall amount for trade does not need to imply that 
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countries must identify trade as a priority; it simply provides greater credibility 
that development assistance will be available to countries if they decide that 
trade projects are a priority.
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Comments by Arancha González
World Trade Organization
I would like to commend Korea and the World Bank for organizing this 
event, especially this session on aid for trade. This is a testament to the 
growing importance that Korea and the World Bank give to increasing 
the impact of aid for trade at the multilateral and regional level. It is also 
particularly noteworthy that these discussions are taking place in Korea, 
which will be hosting the G-20 Summit in November 2010 and which has 
always emphasized the development dimension of economic growth.
Importance of Aid for Trade
Aid for trade is central to the inclusive globalization that underpins 
the Korean approach to promoting economic growth as well as Korea’s 
own development experience. The G-20, with its core mandate of 
global economic governance, is the preeminent aid-for-trade forum, 
and the outcome of this conference can very usefully feed into the 
G-20 process.
At the WTO Ministerial Conference that took place in Hong Kong, 
China, in December 2005, aid for trade was placed on the multilateral 
trade agenda. Its addition to the agenda responded to the realization that 
more open markets and a better regulated multilateral trading system 
also needed to encompass building productive capacity in developing 
countries, including the least developed among them. Empowering 
developing countries is essential to allow them to take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by the multilateral trading system. This fact 
explains why aid for trade is now fi rmly anchored in the WTO.
Since 2005 the WTO has acted as the focal point on aid for trade, 
serving as coordinator of a network of actors covering bilateral 
donors (including more and more emerging economies), partner coun-
tries, development banks, organizations of the UN family, and many 
other development agencies.
Comments on the paper “Aid for Trade: Building on Progress Today for Tomorrow’s 
Future” by Bernard Hoekman and John S. Wilson in chapter 7 of this volume.
 Aid for Trade: Building on Progress Today for Tomorrow’s Future  317
Aid for trade is part of the global effort to eradicate poverty and is part 
of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Since 
2005 it has gathered momentum but not at the expense of other MDGs. 
Strengthening Aid for Trade
Let me begin with a brief review of the paper from Bernard Hoekman 
and John Wilson, which is a very useful contribution to the aid for trade 
literature in that it sets out how aid for trade works, why it matters, and 
what has been achieved to date. The paper contains a useful discussion 
on whether the supply of aid for trade meets demand, with the encour-
aging conclusion that “countries with the lowest scores on trade capacity 
indicators receive the highest amounts of aid.” 
The section on aid-for-trade impacts and effectiveness is also useful. 
It points out the complexities of analyzing the relationships between aid, 
trade, and growth and the challenges of measuring the impact of aid for 
trade. The paper also provides a useful summary of the preliminary 
results, notably of Hoekman and Wilson’s own work, which point to 
high returns on assistance for trade policy and regulatory reform ($700 
in trade for each US$1 offered in support). 
However, let me make a few suggestions on how the recommenda-
tions made in the paper can be further strengthened. 
The reference in the fi rst recommendation to improving effi ciency of 
producer services and the rate of return on infrastructure could be fur-
ther developed. The Bank has been doing interesting work looking at 
infrastructure services and the effects that the liberalization of transport 
service markets would have on the cost of transportation. 
The implication is that building roads is not suffi cient; the operating 
environment needs to be created for transport fi rms to drive down costs 
through competition. This refl ection also highlights a drawback in the 
paper with respect to the need to focus on mainstreaming and the 
demand side of the equation, something which I touch upon later.
The proposal on making exports of least developed countries duty 
free and quota free is excellent, and I think the earlier all developed 
countries, and as many of the developing countries as possible, give full 
duty-free access to all products from these countries, the quicker we will 
318 Postcrisis Growth and Development
be able to collectively contribute to their growth and help them in the 
achievement of the MDGs. This is part of the WTO Doha Round nego-
tiations, and a proposal that the world will be watching closely as Turkey 
hosts the Fourth United Nations Least Developed Conference in 2011. 
This is an area where the G-20 leadership would be most welcome.
The third recommendation, namely, the proposal to create a new 
public-private partnership on aid for trade, builds on the Bank’s trade 
facilitation initiative, which has created a partnership known as the 
Global Express Carriers Association. 
The last recommendation, dealing with work on monitoring and 
evaluation, might be best considered in the context of the monitoring 
framework for aid for trade that is being jointly developed by the OECD 
and the WTO. That would allow for an open process into which the Bank 
and others could feed. I say this because I think the centrality of the 
monitoring and evaluation agenda to the future of the aid for trade ini-
tiative cannot be overemphasized. This agenda is inevitably complex, 
and I would caution against using a one-size-fi ts-all model. 
Resource Allocation and Mainstreaming Aid for Trade
I would like to make two additional points before I conclude, namely, on 
resource mobilization and the need to mainstream trade into opera-
tional stages, elements that I think should be incorporated into any 
future revision of the paper.
One of the most indisputable successes of the aid-for-trade package 
has been the substantial increase in resources that have been provided. 
Between the baseline period of 2002–2005 and 2007 aid-for-trade com-
mitments increased by an average of 10 percent annually. Between 2007 
and 2008 the increase was 35 percent in real terms. These fi gures give 
cause for optimism. OECD reports that aid for trade increased to 
US$41.7 billion in 2008, from US$27 billion in 2007. 
Asia continues to dominate the aid for trade fl ows. It remains the largest 
recipient of aid for trade, with Afghanistan, India, Iraq, and Vietnam being 
among the major individual recipients. In 2008 Asia received US$18.5 bil-
lion on aid for trade, an increase of US$5.3 billion over 2007. This increase 
was allocated mostly to economic infrastructure, which received US$4.5 
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billion, followed by productive capacity and trade policy and regulation 
which received US$465 million and US$221 million respectively. 
Resource mobilization will continue to be an important component 
of the WTO’s future work. Despite the impressive increases in aid-for-
trade fl ows, the expected tightening of public coffers as the recovery 
period moves forward means that we must remain vigilant to ensure that 
these levels of aid for trade fl ows are maintained. Strengthened monitor-
ing and evaluation will be crucial in this regard, as will be the leadership 
expected from the G-20 countries.
But fl ows are not everything. While the aid-for-trade initiative is 
partly about more resources, the focus has to be on improving the quality 
of aid, responding to partner country plans and priorities, and advocat-
ing and building evidence to support trade as a development tool, 
including by mainstreaming aid for trade into national development 
priorities. 
Mainstreaming is the fl ip side to resource mobilization. For increased 
aid-for-trade commitments to be effective, trade must be further inte-
grated into both recipient and donor strategies. It must clearly be demand 
driven.
I am therefore happy to say that in addition to a signifi cant increase in 
resources being committed to trade-related assistance, the aid-for-trade 
initiative has also led to a marked increase in the awareness among both 
donors and recipients of the need to effectively mainstream trade into 
national development policies and sectoral strategies. 
A simple assessment of responses of partner countries to the joint 
OECD-WTO questionnaire in 2009 indicates that developing countries 
are increasingly aware of the importance of mainstreaming and are tak-
ing strides in that direction. Donors have also made greater efforts to 
ensure alignment of their strategies to the needs and priorities of partner 
countries as recommended by the Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness 
and by the Accra Agenda for Action.
The WTO also continues to play an important role in facilitating this 
process. One method that WTO members have agreed to is the integra-
tion of a dedicated aid-for-trade component in the trade policy reviews 
of developing members. This we believe will provide an opportunity for 
mainstreaming activities to be showcased and for gaps to be corrected. 
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A fi nal point on partnerships and newcomers, where I believe the 
paper could also be strengthened: emerging economies are increas-
ingly becoming actors in providing aid for trade. The G-20 provides an 
excellent platform for them to share knowledge and experiences and to 
shine a spotlight into their work in this area. Korea could take the lead 
given its own experience in Asia and within APEC.
Let me conclude by saying that the economic crisis underscored the 
critical role that aid for trade can play in helping the recovery in the 
trade performance of developing countries, in particular the least devel-
oped countries. Aid for trade will have a role to play in the future given 
the expected uneven rates of recovery from the crisis and the change in 
the pattern of demand across countries and sectors. 
Signifi cant progress has been made in making aid for trade a global 
partnership. In the relatively short period of time that aid for trade has 
been on the WTO’s agenda, its impact has been substantial—a direct 
result of the engagement of the WTO members, and the collaboration 
with the international organizations, such as the World Bank. As we 
move into the next phase of our work, that support and collaboration 
becomes even more indispensable.
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Comments by Alan Winters
Department for International Development
This factual and informative chapter is a most welcome addition to the 
debate. It summarizes the state of the arguments and evidence for aid for 
trade after about a decade, and it makes some useful recommendations 
in the action points at the end. My comments mainly concern the action 
points, but I would like to start with two analytical issues. 
Hoekman and Wilson have a useful section on services and their regu-
lation. I would make even more of this part of the argument. Services 
account for a large share of every economy in the world—up to 75 per-
cent in some OECD economies such as Britain. As emerging and low-
income economies develop, their service sectors will both grow and 
become more central to their economic development. Not only are ser-
vices important as a source of income and employment, but they pervade 
the economy. As the authors point out, research suggests that an improve-
ment in the competitiveness and effi ciency of business services raises the 
productivity and competitiveness of nearly every sector in the economy. 
But if services are critical they are equally intractable. Experience in 
Europe and elsewhere suggests that reforming service markets is a far 
more diffi cult task than reforming goods markets. Their intangible 
nature makes problems of asymmetric information more important in 
services than in most goods, and this means that in most markets a 
degree of regulation is essential. In addition, many services are intensive 
users of highly skilled labor and have come to be regulated by organiza-
tions that are not very different from the medieval guilds. Thus a govern-
ment that wishes to reform one of its service sectors is essentially going 
head to head with series of powerful and skilled interest groups. And 
indeed, if the interest groups are not like medieval guilds, they are often 
parts of government itself and have found regulating services an attrac-
tive source of status—and possibly income.
Comments on the paper “Aid for Trade: Building on Progress Today for Tomorrow’s 
Future” by Bernard Hoekman and John S. Wilson in chapter 7 of this volume. Thanks to 
Mandeep Kuar-Grewal for help preparing this note and to Ros Tendler for logistical 
help.
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The diffi culty of introducing reform to service sectors suggests that 
the key is to build competitive and effi cient structures from the start 
rather than have to retrofi t them. Hence service sectors are not a problem 
that developing-country governments can leave until later but ones that 
would be most effectively tackled now. Moreover, in current circum-
stances a further attraction of undertaking service sector reform is that it 
is cheap in fi scal terms. One gets effi ciency gains for very small outlays of 
taxpayer money. These observations lead me to believe that focusing aid 
for trade on service sector reform would potentially offer considerable 
returns. The fi rst requirement is, of course, political—that a government 
wishes to grasp this nettle. But thereafter the requirements are substan-
tially in the realm of technical assistance, which very clearly falls within 
the ambit of aid for trade. Service sector reform is neither simple nor 
quick, so donors and governments will need to commit for substantial 
periods of time if these rewards are to be reaped. 
The second analytical issue I wish to comment on is regional inte-
gration. Regional integration—in the sense of trading strongly with 
your neighbors—is a fi ne thing but not if comes at the expense of trad-
ing with everybody else. Most low-income countries and their neigh-
bors constitute only a tiny proportion of world demand, and while 
there clearly will be market niches that are best fi lled locally, the bulk of 
market potential will lie further afi eld. Aid for trade does not, fortu-
nately, call on countries to reduce their tariffs preferentially on imports 
from their neighbors, and so the costs of simple trade diversion that 
blight regional arrangements in goods are absent. However, if the 
investments in infrastructure or changes to regulation were biased 
toward trade with neighbors, they could still induce inward-looking 
distortions. There are certainly areas in which regional cooperation 
makes a great deal of sense—for example, regional power pools, regional 
standards authorities, regional competition authorities, and the like. All 
that I am saying is that policy should not be oriented aggressively toward 
fostering regional trade but rather should be even-handed about the 
international trade it encourages.
I now turn to the four recommendations in the action plan. 
First, a G-20 knowledge-sharing platform: not surprisingly, given my 
background, I think that knowledge lies at the center of much of what we 
should be doing—not only in identifying issues and devising solutions 
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to problems but also in informing policy makers and the public and 
thus shaping important debates. Balanced growth—the G-20 objective—
 includes the low-income countries, and anything that the G-20 can do 
to support their growth would clearly be very useful. Knowledge does 
not necessarily travel particularly well, however, so a good deal of input 
will be required to tailor general results to local circumstances and to 
help governments develop and apply solutions suitable to their own 
 circumstances. 
Hoekman and Wilson specifi cally mention a regulatory dimension to 
this knowledge transfer and, given the comment above about the impor-
tance of services regulation, I strongly endorse this. On the other hand, I 
cannot help observing that not all the potential donors of such knowl-
edge are paragons of virtue and effi ciency when it comes to managing 
services. It is important in these circumstances that knowledge sharing 
does not amount to promoting national models but rather that it trans-
mits the results of sound analytical work and tailors both them and gen-
eral experience to local conditions. In this case recipients should be 
happy to receive advice that implies “do as I say, not as I do.” 
The second action point dealt with market access. Market access is 
important for low-income countries, although it should not be the be-all 
and end-all of trade policy. The proposal that least developed countries 
should receive duty-free, quota-free (DFQF) access to the whole of the 
G-20 market is challenging indeed, although, to be honest, for the 
advanced countries it should not be. An advanced economy produces 
almost no goods in common with a least developed country, and so 
when DFQF access is granted, the cost is not to local producers (who 
might form a political lobby) but to suppliers from the poor countries 
that do not quite qualify for the preferences—low-income countries that 
do not fall into the poorest category and lower-middle-income coun-
tries. For the emerging market members of the G-20, the situation may 
be a bit different, and there may be threats to local producers. However, 
given the formidable rates of growth that several of them have recorded 
recently, the diffi culties should not be insurmountable. Once DFQF 
access is achieved, there remains the challenge of designing suitable rules 
of origin and addressing other frictions so that the utilization rates of the 
preferences are increased to nearly 100 percent. In addition, however, my 
own view is that the least developed countries need not only to gain 
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market access but also to liberalize access to their own markets so that 
their producers have access to a wider range and a higher quality of 
inputs and their consumers can benefi t from greater effi ciency elsewhere 
in the world.
The third action point is to facilitate a stronger engagement with the 
private sector over aid for trade. This is something I fully endorse. The 
purpose of aid for trade is to facilitate private sector trade, and so an 
obvious place to start is to see what private companies need, how they 
think it can best be delivered, and so on. Of course one needs to be care-
ful to ensure that the process is not captured by particular fi rms or inter-
est groups, but one must equally avoid the logic that suggests that any 
private gain must be a public loss. Engaging the private sector in devel-
opment is also a high priority for the British government. We will be very 
interested to see how the World Bank’s pilot on public-private partner-
ship for aid-for-trade facilitation works out and would be very happy to 
interact further with the Bank in advancing these ideas. 
The fi nal action point is to enhance monitoring and evaluation, which 
has now assumed a central place in the discourse about development. The 
need for rigorous evaluation of our aid for trade and trade facilitation 
activities is pressing. Although we have some good stories to tell, proving 
these to the same sorts of standards achieved by other parts of the devel-
opment community (such as health) has been diffi cult. This is a job that 
must take a high priority and that deserves the attention of some of the 
best minds in the business. It is perhaps a little surprising—and even 
sad—given the World Bank’s efforts over the past fi ve years to main-
stream impact evaluations, that the need for evaluation has to be articu-
lated explicitly in a comment like this and that it is accompanied by a call 
for support. It is important that the Bank “walks its own talk” in generat-
ing the momentum and resources to make impact evaluation an integral 
and fully supported part of much of its lending program. In the British 
government value for money has become a central concern on which we 
expend considerable effort; we hope that the World Bank will take this 
similarly seriously.
The U.K. Department for International Development would welcome 
a program of impact evaluations, not only of DFID and World Bank aid-
for-trade projects but also of projects taken on by other donors. Indeed, 
if developing-country governments are devoting their own resources to 
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such activities, we would be happy to see these efforts evaluated as well. 
One dimension to add on evaluation is that it would be useful to focus 
some effort on evaluation of the impacts of policies on marginalized 
groups, such as female producers, isolated communities, or ethnic 
minorities.
Overall Hoekman and Wilson have provided an excellent and infor-
mative report. The challenge is now to start to put it into action.
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Chair’s Summary by Ernesto Zedillo 
Yale University 
It is my pleasure to serve as moderator and chair for this session. Fortu-
nately, the mantra of “trade, not aid” that was so prevalent in the second 
half of the 1990s and the early years of this century has subsided. It is 
now generally accepted that achieving development is a much bigger 
task than simply opening markets and expanding trade, but it is also well 
established that if trade is properly supported by the right human and 
physical infrastructure, as well as a propitious regulatory environment, it 
can indeed be a powerful tool for growth. That is precisely why aid for 
trade has recently acquired some respectability, fi rst in academia and 
second in policy circles. It is also generally accepted that, to benefi t from 
trade liberalization, developing countries must commit public invest-
ment resources for infrastructure and institutional development and 
involve the private sector. Aid for trade not only satisfi es capacity-build-
ing needs but also can fulfi ll adjustment needs. 
In the short term liberalizing trade can result in fi scal losses, particu-
larly if a country’s economy has been historically protective with high 
tariffs that constituted an important source of revenue. Liberalization 
can also imply preference erosions, which, in the case of least developed 
countries, have to be compensated. Signifi cant implementation costs 
are associated with the trade liberalization agenda, but it is important 
to think of aid for trade as an incentive and a supporting instrument to 
overcome behind-the-border costs that are incurred in productive 
activity. I consider aid for trade as a response to two extremes that 
became most poignant during the debate over the launching of the 
Doha Development Round agenda. On the one hand, some countries 
still hold the position that least developed countries should receive per-
petual, unconditional, special, and nondifferential treatment. On the 
other hand is the position that full trade reciprocity should be immediate. 
Summary of the paper “Aid for Trade: Building on Progress Today for Tomorrow’s Future” 
by Bernard Hoekman and John S. Wilson in chapter 7 of this volume.
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Aid for trade provides a doable and effi cient compromise between these 
two extremes. As I recall, when the duty-free initiative by the European 
Union was announced, my initial reaction was not one of great excite-
ment. At the time, this initiative sounded like a tactic to divert attention 
from the central task: effective, multilateral, and universal trade liberal-
ization. If the emerging countries in the G-20 imitate the countries that 
have already committed to provide duty-free access to their markets, 
that is fi ne, but only as long as that action is not in lieu of completing 
the main job. I feel very strongly on this point, and it would be highly 
disappointing if, at the November G-20 Summit in Seoul, this duty-free 
initiative is put forward as a major announcement in lieu of a commit-
ment to Doha. 
The global economy undoubtedly has ahead of it a rather complex 
and diffi cult period. While the worst has been avoided, that does not 
mean that all signifi cant issues have been solved. On the contrary, some 
of them are just beginning to appear on the international agenda. One of 
these items is the question of what will be the new drivers of growth. 
Historically, trade has been one of the drivers and will continue to play 
this role in the years ahead. It is, therefore, important to be supportive of 
trade, particularly among developing countries and, of course, between 
developed and developing countries. In this respect, aid for trade is going 
to take an even more prominent role than it has in the past. Since 2005, 
in fact, aid for trade has been featured on the international agenda and 
has received signifi cant commitments from donor countries. In a rather 
short period of time, not only the concept, but also the practice, of aid 
for trade has been well established. 
There remain, however, issues to be discussed and important deci-
sions to be made. Therefore, the organizers of this conference had the 
good sense to include a session on aid for trade to help build and expand 
on progress to date. One of the most impressive results from Hoekman 
and Wilson’s paper is that US$1 of aid for trade targeted at trade policy 
and regulatory reform could lead to about US$700 in additional trade. 
This fi nding illustrates the importance of the argument in their paper 
that more needs to be done to deal with the signifi cant lack of empirical 
information of the effectiveness of aid-for-trade policy and a lack of 
investment in rigorous monitoring and evaluation. Such estimates 
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 provide a powerful argument in favor of aid for trade. The authors 
note, however, that besides their paper, only one other piece of analysis 
examines this question from the macro level. To this end, the G-20 can 
help provide support for additional investigation into aid for trade’s 
value proposition and rates of return on investment.
8329
The authors thank Antonio Estache for his contribution to infrastructure research, which 
is drawn upon extensively in this chapter, as well as a number of others who offered advice 
and comments.
Infrastructure is essential for increasing economic progress and reducing 
poverty. The choices made in the type and scale of infrastructure invest-
ment also have major implications for environmental sustainability. To 
date, however, limited progress has been made in expanding infrastruc-
ture access in the vast majority of developing countries, with the notable 
exception of the East Asian newly industrialized economies and other 
countries in the region such as China and Vietnam. Moreover, infrastruc-
ture expansion often has come at the expense of the local environment 
and complicated responses to the longer-term challenge of climate change. 
These observations underscore the diffi culty in planning, building, and 
maintaining infrastructure for both socioeconomic progress and envi-
ronmental sustainability. 
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Several factors explain why progress has been so limited in addressing 
the economic and environmental challenges of infrastructure service 
provision. Economically, infrastructure is expensive, requires substantial 
up-front capital for benefi ts that are spread over time, and is plagued 
with diffi culties with cost recovery. For many countries, especially the 
poorer ones, the amount of investment needed is staggering. Moreover, 
like many others services dominated by the public sector, infrastructure 
has often been mismanaged. And since the consequences of underinvest-
ment are felt only with a lag, infrastructure has often borne the brunt of 
fi scal adjustments. Compounding these problems are limited data on 
infrastructure availability and spending. What does not get measured 
often does not get done. 
Environmental sustainability, in many cases is not well integrated into 
countries’ general strategies for development. Incorporation of the envi-
ronment into public sector infrastructure expenditures may give way to 
concerns about investment costs and more immediately pressing needs. 
Price signals and enforceable regulatory standards also may fall short of 
what is necessary to adequately incorporate environmental concerns in 
private sector infrastructure investment.
Private participation has an important role to play in infrastructure 
expansion. Indeed fl ows of capital associated with private participation 
in infrastructure (PPI) amount to about 1.2 percent of developing 
countries’ gross domestic product (GDP) today.1 PPI is also generally 
associated with fairly substantial increases in effi ciency. Historically, 
however, private participation has been most relevant for telecommuni-
cations and, to a lesser extent, energy, with a limited role in water, sanita-
tion, and transport. So while PPI is important, and is likely to continue 
increasing, it is by no means a magic bullet.
The threat of future climate change adds to the challenge of increas-
ing infrastructure services while addressing more local environmental 
concerns. Substantial inertia in both the natural climate system and the 
built environment means that today’s infrastructure investment deci-
sions heavily infl uence both future climatic conditions and the cost of 
deeply cutting global greenhouse gas emissions. Layered on top of these 
factors is an international system for establishing long-term emissions 
mitigation objectives that currently places the locus of responsibility 
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within already-developed countries. This leaves open questions regard-
ing how climate change threats can and should affect investment deci-
sions in developing countries, and what already-developed countries can 
and should do to support investment in lower-carbon economic growth 
opportunities, including lower-carbon forms of energy. Climate change 
also introduces a need to adapt infrastructure to the new, changing, and 
uncertain climatic conditions, adding further to the challenges of devel-
opment planning. 
The types and scale of infrastructure investment and its ongoing 
management constitute a key part of achieving “green growth”—growth 
that reduces poverty and is environmentally sustainable. Other factors 
also have decisive infl uences on green growth, notably, the nature of 
regulatory standards and economic incentives for reducing environmen-
tal degradation; availability and affordability of technologies with lower 
environmental impact; availability of complementary knowledge and 
skills; and broader issues of institutional capacity and governance. Since 
these factors in turn affect infrastructure decisions, there is strong inter-
dependence among the various infl uences on green growth.
This chapter begins with an overview of what is known about infra-
structure’s importance for growth, poverty reduction, and environmen-
tal sustainability. It then looks at the disappointing achievements to date 
in infrastructure provision across most of the developing world. Reasons 
for weak performance, including scarcity of fi nancial resources and inef-
fi cient management, are discussed, followed by a discussion of the role 
of the private sector. The challenge of addressing environmental sustain-
ability in infrastructure planning and investment is reviewed, and the 
chapter concludes with concrete proposals for follow-up by the Group 
of 20 (G-20).
Infrastructure Matters 
Infrastructure choices matter for economic growth, poverty reduction, 
and environmental sustainability. The relationships between infrastruc-
ture and growth are complex, however: more infrastructure does not 
always mean more growth, and more growth does not necessarily require 
more infrastructure.
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Infrastructure and Growth
Common sense suggests that modern economies cannot function with-
out infrastructure, which provides a variety of critical services that help 
determine any economy’s production and consumption possibilities.2 
Even if infrastructure is necessary for modern economies to function, 
however, more infrastructure may not necessarily cause more growth. 
The binding constraints may lie somewhere other than simply in the 
total quantity of infrastructure investment—in poor managerial incen-
tives or externalities from missing markets, for example. The effect of 
infrastructure may also vary as changes in the economy infl uence fi rms’ 
ability to take advantage of it. Thus infrastructure’s productive impact in 
Chile became much more pronounced after 1973, when the economy 
was liberalized (Albala-Bertrand and Mamatzakis 2004). 
Infrastructure can affect growth through many channels (see Agénor 
and Moreno-Dodson 2006 for an overview). In addition to the conven-
tional productivity effect, infrastructure is likely to affect the costs of 
investment adjustment, the durability of private capital, and both 
demand for and supply of health and education services. Many of these 
channels have been tested empirically and are refl ected in the wide vari-
ety of fi ndings in the abundant empirical literature on infrastructure 
and growth or productivity. Indeed exhaustive reviews of the literature 
(Briceño-Garmendia, Estache, and Shafi k 2004; Gramlich 1994; Romp 
and de Haan 2005; Straub and Vellutini 2006) show that, while some 
authors fi nd negative or zero returns, others fi nd a high impact of infra-
structure on growth.
Careful analysis of the literature shows broad agreement with the idea 
that infrastructure generally matters for growth and productivity, 
although some studies suggest its impact seems higher at lower levels of 
income (Romp and de Haan 2005; Calderón and Servén forthcoming; 
Briceño-Garmendia, Estache, and Shafi k 2004). Nevertheless, the fi nd-
ings vary greatly, particularly about the magnitude of the effect, with 
studies reporting widely varying returns and elasticities. In other words, 
the literature supports the notion that infrastructure matters, but it can-
not serve to unequivocally argue in favor of more or less infrastructure 
investment in specifi c instances. 
The variety of fi ndings is, in fact, not surprising. There is no reason 
to expect the effect of infrastructure to be constant (or systematically 
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positive), either over time or across regions or countries. Furthermore, 
estimating the impact of infrastructure on growth is a complicated 
endeavor, and papers vary in how carefully they navigate the empirical 
and econometric pitfalls posed by network effects, heterogeneity, and 
endogeneity. 
Leaps and Bounds: Network Effects. Infrastructure services are mostly 
provided through networks, a fact that implies a nonlinear relation with 
output. Telecommunications and electricity transmission exhibit strong 
network effects, whereby returns to users increase with the number of 
users. Roads, rail, and water and sanitation systems are also networked 
services, so the impact of new investments on growth, output, and fi rm 
costs depend on the overall state and extent of the network (Romp and de 
Haan 2005).3 With increasing returns, the marginal productivity of invest-
ments rises with the scale and “spread” of the network and thus will exceed 
the average productivity of investment until the market is saturated. 
A few authors have explicitly modeled the nonlinearity of infrastruc-
ture’s impact on output, growth, or production costs. Röller and Waver-
man (2001) fi nd that the impact of telecommunications infrastructure 
on output is substantially higher in countries where penetration 
approaches universal coverage. In the case of roads in the United States, 
Fernald (1999) fi nds that returns to investments were very high up to the 
point when the basic interstate network was completed. He argues that 
the completion of that network provided a one-time boost in U.S. pro-
ductivity. This fi nding is consistent with Hurlin (2006), who concludes 
that returns to infrastructure exhibit threshold effects and that the high-
est marginal productivity of investments is found when a network is 
suffi ciently developed but not completely achieved. 
Apples and Oranges: Heterogeneity in the Quality of Infrastructure Invest-
ments. Heterogeneity is a problem with measuring infrastructure stocks 
and services: for example, measuring only total kilometers of roads 
implies that a kilometer of one-lane road counts as much as a kilometer 
of fi ve-lane highway. Of even greater concern in interpreting fi ndings in 
the infrastructure growth literature is heterogeneity in the quality or 
purpose of infrastructure investment. Infrastructure investment gener-
ally is not faced with a real market test, and therefore differences should 
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be expected in rates of return across different projects. Politically or 
socially motivated projects are likely to exhibit lower rates of return, 
because their objectives are to bring in the votes or satisfy some social 
objective rather than to maximize growth.4
More generally, public infrastructure spending and thus the return on 
investment can be affected by public sector spending ineffi ciency. As a 
result, although fi nancial estimates of investment may be a good proxy 
for increases in private physical capital and may serve as the basis for 
constructing a stock fi gure through a perpetual inventory method, such 
estimates are much less appropriate with infrastructure. 
Which Came ﬁ rst? Endogeneity of Infrastructure Investments. Causality 
runs both ways between income and infrastructure. Indeed, most infra-
structure services are both consumption and intermediate goods, and 
many studies have documented that electricity consumption and demand 
for telephones and cars increase along with disposable income (Chen, 
Kuo, and Chen 2007; Ingram and Liu 1999; Röller and Waverman 2001).5 
Calderón and Servén (forthcoming) are among the researchers who 
take pains to deal with endogeneity and reverse causation effects through 
their choice of econometric techniques and by looking at the effect of 
cross-country differences in the level of infrastructure (not its change) 
on subsequent growth. They fi nd that both infrastructure quantity and 
quality are signifi cant infl uences on growth (fi gure 8.1).6 Infrastructure 
development increased average growth by 1.6 percent across the sample 
during 2001–05 compared with 1991–95. Of that, 1.1 percent was from 
increased quantity of infrastructure stocks, and 0.5 percent was from 
improved infrastructure quality. In South Asia the total contribution to 
the growth rate was 2.7 percent a year—1.6 percent from increased 
quantity and 1.1 percent from quality improvement. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa, in contrast, expansion in infrastructure stocks raised the growth 
rate by 1.2 percent a year, but deterioration of infrastructure services 
reduced the growth rate by 0.5 percent a year, implying only a 0.7 percent 
annual net contribution to growth rates.
Infrastructure and Poverty Reduction 
Low-quality and limited access to infrastructure have substantial impli-
cations for the poor (Fay et al. 2005). It affects their health, with unsafe 
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water and sanitation responsible for some 1.6 million deaths in 2003, 
90 percent of which were children under fi ve, mostly in developing 
countries (Hutton and Haller 2004). Richer people can also be affected, 
but the impacts are much greater for individuals already suffering from 
malnutrition or less likely to receive quality medical attention. Similarly, 
long-term exposure to indoor air pollution associated with the use of 
biomass for cooking by those who do not have access to modern sources 
of energy causes 2 million premature deaths every year.7 Limited infra-
structure access also affects the poor’s productivity. Electricity access is 
associated with improved educational outcomes, while access to reliable 
transportation determines access to jobs and markets to sell goods. 
For all these reasons, Calderón and Servén’s fi nding that increased 
infrastructure quantity and quality reduces inequality (fi gure 8.2) is 
hardly surprising. Once again, however, there is a sharp contrast between 
the experiences of South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa in the contribu-


































































Figure 8.1. Impact of Infrastructure Quantity and Quality on Growth
Source: Calderón and Servén forthcoming, ﬁ g. 2. 
Note: Bars show changes in average per capita growth from 1991–95 to 2001–05 resulting from changes in 
infrastructure quantity and quality.
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Infrastructure and Environmental Sustainability
With inadequate pollution control measures, emissions from large power 
plants and factories as well as from small-scale diesel generators will have 
negative effects on local air quality, leading to adverse effects on human 
health such as those noted above as well as damage to the natural envi-
ronment. Figures 8.3–8.5 provide some rough comparative information 
on these effects, which can be severe at high levels of concentration. 
Concentrations of PM10, which refers to fi ne particulate matter (under 
10 microns in diameter) that results to a signifi cant extent from burning 
fossil fuels, are signifi cantly above the World Health Organization target 
standard in all developing regions (fi gure 8.3). PM10 concentrations are 
heavily implicated in a variety of threats to human health. Data on 
sodium dioxide (SO
2
, a precursor of acid rain and itself a source of par-
ticulate matter) and carbon dioxide (CO
2
) per unit of electricity pro-
duced give a very crude sense of how these emission factors differ across 

































































Figure 8.2. Impact of Infrastructure Quantity and Quality on Income Inequality 
Source: Calderón and Servén forthcoming, ﬁ g. 3. 
Note: Bars show change in Gini coefﬁ cients from 1991–95 to 2001–05 resulting from changes in infrastructure 
quantity and quality.
















































































Figure 8.3. PM10 Ambient Concentration by Region in 2006











































































Figure 8.4. Average SO2 Emissions Related to Electricity Production, 
by Region, 2000 
Source: Stern (2006) for SO
2
 data; World Development Indicators 2009 for electricity data.
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advanced economies of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) (fi gures 8.4 and 8.5).
Infrastructure improvements, both large and small, also can provide 
signifi cant economic development benefi ts. Access to even limited elec-
tricity for lighting can have profound livelihood benefi ts, particularly for 
the more than 1.5 billion people worldwide still lacking such energy 
access. Transportation infrastructure improvements can lower costs of 
production and improve market access; improved surface water man-
agement infrastructure can help mitigate costly shortages. While the 
direct effects of these improvements are economic, they also can help 
facilitate more sustainable development (such as less depletion of land 
and water resources).
Management and upkeep of infrastructure affect not only the quality 
of services but also the environmental consequences of its use. The ben-
efi ts of expanded electricity transmission grids that can provide greater 
systemwide energy effi ciency and potentially improve access to renew-
able sources will not be realized if the grid is poorly maintained or if 
regulations limit access by cost-effective and lower-emitting generators. 
Likewise, substantial investments in improved water management and 
congestion-reducing road capacity will not produce economic or envi-












































































Figure 8.5. Average CO2 Emissions Related to Electricity Production, by Region, 2006 
Source: World Development Indicators 2009.
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Climate change adds new complexity to infrastructure planning and 
implementation. Globally, CO
2
 emissions from coal combustion in 2008, 
most of it used to generate electricity, accounted for about 42 percent of 
total emissions from energy consumption. Emissions from petroleum 
consumption constituted another 37 percent of the total, refl ecting both 
electricity generation and transportation.8 Both transport and energy 
infrastructure have long economic lives, so emissions from their use can-
not be easily or cheaply reduced. They also have strong indirect (induced) 
impacts on other long-lived infl uences on emissions such as settlement 
patterns and investment in energy-using equipment, as well as consump-
tion habits. The induced effects of infrastructure choices are a substantial 
part of the total carbon footprint (Shalizi and Lecocq 2009). While these 
types of investment currently are more cost-effective than investment in 
“greener” infrastructure when only investment and operating costs are 
considered, the “lock-in” effects imply a potentially very large cost in mov-
ing later to lower-carbon patterns of production and consumption. The 
prospect of bearing such costs in the future should be part of the calculus 
in evaluating infrastructure investment options, as discussed later.
Insufﬁ cient Infrastructure Achievements to Date 
Slow progress in expanding the availability of infrastructure has a signifi -
cant effect on households, particularly the poorer ones and those in poor 
countries. More than a quarter of developing-country households have 
no access to electricity (table 8.1). The situation is particularly dire in 
Africa, where nearly 70 percent of the population is unconnected. Access 
to water has increased (and the world is on track to meet the Millennium 
Development Goal, or MDG, of halving the proportion of people with-
out access to improved water), yet 884 million people are still without 
access to an improved water source. The sanitation situation is much 
worse, with 2.6 billion people lacking access to improved sanitation and 
the developing world unlikely to achieve the MDG sanitation goal.9 Con-
nectivity also remains low, particularly in the rural population where 
only 70 percent have access to an all-weather road (33 percent in Africa).
The infrastructure defi cit also affects productivity and fi rms’ ability to 
compete. Enterprise surveys reveal that delays of 30 days are the norm for 
connections to electricity, telephone, and water in developing countries. 
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And unreliability affects the bottom line, with some 4 percent of inven-
tory value lost to power outages (fi gure 8.6). Indeed, electricity-generating 
capacity per capita remains very low in developing countries (fi gure 8.7), 
a serious constraint to growth in many fast-growing low- and middle-
income countries.
Factors Explaining Slow Progress in 
Infrastructure Provision 
Slow progress refl ects a combination of insuffi cient and ineffi cient 
spending both in capital expenditures and in operations and mainte-
nance. Many governments, faced with competing priorities or diffi cult 
fi scal situations, simply do not or cannot allocate the resources needed 
to reach desirable levels of access or quality. In addition, infrastructure 
services often are public goods or natural monopolies, or both. As such 
they are either run or regulated by public entities and thus suffer from 
some common ineffi ciencies of public services. But a lack of data on 
spending, stocks, and services makes it diffi cult to evaluate the extent of 
the problem or its source. Private participation in infrastructure has 
brought additional fi nancing and in many cases has contributed to 
improvements in productivity. However, private participation depends 
on cost recovery potential and the quality of the regulatory framework. 






Percent of households with access to
Electricity 63 29 56
Improved water source 84 60 79
Improved sanitation facilities 52 31 48
Percent of rural population with access 
to an all-weather road 70 33 49
Telecom: mobile and ﬁ xed lines per 100 
inhabitants 64 36 42
Source: Cieslekowski (2008) for electricity; WHO-UNICEF (2010) for water and sanitation; Roberts, Shyam, and 
Rastogi (2006) for roads; and World Development Indicators 2009 for telecom data.
Note: Electricity and road access are for 2006 or the latest year available up to that date; telecoms, water, and 
sanitation data are for 2008. Figures are weighted by country population. The road access indicator measures 
the share of rural population that lives within two kilometers of an all-season road. 
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Infrastructure Is Costly 
Infrastructure is expensive and requires lumpy, up-front outlays. How 
much then should countries spend on infrastructure? The answer 
depends on the goal (box 8.1).10 Universal access does not require very 
large outlays. Responding to demand triggered by GDP growth would 
Figure 8.6. Connection Delays Are Substantial in Developing Countries 
Source: World Bank 2009b. 






















Figure 8.7. Electricity-Generating Capacity per Person in Developing 
and High-Income Countries, 2007
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Box 8.1. Estimating Infrastructure Expenditure Needs 
One approach for assessing infrastructure investment needs, laid out by Fay and Yepes (2003), 
estimates how much investment may be needed to satisfy ﬁ rm and consumer demand as a con-
sequence of predicted GDP growth. It does not measure the level of infrastructure needed to 
achieve a particular level of growth or well-being. The relationship between income level and 
demand for infrastructure services is established on the basis of past observed behavior in a 
sample of countries and extrapolated to the future using predicted income growth.a Although this 
approach has serious limitations, it forms the basis for many of the current estimates of multi-
country investment needs. Important caveats are that it relies on standardized unit costs, ignores 
many country and regional speciﬁ cities, and assumes that what happened in some countries in 
the past is a good predictor of what might happen in some other countries in the future. 
Estimates generated from an update of the original model suggest that investment and mainte-
nance expenditure required to respond to demand associated with projected increases in income 
are large, especially in low-income countries (box table).
Expenditures on maintenance are essential. Countries tend to underspend on maintenance 
(Rioja 2003; Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis 2004), a fact that substantially reduces the useful life of 
infrastructure assets and hence their rate of return. Maintenance expenditure standards are well 
known and result in predictable annual expenditure outlays when averaged over an entire network.b 
Yet, no country (of which the authors are aware) makes automatic provision for an increase in cur-
rent expenditures when a new asset is built or acquired. The implication is that in most countries, 
maintenance is suboptimal, leading to additional costs. 
There are many alternative ways of estimating infrastructure needs (Fay and Morrison 2007). A 
particular goal can be set and priced. This approach is the one followed by the Africa Infrastructure 
Country Diagnostic (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010). The goal was relatively ambitious given 
the existing situation: to stabilize electricity supply by developing an additional 7,000 megawatts a 
year of new power generation capacity and enabling regional power trade by laying cross-border 
transmission lines; to complete the intraregional ﬁ ber-optic backbone network and continental 
submarine cable loop; to interconnect capitals, ports, border crossings, and secondary cities with 
a good-quality road network; to provide all-season road access to Africa’s high-value agricultural 
land; to more than double Africa’s irrigated area; to meet the Millennium Development Goals for 
water and sanitation; to raise household electriﬁ cation rates by 10 percentage points (from its very 
Infrastructure Expenditure Needs (% GDP)
Country Income Investment Maintenance Total
Low-income  7.0  5.5  12.5 
Lower-middle-income  4.9  3.3  8.2 
Upper-middle-income  1.3  1.0  2.3 
Total developing  2.7  4.1  6.6 
Source: Yepes (2008). 
Note: Figures reﬂ ect estimated expenditures needed to respond to increased demand for infrastructure ser-
vices associated with projected income increases. Infrastructure includes water, sanitation, transport, and 
telecom. Expenditure percentages are calculations of average annual infrastructure spending needed over 
2008–15 as a percentage. 
(continued)
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require some 3 percent of GDP in new investments. But achieving the 
kind of growth that the Republic of Korea or other newly industrial-
ized countries experienced or following the rapid industrialization 
path of China would require spending some 6–10 percent of GDP 
annually, for decades. 
In the absence of data on public spending on infrastructure, it is 
impossible to contrast these estimates with what is actually spent. The 
one exception is Africa, where detailed country-specifi c studies were 
conducted under the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) 
study (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010). This study is an unprece-
dented effort to analyze both the state of infrastructure and the way to 
address the challenges of providing and fi nancing infrastructure services. 
The AICD fi ndings suggest that expenditure needs are higher than Yepes 
(2008) estimated and that they are much greater than the amounts cur-
rently allocated to infrastructure (table 8.2). Whether a similar fi nding 
would apply to other regions is unclear. 
Four steps are needed for a proper analysis of investment needs.11 
First it is helpful to understand how much is currently being spent and 
how that relates to current quantity and quality of infrastructure (Step 1 
in fi gure 8.8). The second is to set a target (which, as discussed, can be 
determined in a variety of ways) and price it. The difference between the 
target and current spending establishes the “infrastructure gap” shown 
in fi gure 8.8. It is then necessary to determine how much of this infra-
structure gap can be bridged through improved effi ciency (step 3). The 
balance represents the needed additional spending (step 4). 
Box 8.1. Estimating Infrastructure Expenditure Needs (continued)
low 29 percent); and to provide global systems mobile voice signal and public access broadband 
to 100 percent of the population. Implementing such a program would cost around US$93 billion 
a year (about 15 percent of the region’s GDP). Some two-thirds of this total relates to capital 
expenditure, and the remaining one-third to operation and maintenance.
Notes: 
a. The model only identiﬁ es potential demand given expected growth, not the level of infrastructure that would 
maximize growth or some other social goal.
b. Appropriate, but by no means generous, standards are approximately 2 percent of the replacement cost of 
capital for electricity, roads, and rail; 3 percent for water and sanitation; and about 8 percent for mobile and 
ﬁ xed telecom lines.
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Infrastructure Investments Are Not Always Efﬁ cient
Estimating the effi ciency with which infrastructure is designed, built, 
and operated requires a great deal more analysis than identifying infra-
structure spending, diffi cult as that can be. Such in-depth work was 
carried out for the AICD study. The conclusion was that Africa’s large 
infrastructure fi nance gap could be reduced by a third through effi -
ciency gains (see table 8.2). 
The effi ciency gap can have a variety of causes. Countries may be 
spending more on some types of infrastructure than they need to; that 
is particularly true where the expenditure is crowding out private 
Table 8.2. Infrastructure Spending Needs and the Funding Gap in Africa 
(as a percentage of GDP)
African Country Grouping Needs Spending Efﬁ ciency Gap Funding Gap
Middle-income (10) 6 2 (2)
Resource-rich (12) 5 3 (4)
Low-income (22) 10 3 (9)
Fragile states (36) 6 5 (25)
All Africa (15) 7 3 (5)
Source: Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010. 
Figure 8.8. The Key Steps of a Good Infrastructure Assessment 
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investment (for example, in telecom). Reducing institutional bottle-
necks to capital expenditure, improving maintenance, and reducing 
backlogs in infrastructure rehabilitation also would improve services at 
lower cost. 
Other sources of effi ciency improvement are more challenging to 
address in political economy terms. According to the AICD analysis, 
Africa’s power and water utilities have high distribution losses and 
signifi cant undercollection of revenues, as well as being overstaffed. 
Moreover, although African infrastructure charges are high by 
 international standards, so are the infrastructure costs; consequently, 
underpricing of infrastructure services is substantial.
Many other studies confi rm that spending effi ciency is a chronic 
problem in many countries. Recent work on energy consumption subsi-
dies by the International Energy Agency (IEA 2010) indicates that in 
2008 these subsidies added up to over US$550 billion globally, much of 
which was not very well targeted and providing limited benefi t to the 
poor. Moreover, phasing out these consumption subsidies by 2020 could 
reduce global CO
2
 emissions by almost 7 percent relative to what they 
otherwise might be. Similarly, work on Eastern European and Central 
Asian countries found that technical and commercial ineffi ciencies in 
spending cost the region some 6–7 percent of GDP in 2003 and continue 
to be signifi cant, despite improvements (Ebinger 2006). And the key 
conclusion of a report on infrastructure in Latin America was to “spend 
better” (Fay and Morrison 2007).
A word of caution is needed, however. Effi ciency gains are neither 
easy to achieve nor always free. Substantial efforts and political will are 
usually needed for the needed reforms. Signifi cant up-front investments 
may also be required, even if they eventually pay for themselves. 
What Does Not Get Measured Does Not Get Done
The claim that slow progress in public infrastructure refl ects a combina-
tion of insuffi cient and ineffi cient spending, while very plausible in light 
of the information available, is based on partial evidence because there is 
no systematic way of monitoring spending on infrastructure. Very few 
countries collect and report data on infrastructure investments, and the 
International Monetary Fund does not include such information in its 
Government Financial Statistics database (box 8.2). The situation is only 
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slightly better for private participation in infrastructure, as noted later. 
This is a challenge not just for analysis but even more importantly for 
informing decision makers and other stakeholders. One aphorism sums 
up the problem: “What does not get measured does not get done.”
The Private Sector and Infrastructure Investment
No data are available on actual disbursements by private investors in 
infrastructure. However, an international database developed and main-
tained by the World Bank compiles data on investment commitments 
associated with management, concession, greenfi eld, and divestiture con-
tracts that have reached fi nancial closure (http://ppi.worldbank.org/). 
PPI Has Grown Steadily Even in Low-Income Countries
Private participation in infrastructure has increased steadily since the 
1990s—at an average pace of 13 percent a year (fi gure 8.9). The Asian 
crisis in the late 1990s led to a fi ve-year hiatus, during which PPI slowed 
down quite substantially. PPI fl ows eventually recovered, reaching a peak 
of US$160 billion in 2007. 
Box 8.2. A Need for Better Data on Public Infrastructure Spending 
The Government Finance Statistics (GFS) database compiled by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) constitutes the main source of cross-country data on public ﬁ nance. However, its informa-
tion on infrastructure presents a number of problems, particularly for Africa. First, the GFS focuses 
on tracking general government expenditure, whereas a large share of infrastructure spending 
passes through nonﬁ nancial public corporations (parastatals). Second, even within the category of 
general government spending, the GFS is limited in practice to central government spending, with 
little reporting of subnational and special funds—two other important channels of infrastructure 
spending. Last, the GFS does not break down infrastructure spending by subsector or expense 
category. It thus provides no insight into how much is being spent on infrastructure, whether 
overall or by sector. 
The format in which the GFS is structured is undergoing revisions and may therefore be 
improved to include classiﬁ cations that are relevant for infrastructure. There is no plan to expand 
data collection beyond the central government accounts, however, implying that the substantial 
amount of infrastructure spending that is done by state-owned enterprises or decentralized gov-
ernment agencies (such as municipalities or provinces) will not be included. (The GFS actually does 
report consolidated public spending for Latin America.) 
Source: Briceño-Garmendia et al. 2010. 
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Overall PPI volumes have remained relatively steady in the face of the 
fi nancial crisis, although this masks a fl ight to quality that appears to be 
hurting poorer countries most. Flows barely changed between 2007 and 
2008, and new data confi rm that total fl ows remain high, with investment 
commitments to new projects growing by 15 percent in 2009 (Izaguirre 
2010). However, the number of projects has shrunk as investments grew 
selectively, concentrated in a few large projects in a few countries such as 
Brazil, China, India, the Russian Federation, and Turkey (Izaguirre 2010). 
If these fi ve countries were excluded, investments in developing countries 
would have fallen by 39 percent in 2009 relative to 2008. Among sectors, 
only energy has had investment growth in 2009. And while overall PPI 
investment fell by only 2 percent between 2007 and 2008, it dropped by 
nearly 10 percent in low-income and lower-middle-income countries 
and increased by 7 percent in upper-middle-income countries. 
More generally new projects are facing more diffi cult market condi-
tions. Deals take longer to close, and conditions are more stringent. 
Financing usually involves lower debt-to-equity ratios, higher costs, and 
shorter debt tenors. The favorable credit conditions that prevailed before 
the fi nancial crisis are not expected to return. Tougher fi nancial condi-
tions, including higher borrowing costs, are expected to become the 
Figure 8.9. Investment Commitments to PPI Projects Reaching Closure in 
Developing Countries, 1990–2008
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norm, a result of increased risk aversion, competition with borrowing 
from high-income governments, and the backlog of deferred or unfi -
nanced projects (Izaguirre 2010).
Sectorally PPI has been concentrated in telecommunications, which 
has accounted for about half of all investment commitment of the past 
20 years (fi gure 8.10). Energy is a distant second (30 percent of total), 
followed by transport (17 percent), while water and sanitation never 
represented a large share.
PPI has also been concentrated geographically, with the top six coun-
tries accounting for about half of PPI in the last few years (increasing to 
60 percent in 2008) (fi gure 8.11). Historically PPI represented a fairly 
even share of GDP for all regions except the Middle East and North 
Africa and East Asia. But that changed in recent years, with Europe and 
Central Asia, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa seeing PPI gain in 
importance and reaching some 2 percent of GDP. In contrast, PPI became 
relatively less important for East Asia and Latin America (fi gure 8.12).
PPI has amounted to a striking 4 percent of low-income countries’ 
GDP in recent years—much higher than in richer developing countries, 
where it averaged 1.2–1.3 percent of GDP (fi gure 8.13a). These numbers 
Figure 8.10. PPI Infrastructure Projects by Sector 
Source: PPIAF and World Bank (http://ppi.worldbank.org/). 
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refute the widespread belief that low-income countries have not benefi ted 
from PPI. The concentration of PPI fl ows in upper-middle-income coun-
tries (55 percent of PPI fl ows since 1990) declined in recent years as low-
income countries nearly doubled their share from 7 to 12 percent. More 
generally the concentration of PPI is roughly in line with global GDP 
concentration (fi gure 8.13b). However, three-quarters of low-income 
Figure 8.11. Geographic Concentration of PPI in Developing Countries
Source: PPIAF and World Bank (http://ppi.worldbank.org/). 


















Figure 8.12. Change in Importance of PPI by Region 
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country PPI investment has been in telecom, as opposed to a bit less than 
half for middle-income countries. 
Given the lack of data, it is unclear what share of overall investments 
PPI investment represents, although various authors have estimated it to 
be 20–25 percent (Estache and Fay 2010). In Africa AICD analysis suggests 
PPI has contributed some 10–15 percent of needs in recent years, but 
much of it is concentrated in South Africa and to a lesser extent Kenya.
Behind these overall measures, large-scale operators from high-
income countries increasingly are being replaced by developing-country 
investors who have emerged as a major source of investment fi nance 
for infrastructure projects with private participation. Schur et al. (2008) 
show that during 1998–2006 developing-country investors contributed 
more than half the private investment in concessions (55 percent), half 
in greenfi eld projects (50 percent), and a smaller share in divestitures 
(29 percent). The large majority of the funding came from local compa-
nies investing in projects in their own country (“developing local” inves-
tors); almost all the rest came from investors from nearby countries.
PPI Brings Efﬁ ciency Improvements But Also Can Be Costly
In all sectors, with the exception perhaps of the water sector, there has been 
a difference in effi ciency between public and private operators.12 In general 
Figure 8.13. Distribution of PPI by Income Group 
Source: PPIAF and World Bank (http://ppi.worldbank.org/). 
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private operators have been more effi cient, which implies that users and 
the taxpayers can potentially benefi t from private operation of the ser-
vices. However, the level of effi ciency and the distribution of the gains 
achieved from these more effi cient levels have been driven by the quality of 
the economic and regulatory environment, and these often fall short. 
Exchange rate risks, commercial or demand risks, regulatory risks, 
and political instability all act as strong disincentives for the participation 
of the private sector and increase the cost of public-private partnerships 
(PPPs). These risks are typically accounted for in estimates of the mini-
mum rate of return that private operators want from a deal in a given 
country. Ultimately these risks refl ect problems of governance that go 
beyond infrastructure. Until and unless these risks are reduced, mini-
mum rates of return on private investment will be high. Box 8.3 provides 
some ideas on how to reduce the costs of PPPs. 
The estimated cost of capital associated with a transaction can be a 
good approximation of the expected minimum return. Estimates of 
the cost of capital for various infrastructure subsectors suggest that 
the returns required to start a project have to be at least 2–3 percentage 
points higher in lower-income countries than in richer developing 
Box 8.3. Some Suggestions for Reducing the Costs of PPPs
Appropriate allocation of various risks between the parties (public, private, or third party such 
as a guarantee facility) best placed to shoulder them can lead to net reductions in cost. Thus 
having a broad range of instruments available to deploy ﬂ exibly for allocating risks should lead 
to efﬁ ciencies that in turn will reduce the costs of PPPs. 
The ﬁ rst few partnerships in a particular investment program involve experimentation and 
signiﬁ cant uncertainty for the private sector. As such, they inevitably tend to be costly in terms of 
using scarce planning and oversight resources in the government, as well as typically seeing a 
higher return demanded to compensate for risk. If these initial investments go well, however, 
subsequent partnerships are likely to be easier to prepare and to beneﬁ t from the improved famil-
iarity of private investors with the structure and sector. As the program expands with additional 
projects in the same sector, costs should then drop. India had this experience with its national 
highways program. India ﬁ rst introduced PPI partnerships into its national highway development 
project through pilots to experiment with their use in expanding existing highways. The pilot 
projects were replicated not just across the national program but also provided models for state 
governments to adopt in expanding their own road networks. Governments also may beneﬁ t 
from focusing on structuring PPIs at a scale well suited to capacities of the local private sector, 
which may mean smaller-scale investments.
Source: Contributed by Clive Harris.
352 Postcrisis Growth and Development
countries—more than twice what is generally expected in developed 
countries in infrastructure activities.13 The average ex post rates of return 
for the large operators that have led many of the developing-country 
privatizations of the last 15 years often have been below the desired or 
expected levels, particularly in Eastern Europe and in Latin America. 
Summing Up: Determining the Level and 
Availability of Needed Financing 
How large might future infrastructure expenditures be? How might the 
needed increases be funded?
The basic equation of infrastructure fi nance is that funding can come 
only from two sources: users or taxpayers (fi gure 8.14).14 The willingness 
of users and taxpayers to accept payment obligations determines the 
extent of fi nancing available. This fi nancing can be provided by national 
budgets, international assistance, and the private sector. At the same time, 
effi ciency gains can help reduce the overall funding—hence fi nancing—
needs.15 The private sector will get involved only to the extent it can 
recover its costs (including its desired risk premium) and obtain a rea-
sonable profi t from user charges or public subsidies funded by taxpayers. 
Public fi nancing is constrained by the willingness of users and domestic 
taxpayers to contribute, while offi cial development assistance (ODA) 
depends on foreign taxpayers. 
Figure 8.14 helps structure thinking about how to move forward on 
improving infrastructure access and quality. The annex to this chapter 
describes a set of illustrative calculations, based on admittedly heroic 
assumptions, which suggest that infrastructure investment needs in 
Figure 8.14. The Balance of Infrastructure Financing and Funding
Source: Authors’ depiction.
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developing countries could be on the order of US$1.2 trillion to US$1.5 
trillion a year in 2013, if they represent some 5–6 percent of developing-
country GDP (we know they are much higher, possibly around 15 per-
cent of GDP in the poorer countries). This does not include any addi-
tional expenditures related to maintenance, or to greenhouse gas 
mitigation and adaptation to climate change.16 
Not all developing countries have the fi scal space to spend the needed 
amount on infrastructure—that is the case not just for the poorest coun-
tries but also for most Latin American countries and for countries in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia whose fi scal positions have been heav-
ily affected by the consequences of the fi nancial crisis. 
International assistance to infrastructure has been substantial in 
recent years but is likely to decline. Much aid has been directed to sup-
port stimulus packages in which infrastructure was often prominent. 
World Bank Group lending, for example, reached some US$22 billion 
in 2009, leveraging another US$55 billion from bilateral and multilat-
eral ODA. Such high levels of crisis-induced lending are unlikely to be 
sustained, however. Expectations are that World Bank lending, as well 
as other ODA, will substantially decrease overall in the next few years. 
This is a consequence both of the need to readjust balance sheets after 
the peak in lending around the crisis and of donor countries’ own fi s-
cal woes. A very likely scenario is that infrastructure lending by the 
World Bank could be cut by half, even if it remains around 40 percent 
of overall lending. 
If the growth in PPI continues as it has over the past 20 years, fi nanc-
ing could reach some US$250 billion by 2013. Such growth is possible; 
but the binding constraint, again, will be the attractiveness of the market 
for private fi rms as determined by the potential for cost recovery. The 
ability of countries to keep the costs of PPI down, through better regula-
tion and contract management and through a focus on the truly promis-
ing sectors, will also be critical. 
The fi gures developed in the annex inform on the magnitude of the 
challenge. Even under a fairly optimistic scenario, in which public 
spending on infrastructure increases by 20 percent in real terms, public-
private partnerships continue to grow at the rhythm exhibited in the 
past, and ODA declines by only 25 percent, a funding gap of some 
15–30 percent could emerge. A more pessimistic scenario, one in which 
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developing countries cut public investments by 20 percent, PPI grows at 
only 7 percent a year, and ODA declines by half could result in a massive 
shortfall. Further, the gap is likely to be largest in poorer countries. Suc-
cess in minimizing or even closing the gap will require very substantial, 
though feasible, improvements in investment effi ciency, in resource 
allocation, and in the climate for public and private fi nancing. Building 
on the lessons learned in dealing with the impact of the crisis on infra-
structure will be essential (box 8.4).
Green Growth and Infrastructure Investment 
The term green growth has been coined to capture the juxtaposition of 
two related ideas. The fi rst idea is the importance of incorporating 
Box 8.4. Opportunities for Increasing Infrastructure Funding 
Under the World Bank’s Infrastructure Assets and Recovery Platform (INFRA), country-level diag-
nostics have been carried out in East Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East and North Africa to 
assess vulnerabilities of infrastructure investment portfolios and to recommend actions for remov-
ing bottlenecks to growth and prioritizing infrastructure needs.a Many of the bottlenecks identi-
ﬁ ed in the INFRA diagnostics existed before the crisis but have grown more pronounced as access 
to ﬁ nancing has become more difﬁ cult. Although circumstances and priorities vary across coun-
tries, some common obstacles and opportunities have been observed, as described below.
In countries where the general impact of the crisis has been moderate, infrastructure invest-
ments have experienced delays in structuring projects and harsher lending terms and condi-
tions. Even where there are “good” projects and no shortage of available sources of ﬁ nancing, the 
overall cost of ﬁ nance has increased: up-front fees are higher, greater security is required, tenors 
are shorter, and covenants are stricter (Izaguirre 2010). 
In some countries local banks and institutional investors have sufﬁ cient liquidity, but it is 
often not available for ﬁ nancing large, long-term infrastructure projects. Support is needed to 
review legislative and regulatory obstacles to investments by pension funds and other institutional 
investors in infrastructure projects. Financial institutions can be supported to improve capacity for 
assessing projects and with coﬁ nancing and risk sharing to enable ﬁ nancing of larger loans with 
longer tenors. Appropriate regulations are needed to ensure disclosure of public authorities’ ability 
to meet debt obligations and to create opportunity for infrastructure bond issues. 
The quality and size of projects are major factors in attracting ﬁ nancing. Capacity support 
for project development could be provided to improve project feasibility. Speciﬁ cally for public-
private partnerships, support can be provided to improve monitoring, management, and evalua-
tion of individual projects as well as the overall government program. While the public sector can 
play a signiﬁ cant role in providing coﬁ nancing and risk sharing to attract local partners and insti-
tutional investors for large and strategically important projects, participation by development 
partners can enhance project design and risk assessment.
(continued)
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environmental sustainability into development policy and planning so 
that overall human welfare—not just material economic output—
increases over time. The second idea is that measures to sustain fl ows of 
environmental goods and services can facilitate growth in economic 
output, in addition to their direct contributions to human well-being. 
Because infrastructure expansion also contributes to more rapid and 
inclusive growth and because infrastructure choices can have signifi -
cant environmental implications, it is important to consider the inter-
actions between infrastructure policy and environmental policy in 
advancing sustainable development. 
Incorporating environmental sustainability in infrastructure invest-
ment adds additional complexities. The root of the challenge is that envi-
ronmental sustainability is a form of public good that markets do not 
adequately provide on their own. Thus, we must consider how public 
policies can lead to private sector decisions for investment and consump-
tion that refl ect the social benefi ts of environmental sustainability as well 
as the costs of various forms of environmental protection. The environ-
mental sustainability of the public sector’s own consumption and invest-
ment decisions must also be considered.17 These issues extend well beyond 
infrastructure, so they are fi rst considered here at a more general level. 
Box 8.4. Opportunities for Increasing Infrastructure Funding (continued)
Project implementation delays have caused stimulus funding to move slowly in many 
countries. It has often taken time to get even so-called shovel-ready projects under way. Some 
countries have taken measures to improve budget execution by state-owned enterprises and pri-
vate sector partners, requiring more systematic reporting on budget implementation and strength-
ening oversight by the Finance Ministry or the sector regulator. Capacity building could help 
improve administrative capacity for budget execution; introduce more realism in planning and 
project development; and establish disclosure requirements for budget allocations, procurement, 
contracting, and implementation progress. In addition, donor harmonization on procedures can 
be improved.
Many power and water utilities and road funds have suffered reduced revenues and collec-
tions and have had difﬁ culty ﬁ nancing operations and maintenance, renewal and replacement 
of assets, and debt service. While tariff increase proposals are even more controversial than under 
normal economic circumstances, support can focus on improved operational efﬁ ciency; better 
targeting of subsidies; improved corporate governance (of state-owned enterprises and public-
private partnerships); and sector regulation that is autonomous, predictable, and transparent.
Source: Contributed by Catherine Revels.
a. See www.worldbank.org/infra.
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Policies for Addressing Environmental Externalities
With respect to internalizing environmental externalities, there has been 
a profound shift over the past few decades toward the use of economic 
incentives or market-like mechanisms to limit harmful environmental 
impacts. These include taxes on emissions or tradable emission allow-
ances. These policies create strong incentives not only to curb damages 
cost-effectively with existing technologies but also to induce innovations 
that lower the cost of avoiding future environmental harm. 
Market-like environmental policies are more diffi cult to use in prac-
tice when infrastructure is owned and operated by the public sector or 
parastatal enterprises. In addition, coordination problems involving 
signifi cant fi xed investments can pose diffi culties in relying solely on a 
pricing approach.18 Whatever mix of instruments might be applied to 
increase the environmental sustainability of infrastructure, appropriate 
regulatory standards must be put in place and enforced.
In addition, a suite of other effi ciency-enhancing but often politi-
cally diffi cult policy reforms is needed to increase environmental sus-
tainability. These reforms include reducing harmful subsidies (of energy 
and water, for example), lowering market barriers to technology that is 
less harmful to the environment, and increasing both global environ-
mental research and development (R&D) and diffusion of improved 
technologies. Thus, while infrastructure investment is a major infl u-
ence on nearer- and longer-term environmental conditions, changing 
those conditions requires a variety of measures, of which infrastructure 
policy itself is only one part.19
Setting Environmental Standards 
Deciding at what level environmental and natural resource protection 
standards should be set is at least as important, and diffi cult, as the design 
of the policies to implement the standards. The considerable literature 
on environmental cost-benefi t analysis is outside the scope of this chap-
ter (for a compact review of this topic, see OECD 2006). Nor do we 
address the challenges to application of conventional cost-benefi t analy-
sis to climate change mitigation, where long time lines and high levels of 
uncertainty greatly complicate the valuation of future benefi ts (avoided 
climate change damages and less need for high coping costs) relative to 
current costs of mitigation. 
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There is, however, a general debate related to the nature of the antici-
pated social benefi ts from environmental and natural resource policies 
that is highly germane to the green growth discussion, including its 
infrastructure component. Advocates of a green economy often state 
that stronger environmental policies also can deliver higher incomes 
and jobs. Separating such claims from the broader potential contribu-
tions of environmental protection to individual welfare and socioeco-
nomic well-being is crucial in evaluating opportunities for green 
growth. Individuals can be better off from stronger environmental pol-
icies even though they are costly, if the value of total benefi ts they 
gain—pecuniary and nonpecuniary—exceeds the costs incurred. 
The strength of such win-win arguments related to environmental 
protection and income growth from green investment in developing 
countries depends on the extent to which environmental policies can 
increase overall economic productivity as well as stem environmental 
damages. The prospects for this in developing countries are especially 
diffi cult to gauge, in no small measure because data are so limited. Studies 
in developed countries indicate that for many pollution problems, non-
market benefi ts of reduced pollution exceed direct economic benefi ts, 
often by a signifi cant amount, and that justifying environmental regulation 
primarily on the basis of direct economic benefi ts is problematic.20 For 
developing countries facing very different economic and environmental 
conditions, however, the contributions of pollution reduction to improv-
ing human health, productivity, and access to better land and water 
resources can be proportionately much greater, thus increasing the scope 
for win-win environmental and economic benefi ts.21 
Stronger energy effi ciency policies can be a source of signifi cant 
low-cost opportunities for economic and environmental benefi ts in 
both developed and developing countries. These improvements can 
free up resources for other more productive uses in the economy, thus 
providing a positive effect on national product and income. Energy 
effi ciency also has the potential to provide signifi cant environmental 
co-benefi ts resulting from lower local pollution and reduced green-
house gas emissions.
Another important case is anticipatory adaptation to climate change. 
As noted above, infrastructure fi nancing needs to improve resilience 
have been estimated at US$30 billion to US$40 billion annually, starting 
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right away (World Bank 2009a).22 However, these and other adaptation 
measures often blend seamlessly into what would be good economic 
development plans and investments in the sense that they can deliver 
 signifi cant benefi ts on their own, unrelated to climate change. It is thus 
likely that signifi cant win-win opportunities exist with increased invest-
ment to enhance adaptation—if the needed fi nance can be generated.
Incentives for more environmentally sustainable investment also 
depend on their costs, and the costs of different green investments vary 
considerably. The costs of conventional air and water pollution controls, 
for example, are by and large relatively affordable because of previous 
advances in technologies and improved economies of scale. As noted, a 
number of energy effi ciency investments are likely, once in place, to pro-
duce cost savings that complement environmental benefi ts. In contrast, 
renewable energy resources still are cost competitive only in certain mar-
ket niches and cannot yet be scaled to make deep cuts in greenhouse gas 
emissions without substantial costs. 
Green Technology Innovation, Green Investment Cost, 
and Green Growth
The relatively high cost of measures to sharply curtail greenhouse gas 
emissions and the continuing need to make other forms of environ-
mental and natural resource protection more affordable for lower-
income countries highlight again the importance both of stronger 
R&D programs to make environmentally sustainable technologies 
more affordable and of measures to lower the cost of their diffusion 
and adoption. These technology supply-side measures complement 
other measures to increase the incentives on the demand side for envi-
ronmentally sustainable infrastructure and other investment. The 
practical fi nancial consequences in the case of greenhouse gas mitiga-
tion are brought into stark relief by the 2010 World Development Report 
(World Bank 2009c). As noted above, that report gauges that substan-
tial progress in greenhouse gas mitigation would require investment 
on the order of US$140 billion to US$175 billion annually by 2030, 
with a need for signifi cant investment well before then to mitigate con-
cerns over “locking in” high-carbon infrastructure that would be much 
costlier to reverse subsequently. Lowering that signifi cant cost will 
require major advances over current low-carbon technology.
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A number of the general impediments to private sector investment in 
infrastructure mentioned previously also can impede adoption of newer 
green technologies—low effective rates of return because of market dis-
tortions, fi scal and trade policies, and fi nancial uncertainties arising in 
particular from economic and other types of governance. One area of 
active debate is the role that the public sector should play in reducing the 
risks of initial technology diffusion (through partial investment risk 
guarantees, for example, or minimum purchase commitments). How-
ever, such efforts would have limited effects if more fundamental policy-
related barriers to economically sustainable diffusion are not reduced.
It is well understood that the private sector inherently underinvests in 
R&D because not all benefi ts can be appropriated back (for example, 
through licensing agreements), so increased public support for R&D 
generally certainly is warranted. In the case of environmentally related 
technology innovation, moreover, policies need to infl uence the alloca-
tion of R&D support across different lines of research, as well the total 
size of R&D expenditure. Acemoglu et al. (2009) illustrate one impor-
tant reason for this: the returns to innovation activity may be higher in 
better established but less environmentally sustainable lines of tech-
nology development, even if policies limiting emissions are boosting 
demand for more green technology. 
Since many environmental problems exist across international bor-
ders, and regional problems or global climate change necessarily tran-
scend such borders, the potential markets for greener technology are 
global in scale. Correspondingly, international cooperation to increase 
green R&D innovation is needed to respond to that global demand; oth-
erwise the same problem of underinvestment remains. The need for 
global cooperation is amplifi ed by the differences in means to fund R&D 
between developed and middle-income developing countries on the one 
hand and least developed countries on the other. To obtain a desirable 
level of international support for greenhouse-gas-reducing R&D in par-
ticular, and a desirable rate of diffusion of the technology, there is need 
to recognize explicitly the public goods nature of basic R&D in this equa-
tion, while still fi nding ways to reward applied innovators in the private 
sector who play a key role in developing marketable new technology.
Large public investment in green R&D, and subsequent public sec-
tor support for private investment in development of environmentally 
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sustainable products and processes including infrastructure services, 
could be part of a broader industrial policy used to gain international 
market leadership in the provision of new and improved green technol-
ogy. This general approach to industrial development has been used by 
some countries, notably in East Asia, to gain a strong position in mar-
kets for a number of consumer goods that depended on technology 
innovation (Rodrik, Grossman, and Norman 1995; Mowery and Oxley 
1995). Success in such an endeavor in the context of green technology 
could convey global benefi ts by lowering the cost of producing environ-
mentally sustainable technology, although the actual cost of acquiring 
the technology would depend on the degree of competitiveness in sup-
plying the technology. Given the scale and diversity of innovation needed 
to bring down the economic cost of achieving a much-lower-carbon 
future, however, it is uncertain whether the national industrial approach 
would be adequate environmentally or suffi ciently attractive economi-
cally. In any event, such a highly coordinated industrial policy would 
seem to be feasible only for a limited number of countries.
Summing Up: How to Induce Green Investment 
for Green Growth?
When local and global environmental goods are being undervalued 
and overused, there is always a case for policies to correct such exter-
nalities. The aim of the policies is to shift investment and consumption 
decisions toward patterns that do less on balance to deplete “natural 
capital.” As a major source of environmental stresses and as a key 
potential mechanism for lowering those stresses, the size and composi-
tion of infrastructure investment is at the heart of the interactions of 
environmental and socioeconomic goals. In no area is this more true 
than in greenhouse gas mitigation, given the long time lines and lock-in 
risks involved.
Nevertheless, the potential for green growth at low cost can be over-
sold. While green infrastructure certainly has a major role in lowering 
environmental harm, the direct productivity benefi ts depend on the 
degree of other market distortions in the economy. Green investments 
may create jobs in some sectors, but jobs are also lost because invest-
ment moves from dirtier to cleaner sectors, and because environmental 
 Infrastructure and Sustainable Development  361
protection (in particular, cutting greenhouse gas emissions) almost 
inevitably entails some costs that get passed throughout the economy. 
Again, while these costs may represent an extremely valuable societal 
investment, they do not automatically imply a double benefi t in terms 
of net job and income growth as well as environmental protection. 
The scope for win-win likely is greater in developing countries—
because of the presence of more distortions—than in more developed 
countries. However, developing countries have less fi nancial means 
and thus less scope for purchasing or building greener infrastructure 
and other forms of capital, especially when such investment is costlier 
than less green options and the countries already are falling short in 
meeting needs for basic infrastructure services. Such investments may 
also face additional barriers stemming from environmentally negative 
subsidies that are nonetheless challenging socially to reduce and from 
challenges in the investment climate. Key steps forward then would be 
improvements in the conditions for infrastructure investment and 
environmental management in developing countries, greatly expanded 
funding for cost-reducing green innovation, and support for its diffu-
sion from more developed countries. 
The Way Forward: Proposals for Further G-20 Attention
The key message of this chapter for infrastructure investment can be 
summed up in three words: More, Better, Cleaner. None of these is easy 
to achieve. More infrastructure investment and better-quality infra-
structure services require overcoming a number of obstacles related to 
cost and governance, as well as refi ning how public and private sector 
participation interact in practice. Cleaner infrastructure faces obsta-
cles related to undervaluation of environmental benefi ts at the coun-
try level, the costs of current investment options, and the need for 
achieving complicated international agreements for addressing cli-
mate change.
While these challenges are real, so are opportunities for reducing 
them—especially if political will can be enhanced and, for developing 
countries, affordability can be improved. We briefl y summarize the 
important follow-up actions below.
362 Postcrisis Growth and Development
Action 1. Develop an action plan for increasing public and private 
fi nancing of infrastructure, as well as improving its effi ciency. Initial 
steps would include: 
•  Assessing the potential for increasing fi scal space in developing coun-
tries. This should be broadly understood as ranging from efforts at 
improved revenue collection, to reduction of poorly targeted subsi-
dies, to a review of investment planning and disbursement. It could 
also include a review of which sectors and subsectors are likely to 
benefi t from public-private partnerships. South-South collaboration 
could be one driver of such a review. 
•  Assessing the potential for increasing private investment and reducing its 
costs. This step will require more effi cient investment climates, more 
effective integration of public and private resources, and greater access 
to instruments for risk sharing to induce more investment in riskier 
contexts. One proposal that has received attention in this context is to 
tap the investment potential of sovereign wealth funds. 
•  Assessing how to integrate environmental considerations into infrastruc-
ture investments more cost-effectively. In addition to increased infor-
mation about costs and impacts of environmental components of 
investments, this step will require further attention to the comple-
mentary policy reforms needed to improve environmental outcomes 
generally. Thus the environmental component of the action plan 
should include further consideration of policy reforms for improving 
private sector environmental performance, including more effective 
environmental measures and reform of environmentally damaging 
subsidies. In addition, the action plan should include identifi cation of 
needs for improving the capacity of public sector decision makers for 
assessing the benefi ts and costs of alternative infrastructure invest-
ment plans.
•  Improving the development and fi nancing of regional infrastructure 
projects. Current funding mechanisms for regional projects are lim-
ited, offer little in the way of facilitation and risk mitigation, and are 
limited to low-income countries (thereby excluding a project 
involving both low- and middle-income countries). Regional proj-
ects, which are particularly critical for small and landlocked coun-
tries, have become even more relevant in the context of a changing 
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climate because they can reduce vulnerability by diversifying water 
and energy sources and facilitating development of renewable 
resources that are often concentrated in a few locations. 
Action 2. Develop an action plan for providing increased technical and 
fi nancial assistance to developing countries in their efforts to improve 
infrastructure effi ciency, enhance the investment climate, and integrate 
environmental with economic concerns. The action plan would need to 
highlight priority needs; pool knowledge based on previous experience, 
and analyze how to lower barriers to achieving the stated objectives; and 
identify adequate and reliable donor fi nancing for developing countries 
to be able to make signifi cant progress toward those objectives. Again, 
one particular emphasis could be on South-South cooperation. 
The World Bank and other multilateral development banks (MDBs) 
can play several valuable roles in realizing these initiatives through pro-
viding public sector fi nance and technical assistance. In particular, the 
MDBs can:
•  Review their guidelines for infrastructure investment and technical 
assistance, with a view to encouraging further streamlining and 
integration across objectives while maintaining effectiveness and 
transparency. This could include a review of procurement practices, 
including those with an impact on the environmental characteris-
tics of operations, and an analysis of ways to fund the technical 
assistance needed to permit better public-private partnerships and 
more regional integration of infrastructure investment. In addition, 
the MDBs might be called on to undertake a global infrastructure 
survey to identify those infrastructure gaps that pose the greatest 
impediment to low-income-country efforts to integrate with the 
global economy as well as the possible sources of and remedies for 
these gaps.
•  Initiate new efforts to most effectively utilize private capital, including 
better leveraging of public sector fi nance and offi cial development 
assistance and improving the cost-effectiveness of public-private 
partnerships. This step could include an analysis of how to tap non-
traditional investors such as domestic investors (whose role is on the 
increase), domestic pension funds, and sovereign funds.
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Action 3. Promote collaborative efforts to greatly increase and improve 
collection and sharing of data on infrastructure investment and its 
impacts. Without improved information, it will remain diffi cult to diag-
nose the nature and extent of problems, design effective response mech-
anisms, and assess their postimplementation effectiveness (including 
their effect on the environment) so that mechanisms can continue to 
improve. Improved information also is crucial for obtaining buy-in from 
the most important constituencies: those taxpayers and infrastructure 
service users who ultimately are responsible for the fi nancing. 
The methodology and practical experience accumulated during the 
Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostics could be used. An excellent 
opportunity is being offered by the proposed revision of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund’s Government Financial Statistics. The World 
Bank and the Fund, along with relevant partners, could be tasked with 
developing a common methodology as well as the practical means to 
collect this information in a systematic and regular manner. 
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A chronic lack of data in the infrastructure sectors means that this 
table is built on a number of heroic assumptions. It should therefore be 
seen as illustrative only. In that spirit, all numbers are rounded off to the 
nearest US$25 billion to avoid giving a false sense of precision. 
The fi nancing gap is not likely to be evenly distributed across regions. 
It is likely minimal in East Asia (at least in China), whereas it has been 
estimated at 5 percent of GDP in Africa where detailed microlevel analy-
sis has been conducted (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010). 
The table includes estimates only of capital spending (investments). 
Operation and maintenance, or O&M, would add substantially to the 
numbers shown. Yepes (2008) estimated infrastructure maintenance 
needs to be around 4 percent of developing countries’ GDP, using a 
well-accepted ratio of current to capital expenditures for the various 
infrastructure sectors. No data are available on how much governments 
actually spend on O&M except in the case of Africa where Foster and 
Briceño-Garmendia (2010) estimated it to be 3.2 percent of GDP.
Assumptions Made 
Estimated Infrastructure Investment Needs in 2013. The estimates in the 
table assume 4 percent GDP growth a year from 2008 and a 5–6 percent 
Annex. A Heroic Attempt at “Guesstimating” Future Infrastructure 
Investment Needs and Financing Gap 














Investment 1,250–1,500 Public spending 600–650 500 750
ODA 50–100 50 75
PPI 138 200 250
Total 1,250–1,500 800–900 800 1,075
Financing gap 450–700 175–425
Source: See text.
In 2013 
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investment-to-GDP ratio. This is a “compromise” value between various 
measures of “investment needs,” including Yepes (2008), who calculates 
2.7 percent of GDP would be needed to respond to growth in demand 
associated with projected GDP growth based on the (constrained) pat-
terns of the past, and Foster and Briceño-Garmedia 2010, who calculated 
the cost of providing Africa with a much improved, yet still relatively 
basic, package of infrastructure and found it to be about 10 percent of 
the region’s GDP. Finally, estimates are that the Asian newly industrial-
ized economies and China spent some 8 to 10 percent of GDP for decades 
to fuel industrialization. The Yepes estimates are generally considered to 
be a lower bound. The Africa number is likely to be higher than for other 
developing regions given that Africa has the lowest infrastructure cover-
age of any region. 
Current Public Spending Estimate. For capital spending we relied on the 
shares of GDP reported in Yepes (2008, original source: Gill and Kharas 
2007) for East Asia and the Pacifi c (6.8 percent); for South Asia 
(4.2 percent), we used estimates of India’s public infrastructure spend-
ing from the country’s public expenditure plans; and for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (1.2 percent), the estimates came from original 
data collection efforts. These shares were applied to 2007 GDP fi gures 
from the World Development Indicators. Figures for Sub-Saharan 
Africa are from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010, table 2.1. For 
Europe and Central Asia we assumed the investments share was simi-
lar to that of Latin America; for the Middle East and North Africa, 
where no data were available either, we used the weighted sample 
 average (4.2 percent). 
Pessimistic Scenario. This scenario assumes a 20 percent decline in pub-
lic spending on infrastructure, a halving of ODA, and a decline in the 
rate of growth of PPI to 7 percent a year (down from the 13 percent 
yearly average growth of the past 20 years). All these are in real terms.
Optimistic Scenario. This scenario assumes that future public spending 
increases by 10 percent; that ODA only declines by 25 percent; and that 
PPI continues to grow at 13 percent a year. Again, these changes are in 
real term. 
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Notes
 1.  This information is available at the web site maintained by PPIAF and World 
Bank (http://ppi.worldbank.org). In this chapter PPI includes outright privati-
zation (hence divestiture payments), while a related concept, private-public 
partnerships, does not. 
 2.  This section is largely reproduced from Estache and Fay (2010). 
 3.  The public health value of safe water and sanitation systems also is likely to 
increase the more individuals are served, in a kind of herd-immunity effect. 
 4.  Papers on the political economy guiding infrastructure investment decisions 
include Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999); Rauch (1995); Robinson and Torvik 
(2005), de la Fuente and Vives (1995); and Cadot, Röller, and Stephan (2006). 
 5.  The extent of reverse causation may vary across types and measures of infra-
structure. For example, road networks that are long lived and slow to change are 
perhaps less likely to respond to changes in income (particularly in countries 
that already have a large network and where changes to cope with congestion—
such as more lanes, better traffi c management, and ring roads—will not sub-
stantially affect aggregate measures such as kilometers of roads per capita). This 
is not the case with telephones or electricity-generating capacity (which responds 
to energy demand whose income elasticity has been around 0.5 since 1990, 
according to IEA 2006). 
 6.  Calderón and Servén’s analyses also show that other factors also contribute to 
growth, including human capital and macroeconomic stability.
 7.  Based on 2004 World Health Organization data, http://www.who.int/indoorair/
health_impacts/burden/en/index.html. See Lvovsky 2001 for a review of the 
environmental health issues associated with infrastructure.
 8.  U.S. Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/
international/contents.html. The remaining 21 percent resulted from natural 
gas consumption and fl aring. Note that these energy-related fi gures do not 
include new CO
2 
releases from land use changes or industrial processes, and 
they do not include other greenhouse gases, including methane releases 
related to the energy system. Adding energy-related methane emissions to the 
calculations would only strengthen the point made in the text. 
 9.  WHO-UNICEF (2010) projects that by 2015 the share of people without 
improved water will have fallen to 9 percent on current trends, exceeding the 
target of 12 percent. In contrast, the share of individuals without access to 
improved sanitation is expected to be around 36 percent, much higher than the 
23 percent target.
 10.  For a full discussion of the ways to estimate infrastructure needs, see Fay and 
Morrison 2007.
 11.  We are grateful to Luis Alberto Andres for sharing this framework, which is to 
serve as the basis of a study of infrastructure needs in South Asia that he is con-
ducting in the South Asia Region of the World Bank. 
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 12.  This section is reproduced from Estache and Fay (2010). For a recent overview, 
see Gassner, Popov, and Pushak (2007) and Andres et al. (2008).
 13.  See Estache and Pinglo (2005) for all developing countries. Sirtaine et al. 
(2005) provide a detailed analysis of the evolution of the cost of capital in 
Latin America and compare it to the rate of return that can be estimated from 
the balance sheet of the main infrastructure operators in the region.
 14.  Many argue that capital depletion (cutting maintenance) is another source of 
funding, but that is equivalent to funding by future users and taxpayers.
 15.  Potential effi ciency gains can be related to the way that infrastructure services 
are run (technical or managerial effi ciency) or to the way that infrastructure 
expenditures are allocated. PPI contract designs and regulation can also be 
sources of effi ciency gains. 
 16.  Maintenance would add at least some US$800 million. An estimated US$30 billion 
to US$40 billion is needed for infrastructure adaptation to climate change (World 
Bank 2009a) and some US$140 billion to US$175 billion is associated with mitiga-
tion in the energy sector (World Bank 2009b).
 17.  While this may seem less diffi cult in the case of public sector investment; the 
need remains for sometimes diffi cult coordination to ensure that environmental 
considerations are adequately represented in evaluations of projects. For both 
private and public sector decisions, moreover, assessment of environmental 
benefi ts and costs often is done heuristically, subjectively, or not at all.
 18.  One example directly relevant to infrastructure investment is the conversion of 
all public vehicles in Delhi (and now in many other Indian cities) to compressed 
natural gas (CNG) instead of the much more polluting diesel fuel they had used. 
Economic incentives would have required a longer time to have an effect, in part 
because of the need to coordinate retrofi t of vehicles with greatly increased 
capacity to supply CNG. 
 19.  While environmental impacts from infrastructure (and other larger-scale, cap-
ital-intensive projects) may be somewhat easier to regulate from a technical 
perspective than other more decentralized sources of emissions, focusing envi-
ronmental measures disproportionately on infrastructure can have unintended 
consequences. High water and sanitation tariffs could induce some users to 
drop off the system in order to self-supply, reducing the effi ciency of water 
management and increasing the challenge of environmental quality enforce-
ment. Similarly, passing forward high pollution charges in electricity rates could 
induce less economically effi cient and more environmentally harmful autogen-
eration. Policies for inducing or requiring environmentally sustainable infra-
structure are most effective when they are made a part of a more comprehensive 
and cost-effective environmental management system.
 20.  For example, reduced concern about premature mortality from long-term pol-
lutant exposure, or subjective benefi ts from improved environmental quality for 
recreation and intrinsic existence values, often are larger than the direct eco-
nomic benefi ts of avoided medical costs or reduced land and forest degradation.
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 21.  The Porter hypothesis (Porter and van der Linde 1995) holds that under a very 
broad range of circumstances, a variety of environmentally oriented policies 
and investments also can improve the corporate bottom line by increasing pro-
ductivity. There is, however, no evidence that this hypothesis is generally appli-
cable in developed economies, though examples of it have been proffered 
(Albrecht 1998; Murty and Kumar 2003). In developing-country economies 
with greater distortions, there could be more scope for environmental improve-
ment investments with signifi cant economic cobenefi ts. 
 22.  This includes investment for what the report calls “infrastructure” as well as for 
water supply and fl ood protection. 
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Comments by Kiyoshi Kodera
Japan International Cooperation Agency
The authors sensibly survey the relevant issues surrounding infrastruc-
ture and sustainable development. Infrastructure matters. Although data 
are far from suffi cient, factors behind slow progress in infrastructure 
provision are already clearly identifi ed. The proposals for further G20 
attention are interesting ones, providing good theoretical and concep-
tual frameworks. From a practitioner’s point of view, I would like to 
reinforce and complement these proposals.
Promote Collaborative Efforts to Greatly Increase and Improve 
Collection and Sharing of Infrastructure Data and Its Impact
•  The revision of the IMF’s Government Financial Statistics is an 
important step.
•  The need for multidimensional compilation of data is essential. 
Household census data typically cover only access to infrastructure, 
not the stock of infrastructure. When it comes to network infrastruc-
ture such as highways and power transmission, it is critical to compile 
more comprehensive data from a regional integration perspective. We 
need to think beyond administrative and national borders. In addi-
tion, the infrastructure needs of megacities vary in scope and scale. 
Fuller bottom-up estimates are needed for urban infrastructure based 
on the characteristics of each city, including topography and demo-
graphic trends as well as the infrastructure defi cit. 
•  The diffi culty in applying impact evaluation to infrastructure should 
be recognized. We should acknowledge diffi culty in the randomiza-
tion of infrastructure placement in general.
Filling the Funding Gap in Sub-Sahara Africa
•  Thanks to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and the 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, the current overall debt situation 
has dramatically improved, and most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Comments on the conference paper “Infrastructure and Sustainable Development,” by 
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seem to have room for further borrowing. Policy makers should be 
vigilant, however, about debt management. 
•  Governments should continue to seek increased revenues. 
•  Donors should increase grant or concessional funding for low-income 
countries. It is important to fulfi ll the Gleneagles’ commitment. The 
multilateral development banks’ countercyclical role to maintain 
appropriate ongoing investment is very critical. The recent series of 
agreements for general capital increases for the MDBs pushed by the 
G20 is welcome. We should continue efforts to secure concessional 
funding for the International Development Agency and the Africa 
Development Fund.
•  The public-private partnership (PPP) option deserves serious consid-
eration, particularly for resource-rich middle-income countries. 
Scaling Up PPP
•  Infrastructure should be fi nanced either by taxpayers or users. The 
key for involving the private sector is to strike a balance between the 
two and clarify the corresponding risks in individual projects. For 
example, in the case of network infrastructure, it is essential to iden-
tify which specifi c areas and population would be benefi ciaries, which 
benefi ciaries might be cross-subsidized, or whether a government 
wants universal coverage. To reach appropriate conclusions, multidi-
mensional data collection and estimates are indispensable. It would 
be desirable for partner countries to assist developing countries to 
compile such data.
•  Crucial information compiled by the private sector should be fully 
shared with the government formulating a PPP framework, based on 
appropriate policy needs. Conversely, the public sector needs to do 
more to mitigate perceived risks to the private sector. It is critical to 
address issues including lack of credible studies, lack of detailed struc-
ture on government guarantees, uncertain prospects for land acquisi-
tion, inadequate tender documents, and lack of contract enforcement 
as well as proposed penalties in a case of breach of contract. (Findings 
from the JICA-WB-ADB joint investor survey in Indonesia.)
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On Green Growth and Infrastructure
•  Depending on income levels, natural resources, and the geography 
of a country, it is advisable to focus on areas of mutual interest to 
both developed and developing countries without waiting for a big 
framework agreement to come out of the UN Climate Change Con-
ference in Cancun, for example. Adaptation should be mainstreamed 
in development planning and specifi c actions should be formulated 
quickly. For instance, adaptation investments needed in Manila are 
estimated to be only increments to current fl ood control investments 
(Joint assessment by JICA-WB-ADB). Even in the case of mitigation 
factors such as mass transit or renewable energy, we should address 
issues in the context of fi lling the infrastructure gap and improving 
existing infrastructure. As for the latter, the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) conducted a feasibility study to improve 
the bus transportation system in Bogotá, which was later funded by 
the World Bank. JICA also rehabilitated electrical transmission lines 
in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka and provided technical assistance to 
tackle water leakage problems in Indonesia, Jordan, and Brazil. In 
addition, JICA is refocusing on railway and subway projects under a 
US$15 billion climate change package announced in December 2009.
•  Many donors and governments have formulated guidelines and 
implemented social and environmental assessments at individual 
project levels. With a view to cost savings and proper sequencing of 
actions, it is time to broaden impact assessments at the medium-term 
strategic planning stage. We should not shy away from research to 
measure environmental and economic benefi ts despite current diffi -
culties in method and data collection.
376 Postcrisis Growth and Development
Comments by Haeryong Kwon
Presidential Committee for the G-20 Seoul Summit 
My comments will fi rst focus on fi nancing for infrastructure, then touch 
upon infrastructure issues in the context of the G-20’s Seoul Summit in 
November. In general, insuffi cient public fi nancing and poor manage-
ment of infrastructure projects in developing countries have led to a dis-
appointing result. The paper by Fay and her co-authors emphasizes the 
importance of expanding the role of the private sector to overcome these 
limitations. According to the authors, private participation in infrastruc-
ture has grown steadily and appears to be relatively unaffected by the 
recent fi nancial crisis. Private investment, however, has been highly con-
centrated, with 60 percent of private participation in infrastructure 
going to the four BRIC countries and Turkey.  Despite increases in invest-
ment in low-income countries, levels are still insuffi cient for adequate 
development. Consequently, research is needed that explores policy 
alternatives to increase the level of private participation in infrastructure 
for low-income countries. Options could include, for example, tax 
exemptions or government guarantees for infrastructure investment. 
The second major point to highlight is South-South cooperation. Large-
scale involvement in infrastructure by private investors in developed coun-
tries is increasingly being replaced by developing-country investors who 
have emerged as a major source of investment fi nance for infrastructure 
projects. According to the paper, from 1998 to 2006 developing-country 
investors contributed more than half of private investment, which is a 
good example of increasing South-South cooperation. South-South 
cooperation is becoming more important, particularly since the recent 
fi nancial crisis has weakened the ability and willingness of developed 
countries to invest in low-income countries. 
Further studies are needed on the policies and mechanisms that can 
facilitate infrastructure investment in low-income countries. One exam-
ple currently under discussion is enhancing the global fi nancial safety 
net, which would minimize the risk of a sudden reversal in capital fl ows 
or an increase in economic volatility in developing countries, thereby 
Comments on the paper “Infrastructure and Sustainable Development” by Marianne Fay, 
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reducing their tendency to accumulate excess foreign reserves. This safety 
net would enable developing countries with a current account surplus to 
invest in low-income countries, which would contribute not only to sus-
tainable growth but also to the global economic rebalancing. 
Infrastructure will likely play a major role in the context of the G-20 
Seoul Summit. The authors have recommended that the G-20 consider 
the promotion of effi cient infrastructure development as a crucial com-
ponent of economic growth. The Seoul Summit approach to develop-
ment is focused on building partnerships for economic growth. The 
G-20 is the premier forum for global economic issues, and its develop-
ment approach fl ows naturally from its core mandate of international 
economic cooperation. We therefore believe that the G-20 should focus 
on the economic aspect of development, especially the economic growth 
of low-income countries. Our focus on the economic aspect of develop-
ment also fi ts well with one of the main topics of the G-20 agenda, spe-
cifi cally the framework for “strong, sustainable, and balanced growth.” 
To assist low-income countries in reaching their maximum growth 
potential, we tend to focus on infrastructure. It is widely recognized that 
the availability of infrastructure is one of the most critical factors for 
economic growth. Throughout the preparations for the November G-20 
Summit, Korea has continuously argued that development issues remain 
a main agenda item in order to enhance the legitimacy and credibility of 
the G-20. Fortunately, with the support of other G-20 member coun-
tries, the goal of placing development on the offi cial agenda has been 
achieved. Korea is cooperating closely with other G-20 member coun-
tries and relevant international organizations, including the World 
Bank, to develop recommendations and action plans, which will be pre-
sented to leaders at the Seoul Summit in November. Infrastructure will 
undoubtedly feature prominently, and this paper has been useful in 
helping us think through the issues as we move forward.
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Comments by Helen Mountford
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Economic development and environmental protection can no longer be 
considered in isolation, let alone seen as competing objectives. The recent 
economic, food, and fuel crises, together with the looming climate crisis, 
have made the links clear.
As highlighted by Marianne Fay, Mike Toman, and their co-authors, 
these connections are particularly important with respect to investment 
in infrastructure. Increased and better targeted infrastructure investments 
are badly needed both to achieve development objectives and to move 
toward cleaner, low-carbon, and more resource-effi cient economies. 
Investments in infrastructure need to take into consideration two 
types of environmental linkages, to ensure that these investments are 
well targeted and sustainable over the long term.
•  First, the impacts of changing environmental conditions on infra-
structure need to be considered when making these investments. 
Increased fl ooding, droughts, and extreme weather events, as well as 
rising sea levels from climate change, will affect infrastructure, and 
these impacts need to be considered in planning for the development 
of buildings, roads, railway tracks, water and sanitation facilities, and 
power supplies. While there is no question that additional fi nancing 
will be needed to support adaptation to climate change in developing 
countries, it is also essential that adaptation be integrated into all eco-
nomic and development activities to ensure that the investments 
made are not simply “washed away” with the fi rst unusually heavy 
rainfall. Last year OECD produced a Guidance on Integrating Adapta-
tion to Climate Change into Development Co-operation, to support 
development assistance agencies and partner countries in addressing 
this challenge.
•  Second, infrastructure investments are long lived. The buildings, 
transport, and energy infrastructure that we put in place now will stay 
Comments on the paper “Infrastructure and Sustainable Development,” by Marianne Fay, 
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with us for many years to come. If we get these investments wrong, 
they can lock in polluting activities for decades. This lock-in could 
hamper a shift in the future to a low-carbon, resource-effi cient econ-
omy, or, alternatively, could lead to the early and expensive scrapping 
of ineffi cient infrastructure when countries take on more ambitious 
environmental policies. These considerations are particularly relevant 
for emerging and developing countries, given their fast growth in 
infrastructure development. For example, the 2008 OECD Environ-
mental Outlook projected that over the next two decades China will 
build new housing stock equivalent to the total housing stock in 
Europe today. And the environmental impact of these buildings will 
depend greatly on whether they are built in an energy-effi cient man-
ner or not. So it is important that infrastructure investments help 
facilitate, rather than hinder, a move toward cleaner and more 
resource-effi cient modes of transport, energy, and living.
Given these risks, it is clear that development and environmental con-
siderations must go hand-in-hand when infrastructure investment 
choices are made.
As the authors indicate, measures that can promote both economic 
development and environmental quality not only include investments in 
green infrastructure but also other critical policy approaches, such as 
removing costly and environmentally harmful subsidies, setting envi-
ronment-related taxes and charges, and providing incentives for green 
innovation and the rapid transfer and take-up of clean technologies. We 
at OECD are looking carefully at this policy toolkit as we develop an 
OECD Green Growth Strategy for 2011, at the request of Ministers of 
Finance and Economy. 
We have found that many of the stimulus packages put in place by 
OECD countries and emerging economies in the last couple of years 
included signifi cant investments in green infrastructure and in green 
research, development, and deployment, as well as some important green 
tax measures. Almost all OECD countries increased infrastructure 
investments in the context of the crisis, on average increasing public 
investments by about one-third of a percent of GDP. 
We found that about two-thirds of OECD countries used their stimulus 
packages to make investments that were specifi cally aimed at contributing 
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to green growth, with some—such as Korea—placing green growth at the 
center of their stimulus packages. Many invested in increasing energy effi -
ciency of public buildings, upgrading or extending public transport (such 
as high-speed rail and urban public transit), and increasing renewable 
energy generation. Some also included investments in water infrastruc-
ture, “natural” infrastructures (such as forests and waterways), and carbon 
capture and storage. 
About half of OECD countries also took green fi scal reform actions as 
part of their responses to the crisis, introducing or increasing taxes on 
pollution and energy consumption and introducing tax breaks for envi-
ronment-related R&D. These measures provide private investors with 
clear incentives to ensure that infrastructure developments are more 
energy and resource effi cient, and to make investments in green innova-
tion. In addition, increased use of environmentally related taxes and 
other economic instruments will also raise government revenues, which 
will be critical in the coming years both to bring down the signifi cant 
budget defi cits in many countries and to address other pressing priori-
ties, such as funding education, health care, and reductions in labor 
taxes. These revenues could be large. Recent OECD analysis has found, 
for example, that if countries were to achieve their Copenhagen climate 
pledges through carbon taxes or auctioned permits, they could raise rev-
enues amounting to over 1 percent of GDP or over US$400 billion a year 
by 2020. 
Another key win-win approach for the economy and the environ-
ment that the authors highlighted is the removal of environmentally 
harmful subsidies. These often distort key infrastructure investment 
choices. Subsidies to fossil fuel use and production, for example, encour-
age overinvestment in fossil fuel exploration and power generation. In 
turn, these investments lock in pollution-intensive energy systems and 
transport modes for decades to come, making it harder for clean alter-
natives to compete on an equal footing. Recent OECD analysis, based 
on subsidy data from the International Energy Agency (IEA), has shown 
that removing subsidies to fossil fuel consumption could lead to wel-
fare gains and reduce global greenhouse gas emissions by 10 percent in 
2050 compared with business-as-usual. These results are highlighted 
in a joint report on energy subsidies developed by the IEA, Organiza-
tion of Petroleum-Exporting Countries, OECD, and World Bank and 
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delivered to G-20 fi nance ministers meeting in Busan, Korea, in early 
June 2010 and to G-20 leaders meeting in Toronto at the end of June. 
The report also highlights lessons learned from experiences in both 
developed and developing countries on how subsidy reform can be suc-
cessfully implemented in practice, including the importance of putting 
in place better targeted measures to achieve the original social objec-
tives of the subsidies.
Subsidies to water use, including undercharging and undercollection 
of tariffs, also distort infrastructure choices. Subsidies to water use are 
common in many countries, in particular for agricultural water use. 
Without an appropriate price on water, many drought-prone regions are 
increasingly experiencing unsustainable water withdrawals, with serious 
impacts for local communities, human health, and ecosystems. By 2030 
almost half the world’s population will live in areas of water stress unless 
we reverse these trends. 
Putting an appropriate price on water can both help to raise a large 
chunk of the fi nance needed to maintain and extend water services to 
the poor and also provide an incentive for less wasteful water use. 
Almost half of OECD countries have managed to reduce their total 
annual water use since 1990, mainly as a result of water pricing policies. 
We are encouraging countries to develop strategic fi nancial plans for 
the water sector based around the 3 Ts—tariffs, taxes (that is, govern-
ment investment), and transfers (through offi cial development assis-
tance, for example). Combined, these need to cover the full costs of 
infrastructure development, operation, and maintenance. The authors 
of this chapter highlight the importance of private sector participation 
in infrastructure, and OECD is looking closely at how public policy 
frameworks can facilitate private investment and at the mechanisms to 
ensure accountability in this context. At OECD we have developed with 
countries 24 Principles for Private Sector Participation in Infrastruc-
ture, highlighting the key issues governments need to consider in engag-
ing in public-private partnerships, and we have recently developed a 
Checklist for Public Action to assist governments wishing to engage the 
private sector in the water sector.
These examples clearly support the key messages of this chapter on 
infrastructure investment: we need more, we need better (that is, more 
effi cient), and we need cleaner. 
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The challenge now is to fi gure out how to achieve it and to identify 
what roles the G-20 can usefully play. Building on those proposed by Fay 
and her co-authors, some possibilities include:
•  Providing a forum where countries can work together to move for-
ward on diffi cult national policy reforms that will affect infrastruc-
ture decisions. The benefi ts to countries of doing this through the 
G-20 include the peer support—or peer pressure—and a forum to 
share experiences. To a large extent, this is the role of the G-20 work 
on fossil fuel subsidies. Moving together to maintain a level playing 
fi eld can also help to reduce any potential impacts of unilateral policy 
action on industrial competitiveness. 
•  Identifying key gaps in information common among countries and 
coordinating to task relevant organizations to work on fi lling these 
gaps. The authors’ proposal to “promote collaborative efforts to 
greatly increase and improve collection and sharing of data on infra-
structure investment and its impacts” clearly falls within this category 
of action.
•  Identifying policy priorities for infrastructure and agreeing on action 
plans for how to ensure the necessary technical and fi nancial assis-
tance is forthcoming. These are largely Actions 1 and 2 in the paper. 
Care will need to be taken, however, to avoid a risk of overlap with the 
agendas of UN bodies on this task. 
•  Identifying key opportunities for international public and private 
fi nance for infrastructure. The G-20 could help to move forward with 
designing and piloting innovative fi nance tools, for example for water 
supply and sanitation infrastructure and for climate-related infrastruc-
ture. The latter could be important in helping to deliver on Copenha-
gen fi nance commitments, but it would need to be carefully framed so 
that it contributes to, rather than interfering with, negotiations.
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Economic growth is hampered and cannot be sustained in poor—and 
especially populous poor—countries if there are major uncertainties 
concerning the availability of food staples that typically account for half 
of household net expenditures. This fact was widely recognized in the 
1960s and 1970s, following protracted periods of famine and global 
food price volatility. Major international efforts in research, extension, 
and irrigation infrastructure then led to the expansion of rice, wheat, 
and maize production that has been credited with most of the tripling 
of global cereal production between 1949–51 and 1995–97. The part of 
this process that occurred in developing countries, termed the green 
revolution, was largely propelled by judicious public goods investment 
in agriculture, primarily in Asia, that allowed smallholder farmers to 
be part of the solution and not just part of the problem. The green 
revolution has clearly been central to preventing hundreds of millions 
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of deaths from starvation and has been a key factor permitting the tri-
pling of global population over the same period (Borlaug 2000). 
Greater public investment in agricultural productivity growth con-
tributed to the trend decline in food prices, which also became much 
more stable from the second half of the 1970s until 2002. Besides facil-
itating increases in global food security, lower food prices were central 
to the success of labor-intensive industrialization strategies in large 
countries such as China (Hayami 1997). However, in large part because 
of the decline and greater stability in world prices, complacency set in 
globally regarding the provision of public goods investment to stimu-
late continuing private sector response in poor countries. Donor 
fi nancing for investment in agriculture was halved in infl ation-adjusted 
dollars, declining from 18 percent of overall donor support to develop-
ing countries to about 3 percent in 2002, then rising again to 5 percent 
by 2006. The share of public spending on agriculture by developing 
countries also declined. As a result, the average annual rate of growth of 
cereal yields in developing countries fell steadily from 3 percent during 
the late 1970s to less than 1 percent currently, a rate less than that of 
population growth and much less than the rise of the use of cereals for 
other things besides direct use as food (World Bank 2008).
Increasing aggregate food availability is not enough to reduce hunger. 
The study of famine has shown that the key to reducing hunger is to 
increase the “food entitlement” or command over food of individuals, 
which may or may not be linked to aggregate food availability in mar-
kets. Changes in food entitlements could occur through changes in a 
variety of factors, such as policies (domestic and foreign), environment, 
technologies, and individual characteristics that affect how individuals 
secure access to food (Sen 1981). The main point is that aggregate food 
availability alone is not enough, even though subsequent work has shown 
that in many cases improvement in the overall national food supply is a 
necessary if not a suffi cient condition for reducing hunger (Eicher and 
Staatz 1998).
Something major needs to be done to reverse declining trends in the 
growth of cereal yields in developing countries, especially in the most 
populous poor ones that cannot expect to be able to rely increasingly 
on imports for large shares of their basic foods. Failing this, the pros-
pects for sustained overall global growth are unclear. Addressing this 
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issue will require major resources and a global approach and will 
involve investment in public goods such as infrastructure, research, 
and agricultural extension. Widely accepted and detailed analysis of the 
historical experience of agriculturally dependent countries suggests 
that any economic growth or diversifi cation into industry in these 
countries will be very diffi cult to achieve without widely spread funda-
mental improvements in agricultural productivity growth occurring 
fi rst (World Bank 2008). 
Moreover, experience in the early 1970s suggests that rising food 
insecurity increases the likelihood of more inward-looking agricul-
tural trade regimes, accelerating confrontations over wage demands, 
and protracted social unrest. The current economic outlook for high 
commodity-price volatility resembles—but with greater uncertainty—
the early 1970s more than any other time since (FAO 2009a). While 
direct efforts to curb this volatility seem questionable, concerted global 
action is urgently needed to mitigate the negative effects of this volatility 
on the poor in poor countries. 
For the fi rst time ever, more than 1 billion people worldwide are 
reported to be undernourished. This is about 100 million more than in 
2008 and around one-sixth of the world’s population. Rising hunger 
is a global phenomenon, and all regions in the world have been 
affected by the increase in food insecurity. Asia and Pacifi c, the world’s 
most populous region, is home to the largest number of hungry peo-
ple (642 million). Sub-Saharan Africa has the largest prevalence of 
undernourishment relative to its population size (32 percent). The 
largest percentage increase in the number of hungry people in the 
developing world in 2009 from 2008 levels occurred in the Middle East 
and North Africa (13.5 percent). Latin America and the Caribbean, 
which was the only region in recent years with signs of improvement, 
also saw a marked increase (12.8 percent). Even in developed countries 
undernourishment has become a growing concern (FAO 2009b). Glob-
ally, 178 million children suffer from long-term physical and mental 
impairment stemming from malnutrition and associated health ills 
during the fetal period and in the fi rst two years after birth (De Pee et al. 
2010). Renewed action is essential to the creation of a climate of mutual 
benefi t necessary to the success of sustainable global economic growth. 
Now is the time to act in a signifi cant and more effective way.
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Declining donor support for agriculture from around 1980 until 
recently, together with growth in the proportion of support in bilateral 
forms, has imposed signifi cant transaction costs of aid and diverted local 
capacity. Availability of signifi cant additional donor resources for agri-
culture has been largely limited to replenishment cycles of multilateral 
development banks or to funds available through private foundations. 
Some progress has been made to address these issues through the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, and the Accra Agenda for Action, and 
bilateral donors have made progress on alignment of plans at the coun-
try level. However, a broader multilateral effort is needed, as recog-
nized and called for in 2009 by the Group of Eight (G-8) and the Group 
of 20 (G-20). 
The Dimensions of Food Security
“Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and eco-
nomic access to suffi cient, safe and nutritious food that meets their 
dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (World 
Food Summit 1996). Food insecurity results from failures in food avail-
ability, access, utilization, or stability. 
The concept of availability means that suffi cient quantities of food of 
appropriate quality are supplied through domestic production or 
imports (including food aid). Problems with food availability at the 
national level arising from national production fl uctuations are typi-
cally addressed with imports. In some situations, however, grain imports 
may be slow in coming, or may not come at all, because of logistical 
problems, trade distortions (such as export bans by suppliers), foreign 
exchange problems, or credit issues. 
Individuals should have adequate incomes or other resources to 
access appropriate food needed for a nutritious diet. For most of the 
malnourished, the lack of access to food is a greater problem than avail-
ability. Most of the food insecure live in rural areas where food is pro-
duced and available for purchase, but they cannot afford to buy it. For 
those whose usual food entitlement is to grow their own food, crop fail-
ure is a particular problem. Poverty and lack of alternative income 
sources or liquid assets constrain their access to food in the market-
place. According to the UN Hunger Task Force, about half of the hungry 
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are smallholder farmers; a fi fth are landless; and a tenth are agropasto-
ralists, fi sherfolk, and forest users; the remaining fi fth live in urban areas 
(Sanchez and others 2005).
The concept of food utilization addresses the fact that nutritional 
well-being, where all physiological needs are met, depends on the ade-
quacy of diet, clean water, sanitation, and health care. Food must not 
only be available and accessible but also be of the right quality and diver-
sity (in terms of energy and micronutrients), be safely prepared, and be 
consumed by a healthy body, since disease hinders the body’s ability to 
turn food consumed into adequate nutrition. 
To be food secure, a population, household, or individual must 
have access to adequate food at all times. Food security is fundamen-
tally a stochastic concept, subject to uncertainties and risks. Harvest 
shortfalls and high food prices are primary threats to food security in 
most places, but risks related to job loss, health problems, and civil 
strife all play important roles. Food vulnerability for households is a 
consequence of how these various risks play out across their income-
generating activities and of their capacity to mitigate risk and absorb 
loses. 
Why Food Security Is Important for 
Growth as Well as Equity 
Food Security Sustains Economic Convergence 
and Maintains Social Stability 
Although the fi rst Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving 
extreme poverty by 2015 is still reachable based on current projections, 
risks abound.1 Remarkable progress has been made in reducing poverty 
globally, although progress had varied tremendously across countries. 
Improved macroeconomic policies, deregulation and liberalization in 
many countries, rapidly expanding world trade, and the growth of remit-
tances have all contributed to accelerated economic growth and poverty 
reduction in developing countries. As a result, the incidence of extreme 
poverty is falling rapidly throughout the world. Despite growing popula-
tions, the number of poor people in developing countries living on less 
than US$1.25 a day fell from about 1.8 billion in 1990 to 1.4 billion in 
2005—from 42 percent of the population to 25 percent. 
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Aggregate trends mask signifi cant heterogeneity across regions; East 
Asia in fact accounts for much of global progress in reducing poverty. 
East Asia reduced its incidence of poverty, measured as the proportion 
of people living under the US$1.25 threshold, from 55 percent in 1990 
to 17 percent in 2005. The progress was even more remarkable in China, 
where poverty rates came down from 60 percent to 16 percent during 
the same period, with the absolute number of people in extreme pov-
erty declining from 683 million to 208 million. While the number of 
poor people in India increased from 436 million to 456 million during 
this period, the incidence fell from 51 percent to 42 percent. In com-
parison, the economic growth rate and the pace at which it is bringing 
down the incidence of poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa appears too slow 
to meet the MDG target. The pace of growth before the 2009 fi nancial 
crisis helped lower the proportion of Africans living on less than 
US$1.25 a day from 58 percent in 1990 to 51 percent in 2005, but the 
absolute number of poor people actually increased from 296 million to 
388 million.
Progress on poverty reduction notwithstanding, the incidence of 
hunger remains high and rising. The global incidence of undernourish-
ment (hunger) in 2009 was estimated by the Food and Agriculture Orga-
nization (FAO) to have increased to 1.02 billion. While this number 
partly includes the setback suffered as a result of the recent crises, a vex-
ing fact of recent times has been, despite the fall in the number of poor, 
a steady rise in the incidence of hunger (undernourishment), from 
830 million people in 1995 to the current estimated 1.02 billion. As a 
share of the global population, the undernourishment rates have fl uc-
tuated within a relatively narrow band. In 1990 the share of hungry 
people was 20 percent, in 2005 the share had dropped to 16 percent, 
and in 2009 it rose to an estimated 19 percent (fi gure 9.1).
Malnutrition indicators refl ect slow progress in reducing hunger and 
poor dietary quality. An example is the slow progress in various child 
development outcomes, including mortality. At least 3.5 million pre-
ventable deaths of under-fi ve children occur annually because of poor 
dietary intake (De Pee et al. 2010). The proportion of children under age 
fi ve who are underweight—another measure of hunger—declined from 
33 percent in developing countries in 1990 to 26 percent in 2006, a much 
slower pace than needed to halve it by 2015. As of 2008, nearly one in 
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four children under age fi ve in the developing world was underweight, 
and one in ten was severely underweight.
Fragile and confl ict-prone countries are most likely not going to meet 
the MDGs in the reduction of acute poverty and incidence of malnutrition. 
The spate of recent economic crises has overwhelmed the already weak 
capacities of many low-income countries to muster the monetary as well 
as institutional resources to combat poverty and hunger. Fragile and 
confl ict-prone states (half of which are in Sub-Saharan African and 
jointly account for a fi fth of the population of low-income countries) 
have been particularly hard hit because they not only are more suscep-
tible to these shocks but are also least equipped to deal with them.
Impacts Can Last a Generation, Limiting Human Potential
The long-term physical and mental development of 70 percent of chil-
dren born in developing countries since the beginning of 2008 has been 
irretrievably compromised (De Pee et al. 2010). Some estimates show 
Figure 9.1. Global Undernourishment Incidence Trend
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that the food price crisis of 2008 caused global poverty incidence to 
increase by anywhere between 100 million (Ivanic and Martin 2008) to 
200 million (Dessus, Herrera, and De Hoyos 2008). The impact on 
undernourishment was similarly large. By one estimate undernourish-
ment increased by 63 million people in 2008 because of the food price 
crisis, and the economic downturn in 2009 could have contributed to 
41 million more undernourished people than if the crisis had not taken 
place (Tiwari and Zaman 2010). 
Measures of nutritional status that are based on calorie suffi ciency 
alone can understate the true long-term impact of these crises, includ-
ing their effects on food security. As households compromise on dietary 
diversity, abandoning nutrient-rich food in favor of cheap sources of 
calories, and cut back spending on health and education during peri-
ods of crises, they incur substantial long-term costs. Children born 
during droughts in Zimbabwe had signifi cantly lower height during 
adolescence and enrolled into schools later than average. Similarly, 
individuals in China born between 1959 and 1962 and exposed to the 
Great Famine in the early stages of their lives were not only three centi-
meters shorter compared with cohorts born before and after the fam-
ine, they also had signifi cantly lower income and wealth (Chen and 
Zhou 2007). Empirical evidence has confi rmed that early childhood 
nutritional status can have persistent effects through adulthood, includ-
ing effects on wages in the labor market (Hoddinott et al. 2008). Fur-
thermore, to the extent that these resultant shocks to human capital 
impinge on economic growth, they weaken the ability of these coun-
tries to mitigate the ill effects of future crises, including those related to 
food security. 
Interactions between Food Insecurity and Conﬂ ict 
Drag Societies Down
Confl ict and food insecurity overlap considerably in developing coun-
tries. Lack of available and accessible food has been the source of many 
confl icts. Confl ict is often manifested in competition over the factors of 
food production, primarily land and water. Having more people to 
feed, with less land and water, more variable climates, and greater price 
volatility increases stress and raises the risk of civil unrest and confl ict. 
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Studies on the motives for war have found confl ict to be closely associ-
ated with underlying factors affecting food insecurity. 
Economic motivations related to the desire to control resources 
(greed) or the perception of unfairness in the distribution of income 
generated by the resources (grievance) can precipitate confl ict (Collier 
2000; Collier and Hoeffl er 2004). For example, a collapse of cash crop 
prices led to a sudden drop in income for small farmers in Rwanda and 
contributed to the complex forces behind the 1994 genocide there 
(Messer and Cohen 2006; Uvin 1996).
Statistically, countries with a quarter of their national income coming 
from primary commodity exports have a risk of confl ict four times 
greater than ones without primary commodity exports (Collier 2000). 
Shocks that affect food security in the context of very unequal distribu-
tions of income, land, and other material goods provide fertile ground 
for individuals and groups with grievances to cause confl ict (Pinstrup-
Andersen and Shimokawa 2008). Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004), 
for example, found that a negative rainfall shock of 5 percentage points 
in a sample of African countries increased the likelihood of a civil war 
the following year by nearly one-half. Investment in irrigation is likely to 
help reduce confl ict.
While food insecurity induces confl ict, confl ict further induces food 
scarcity, adding to food insecurity and creating a spiral that traps many in 
poverty. Confl ict destroys land, water, and biological and social resources 
for food production and also destroys other food entitlements; 30 million 
people in more than 60 countries were displaced or had their livelihoods 
destroyed by confl ict every year in the 1990s (WFP 2004). Meeting the 
food needs of refugees places a considerable burden on recipient countries. 
In 2001 there were more than 12 million refugees, 25 million internally 
displaced people, and an unknown number of people trapped in combat 
zones (FAO 2002). More broadly, FAO (2002) estimates losses of almost 
US$52 billion in agricultural output through confl ict in Sub-Saharan 
Africa between 1970 and 1997, a fi gure equivalent to 75 percent of all 
offi cial development assistance received by confl ict-affected countries. 
Estimated losses for all developing countries averaged US$4.3 billion a 
year—enough to have raised the food intake of 330 million undernour-
ished people to minimum required levels. 
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What Needs to Be Done, and What Is Different 
from the 1970s?
Early Globalization after 1945 and the Food Price 
Spike of the Early 1970s 
After the Second World War, the recognition that peace required food 
security helped fund a serious attempt to establish a multilateral food 
security system through United Nations specialized agencies such as the 
FAO (Shaw 2007). Global attitudes about food security were also shaped 
over the period by greater awareness of the extent of famine around the 
world (Sen 1981; von Braun, Teklu, and Webb 1998). The 1950s and 
1960s saw the steady rise in the association of food security with political 
security under the Cold War, on both sides of the Iron Curtain (Shaw 
2007). It was also a period of laying the infrastructure and institutional 
groundwork for roads, irrigation, agricultural universities, and research 
centers in developing countries that would allow the rapid development 
of food production in most of Asia and Latin America from the 1970s 
onward. The latter occurred under a green revolution driven by public 
investment in technology generation and diffusion of improved cereal 
seed–fertilizer packages and irrigation (Eicher and Staatz 1998). Between 
the earlier period and the green revolution was a fi ve-year period of food 
price spikes, price volatility, and food insecurity that was to shape agri-
cultural policy for a generation—and that offers key insights for current 
policies.
A sharp spike in commodity prices in the 1970s was triggered by the 
convergence of a variety of macroeconomic factors, structural changes 
in commodity markets for both energy and food, regionally severe 
droughts, and reactive policies leading to infl ation and lower growth in 
major markets, leading in turn to global food price volatility and nega-
tive impacts on trade for poor price-taking countries. In East Asia, rice 
prices in 1974 at one point reached over US$2,500 a ton in 2007 dollars 
(Slayton and Timmer 2008). The surge in food prices in 1973 –74 coin-
cided with a spike in crude oil prices but was caused by this larger group 
of factors. Food prices remained high for several years because sharp 
increases in fuel and fertilizer prices hampered the normal supply 
response. Many countries also isolated their domestic food markets from 
high international prices, further reducing the incentive of producers 
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and consumers to respond to high prices. High crude oil prices sustained 
high grain prices for most of the following decade as oil-exporting coun-
tries increased their grain imports in response to newfound wealth. 
China and other Asian countries also increased grain imports during the 
latter half of the 1970s and 1980s to maintain stable domestic prices 
relative to world prices. In some cases, such as India, governments have 
succeeded in maintaining domestic prices that are much more stable 
than international prices over long periods (fi gure 9.2). 
The macroeconomic imbalances and commodity shocks of the early 
1970s pushed many poor countries toward inward-looking and anti-
market policies in the food and agricultural areas. They also led into a 
period of stagnation in most of Africa, where the 1980s was commonly 
referred to as the “lost decade” for growth and poverty alleviation 
(Grindle 1996). 
Much of agricultural development policy debate in the 1980s and 
1990s in Africa focused on the pros and cons of reform of the antimarket 
policies put in place in the mid-1970s in response to dire food security 
concerns at the time, policies that took on a life of their own thereafter 
and reinforced other state interventions in agricultural marketing intro-
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Figure 9.2. Real Domestic and International Rice Prices, India, 1965–2004
Source: Pursell, Gulati, and Gupta 2007.
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The Green Revolution and Renewing Conﬁ dence 
in Markets, 1976–2000 
Higher investment, better technologies, and adequate policies contrib-
uted to increase cereal yields signifi cantly in developing countries during 
the 1970s. Following the food price spike in 1973–74 agricultural invest-
ment rose signifi cantly, agricultural policies improved, and agricultural 
growth increased in many developing countries, especially outside Africa. 
New investment built on progress already made in developing improved 
crop varieties adapted to tropical and subtropical production conditions. 
The most prominent of these were the rice and wheat varieties developed 
by the International Rice Research Institute and the International Maize 
and Wheat Improvement Center. When grown with adequate moisture 
and under higher soil fertility, these improved varieties yielded four 
times as much as those in use at the time.
Higher levels of investment in agriculture by both governments and 
development partners facilitated adoption of improved crop varieties, par-
ticularly in Asia. By 1980 Asian countries were spending about 14 percent 
of their total public budgets on agriculture. In addition, the share of offi -
cial development assistance to agriculture across all developing countries 
increased from 10 percent in 1975 to 18 percent by 1979, which translated 
into a more than doubling in real U.S. dollar terms (OECD 2006).
The use of improved crop varieties, fertilizer, and irrigation increased 
signifi cantly from the earlier 1970s. The share of area planted to improved 
crop varieties increased in Asia from 10 percent in 1970 to 80 percent by 
2000. Fertilizer use more than doubled. Irrigated areas continued to 
expand and by 2000 accounted for about 40 percent of cropped area in 
South Asia and 30 percent of cropped area in East Asia. Complementary 
investments were made in agricultural research, extension, and seed 
multiplication to facilitate the adoption of new technology (World Bank 
2008). 
Since the early 1980s the excessive taxation of agriculture has also 
declined, raising farmer incentives to produce and invest. A recent analy-
sis of a large sample of countries across the world shows that net agricul-
tural taxation has on average declined sharply. Between 1980–84 and 
2000–04 it declined from about 30 percent to 10 percent in Sub-Saharan 
African countries and from about 15 percent to 5 percent in East and 
South Asia countries (Anderson 2009).
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The result of better technologies and higher investment was a sig-
nifi cant increase in global agricultural productivity growth, driven by 
developing countries primarily in Asia. Global growth in agricultural 
gross domestic product (GDP) averaged 2 percent annually from 1980 
to the early 2000s, while population growth averaged 1.6 percent annu-
ally over the same period. Global poverty rates declined, and global food 
security improved. Agricultural reforms initiated in China in 1978 to 
improve property rights, output prices, and adoption of higher-yielding 
crop varieties (primarily rice) was the primary driver of the 15 percent 
annual increase in rural incomes from 1978 to 1984 (von Braun, Gulati, 
and Fan 2005). By 2001 the rural poverty rates in China had declined to 
12 percent, down from 76 percent of the population in 1980 (Chen and 
Ravallion 2007). In rural India poverty fell from 64 percent in 1967 to 
34 percent by 1986.
The green revolution was not universal: regions outside of Asia such 
as Africa and Latin America did not experience the dramatic increases in 
yields experienced by other regions. Public investments in agriculture 
were lower and agricultural taxes higher in Africa than in other regions 
of the world (World Bank 2008). 
Declining growth in demand for food grain in the late 1970s and rising 
supply led to the growth of surplus stocks and lowered world grain prices. 
By 1977 real world grain prices were half the 1974 levels, and by 2000 they 
were about one-quarter the 1974 levels. Over the same period, the grain 
stock-to-use ratio doubled from 16.5 percent to 33 percent. Higher stocks 
reduced the sensitivity of global prices to production shocks. By the 
early 1980s grain stocks had risen to burdensome levels (fi gure 9.3). This 
situation led to a series of government policy changes that reduced global 
grain stocks, beginning with a major policy change in the United States 
in 1983 that sharply reduced grain stocks and decoupled U.S. producer 
prices from global grain prices (Mitchell and Le Vallee 2005). The U.S. 
action was followed almost a decade later by major reform of the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy of the European Community, which reduced 
grain support prices and lowered grain stocks in government programs. 
The immediate effect of lower grain stocks on prices was not immedi-
ately apparent because it coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union 
in the late 1980s, which sharply lowered grain imports. This allowed the 
shift in dietary patterns toward increased grain-fed meat consumption 
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in developing countries to continue without major disruptions to the 
generally declining trend in real grain prices. 
The signifi cant decline in global food prices led to complacency about 
the continued need to invest in agriculture. The share of public spending 
on agriculture in Asian countries halved from 14 to 7 percent between 
1980 and 2004, and in Africa it declined from about 7 to 4 percent. The 
share of offi cial development assistance to agriculture halved from its 
peak of 18 percent to 9 percent by the late 1980s and then again to about 
4 percent by the early 2000s. The subsequent pace of real-world food 
price decline eased, with real prices in 2000 similar to where they were in 
1987. With lower investment, less attention was now being given to the 
generation and adaptation of new crop varieties, to extension services, 
and to input use. While further improvements in price policies contin-
ued to provide incentives to investment, the scope for future dramatic 
reductions in agricultural taxation had narrowed considerably. 
Sea Changes in Global Cereal Markets, 2001–09 
Because of the decline in levels of global food stocks that started in 2000, 
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Figure 9.3. Declining Food Prices Amid Rising Stocks
Source: World Bank, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
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weather, biofuels, and speculation. The 21st century began with low food 
prices and stagnant demand, as many developing countries struggled to 
recover from the lingering effects of the Asian fi nancial crisis that began 
in 1997. Moreover, it can be seen in fi gure 9.4 that the major destocking 
that took global stocks back to stock-to-use ratios last seen in the early 
1970s occurred only after 1997, suggesting new forces at work in global 
cereal markets.
Real food prices reached all-time lows in 2000 and then began a gradual 
recovery that eventually accelerated and then peaked in 2008 before declin-
ing during the global recession. Annual average real global food prices 
increased 98 percent from 2000 to 2008, and nominal monthly food prices 
almost tripled from January 2000 to their highs in June 2008. Basic staple 
food grains such as wheat and rice more than tripled (fi gure 9.5), while 
other staples such as palm oil showed similar increases. The increases in 
real food prices since 2000 were similar in magnitude to those in the 
1970s, with real prices increasing 82 percent from 1972 to 1974 com-
pared with 98 percent from 2000 to 2008. The price spikes in the 1970s 
occurred more quickly, however, and were driven by easily identifi able 
shocks (large imports by the Soviet Union and drought), while the 
increase from 2000 to 2008 was more gradual and caused by a confl u-





































Figure 9.4. Grain Stock Destocking after 1983 and 1997
Source: Mitchell and Le Vallee 2005.
398 Postcrisis Growth and Development
As with the world food crisis of the 1970s, global grain stocks were 
allowed to fall to dangerously low levels in the 2000s. Crude oil prices 
also contributed to the surge in food prices in both periods by raising 
fuel and fertilizer prices, which are important factors of cereals produc-
tion. In addition to these cost-of-production factors, however, policy 
also contributed to the food price increases by encouraging production 
of biofuels from food crops. Food demand in developing countries also 
increased but was not a major factor contributing to the price increases; 
increases in effective demand were mostly confi ned to soybean imports 
by China to propel its growing poultry and livestock industry. With this 
exception, the global demand for food and feed increased along histori-
cal trends and population growth rates, with global grain consumption 
for nonbiofuel uses increasing by 1.3 percent a year and global trade 
increasing 1.7 percent a year from 2000 to 2009. Global grain feed demand 
grew by only 1.1 percent a year from 2000 to 2008 (USDA 2010). 
Biofuels have benefi ted greatly from a wide array of supportive policy 
measures in the agriculture, energy, transport, and environment sectors, as 
governments sought to promote biofuel production. These policies have 































































Figure 9.5. Food and Grain Prices, 2000–10
Source: Mitchell 2008.
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infrastructure for biofuel storage, blending and production mandates, 
import tariffs, and tax incentives. Such subsidies are quite signifi cant: the 
total support estimate ranges from US$0.28 a liter in the United States to 
US$0.60 a liter in Switzerland for ethanol, and from US$0.20 a liter in 
Canada to US$1.00 a liter in Switzerland for biodiesel (Steenblik 2007).
Since biofuels are direct substitutes for oil, their production has linked 
the agricultural and energy markets to an extent never seen before. Tradi-
tionally price movements in these two markets have exhibited relatively 
low or even negative correlation. However, this relationship has been 
altered in a fundamental way since the increase in biofuel use and the 
advent of oil prices exceeding US$50 a barrel introduced a spillover of 
price volatility from the oil and energy market into agricultural markets 
(Mitchell 2008). 
World market prices rose dramatically: the demand for food crops to 
produce biofuels increased sharply from 2000 and contributed to the 
surge in food-crop prices (Mitchell 2008). This additional demand was 
not quickly met by increased production, and stocks fell. The three larg-
est biofuels producers are the United States, Brazil, and the European 
Union, all of which have provided strong government support to biofu-
els production. Brazil currently uses approximately one-half of its sugar 
cane crop (18 percent of global production) for biofuels, and the United 
States uses almost one-third of its maize production (13.2 percent of 
global production) for ethanol. The European Union produces ethanol 
from grains (wheat and maize) and biodiesel from vegetable oils (rape-
seed, soybean, and sunfl ower oils). In 2009 the 27 members of the 
European Union used an estimated 7.4 million tons of vegetable oils 
(5.4 percent of global production) for biodiesel, and other countries 
used an additional 3.2 million tons of vegetable oils for biodiesel, which 
together accounted for about 8 percent of global vegetable oils produc-
tion. Ethanol production from sugar cane in Brazil has been increasing 
since the 1970s and has had little discernable impact on sugar prices 
because it has been met by increased Brazilian production. 
Many of the policy responses to the recent food crisis were similar to 
those of the 1970s and serve as a reminder that food security, when 
threatened, is a major concern for all governments. During the 1970s the 
United States banned exports of certain food crops in an effort to contain 
domestic food price increases (Mitchell and Mielke 2005). The European 
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Union did the same in the mid-1990s when food prices rose, and that 
policy response was repeated during the recent food crisis. A large num-
ber of countries (India, Vietnam, Ukraine, Argentina, in chronological 
order, and others) banned or restricted exports of one or more major 
cereals in late 2007 or 2008. Countries also increased grain imports dur-
ing and after the food crisis of the 1970s and again in recent years as large 
imports of rice by the Philippines in 2008 contributed to a surge in global 
rice prices. Direct foreign investment in food production occurred fol-
lowing both food crises. For example, following the crisis of the 1970s, 
Japan invested in soybean production in Brazil, and several oil-exporting 
countries have recently invested in food production in Africa. 
Structural changes are happening in the commodity futures mar-
kets. The progressive deregulation of U.S. commodity market opera-
tions from the late 1980s to the early 1990s—fi rst manifested in the oil 
market—was later extended to agricultural commodity markets. It 
facilitated the entry of nontraditional players into agricultural deriva-
tives markets, which previously had been used primarily by commercial 
agricultural entities seeking to hedge the risks of being dependent for 
their business on future procurement of agricultural commodities. 
While deregulation was initially associated with a rush of money into 
energy markets, which are suffi ciently broad and liquid to accommodate 
a trading boom, institutional investors began to diversify their holdings 
into a broader basket of commodities that included food grains. 
“Long-only” investors—investors such as index funds and pension 
funds that stand to gain when prices climb higher—have increased their 
market positions from one-quarter of the commodity market in 1998 to 
about two-thirds in 2008. Such interests committed about US$4.7 bil-
lion to commodities in 1998, an amount that approximately doubled 
every year to 2007, hitting US$80 billion in 2005, and US$175 billion in 
2007. Total fund investments were estimated by commercial analysts in 
mid-2008 at approximately US$250 billion.2
Most of these long-term investments are in commodities futures 
rather than in the commodities themselves. For example, only 0.5 per-
cent of hard red winter wheat futures contracts on the Chicago Board 
of Trade resulted in physical deliveries in 2008. Previously, commodity 
exchanges were owned by commercial market participants with a need 
to have a vehicle for hedging price risks, even if many of the traders 
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involved rarely took physical delivery of commodities themselves. 
Now most major exchanges are run as fi nancial sector businesses in 
their own right, deriving income from the volume of transactions that 
they facilitate. The vast majority of the investments or transactions 
in these markets are now being undertaken by parties whose objective 
is to make fi nancial returns from their investments, mainly over the 
medium to long term, as opposed to hedging short-term commercial 
risk (Gilbert 2008). 
These new investors also have a signifi cantly different perspective from 
the traditional view of speculators. They do not seek to profi t from mar-
ket volatility as do the traditional speculators, who seek returns from 
short-term ups and downs in the market, but rather act as long-only 
investors, who seek not only profi ts from ups, but also interest on margin 
accounts and diversifi cation into assets perceived to have low correlation 
with securities prices (Erb and Harvey 2006). They do not alter their mar-
ket positions in relation to either short-term market volatility or supply-
demand shifts; they only alter their market positions based on long-term 
investment prospects and occasional rebalancing of the share of food 
within the overall commodity basket (food, energy, oil, metals). Unlike 
short-term investors and speculators, they do not add to liquidity in the 
market, since they do not change holdings except as contracts roll over. 
This is an important feature, since adding liquidity is considered to be the 
primary rationale for encouraging a certain level of fi nancial speculation 
in commodity markets. On the other hand, commodity futures investors 
(as opposed to speculators) do tend to push up the price of futures com-
pared to spot prices, thus increasing the profi tability of storage.
Cereal price spikes tend to occur when stocks reach a tipping point. 
The markets for storable commodities such as grains are characterized 
by long periods when prices are in the doldrums, punctuated by short 
periods of intense but short-lived price spikes (Deaton and Laroque 
1992). On the surface the reasons for this are clear: when stock levels are 
adequate, changes in stocks play an important role in stabilizing prices. 
If production is unexpectedly low in a particular year, stocks can be 
drawn down so that consumption does not need to decline as much as 
production. Similarly, a year with a good harvest can be accommodated 
by accumulating stocks—consumption can remain nearer its average 
level. When stock levels become low—perhaps following several years 
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of poor harvests, or surprisingly rapid growth in demand for use in bio-
fuels—it becomes diffi cult or impossible for stocks to play their balanc-
ing role. If production falls by 10 percent but available stocks cover only 
5 percent of consumption, stocks cannot possibly meet the decline in 
production. Under these circumstances prices may need to increase dra-
matically for consumption and production to be brought into balance. 
Defensive policy distortions such as export bans and panic public 
procurement of imports are based in part on the perception of the depth 
of markets going forward. Low stock levels induce less confi dence in 
price stability and even physical availability, as happened in 2008, and 
thus market behaviors occur that aggravate price volatility. The short-
lived price booms of 1973–74 and 2007–08 were both associated with 
low stock levels and greatly decreased confi dence in the ability of global 
food markets to supply needs, especially for relatively thin international 
markets such as rice.
An Uncertain Outlook 
More Uncertain Prices
Demand uncertainty has risen because of evolving energy markets and 
structural change in the nature of the food commodity markets. As con-
cerns about climate change have increased along with the desire to 
decrease reliance on fossil fuel sources, commercial bioenergy produc-
tion continues to grow. Globally, approximately 52 billion liters of etha-
nol were produced in 2007—led by the United States (51 percent), Brazil 
(37 percent), and the European Union (4 percent). About 10 billion liters 
of biodiesel were produced—led by the European Union (60 percent) 
and the United States (17 percent) (FAO 2008). U.S. ethanol production 
began to rise rapidly in 2002 and jumped from 1 billion gallons in 2005 
to 5 billion gallons in 2006. The European Union, led by Germany and 
France, began to increase biodiesel production in 2005. In a study exam-
ining the relation between various U.S. government mandates and U.S. 
coarse grain prices, under a scenario where a production mandate (the 
U.S. Renewable Fuels Standard that mandates production of 15 billion 
gallons a year) becomes binding, the inherent volatility in the U.S. coarse 
grains market is estimated to rise by about one-quarter (Hertel and 
Beckman 2010). This added volatility is estimated to derive from the 
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volatility in the energy market and is incremental to the traditional vola-
tility arising from agricultural market fundamentals. 
The verdict is still out on how structural change in the nature of food 
commodity markets will affect future food prices or food price volatility. 
The strong overlap between the increase in long-only investment in 
commodity markets and the escalation in food prices led the U.S. House 
of Representatives to propose legislation regulating nontraditional 
participants in commodity markets.3 Yet reputable academic research 
has shown inconclusive evidence of causality of the two phenomena 
(Gilbert 2008; Tyner, Abbot, and Hurt 2008). Establishing direct causality 
between the increase in the volume of long-only investment and lasting 
increases in food prices or food price volatility hinges on establishing 
structural changes in the links between futures and spot prices. This 
remains an open issue at the current time.
Land and water constraints, coupled with technology uncertainties, 
are likely to result in a more unpredictable food supply. Supply uncertain-
ties caused by land and water constraints, climate change, and declining 
yield growth pose questions about whether demand projections will be 
met. In addition, high price volatility may dampen supply response to 
higher average prices, negatively affecting both producers and consumers. 
The progress in agricultural growth in developing countries has been 
dominated by signifi cant gains in Asia. In South Asia in particular, how-
ever, the annual yield growth of the green revolution has diminished in 
recent years. For developing countries as a whole, average agricultural 
productivity growth declined from more than 3 percent a year in the 
1980s to less than 1.6 percent from 2000 to 2008, and it is projected to 
decline further. In Sub-Saharan Africa, cereal yield growth rates declined 
from 1.8 percent in the 1970s to 0.7 percent in the 1990s, then increased 
slightly to 1.1 percent from 2000 to 2008. 
In Asia and Africa population pressure and rapid urbanization have 
greatly reduced the land available for agriculture. Productivity of available 
land is also undermined by desertifi cation, salinization, soil erosion, and 
deforestation. Globally 5 million to 10 million hectares of agricultural 
land are being lost annually to severe degradation (World Bank 2008). At 
the same time, competitive pressures from biofuels are adding pressure 
on agricultural land. Governments and private actors from wealthy and 
emerging nations that are buying up land in developing countries in an 
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effort to secure their own long-term food or raw material supplies trig-
ger concern for the livelihoods and food security of people currently 
living on those lands. 
Agriculture uses 85 percent of freshwater withdrawals in developing 
countries, and irrigated agriculture accounts for about 40 percent of the 
value of agricultural production in the developing world. Demand for 
water for both agricultural and nonagricultural uses is rising and water 
scarcity is limiting the future expansion of irrigation. According to the 
Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture, 
approximately 1.2 billion people live in river basins with absolute water 
scarcity; 478 million live in basins where scarcity is fast approaching; and 
a further 1.5 billion suffer from inadequate access to water because of 
lack of infrastructure or the human and fi nancial capital to tap the avail-
able resources (World Bank 2008). 
Agriculture is extremely vulnerable to climate change. Higher tem-
peratures and more erratic rainfall patterns reduce yield, encourage weed 
and pest proliferation, and increase the likelihood of short-run crop fail-
ures and long-run production declines. Although there will be gains in 
some parts of the world, overall impacts are expected to be negative, 
threatening global food security, particularly in the poorer parts of the 
developing world (Nelson et al. 2009). Comparing historical crop pro-
duction and weather data, Schlenker and Lobell (2010) estimated the 
likely yield response to climate change for fi ve key African food crops 
(maize, sorghum, millet, groundnut, and cassava) in 2046–65 relative to 
a baseline of 1961–2002. In all cases except cassava, there is a 95 percent 
probability that yield declines will exceed 7 percent, and a 5 percent prob-
ability that they will exceed 27 percent. Countries with the highest aver-
age yields have the largest projected yield losses, suggesting that modern 
seed-fertilizer packages are more susceptible to heat-related losses.
International trade has enormous potential as a means of reducing price 
volatility. Food security is frequently misidentifi ed as food self-suffi ciency. 
But the critical issue in developing countries is most frequently whether 
poor individuals and households have access to suffi cient food. Food secu-
rity can frequently be reduced by attempts to increase food suffi ciency. 
Policies that, for example, seek to reduce imports by imposing tariffs may 
raise the domestic price of food and make it harder for poor people to 
afford the food they need. This can be a particularly serious problem given 
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that poor people frequently spend three-quarters of their income on food 
(Ivanic and Martin 2008). 
Weather shocks are the most important source of price volatility for 
staple foods such as grains. Opening to international trade provides 
enormous potential for diversifying away food price risk. Other things 
equal, the variance of food prices will be roughly one-tenth as large in a 
market of 10 widely separated countries as it would be in each country 
taken alone. Policies that restrict imports or exports using quotas can 
also substantially increase the volatility of domestic prices—increasing 
the risk of food price spikes. 
Countries seek to use trade policy selectively to reduce the volatility of 
their own prices; however, this behavior is likely to increase global price 
volatility. When prices are high, many countries seek to insulate their 
markets by imposing export taxes or restrictions if they are exporters or 
by lowering import tariffs if they are importers. Conversely, in periods of 
low prices, importers frequently raise duties, and exporters sometimes 
use export subsidies. While these policies can be effective for individual 
countries, the combined impact of key countries adopting these insulat-
ing policies is to increase the volatility of world prices. If many countries 
adopt such policies—and particularly if quantitative restrictions rather 
than price-based measures are used—world prices can become very 
unstable, and importers can become concerned about the reliability of 
their access to food supplies from world markets.
Uncertainty about Poverty and Hunger Trends 
Although the global poverty and hunger MDG is still attainable, World 
Bank projections published in the Global Monitoring Report 2010 suggest 
that Sub-Saharan Africa will not be able to halve poverty by 2015, espe-
cially following the slowdown in growth caused by the economic crisis 
(World Bank 2010b). Projections indicate that the economic crisis will 
lead to deterioration across all MDGs, extending beyond 2015. Under all 
the growth scenarios estimated by the Global Monitoring Report, the world 
will meet the MDG of halving its headcount poverty rate using a poverty 
line of US$1.25 per day. However, the poverty rate in 2015 is considerably 
higher in the low-growth scenario (18.5 percent) than in the one that 
assumes a rapid recovery from the crisis (15 percent). Sub-Saharan Africa 
is projected to miss its poverty target by more than 9 percentage points, if 
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growth continues on postcrisis trends, reaching 38 percent by 2015. 
Before the crisis the region had been on a path to reach a poverty rate of 
36 percent, which would have lifted another 20 million people out of pov-
erty by 2015.
The likelihood of achieving poverty target rates varies considerably 
across the other regions. According to the report, East Asia and Pacifi c 
will achieve the MDG of halving poverty even in a low-growth scenario. 
South Asia will likely meet the poverty target in the postcrisis base case 
scenario but not in a low-growth scenario. Middle-income countries in 
Europe and Central Asia are projected to miss the poverty reduction 
MDG at poverty lines of both US$1.25 and US$2 a day, the latter line 
being more meaningful for this group of countries. 
Even before the crisis the regional differences in the likelihood of meet-
ing the hunger MDG were signifi cant. In 2008, 63 developing countries 
(out of 117 with available data) were on track to halve the prevalence of 
underweight among children under fi ve by 2015. However, in 34 coun-
tries progress is insuffi cient, and 20, most of them in Africa, have made no 
progress toward achieving this MDG target. 
The prospects of meeting the MDGs related to hunger look bleaker 
since the crisis—primarily for two reasons. First, many of the countries 
exposed to high global food prices were those with high preexisting 
levels of malnutrition. Ranking countries by those most affected by 
malnutrition, Burundi, Madagascar, Niger, Timor Leste, and Republic of 
Yemen are among the 10 most affected countries for both stunting and 
wasting indicators. All of these countries experienced double-digit food 
price infl ation in 2007–08. Second, any relief that the subsequent decline 
in food prices in 2009 was likely to bring about was more than offset by 
the global economic crisis that reduced employment opportunities and 
income. Moreover, although international prices were somewhat close to 
their precrisis level by the end of 2009, the price of staples in domestic 
markets continued to increase throughout 2009 (table 9.1).
The Way Forward: Linking Food Security 
with Growth Strategies
Food security is a prerequisite for broad-based economic growth. Once 
a household can attain basic nutritional needs, it starts to have the ability 
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to consume other items, stimulating demand, as well as having the health 
to engage in entrepreneurial activities. Food security is critical to the 
inclusion of the poorest in the economy. It is arguably a prerequisite for 
people to believe in mutual benefi t of market-led development. The lack 
of investment in the dimensions of food security discussed earlier (avail-
ability, access, utilization, and stability) will lead to further food price 
volatility, adversely affecting the majority of the poor who are net con-
sumers of food, dampening consumer spending, and lowering growth.
Seventy-fi ve percent of the world’s poor live in rural areas where 
agriculture is the main source of livelihoods. Recent studies suggest 
that agriculture is up to 3.2 times better than growth originating from 
other sectors at reducing US$1-a-day headcount poverty in low-income 
but resource-rich countries—including those in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Christiaensen, Demery, and Kuhl 2010). Reducing poverty among the 
poorest and improving their food security will require additional 
investments to raise agricultural productivity, link farmers to markets, 
reduce risk and vulnerability, and facilitate rural nonfarm income. 
Rural nonfarm activities are also an important source of income growth 
and safety net support for rural households. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for 
example, multiple studies show that such activities can account for half 
of farm-household income and are especially important as coping 
Table 9.1. Countries with the Largest Increase in Domestic Price of Main Staples 














Nigeria Sorghum 13 50 Mozambique Cassava 33 61
Uganda Maize 10 35 Congo, Dem. Rep. Cassava 55 60
Bhutan Rice .. 26 Sudan Sorghum 26 38
Sudan Sorghum 26 24 Kenya Maize 36 21
Tanzania Maize 34 23 Chad Sorghum 18 18
Kenya Maize 36 16 Burkina Faso Sorghum 27 15
China Rice 27 15 Tanzania Maize 27 14
Source: World Bank, “Food Price Watch,” 1 (February 2010). 
Note: The table is based on data for 58 countries.
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strategies of the rural poor for dealing with volatility in agricultural 
incomes (Reardon, Delgado, and Matlon 1992).
Invest More 
The fi nancing gap remains large; therefore more investment in agricul-
tural productivity growth is needed. The International Food Policy 
Research Institute estimated the global incremental agricultural public 
investment required—the additional amount necessary to meet the 
Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty by 2015—to be 
US$14 billion annually for all developing countries (Fan and Rosegrant 
2008). The estimated incremental annual investment needed in Sub-
Saharan Africa ranged from US$3.8 billion to US$4.8 billion (the former 
using a unit-cost approach, the latter being the additional investment 
needed to meet the Maputo Declaration of spending 10 percent of gov-
ernment budgets on agriculture). 
Estimated returns to additional agricultural investment are high. The 
most frequently estimated returns are for investment in agricultural 
research and extension. A recent synthesis of nearly 700 of these esti-
mates in the developing world indicated an average return to investment 
in agricultural research and extension of 43 percent a year (Alston et al. 
2000). Returns are high in all regions, including Sub-Saharan Africa 
(which averaged 35 percent). Even discounting for selection bias in eval-
uation studies and other methodological issues, there is little doubt that 
investing in research and development can be a resounding success. The 
high payoffs relative to the cost of capital also indicate that agricultural 
science is grossly underfunded.
Returns on irrigation investments have also been high, although more 
varied. Returns have historically been higher in Asia than in Africa, but 
returns on irrigation project investments in Africa now often reach the 
15–20 percent range commonly obtained in the rest of the world (IWMI 
2005). Lower costs and improved technologies and institutions have 
raised returns. In addition, small-scale irrigation has shown recent suc-
cess, especially in Niger and in the Fadama program in Nigeria. Poten-
tial investments in expanding irrigation infrastructure that pass a 
threshold 12 percent rate of return are estimated to be feasible in Africa 
on 1.53 million hectares for dam-based, large-scale irrigation, and on 
5.44 million hectares for small-scale irrigation (World Bank 2010a). 
The potential is signifi cant.
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Expanding irrigation infrastructure to all land in developing coun-
tries with irrigation potential could contribute about half of the total 
value of needed food supply by 2050; however, this expansion would also 
require 40 percent more withdrawals of water for agriculture. Therefore, 
improving productivity of existing irrigated areas is crucial; this includes 
about 5 million hectares in Africa (World Bank 2007) and more than 
half the crop area cultivated in South Asia, where productivity is very 
low (IWMI 2007). 
Investing to Improve Food Availability and Stability 
It is essential to raise productivity growth to improve climate resilience 
and supply. With growing resource scarcity, climate change, and increas-
ing demand, the ability to increase food supply depends more than ever 
on raising agricultural productivity. Yet for major cereals—rice, wheat, 
and maize—the growth rates of yields in developing countries have slowed 
considerably since the 1980s (fi gure 9.6). Except in Africa the easy gains 















































Figure 9.6. Slowing Growth Rates of Yields for Major Cereals, 
Developing Countries
Source: Derived from FAO data.
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productivity gains will need to rely both on improvements in technical 
effi ciency (using existing technologies more effi ciently) and on techno-
logical change (the development and adoption of new technology).
Better use of existing resources and technologies is needed to improve 
technical effi ciency. Average crop yields in many countries are often only 
a third of experimental farm yields, as is the case for rice in many parts 
of Asia and for maize in Africa (World Bank 2008). Closing the yield gap 
will require investments to improve farmer advice and information 
(through improved extension services), to increase use of improved 
seeds and fertilizers (through improved seed multiplication, dealer net-
works, and fi nancing), to use more labor-saving technologies, and to 
strengthen land tenure security (particularly for women in Africa) to 
raise incentives to invest. 
To offset the estimated negative impacts of climate change on crop 
yields in developing countries, estimated to reduce yields by about 
20 percent, urgent attention is needed to improve water resource man-
agement through expansion of managed irrigation, river basin, and rain-
fed systems (World Bank 2008). Investments are needed to expand and 
rehabilitate irrigated areas through irrigation infrastructure (canals, 
pumps, and so on), support for water users associations, training and 
capacity building for technical oversight to community-based schemes, 
reform and modernization of existing large-scale irrigation, and invest-
ments in irrigation equipment providers. River basin management needs 
to be improved through institutional development, including support 
for river basin management authorities and technical support for estab-
lishment of water-rights systems. In addition, water use in rain-fed systems 
could be improved through water control and conservation, including 
contouring and water capture infrastructure; advice on improved farm 
management practices for improved water retention in soil, and watershed 
management through forestation and similar approaches.
Technological change is urgently needed. While signifi cant gains can 
be made from adoption of existing technologies, additional efforts are 
needed to generate new technologies to better match the heterogeneous 
agroecologies and improve climate resilience. New technologies might 
be able to ease persistent and emerging problems that have signifi cant 
negative impacts on the livelihoods and food security of the poor (such 
as banana bacteria wilt, coffee wilt disease, and Rift Valley fever, among 
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others). Yet despite these challenges the intensity of public investment in 
agricultural research (in relation to agricultural GDP) is fi ve times higher 
in developed countries than in developing countries (Pardey et al. 2007). 
Investment in both adaptive and strategic research is needed. This 
includes strengthening not only the scientifi c and administrative capacity 
of national agricultural research systems, but also the links between 
farmers, advisory services, and international centers.
In addition to productivity gains, reducing costs in food marketing and 
trade can help smooth out food prices. In the poorest countries the cost to 
farmers of market transactions can be high. Transport costs are often 
50–60 percent of total marketing costs, leading to situations where bulky 
food staples are not competitive to produce for export from local produc-
tion regions, even in good years, and are expensive to import to local 
markets in bad years. The high cost of trade thus leaves many local food 
markets, particularly in Africa, especially vulnerable to weather shocks that 
translate into high local staple volatility. A vivid example of this occurred 
in Ethiopia in the late 1990s and early 2000s (fi gure 9.7). Reducing costs in 
food marketing and trade can act to dampen local food price volatility.
High trade costs with the outside world, roughly portrayed in fi gure 9.7 
for grain consumed in Addis Ababa as the band between export and 
import parity prices in Addis relative to world markets, benefi t neither 
farmers nor consumers.4 Reducing these costs requires investments to 
upgrade and improve management of rural infrastructure (feeder roads, 
wholesale and retail markets, and storage), to collect and disseminate mar-
ket information (market food price data availability and access), to 
strengthen producer organizations (for scale economies in trade), and to 
improve regional integration of food markets (to lower costs and barriers 
to trade). Road infrastructure is crucial to link elements in the agricultural 
value chain, to meet the distribution requirements of urban retail markets, 
to improve reliability of agricultural inputs, and to increase access to 
farmer fi elds, leading to better farm management. Recent projects in 
agricultural-oriented road development show that private-public part-
nerships can be effective in facilitating access to private investment, inno-
vative fi nance, and specialized expertise. 
Information technology is becoming increasingly important to 
improve rural livelihoods and incomes. For example, wireless communi-
cations technologies are easy to use and have declining rollout costs; they 
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thus are within easy access of rural populations with low levels of income 
and literacy. The next billion mobile subscribers are expected to consist 
mainly of the rural poor (World Bank 2009). A successful use of mobile 
phones in rural areas is to access market information. TradeNet, a Ghana-
based trading platform, allows users to sign up for short message service 
alerts for commodities and markets of their choice and to receive instant 
alerts for offers to buy or sell when anyone else on the network has sub-
mitted an offer by mobile phone. Users can also request and receive 
real-time prices for more than 80 commodities from 400 markets across 
West Africa. In India access to market information through mobile 
phones has allowed fi shermen to respond faster to market demand and 
has increased their profi ts (Jensen 2007); in Niger it has reduced price 
































































Figure 9.7. Local Grain Price Volatility in Ethiopia
Source: Del Ninno, Dorosh, and Subbaro 2005.
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Where complementary investments in training and capacity building 
have been made, there has also been reported success in rural areas with 
broadband Internet access. In India the E-Choupal program was started in 
2000 by ITC, one of India’s largest agricultural exporters. The program 
operates in traditional community gathering venues (choupals) in farming 
villages, using a common portal that links multimedia personal comput-
ers by satellite. Training is provided to the hosts, who are typically literate 
farmers with a respected role in their communities. The computers give 
farmers better access to information such as local weather forecasts, crop 
price lists in nearby markets, and the latest sowing techniques. Collec-
tively, these improvements have resulted in productivity gains for the 
farmers. By 2008 E-Choupal had reached millions of small farmers in 
more than 40,000 villages, bringing economic and other benefi ts.
Interventions aimed at improving overall market effi ciency will also 
help mitigate risks and minimize losses. These interventions should 
include upgrading and improving management of rural infrastructure, 
improving collection and dissemination of market infrastructures, and 
developing systems for grades and standards and their application. At 
the same time, public policies should aim at strengthening the bargain-
ing power of smallholder farmers—especially women—through their 
producer organizations to improve skills and access through outgrower 
schemes where large farms handle inputs and marketing for groups of 
smaller ones for a fee, or contract farming where smallholders typi-
cally supply labor and land for a fee, and an industrial enterprise supplies 
inputs, management, and marketing. 
Smallholder agricultural development and greater involvement with 
higher-value markets is likely to have large-scale impact. High-value 
markets offer profi table opportunities for increasing smallholder income 
because domestic markets for livestock and horticultural products exhibit 
particular dynamism (World Bank 2008) and because nontraditional, 
higher-value food has come to account for the majority of developing-
country agrifood exports (Jaffe and Sewadeh 2006).
Positive impacts of smallholder participation include income genera-
tion; employment; and improved access to credit and technical assistance, 
development of business service markets, and social status (Henson 
et al. 2008). Participation in modern supply chains can increase farmer 
income by 10–100 percent (Guatemala, Indonesia, and Kenya) (World 
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Bank 2008). However, the rapid evolution of markets and the associated 
supply chains for high-value agriculture and food products presents sig-
nifi cant challenges to small farmers, and high transaction costs inhibit 
their participation. Thresholds investments are required to reduce small 
farmers’ competitive disadvantage relative to large farmers and economies 
of scale. These investments include enhancing the capacity of supply 
chains to meet food safety and quality standards, upgrading logistics 
capacity to supply a specifi c quantity on a reliable basis, and refi ning 
current products and production processes. 
It has been shown that large-scale impacts are more likely to be 
achieved when there is a close collaboration between organized groups 
of small farms and the private sector (especially to maintain and enhance 
value as market evolves) and when governments play a multidimensional 
supporting role. Results also show that where domestic capacity is weak, 
international technical and marketing partnerships are critical in provid-
ing a vehicle for technology and knowledge transfer, identifying market 
opportunities, and obtaining local export market contacts and linkages 
(Henson 2008). 
Investing to Improve Food Access and Nutrition 
Investments that lead to improved food access, safety nets, and nutrition 
are crucial to protect the most vulnerable population. Improving access 
to food is linked with functioning markets. Competitive markets can 
lower the cost of basic staples to consumers and also provide a variety of 
food types that ensure dietary diversity.5 Poorly functioning markets can 
increase hunger risks, however. That can occur, for instance, when market 
information is limited and a few traders control local markets. Moreover, 
there is evidence that local prices adjust upward rapidly during global 
food price shifts but are sticky in downward shifts. Hence the existence of 
food markets does not necessarily ensure the reduction of hunger. Mea-
sures required to make food markets work better for the poor include 
investment in appropriate infrastructure, in competition and regulatory 
policy and enforcement, and in strengthening information fl ows.
Ensuring equitable intrahousehold allocation of food is an essential 
part of ensuring food security. Intrahousehold distribution norms are 
critical in ensuring that vulnerable individuals—specifi cally pregnant 
women and infants under two years of age—consume a suffi ciently 
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nutritious diet. Evidence indicates that increasing female income leads 
to a better-quality diet for children in the household (Haddad et al. 
1996). Previous experience has shown that crisis events lead females to 
sacrifi ce their consumption more than males do within a household. 
Hence investing in safety net and nutrition programs that target women 
and girls is essential to reduce hunger and malnutrition.
Safety net programs in low-income countries typically have low cover-
age, are underresourced, and are fragmented. The majority of the extreme 
poor in most low-income countries do not have access to public safety net 
programs and must rely instead on informal networks and other coping 
strategies. Public spending on safety net programs, averaging 1–2 percent 
of GDP (Grosh et al. 2009), is typically signifi cantly lower than on pub-
licly provided education and health services, and the programs are often 
implemented by multiple government agencies. As a result, during crises 
that affect the food security of a large part of the population, policy mak-
ers are often compelled to rely on suboptimal policies such as universal 
subsidies to cushion the poor. Hence it is essential that during noncrisis 
years, countries invest in strengthening existing programs, and piloting 
new ones, to address chronic poverty, achieve food security and human 
development goals, and be ready to respond to shocks.
A number of safety net options exist based on country circumstances 
and priorities (fi gure 9.8). Food voucher or cash transfers, or food assis-
tance programs are meant to ensure that the minimum dietary energy 
needs of targeted benefi ciaries are fully met. They can be used to address 
chronic year-round poverty as well as be scaled up during crises. Cash- 
or food-for-work programs are suitable for working-age adults and can 
integrate infrastructure development objectives with income transfers. 
Supplementary feeding programs provide nutrient-rich foods, typically 
targeting mothers, young children, and other vulnerable groups. School 
meal programs are one form of supplemental feeding that can play an 
important role in addressing education, hunger, and nutrition objec-
tives. Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs are also a good way to 
integrate safety net programs with broader development goals such as 
increased use of health and education services. Establishing new CCT 
programs may take too long during crises and may exclude the neediest 
where services are scarce, but where CCTs already exist they can be part 
of the response.
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Staple food subsidies act as a safety net in many countries, especially 
in the Middle East. Here, it is important to distinguish between universal 
subsidies, which take up a large share of the budget and depress incentives, 
and smaller subsidies targeted at vulnerable groups through rationing or 
provision of staples typically consumed by the poor. 
Fortifi ed foods are the missing link in most food-based safety net pro-
grams, most of which provide, or subsidize, nonfortifi ed food. Such 
foods are cheaper to source, and in many cases the local private sector 
does not have the capacity to fortify. Yet the food security benefi ts of 
expanding fortifi cation are clear. A study comparing four safety net pro-
grams in Bangladesh that included food assistance clearly shows that 
fortifi ed wheat fl our had a positive nutritional impact relative to house-
holds receiving unfortifi ed rice. Fortifi ed food assistance also had a larger 
positive effect on the caloric intake of women relative to men, because 
wheat is generally consumed more by women than men in Bangladesh; it 
is generally less preferred than rice in local diets, and women accordingly 
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Figure 9.8. The Distribution of Safety Net Programs
Source: Wodon and Zaman 2010.
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implementing food vouchers with the view to increase consumption of 
fortifi ed food may meet the twin objectives of ensuring adequate calorie 
intake and dietary diversity.
Multilateral Action Is Needed
For years donor partners have urged poor countries to make their agri-
cultural and food security investments more strategic, better prioritized 
for results, and at a technically improved level. The Paris Declaration 
(2005) on Aid Effectiveness stressed fi ve principles: country ownership 
of the development agenda; donor alignment with country priorities 
and systems; harmonization of donor policies, procedures, and prac-
tices; managing for development results; and mutual accountability. The 
follow-up to the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), 
stressed enhancing country ownership, building more effective and 
inclusive partnerships, and achieving development results and being 
accountable for them. Most recently, donor discussion at the Rome Food 
Summit of 2009 stressed the need for all partners to align behind invest-
ment in country-owned and -led plans that are strategic, that are strongly 
peer reviewed, and that have benefi ted from adequate and inclusive con-
sultation with civil society and the private sector. A major problem in 
implementing this vision is that bilateral and multilateral aid is allocated 
country by country for all purposes, and sectoral projects are typically 
programmed three years in advance. In effect, no standing bilateral or 
multilateral pool of sectorally targeted but otherwise unallocated capital 
is available to adequately support what donors as a group meeting at the 
country level have been asking countries to do in agriculture and food 
security.
Principles for Action
A number of principles for action emerge that should guide G-20 collec-
tive action in the food security fi eld. First is the need to retain a focus on 
economic growth, by
•  supporting productivity growth of a sector such as agriculture that 
directly accounts for about one-third of economic of growth in poor 
countries, 
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•  reducing the volatility of this growth by improving the sector’s resil-
ience to climate change with support for development and adoption 
of more drought-tolerant varieties and combinations of crops and 
livestock and improved water management, and 
•  improving productivity growth with better market links, which can 
help dampen food price volatility, reduce the risk of civil unrest 
induced by food price spikes, lower the associated need for precau-
tionary savings, and raise consumption and growth of the nonfood 
sector. 
Second, action should be complementary to existing aid effectiveness 
initiatives by
•  supporting country-led investment plans, 
•  providing a more fl exible pool of unallocated donor resources to sup-
port and complement what countries are asking donors as a group to 
do for agriculture and food security, and 
•  using existing entities and processes to support design, appraisal, and 
implementation of country programs.
Third, action should be outcome oriented and inclusive, by
•  giving priority to investment proposals with strong results frame-
works, 
•  giving priority to countries with greatest need (assessed against MDG 1 
indicators), with a policy environment more conducive to generating 
higher investment returns, and with a sound investment proposal, and 
•  incorporating the results of extensive consultation with relevant civil 
society and private sector organizations in order to mobilize all the 
resources of a country to produce common results. 
Actions for the G-20
Actions that the G-20 can and should undertake are fourfold. First is the 
need to provide additional resources to scale up agricultural and food 
security assistance to eligible developing countries. Even with the 
increased direct support by bilateral and multilateral agencies, there 
remains a fi nancing gap for achieving the Millennium Development 
Goal (MDG 1) of halving poverty and hunger by 2015. A conservative 
view of the estimated incremental need for public goods investment in 
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this area is $14 billion annually for all developing countries (Fan and 
Rosegrant 2008), which cannot be met without additional resources.
Second is the need to ensure immediate availability of additional 
funds. Although multilateral institutions are scaling up support for agri-
culture and food security, the increases are often done within con-
strained resource envelopes with specifi c replenishment cycles (for the 
World Bank and International Fund for Agricultural Development, for 
example, International Development Association replenishments occur 
every three years). Providing additional resources now to a multidonor 
fund for agriculture and food security can ensure that funds can be 
made available without having to wait for the next replenishment cycle.
Third, improving donor alignment around country programs is 
important. Channeling multiple sources of donor funds through a uni-
fi ed global mechanism with a common framework of support for coun-
try and regional agriculture and food security programs can help to 
improve donor alignment around country and regional programs. This 
approach can provide a global complement to the ongoing in-country 
efforts to improve donor alignment.
Fourth, reinforcing country-led processes by limiting parallel plan-
ning and prioritizing processes to those already in place in-country is 
critical for aid effectiveness. Governments will be responsible for identi-
fi cation of national public investment and technical assistance programs, 
and regional organizations will be responsible for identifi cation of 
regional public sector investment and technical assistance programs. The 
latter will be in response to an invitation for proposals from the Global 
Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) Steering Committee.
The GAFSP was recently created to help in all these respects. Launched 
in April 2010 in response to a request from the G-20 in Pittsburgh in 
September 2009, the program is a multilateral means to assist in the 
implementation of more than $20 billion in pledges to agriculture and 
food security in low-income countries made by the G-8 and other coun-
tries at L’Aquila, Italy, in July 2009. It was set up as a trustee account 
within the World Bank for the fi nancing of country-led agricultural 
development and food security plans using a variety of external super-
vising entities (such as the multilateral development banks and some 
United Nations agencies). The new mechanism is run under external 
joint donor and recipient governance. Its specifi c objective is to address 
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the underfunding of high-quality and inclusive country and regional 
agriculture and food security strategic investment plans already being 
developed by countries in consultation with donors and other stake-
holders at the country level. 
To date, the new program has been generously supported by pledges 
of over $900 million and disbursements of $264 million from (in alpha-
betical order) Australia, Canada, Ireland, Republic of Korea, Spain, and 
the United States, and by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. How-
ever, to succeed, it requires both moral and fi nancial support from a 
larger group of G-20 countries committed to growth and food security 
in poor countries. The program has already disbursed $235 million to 
support innovative, strategic, and inclusive agricultural and food secu-
rity investment plans in fi ve countries, but is currently facing at least fi ve 
times this much in unfunded eligible proposals from low-income coun-
tries spurred by previous G-8 and G-20 statements of willingness to 
make multiple billions of new resources available for these purposes. 
Failure to make good on these statements very soon when an implemen-
tation path is ready and waiting runs the danger of breeding at best deep 
skepticism and at worst cynicism or rejection concerning the aid effec-
tiveness process and G-20 pronouncements.
Notes
 1.  This section uses material from the World Bank’s Global Monitoring Report 2010 
and other cited sources.
 2.  “Feeding Frenzy,” Toronto Globe and Mail, May 31, 2008.
 3.  In June 2008 the U.S. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 
held pension funds responsible for price spikes in commodities markets. The 
committee proposed barring funds with more than US$500 million in assets 
from investing in the U.S. agricultural and energy commodities in a dramatic 
bid to lower food and energy prices. The proposed bill, the Commodity Specula-
tion Reform Act of 2008, passed in the U.S. House of Representatives in Septem-
ber 2008 but failed to pass the Senate and seems unlikely to be carried forward.
 4.  It pays to import from the world market when the domestic price is at import 
parity and to export when the domestic price falls below the export parity. Trade 
in effect will tend to prevent domestic prices from going outside the import-
export parity band. High trade costs can make the band very wide, however, 
greatly contributing to high domestic price volatility.
 5.  The discussion on food markets draws heavily on World Food Programme 
(2009).
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Comments on the paper “Food Security: The Need for Multilateral Action,” by Christo-
pher Delgado, Robert Townsend, Iride Ceccacci, Yurie Tanimichi Hoberg, Saswati Bora, 
Will Martin, Don Mitchell, Don Larson, Kym Anderson, and Hassan Zaman in chapter 9 
of this volume.
Comments by David Nabarro 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Food 
Security and Nutrition
This note starts by restating four realities. First, the challenges faced by 
developing countries in the aftermath of a global crisis characterized by 
high commodity (including food) prices in 2008–09, economic contrac-
tion in 2009–10, and now extreme price volatility and the high priority 
that is being given to agriculture and rural-based transformation. This 
is the engine of growth and resilience for the majority of people in the 
face of a range of challenges. Second, food security, with its dimensions 
of accessibility, availability, and utilization, is a prerequisite for house-
holds and communities to achieve their full social and economic poten-
tial. It is key to societal stability. Third, when policy makers seek to 
ensure equitable growth and development, they will wish to take account 
of three facts: the destructive impact of food price volatility on poor 
people who spend as much as 80 percent of their incomes on food; the 
reality that 14 percent of the world’s population is affected by chronic 
hunger; and the destabilizing impact of climate change and the cuts being 
made by resource-strapped countries in their social protection programs. 
Fourth, with more than 4 percent of the world population affected by 
severe undernutrition, specifi c efforts to improve human nutrition also 
play key roles in determining individual survival, educational attainment, 
and prosperity. 
These four realities explain why responses to food insecurity have 
increased in intensity and coherence within the past two years. There is 
increasing consensus on what needs to be done and how. Leadership is 
being provided from within countries with recognition of the need for 
a strong stewardship (but not controlling) role by government (refl ect-
ing a national consensus around the importance of food and nutrition 
security for development) and the alignment of external support systems 
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(including development assistance and research). Nations are pursuing 
comprehensive approaches linking short- and long-term interven-
tions, focusing on smallholders and women, and promoting increased 
investments in value adding technologies. Responses are being better 
coordinated at all levels, taking into account the important role of gov-
ernment in setting the agenda, the need of collective actions by all sec-
tors including nonstate actors, and the key roles of regional bodies and 
the private sector.
The G20 actions have been an important source of international 
support toward postcrisis growth and development as increased inter-
national investments in supply responses for food and nutrition reap 
benefi ts for all. Over the next few years we expect to see international 
investments increase further. Investors will demand that the funds they 
provide have the greatest possible impact through the pursuit of com-
prehensive and evidence-based strategies (such as the Comprehensive 
Framework for Action), the application of new technologies that add 
value, and continuing efforts to increase women’s autonomy while 
reducing demand for their labor (to increase time available for child 
care). Investors also want to see their funds used in the most effi cient 
way possible, with different fi nancing pathways backing a common 
investment program, robust in-country coordination, the pooling of 
fi nancial assistance where possible, a high degree of accountability, and 
effective supervision. They are also anticipating reforms to the gover-
nance of international support for food security and nutrition. 
Members of the G20 have an important role in catalyzing food and 
nutrition security in all the world’s nations through a mix of political, 
economic, and fi nancial actions. These include acknowledging the 
importance of pursuing food and nutrition security for all to promote 
stable and just societies, backing the consensus and principles for 
responses to food and nutrition insecurity agreed at the Summit on 
World Food Security in Rome in November 2009, advocating for and 
supporting collective multilateral action, encouraging evolution of 
accountability and governance, supporting continuing reform of multi-
lateral institutions so that they are fi t to serve a multipolar world, and 
backing pooled fi nancing systems such as the Global Agriculture and 
Food Security Program.
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Going Multilateral
Nations, working together, are seeking both synergy and coherence on 
policies for agricultural development and food and nutrition security 
(investment, support for trade, better-managed ecosystems, gender 
equality, social protection, equity basis, focus on the needs of the most 
vulnerable, attention to nutrition), stimuli for research and technology 
(including through the support to the reform of the Consultative Group 
on International Agricultural Research), involvement of farmers’ organi-
zations and civil society, engagement of business (through the World 
Economic Forum’s New Vision for Agriculture, for example), and pro-
motion of ethical practices (including responsible foreign investment in 
land). They are also seeking more responsive governance and institu-
tional alignment on all aspects of food and nutrition security.
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Comments by Cheikh Sourang
International Fund for Agricultural Development
This timely and richly documented contribution on food security 
provides a historical perspective on issues and options, as well as a 
discussion of workable solutions and related tensions and trade-offs 
in addressing food security issues. The chapter confi rms that invest-
ing in agriculture makes a lot of sense and therefore calls for sus-
tained mobilization of fi nancial resources to address a long-standing 
problem. 
From the perspective of IFAD as a UN agency and an international 
fi nancial institution exclusively dedicated to combating hunger and pov-
erty in rural areas, the chapter and the related debates on food security 
issues also provide an opportunity to illustrate what is happening on the 
ground and to stress the importance of a joint refl ection on pathways, 
drivers, and spaces for scaling up successful interventions, including 
social protection, productivity increase, and a conducive policy and 
institutional environment.
The Problem
Food insecurity as a recurrent phenomenon in the developing world has 
reached alarming proportions in the wake of the recent global food, fuel, 
and fi nancial crises. Millions of people around the world are being 
pushed below poverty lines, exacerbating existing concerns that MDG 
targets on poverty and hunger will not be met in the poorest parts of the 
world. Pervasive food insecurity in the developing world, if not vigor-
ously addressed, will have immeasurable impacts on households and 
economies and across generations in concerned countries, not to men-
tion other negative global externalities that will be part of the cost of 
inaction. 
Comments on the paper “Food Security: The Need for Multilateral Action,” by Christopher 
Delgado, Robert Townsend, Iride Ceccacci, Yurie Tanimichi Hoberg, Saswati Bora, Will 
Martin, Don Mitchell, Don Larson, Kym Anderson, and Hassan Zaman in chapter 9 of this 
volume.
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The Solutions
Examples abound in Africa, Asia, and Latin America demonstrating that 
food insecurity is not an insurmountable problem. The poor tend to be 
the most food insecure, and the majority of the poor are in rural areas 
where agriculture is the main source of livelihood. Most success stories 
confi rm the relevance of agriculture as an engine for growth, a tool for 
poverty reduction, and a key entry point for environmental stewardship. 
But the tensions and trade-offs in investment choices for addressing 
food security, as well as the gaps and disconnects in related country-led 
processes, should not be overlooked.
A consensus is growing on what should be done, including all or part 
of the following: 
•  Secured access to—and sustainable management of—productive assets, 
including land and water.
•  Providing predictable access to inputs (seeds, fertilization), appropriate 
technology, and related advisory services.
•  Providing dependable access to produce markets and fi nancial services.
•  Ensuring income diversifi cation through rural off-farm enterprise 
development.
•  Addressing vulnerability to external shocks associated with market 
volatility and climate change.
•  Giving voice and choice to the rural poor and their organizations 
through meaningful participation in local programming and policy 
processes, and their engagement in multistakeholder partnerships in 
the context of a country-led harmonization and alignment agenda.
•  Paying special attention to targeting women, as better credit perform-
ers and consistent investors in household food security, and also rural 
youth, as tomorrow’s farmers and rural entrepreneurs, willing to stay 
on the land subject to availability of adequate incentive systems in the 
rural space. 
•  Managing tensions and trade-offs: for example, irrigation is profi t-
able as a major source of food supply by 2050, subject to improved 
effi ciency in water management (more crops per drop!) in the context 
of climate change and water scarcity. Likewise, increased market 
access may contribute to growth and poverty reduction while increas-
ing the vulnerability of the rural poor to price and income volatility.
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The Challenge of Scaling Up
Beyond the “feel-good stories” of successful projects, it is a daunting 
challenge to muster collective action at national and international levels 
for scaling up interventions to address food insecurity in a multipolar 
world, based on durable public-private partnerships and a development-
oriented South-South cooperation, and to mobilize new and additional 
resources, drawing from traditional ODA, foundation-driven new phi-
lanthropy, and decentralized cooperation. Despite numerous cases of 
successful projects in food security, there are fewer showcases of large-
scale and durable development impact. Therefore, without prejudice to 
continuing innovations in technology development or organizational 
approaches as warranted by local circumstances, the scaling up of what 
already works well requires a systematic and proactive approach to iden-
tifying pathways, drivers, and spaces for expansion in terms of fi nance, 
policies, institutions, partnerships, and learning. 
In other words, systematic scaling up would involve:
•  A common vision of agriculture as a multifunctional activity affecting 
economic growth, poverty reduction, and environmental management. 
•  Early consultations—that is, at project design—on pathways for scaling 
up, whether through pursuit of stand-alone repeater projects, cofi -
nancing of sector programs, exploration of public-private partner-
ships, and the like. 
•  The mobilization of champions including not only the responsible 
line ministries and implementing agencies but also the ministries of 
fi nance for the sake of creating fi scal space and mobilizing other 
donors; the parliamentarians concerned about the social cost of inac-
tion; and other country stakeholders including producer organiza-
tions, service providers, and other actors involved in the relevant 
commodity value chains.
•  The opening of policy and institutional space at country, regional, 
and international levels in response to market failures or emerging 
issues that existing institutions are not adequately equipped to deal 
with. Pending matters for follow-up include, among others, removal 
of agricultural subsidies in developed countries; remedies to the func-
tional drifts from hedging to speculation in commodity futures 
markets; responses to evolving requirements in public goods delivery 
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and standards setting; and efforts toward enhanced institutional 
effectiveness, in the context of evolving aid architecture. 
•  A common understanding of what works, what does not, and why; 
and linking monitoring systems—often confronted with issues of 
ownership, incentives, and capacity—at project and sector levels, as a 
knowledge source informing policy dialogue.
•  Maintaining the current momentum in partnership development, 
to which the G-20 can add tremendous value, building on already 
existing assets. Some of these partnerships include globally or 
regionally resourced programs and fi nancial instruments (such as 
the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program and the EU Food 
Facility) vertically targeted at food security issues in response to 
various summit resolutions; regionally focused public-private alli-
ances and partnerships to promote a green revolution at regional 
level (such as Africa) or scaling up of selected commodity value 
chains (such as rice, cassava); increased allocation of resources to 
agriculture and the rural productive sector; vigorous debates on 
food security issues, related institutional mechanisms, and frameworks 
of action at various levels; country-owned agricultural investment 
plans linked to regionwide frameworks (such as the Comprehensive 
Africa Agricultural Development Programme); generation of tech-
nology and knowledge products (such as the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research, UN, multilateral and bilateral 
aid agencies, independent think tanks) as a critical input to evidence-
based policy making for food security; and last but not least the 
increasing recognition of the need to engage the rural poor and their 
organizations.
•  In response to the challenge of coordination at various levels, it is 
encouraging to note a trend of progressive improvement in the latest 
generation of poverty reduction and national growth strategies. 
Increasingly governments and donors alike are placing emphasis on 
sharpening the agricultural and rural productive focus; improving 
the integration between national and sector planning frameworks 
and their links to emerging decentralization policies; and balancing 
the governments’ internal and external accountabilities vis-à-vis 
national stakeholders and external donors. 
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Comments by Joachim von Braun
University of Bonn
The world’s food crisis has not yet entered into its postcrisis phase. Food 
and nutrition insecurity has increased in the context of the interlinked 
food and economic crises of 2007–10. The food crisis came fi rst, over-
lapping with the onset of the economic recession, and may actually have 
had some role in that onset stemming from the infl ationary forces of 
food (and energy) prices to which macroeconomic policies reacted. Not 
only food and energy markets but also food and fi nancial markets have 
become closely linked, and these links pose new and added risks and 
uncertainties for the poor. Regarding needed policy actions, we must 
distinguish between those that are largely in the domain of national gov-
ernments and those that are best handled at international and global 
level and that require attention by global actors. Actions at both levels 
are needed. The focus in this commentary is on international and global 
actions, because that is where there are large defi ciencies that need to be 
corrected and where the G-20 can play a unique key role.
Action Area 1: Redesign the Global Governance System 
of Agriculture, Food, and Nutrition
The world food and agricultural system is in disarray. Global public goods 
are not suffi ciently delivered. There are four key principles for sound 
global governance of agriculture, food, and nutrition security: adherence 
to legitimacy with accountability (that is, the decision-making body has a 
legitimate basis and is accountable) and effectiveness (that is, the chosen 
governance structure is the most cost-effective option among alternatives 
in delivering the public goods). And given the fast-changing and uncer-
tain nature of the drivers of global food and agriculture, such as climate 
change or food-related health risks, a fourth principle needs to be 
inventiveness (that is, the capacity to innovate and adapt to changing 
Comments on the paper “Food Security: The Need for Multilateral Action,” by Christopher 
Delgado, Robert Townsend, Iride Ceccacci, Yurie Tanimichi Hoberg, Saswati Bora, Will 
Martin, Don Mitchell, Don Larson, Kym Anderson, and Hassan Zaman in chapter 9 of this 
volume.
434 Postcrisis Growth and Development
circumstances). The current governance system especially lacks account-
ability, effectiveness, and inventiveness. 
Today, global governance does not happen only or even mainly 
through formal global organizations. It increasingly occurs through a 
complex global web of government networks, where a collection of 
nation states communicates through heads of states, ministers, parlia-
mentarians, and the United Nations, and where corporations and 
nongovernmental organizations participate in various ways (Slaughter 
2004). A redesign should aim for a new architecture for governance of 
the global public goods related to agriculture and food. An indepen-
dent strategic body is needed to overcome the global governance vacuum 
related to food security. This body should be able to make quick deci-
sions in the face of crises and to tackle fundamental problems that 
currently fall between the gaps in global governance. The indepen-
dence must be ensured by positioning this body above any of the agri-
culture, food, and nutrition-related UN agencies. This body needs to 
have the authority to make exist ing organizations take evidence-based 
action and to mobilize the necessary resources. The G-20 ought to 
ensure that this body has the authority and resources it needs to be 
effective. 
Action Area 2: Reduce Extreme Price Volatility 
Food price volatility most affects the poorest and undermines the health 
and nutrition of many more. The price volatility in 2007–08 was an 
international event. Accordingly, international action is required to pre-
vent future global price shocks. Food markets must not be excluded from 
the appropriate regulation of the banking and fi nancial system, because 
the staple food and feed markets (grain and oil seeds) are closely con-
nected to the speculative activities in fi nancial markets. The two sets of 
measures proposed here are: 
Better Regulation. Excessive speculation opportunities in food com-
modities should be curbed by regulations. That is, the costs of specula-
tion by noncommercial traders should be increased (through deposit 
regulations, for example). 
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Innovative Grain Reserves Policies. Global collective action for food 
security–enhancing grain reserves is now needed; this action should be 
composed of three elements (von Braun, Lin, and Torero 2009): 
•  A small, independent physical reserve should be established exclu-
sively for emergency response and humanitarian assistance. The 
reserve would be managed by the World Food Programme. 
•  A modest reserve should be established to be shared by nations at 
regional or global level. 
•  A virtual reserve intervention mechanism should be created to help 
avoid price spikes. The concept of virtual reserves is based on signal-
ing theory, where a strong commitment is required to increase the 
risk assumed by speculators in entering the market, which in turn, 
would increase their discount rate and, as a result, lower the probability 
of their participating excessively in this market (Torero and von 
Braun 2010). 
Action Area 3: Provide the Incentives for Private 
Sector Investment and Facilitate Agricultural 
Technology for the Poor
The actions in this domain include the appropriate guidance for sound 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and for long-term enhancement of R&D 
that serves food security in the long run. The food security crisis trig-
gered concerns about access to food even in richer countries. This con-
cern was part of the reason for growing transnational acquisition of land 
by fi nancially strong countries that wanted to enhance their national 
food security in view of increased scarcity of resources (especially land 
and water). Internationally coordinated policy action is now needed to 
make sure that these investments are sound and sustainable. An appro-
priate code of conduct for host governments and foreign investors 
intending to acquire land in developing countries should be developed 
(von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009). Voluntary guidelines will not 
facilitate suffi cient improvement in the investment climate in this criti-
cal area, which can offer important FDI growth opportunities for devel-
oping countries. The more long-term action required at the global level 
relates to R&D. Doubling investments in public agricultural research 
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from US$5 billion to US$10 billion from 2008 to 2013 would signifi -
cantly increase agricultural output, and millions of people would emerge 
from poverty. The Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research has a critical role to play in this at the global level.
Action Area 4: Expand Social Protection 
and Child Nutrition Programs 
Both to protect the basic nutrition of the most vulnerable and to improve 
food security, agricultural growth and reductions in market volatility 
must be accompanied by social protection and nutrition actions. Most 
of these actions can be done by national governments, but international 
support for these investments is needed, especially in the least developed 
countries. Protective actions are needed to mitigate short-term risks 
while preventive actions are needed to avoid long-term negative conse-
quences. Protective actions include conditional cash transfers, pension 
systems, and employment programs. Preventive health and nutrition 
interventions such as school feeding and programs for improved early 
childhood nutrition should be strengthened and expanded to ensure 
universal coverage. As such, social safety nets not only ease poverty 
momentarily but also enable growth by allowing poor households to 
create and protect assets and allocate resources to risky but highly remu-
nerative production activities. 
Conclusions
Prioritization, sequencing, transparency, and accountability are crucial 
for successful implementation of agriculture, food, and nutrition policy. 
More and better investment is needed, but investment will only make its 
full contribution when the governance of agriculture, food, and nutri-
tion is being strengthened at international levels. Trying to counter insti-
tutional failures mainly with investments in technical domains will not 
work. Especially for reducing global food price volatility, appropriate 
regulation and investments in institutions is needed. 
Food and nutrition security needs to be given high priority among 
the development issues on the agenda of the upcoming G-20 summits 
for a long time. 
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Chair’s Summary by Hak-Su Kim
United Nations
This paper focused on long-term policies to ensure food security in 
developing countries by scaling up efforts to spur agricultural produc-
tivity, improve links from farmers to markets, and reduce risk and vul-
nerability. Demographic dynamics factor highly into this equation. The 
world population in 1800 was only 1 billion. The population doubled by 
1930 to 2 billion and in 1960 to 3 billion. Between 1930 and 2010, the 
population more than tripled from 2 billion to 7 billion. The United 
Nations estimates that the world population will reach 9 billion in the 
year 2033 and 10 billion by the year 2046. That is only 36 years from now. 
Accordingly, we may expect food shortages in terms of aggregate food 
availability and a growing threat of hunger and malnutrition in relation 
to food entitlement. The paper by Mr. Delgado and others is therefore of 
particular importance. 
The Asian solution to the food security problem was the green revolu-
tion. I had the opportunity to meet with Dr. Monkombu Sambasivan 
Swaminathan, the green revolution expert of India, who said that before 
the revolution, India was extremely worried about how to feed its 400 
million people. Thanks to the green revolution, India—and many other 
countries—benefi ted from the production of high-yielding crop varieties, 
fertilization, improvements in irrigation systems, and, in the case of 
China, the application of agricultural machinery. Asian countries adopted 
all these measures, as well, making the Asian green revolution a success 
that can provide lessons for other regions.
Joachim von Braun raised questions about the governance structure 
of existing organizations tied to the food security agenda, such as the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Do we need a new organization 
specifi cally to handle food security? Cheikh Sourang (IFAD) clarifi ed 
that a new organization in charge of fundraising and implementing 
Summary on the paper “Food Security: The Need for Multilateral Action,” by Christopher 
Delgado, Robert Townsend, Iride Ceccacci, Yurie Tanimichi Hoberg, Saswati Bora, Will 
Martin, Don Mitchell, Don Larson, Kym Anderson, and Hassan Zaman in chapter 9 of this 
volume.
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programs was not necessary. Rather, what is needed is a mechanism or 
an oversight body that would operate strategically and at a higher level 
than the existing institutions. This body would task organizations, such 
as the FAO, with taking on new agendas items when they arise, much like 
the One Campaign does for poverty issues. When food prices were spik-
ing, for example, there was no organization to direct attention toward 
the volatility. As a result, none of the existing food organizations took up 
this charge, and neither did the World Trade Organization. When there 
was a rush of foreign direct investment into developing countries, there 
was no advocacy body to quickly facilitate action or establish a code of 
conduct so that this capital could be mobilized and sustained for wider 
benefi t. The agricultural landscape can change in unpredictable ways, 
and there is not a strategic body that can pick up new agendas and task 
them to organizations. The G-20’s role should be to facilitate the cre-
ation of a body that is independent of current institutions, so as not to 
create a confl ict of interest. 
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This chapter highlights key trends, challenges, and opportunities for 
advancing fi nancial inclusion and proposes major high-level policy rec-
ommendations for consideration by the Group of 20 (G-20) policy 
 makers to benefi t a wider range of developing countries, including many 
non-G-20 countries. As such, the chapter serves a broad audience, rang-
ing from policy makers, development fi nance institutions, and the pri-
vate sector to experts seeking a synopsis of the key subtopics relevant for 
fi nancial inclusion and areas of work for advancing progress. The chap-
ter is organized into four sections. The fi rst recommends broad goals and 
agenda items to accelerate progress in fi nancial inclusion. The second 
defi nes the fi nancial inclusion concept and its importance for economic 







Toward Universal Access: 
Addressing the Global Challenge 
of Financial Inclusion
This chapter was prepared by a World Bank Group team coordinated by the Access to 
Finance Advisory of the International Finance Corporation (IFC). Asli Demirgüç-Kunt 
(World Bank) and Margaret Miller (CGAP) provided technical inputs to the chapter.
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each of the pillars proposed as part of the recommendations, and the 
fourth section summarizes the way forward.
The chapter also contains an annex that takes a closer look at the 
microfi nance industry as a case in point for reviewing the successes, 
innovations, and lessons learned, which are critical for the broader dis-
cussion on fi nancial inclusion.
The Challenge in Brief
Financial inclusion encompasses the range, quality, and availability of 
fi nancial services to the underserved and the fi nancially excluded. Some 
2.7 billion adults—almost 70 percent of the population in developing 
countries—have no access to formal fi nancial services (table 10.1). It is 
important that efforts to improve fi nancial inclusion focus not only on 
the fi nancially excluded but also on the underserved population and 
fi rms in developing countries.
The working poor (living on less than US$2 a day), who make up over 
60 percent of the total labor force in developing countries, represent a key 
target market segment for expanding fi nancial inclusion (fi gure 10.1). In 
addition, because small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are overall one 
of the largest employers of the working poor, the SME market is a big 
opportunity for expanding the fi nancial access frontier. 
To advance the fi nancial inclusion agenda at the global level, it is 
important and timely to build on the G-20 commitment, made in Pitts-
burgh in September 2009, to improve access to fi nancial services for the 
poor. To advance that goal, the G-20 leaders established the Financial 
Inclusion Experts Group (FIEG), with two subgroups—one to focus on 
Table 10.1. Current Measurement of the Unbanked
WBG Financial Accessa 2009 Report 70% or 2.7 billion of the adult 
population
McKinsey/FAl (Chaia and 
others)
October 2009 paper 2.5 billion of the adult population
Research: Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Beck, and Honohan
2007/2008 70% of the population
Source: World Bank Group Team compilation. Note that as of July 2010, the International Monetary Fund 
launched a new online database on ﬁ nancial access with access indicators per country. 
Note: a. Collects and releases data on an annual basis.
 Toward Universal Access: Addressing the Global Challenge of Financial Inclusion  441
innovative modes of delivering fi nancial services to the poor and the 
other to focus on improving fi nancial access for SMEs. The work of the 
subgroups is under way. 
Collaborative Model and Implementation Pillars
The successful global efforts in advancing fi nancial inclusion to date 
indicate a need for collaborative action from multiple stakeholders and 
channels. The targets and efforts to be charted for the “next generation” of 
fi nancial inclusion have much to leverage and learn from previous col-
laborative actions. Figure 10.2 shows the key stakeholders that were 
needed to kick-start the movement toward fi nancial inclusion. The key is 
to align the main incentives and high-level goals among the stakeholders. 
Past trends indicate that four major types of players are needed: the indus-
try; the global development community; knowledge centers (CGAP), and 
national governments.1 
Global targets to date and collaborative efforts tied to them involved 
credit-focused goals. The original goal of the Microcredit Summit when 












1 billion  
Source: World Bank Group Team Analysis, based on World Development Indicators, and analysis for the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation. 
Note: The total labor force in developing countries numbers 2.6 billion; the total developing countries 
population is 5.6 billion. Working poor are deﬁ ned as living on less than US$2 a day.
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it was launched in 1997 was to reach 100 million of the world’s poorest 
families (with a focus on women) with credit for self-employment and 
other fi nancial and business services by 2005. 
To address the global challenge of fi nancial inclusion, a high-level 
global target is needed. While striving to fully eliminate the fi nancial 
inclusion gap is challenging, the time has come to advance and align 
fi nancial inclusion efforts in order to make a visible and meaningful 
contribution toward reducing that gap. The global target can be estab-
lished either through a bottom-up approach (aggregating established or 
projected country-level targets) or a top-down approach (setting a global 
high-level target, with the projection that individual country efforts will 
meaningfully contribute to reaching the target over time), or a combina-
tion of the two. For example, if a global target is set to reach 1 billion 
fi nancially excluded individuals and 50 million SMEs by 2020, this target 
would be validated with the bottom-up process to ensure that individual 
countries’ projected targets do not fall short of the global goal. One key 
factor differentiating a global target from earlier targets is that the num-
ber to be reached would include those excluded from a range of fi nancial 












• UN year of Microcredit (2005)
• DFIs, IFIs
• G-8
• donor support and funding
• Consultative Group to
  Assist the Poor (CGAP)
  founded in 1995
• Importance of the
  national governments’
  efforts in improving
  the state of financial
  access through various
  initiatives
• Microcredit Summit (goals
  launched in 1997, achieved in
  2007) rallied the
  microfinancce industry
Source: World Bank Group Team Analysis. Diamond model inspired by Michael Porter’s “Diamond Model of 
Competitiveness” used for the diagnosis and recommendations around the competitiveness of nations and 
industry clusters. 
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products and services including payments, remittances, savings, and 
insurance, and not just from credit. 
Efforts around this future global target will need to include not only the 
same four types of stakeholders as the earlier effort but also a broader and 
more diverse range of players. Figure 10.3 outlines the preliminary collab-
orative model needed for the next round of fi nancial inclusion to take off.
Key working pillars need to focus on six themes: the policy environ-
ment; fi nancial infrastructure; delivery mechanisms and products; respon-
sible fi nance/consumer focus; data and measurement; and building upon 
the work of the FIEG subgroups. Figure 10.4 outlines the preliminary 
G-20 agenda items for each of the pillars; a snapshot for each of the pillars 
is discussed later.2
Expanding the reach of fi nancial access holds signifi cant promise 
for enhancing the livelihood and well-being of the poor and the growth 
of small and medium enterprises. Concerted efforts and resource com-
mitments will be needed to effectively implement this agenda and 
integrate it into the broader assistance work across the international 
development community. A systematic approach with dedicated 
Figure 10.3. Collaborative Diamond Model for Financial Inclusion: Generation 2.0 
(2010–2020s)
INDUSTRY
G-20 to serve as the convening
platform for effective and long-
term collaboration of these













• Foundations and donor partners
  (traditional and nontraditional)
  
• Multiple knowledge centers,
  including CGAP and AFI
  • Standard-setting bodies
• UN secretary general special
  advocate for inclusive finance
  for development
  
• Wider and more diverse range
  of industry partners, beyond
  only the microfinance
  industry
• Need for south-south
  knowledge sharing
  and learning
• Wider range of public
  players involved
Source: World Bank Group Team Analysis. Diamond model inspired by Michael Porter’s “Diamond Model of 
Competitiveness.” 
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resources would assist governments in setting an appropriate regula-
tory and policy framework, help build effective fi nancial infrastruc-
ture, and work with fi nancial service providers to enhance product 
diversifi cation and reach as well as to build fi nancial capability. Devel-
oping fi nancial products that meet the needs of the fi nancially excluded 
in a timely, cost-effective, and responsible manner will require new 
and innovative approaches. 
Financial Inclusion: Deﬁ ning the Challenge
Counting the Unbanked
Financial inclusion encompasses the range, quality, and availability of 
fi nancial services to the underserved and the fi nancially excluded. While 
there is a growing consensus on the importance of fi nancial inclusion, the 














• support national policies for universal access to critical financial services, including G2P 
• adapt the regulatory environment to support branchless banking
• strengthen competition for greater affordability of financial services
• support systematic peer-to-peer learning and sharing of financial inclusion policy lessons
• develop and promote good business models for retail payments for the underserved
• work toward G-8 5x5 goal for remittances
• scale up inclusive credit reporting systems, including microfinance credit reporting
• increase the use of mobile banking, agent networks, smart cards
• expand insurance for the poor (microinsurance), long-term and short-term savings
• strengthen SME finance via innovation, infrastructure, funds
• focus on rural, low-access areas
• expand financial inclusion for women clients
• convene financial services providers to operationalize responsible finance practices
• strengthen responsible finance/consumer protection at the country level (via
  diagnostics, advisory services) and global standards
• develop evidence base on financial capability through research, pilots
• continue and expand supply side data collections (include SME finance and insurance)
• set up global clearing house for institutional level data on access for microfinance and
  SMEs
• improve data on financial usage to inform policy making (demand side)
• SME finance
• access through innovation
Source: World Bank Group Team Analysis. 
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same consensus does not exist around its defi nition. Financial inclusion 
can be defi ned as a “state in which all people of working age have access 
to a full suite of quality fi nancial services, provided at affordable prices, in 
a convenient manner, and with dignity for the clients” (Accion Interna-
tional 2009a). These products and services can be offered cost effectively 
by a range of fi nancial service providers. Financial inclusion implies that 
both unbanked and underbanked households and fi rms are part of the 
target market. Figure 10.5 displays the key dimensions that defi ne fi nan-
cial inclusion, with a particular focus placed on the range of products and 
delivery channels that go beyond the early microcredit-only approach. It 
is challenging to strike the right balance between availability, affordabil-
ity, and sustainability. 
Diversifi ed products beyond microcredit, such as remittances, microin-
surance, savings accounts, and other fi nancial instruments, are needed to 
expand fi nancial access. In Portfolios of the Poor, Collins and others (2009) 
show that all 250 of the very poor slum residents they study have some 
form of debt and savings and all use a minimum of four types of fi nancial 
instruments (formal and informal) throughout the year. Poor households 
are continuously shifting between a variety of formal, semiformal, and 
Figure 10.5. Deﬁ ning Financial Inclusion
Source: World Bank Group Team Analysis.
PRODUCTS FEATURES CHANNELS
KEY DIMENSIONS OF FINANCIAL INCLUSION
beyond
credit
• payments (ATM/debit cards, government
  payments, remittances, e-payments)
• savings (savings account,
  checking/current account, pensions,
  youth savings, program savings)
• insurance (life, health, property, 
  microinsurance, agriculture)
• credit (personal, consumer, credit card,
  education, mortgage, home
  improvement, microenterprise)
• affordability (costs,
  minimum requiremens, fees)
• availability and
  convenience (days to
  complete transaction,
  documents required, physical
  proximity)
• quality (consumer protection
  including price transparency,
  fair disclosure, responsible
  finance practices, risk
  management and assessment
  with inclusive credit
  information systems)
• access points: banking beyond
  branches
• financial inflastructure:
  payment and settlement
  systems, credit reporting,
  collateral registries
• institutions: banks/nonbanks, 
   insurance companies,
   pension funds, credit
   cooperatives, MFIs
• clients: everyone who has the
  demand for the services,
  including the excuded and
  underserved poor
446 Postcrisis Growth and Development
informal fi nancial products based on availability, product features, pricing, 
and other nonprice barriers. The study also demonstrates households’ high 
turnover in fi nancial instruments over assets and a higher turnover for 
rural areas (fi gure 10.6). The study defi nes “turnover” as the total sum of 
money being “pushed” (deposited, lent, or repaid) into instruments plus 
the money being “pulled” (withdrawn, borrowed, or received) from them.
How many people are fi nancially excluded? Almost 70 percent of the 
adult population in developing countries, or 2.7 billion people, lack 
access to basic fi nancial services, such as savings or checking accounts 
(World Bank Group 2009).3 The regions with the largest share of 
unbanked populations are Sub-Saharan Africa, where only 12 percent 
are banked, and South Asia, with 24 percent banked (map 10.1).
The availability of fi nancial access points varies greatly depending on 
the level of fi nancial sector development in the country. Developing coun-
tries have 3 times fewer branches and automated teller machines (per 
100,000 adults) and as many as 12 times fewer point-of sale terminals 
compared with developed markets (fi gure 10.7). For example, regional 
averages for Africa and South Asia are well below 10 branches per 100,000 
adults compared with more than 25 in high-income countries.4 When 
comparing the number of cashless retail payment transactions per capita, 
the gap is even wider, with developed countries transacting 25 times more 
a year than developing countries.









Source: Collins and others 2009. 
Note: Year-end asset values and annual cash ﬂ ow through ﬁ nancial instruments (formal and informal), for the 
median household in South Africa.
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The drive toward full fi nancial access and full-scale banking applies 
not only to individuals but also to the underserved SME segment. The 
need for SMEs to access fi nancial services goes well beyond access to 
lending. Treasury and cash management, savings, insurance, and trans-
actional products are critical for SMEs to ensure optimal fi nancial man-
agement and risk mitigation, and these products also provide private 
sector fi nancial institutions with increased incentives to focus on the 
SME segment. The World Bank Enterprise Surveys and Investment Cli-
mate Surveys consistently show that SMEs are 30 percent more likely 
than large fi rms to rate fi nancing constraints as a major obstacle to 
growth. The smaller the fi rm, the higher this percentage is.5
Financial Inclusion: Beneﬁ ts and Constraints
Empirical evidence suggests that improved access to fi nance is not only 
pro-growth but also pro-poor, reducing income inequality and poverty 
Map 10.1. Global Map of the Financially Included
Source: For data and methodology, see World Bank Group 2009 and the accompanying methodology paper (Kendall, 
Mylenko, and Ponce 2010). 
Note: Map shows percentage of adults with a deposit account in regulated ﬁ nancial institutions including banks, coopera-
tives, specialized state ﬁ nancial institutions, and microﬁ nance institutions. Regional averages show the simple average of 
country averages of adults banked (not weighted by population), based on the data provided in World Bank Group 
(2009). Not all countries in each region are included in the average calculation because not all provided survey data.
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(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Honohan 2008, 2009). Cross-country 
regressions have shown that economies with better-developed fi nancial 
systems experience faster drops in income inequality and faster reduc-
tions in poverty levels. Financial depth can have direct and indirect 
effects on small fi rms and poor households (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Honohan 2008).6 Greater depth is likely to be associated with greater 
access for both fi rms and households, making them better able to take 
advantage of investment opportunities, smooth their consumption, and 
insure themselves. The numerous benefi ts of fi nancial inclusion for low-
income households and small and microenterprises are summarized in 
fi gure 10.8.7
Why are so many people fi nancially excluded when the benefi ts of 
fi nancial inclusion are so well recognized? Surveys of fi nancial institutions 
Figure 10.7. Access and Payment Transactions Gaps
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Source: World Bank Group 2009 and World Bank Payment Systems Survey 2008.
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around the world show that the constraints to fi nancial inclusion fall into 
three categories (Demirgüç-Kunt 2010):
•  Geography or physical access. While technology—phone and Internet 
use—has the potential to alleviate this constraint, physical distance 
still matters.
•  Lack of proper documentation. Financial institutions require one or 
more documents for identifi cation purposes, but many people in 
low-income countries who live in rural areas and work in the infor-
mal sector lack such papers.
•  High prices, minimum account requirements, and fees. Many institu-
tions have minimum account requirements and fees that make even 
opening a simple account out of reach for many potential users. 
A study on barriers to fi nancial access and use around the world based 
on surveys from 193 banks in 58 countries highlights interesting coun-
try differentials focused on barriers to fi nancial access. For example, 
















































improve quality of life
In the absence of payment services, entrepreneurs and individuals
travel long distances and wait in lines to make transactions. This
can be time-consuming, costly, and risky. 
Low-income families have small, unpredictable, and often seasonal-
incomes. Credit and savings can help these families take advantage
of immediate (business) opportunities and smooth consumption.
Families use financial services to gain access to education, health
care, and other necessities that improve their quality of life.
Low-income families have many vulnerabilities, from illiness, to
theft, to unemployment. Savings, credit, insurance, remittances
provide sustainable and low-cost coping strategies.
Low-income families own assets, both social and physical and 
movable and immovable. The right financial infrastructure can help 
with recognition of these assets by the formal sector.
Enterprise owners can use credit or savings to make investments 
in productive assets, such as sewing machines, refrigerators,
or farm implements.
Financial services foster independence, giving people ability to be
active participants in their communities and countries.
Source: Adapted from Accion International 2009b. 
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the minimum deposit requirement to open a checking account in 
Cameroon is over US$700, an amount higher than the GDP per capita 
of that country, while no minimum amount is required in South Africa 
or Swaziland (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez Peria 2008).
Global Mandates
Advancing the fi nancial inclusion agenda can help boost progress toward 
the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), in par-
ticular toward poverty reduction, health, education, and gender equality 
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2004; Claessens and Feijen 2006; Lit-
tlefi eld, Morduch, and Hashemi 2003) (fi gure 10.9). 
Financial inclusion as a goal in itself is rapidly emerging as a major 
focus on global and national platforms. The fi nancial inclusion concept 
has gained increased attention since the United Nations designated 2005 
as the International Year of Microcredit and adopted the goal of building 
inclusive fi nancial systems. In 2009, Princess Máxima of the Netherlands, 
was appointed the UN secretary-general’s special advocate for inclusive 
fi nance for development.
In September 2009 G-20 leaders in Pittsburgh pledged to “commit to 
improving access to fi nancial services for the poor.” The leaders launched 
the creation of a Financial Inclusion Experts Group tasked with support-
ing innovative modes of fi nancial service delivery capable of reaching 
the poor and scaling up models of small and medium enterprise fi nanc-
ing. Two subgroups were formed to lead these two tasks. One, on Access 
through Innovation, supported by CGAP and the Alliance for Financial 
Inclusion (AFI) and cochaired by Brazil and Australia, is focusing on 
Figure 10.9. Access to Finance and Millennium Development Goals
Source: Claessens and Feijen 2006; MDG icons from http://www.undp.org/mdg/.
inclusive finance is an important driver for attaining the MDGs, as finance: 
reduces vulnerability to shocks, thus mitigating the risk of falling into poverty 
leads to higher income per capita facilitating achievement of many of the MDGs 
creates reducing inequalities and broadening opportunities, contributing to gender equality 
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analysis of recent experience and lessons learned with branchless bank-
ing and similar innovations in fi nancial service delivery to the poor and 
on the development of principles for innovative fi nancial inclusion. The 
nine “Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion” were announced 
and endorsed at the G-20 Summit in Toronto in June 2010. The other, on 
SME fi nance, is supported by the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) and cochaired by Germany and South Africa. Its objective is to 
identify and promote successful models for public fi nancing to maxi-
mize the deployment of private sector resources on a sustainable and 
scalable basis. The subgroup is working toward this objective by con-
ducting a stocktaking exercise and launching an SME fi nance challenge. 
The SME Finance Challenge—“a call to the private sector to put forward 
its best proposals for how public fi nance can maximize the deployment 
of private fi nance on a sustainable and scalable basis”—was launched at 
the G-20 Toronto Summit. Final deliverables for both subgroups, includ-
ing the winners of the SME Finance Challenge, will be announced at the 
G-20 Seoul Summit. 
On the national level, governments are becoming increasingly more 
proactive, and some are incorporating fi nancial inclusion and the drive 
to universal access into their national mandate (map 10.2). For exam-
ple, India has mandated fi nancial inclusion as a national goal, and 
the Reserve Bank of India has intensifi ed a number of measures and 
endorsed quantitative access targets over the last year to further 
 fi nancial inclusion (Subbarao 2009). The government of Mexico is 
welcoming and supporting ongoing fi nancial inclusion programs and 
analytical work to advance the goal of full fi nancial inclusion by 2020 
(Accion International 2009b). South Africa has mobilized the public 
and private sectors to design products and interventions that serve as 
entry-level points for delivering formal fi nancial services to a larger 
percentage of the unbanked, such as Mzansi accounts with no monthly 
fee and no minimum balance (Bankable Frontier Associates and Fin-
Mark Trust 2009). Moreover, the United Nations committee on build-
ing inclusive fi nancial sectors, set up in 2006, urged central banks and 
governments to add the goal of universal fi nancial inclusion to the two 
traditional goals of prudential regulation of depositors’ funds and the 
stability of the fi nancial system (United Nations 2006). There is grow-
ing appetite for peer-to-peer learning and for internalizing lessons and 
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policy and product solutions from countries championing fi nancial 
inclusion to those countries that are beginning to address the chal-
lenges of fi nancial inclusion. 
Financial Inclusion Pillars
Policy Environment
Addressing Market Failures. Financial markets and institutions exist to 
overcome the effects of information asymmetries and transaction costs 
that prevent the direct pooling and investment of society’s savings.8 They 
mobilize savings and provide payments services that facilitate the exchange 
of goods and services. In addition, they produce and process information 
about investors and investment projects to guide the allocation of funds; 
monitor and govern investments; and help diversify, transform, and man-
age risk. When they work well, they provide opportunities for all market 
participants to take advantage of the best investments by channeling 
funds to their most productive uses, hence boosting growth, improving 
income distribution, and reducing poverty. When they do not work well, 
Map 10.2. Recent Examples of Countries Advancing Full Financial Inclusion
Source: World Bank Group Team Analysis and AFI.
Note: Map represents selected examples only, not an exhaustive or best practice list of countries with ﬁ nancial inclusion 
initiatives. Note that example for the Republic of Korea dates back to the credit card lending boom in 1999–2002 (Kang 
and Ma 2009). 
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growth opportunities are missed, inequalities persist, and in extreme 
cases, there can be costly crises.
Since expanding access remains an important challenge even in devel-
oped economies, it is not enough to say that the market will provide. 
Market failures related to information gaps, the need for coordination 
on collective action, and concentrations of power mean that govern-
ments everywhere have an important role to play in building inclusive 
fi nancial systems (Beck and de la Torre 2007). However, not all govern-
ment action is equally effective and some policies can even be counter-
productive. Direct government interventions to support access require a 
careful evaluation, something that is often missing.
Enabling Policy Actions. Even the most effi cient fi nancial system, sup-
ported by a strong contractual and information infrastructure, faces lim-
itations. Not all would-be borrowers are creditworthy, and there are 
numerous examples of national welfares that have been damaged by 
overly relaxed credit policies. Access to formal payment and savings ser-
vices can approach universality as economies develop, although not 
everyone will or should qualify for credit. For example the subprime cri-
sis in the United States graphically illustrates the consequences of encour-
aging low-income households to borrow beyond their ability to repay. 
An underlying, albeit often long-term, goal is deep institutional 
reform that ensures the security of property rights against expropriation 
by the state. Prioritizing some institutional reforms over others, however, 
would help focus reform efforts and produce impact in the short to 
medium term. Recent evidence suggests that in low-income countries it 
is the information infrastructures that matter most, whereas in high-
income countries enforcement of creditor rights is more important. 
Cross-country variation in fi nancial depth can be explained in low-
income countries by the existence of credit information systems but not 
by the effi ciency in contract enforcement; in high-income countries it is 
just the reverse (Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer 2007). As noted in the 
fi nancial infrastructure section of this chapter, credit information sys-
tems are key to fostering inclusive fi nancial systems.
But even within the contractual framework, there are certain short-
cuts to long-term institution building. In relatively underdeveloped 
institutional environments, procedures that enable individual lenders to 
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recover on debt contracts (for example, those related to collateral) are 
more important in boosting bank lending than those procedures mainly 
concerned with resolving confl icts between multiple claimants, such as 
bankruptcy codes (Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig 2006). Given that it is 
potentially easier to build credit registries and reform procedures related 
to collateral than to make lasting improvements in the enforcement of 
creditor rights and bankruptcy codes, these are important fi ndings for 
prioritizing reform efforts. Introducing expedited mechanisms for loan 
recovery can be helpful, as shown by the example of India, where a new 
mechanism bypassing dysfunctional court procedures increased loan 
recoveries and reduced interest rates for borrowers.
Results can be produced relatively fast by encouraging improve-
ments in specifi c infrastructures (particularly in information and debt 
recovery) and the launch of fi nancial market activities that can allow 
technology to bring down transaction costs. Some examples of these 
market activities are establishing credit registries or issuing individual 
identifi cation numbers to establish credit histories; reducing costs of 
registering or repossessing collateral; and introducing specifi c legisla-
tion to underpin modern fi nancial technology, from leasing and factor-
ing to electronic and mobile fi nance. These activities can produce 
results relatively fast, as the success of m-fi nance in many Sub-Saharan 
African countries has shown, most recently M-Pesa in Kenya (Porteous 
2006 and box 10.3).
Encouraging openness and competition is also an essential part of 
broadening access, because they both encourage incumbent institutions 
to seek out profi table ways of providing services to the previously 
excluded segments of the population and increase the speed with which 
access-improving new technologies are adopted. Foreign banks can play 
an important role in fostering competition and expanding access.
In this process, providing the private sector with the right incentives 
is key, hence the importance of good prudential regulations. Competi-
tion that helps foster access can also result in reckless or improper 
expansion if not accompanied by a proper regulatory and supervisory 
framework. As increasingly complex international fi nancial regula-
tions—such as Basel II on minimum standards for capital adequacy 
(BIS 2010)— are imposed on banks to help minimize the risk of costly 
bank failures, it is important to ensure that these arrangements do not 
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inadvertently penalize small borrowers by failing to make full allowance 
for the risk-pooling potential of a portfolio of SME loans. Research sug-
gests that banks making small loans have to set aside larger provisions 
against the higher expected loan losses from small loans and therefore 
need to charge higher rates of interest to cover these provisions.
A variety of other regulatory measures is needed to support wider 
access. But some policies that are still widely used do not work. For exam-
ple interest ceilings often fail to provide adequate consumer protection 
against abusive lending, because banks replace interest with fees and 
other charges. Increased formalization of transparency and enforcement 
of lender responsibility offer a more coherent approach, along with sup-
port for the overindebted. However, delivering all of this can be adminis-
tratively demanding.
The scope for direct government interventions in improving access is 
more limited than often believed. A large body of evidence suggests that 
interventions to provide credit through government-owned fi nancial 
institutions have generally not been successful. One of the reasons is that 
lending decisions are based on the political cycle rather than on socio-
economic fundamentals, as both cross-country evidence and a carefully 
executed case study for India show.
In nonlending services, the experience of government-owned banks 
has been more mixed. A handful of governmental fi nancial institutions 
has moved away from credit and evolved into providers of more com-
plex fi nancial services, entering into public-private partnerships to help 
overcome coordination failures, fi rst-mover disincentives, and obstacles 
to risk sharing and distribution (de la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler 
2006). A good success example is Mexico, where government-owned 
banks had a useful catalytic function in kick-starting certain fi nancial 
services (box 10.1). Ultimately, these successful initiatives could have 
been undertaken by private capital, but the state played a useful role in 
jump-starting these services. Direct intervention through taxes and sub-
sidies can be effective in certain circumstances, but experience suggests 
that this intervention is more likely to have signifi cant unintended con-
sequences in fi nance compared with other sectors. In addition, how best 
to use postal fi nancial services and develop these large networks for 
expanding access to fi nancial services is an important question for policy 
makers to consider.
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With direct and directed lending programs discredited in recent 
years, partial credit guarantees have become the direct intervention 
mechanism of choice for SME credit activists. Some seem to be 
 functioning well, breaking even fi nancially thanks to the incentive 
structure built into the contract between the guarantor and the inter-
mediary banks. For example, the Chilean scheme has the intermediary 
banks bidding for the percentage rate of guarantee, and the premium 
charged can be adjusted on the basis of each intermediary’s claims 
record. This approach has resulted not only in higher lending by ben-
efi ciaries but in a reduction of loan losses (Cowan, Drexler, and Yañez 
2008). Other partial credit guarantees have been poorly structured, 
however, embodying sizable hidden subsidies and benefi ting mainly 
those who do not need the subsidy. The temptation for an activist gov-
ernment to underprice guarantees (especially for long-term loans 
when the underpricing will not be detected for years) does present 
 fi scal hazards similar to those that have undermined so many develop-
ment banks in the past. In the absence of thorough economic evalua-
tions of most schemes, their net effect in cost-benefi t terms remains 
unclear (Honohan 2008).
Box 10.1. Mexico: An Example of Development Banks Kick-Starting 
Financial Services
Three government-owned banks in Mexico were important in getting certain inclusive 
ﬁ nancial services up and running.
NAFIN (Nacional Financiera). Electronic brokerage of reverse factoring, devel-
oped by NAFIN, a government development bank, allows many small suppliers to use 
their receivables from large creditworthy buyers to obtain working capital ﬁ nancing. 
BANSEFI (Banco del Ahorro Nacional y Servicios Financieros). Another exam-
ple is the electronic platform implemented by BANSEFI, another government-owned 
institution, to help semiformal and informal ﬁ nancial intermediaries reduce their oper-
ating costs by centralizing back-ofﬁ ce operations. 
FIRA (Fideicomisos Instituidos en relacion con la Agricultura). A government-
owned development-ﬁ nance-institute-turned-investment-bank, FIRA, has brokered 
quite complicated structured ﬁ nancial products to realign credit risks with the pattern 
of information between ﬁ nancial intermediaries and the different participants in the 
supply chains for several industries, including shrimp and other agriﬁ sh products.
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Honohan 2008. 
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Financial Infrastructure
Financial infrastructure has the potential to expand access to fi nance 
 signifi cantly.9 Key elements of fi nancial infrastructure such as credit infor-
mation systems; enforcement of collateral; and functioning payment, 
remittance, and securities settlement systems are vital to facilitating 
greater access to fi nance, improving transparency and governance, and 
safeguarding fi nancial stability.10 Recent estimates demonstrate the high 
impact of fi nancial infrastructure on the current and potential fi nanc-
ing volume and reach (fi gure 10.10). Current estimates show that 390 
million people in developing countries are covered by credit bureaus, 
over 700 million are affected by remittances, and over 1 billion by pay-
ment systems. Future growth, based on expected growth of fi nancial 
infrastructure where it does not currently exist, and expected increases 
in the reach of existing fi nancial infrastructure, are likely to increase 
these fi gures in some cases by 100 percent or more. For this growth 
Figure 10.10. Current and Potential Impact of Financial Infrastructure
total current financing volume
total potential financing volume
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Source: Miller, Mylenko, and Sankaranarayanan 2009.
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and impact potential to be realized, concerted collaborative effort is 
needed from governments, development fi nance institutions, and 
fi nancial institutions.
These central elements of fi nancial infrastructure need signifi cant 
development or improvement in many developing countries, including 
those with a large number of unserved and underserved. Even in coun-
tries that have the basic fi nancial infrastructure, fi nancial service provid-
ers such as microfi nance institutions (MFIs) and nonbank fi nancial 
institutions do not participate in key fi nancial infrastructure elements, 
such as credit information systems. It is key to develop inclusive and 
effi cient fi nancial infrastructure to alleviate the availability and afford-
ability constraints to fi nancial inclusion. 
Credit Information Systems. The primary benefi t of credit information 
systems is the establishment of “reputational collateral” through the pay-
ment performance of individual and fi rm borrowers and fi nancial users 
(Miller 2003). Lenders are able to make more informed decisions about 
creditworthiness when they have access to a borrower’s payment history, 
including both positive and negative information. Major benefi ts of 
credit reporting include: 
•  Greater access by individuals to loans and other fi nancial services at 
banks. Individuals who have a credit history can use it to obtain ser-
vices at fi nancial institutions. Studies show an 89 percent increase in 
the loan approval rate when positive and negative information is 
included in the credit report and an 11 percent increase in the loan 
approval rate when credit reports capture information from retail as 
well as other lenders (Barron and Staten 2003).
•  Decrease in the cost and processing time for loans. Credit reports speed 
up the decision-making process and turnaround time for loans, which 
reduces the transaction cost of making the loans. These savings can be 
passed on to the borrower in the form of lower interest rates. 
•  Greater access to fi nancing by SMEs. In studies done that covered 5,000 
fi rms in 51 countries, the percentage of fi rms reporting constraints to 
fi nancing is lower for fi rms operating in environments with a credit 
bureau (27 percent) than it is for fi rms operating in environments 
without a credit bureau (49 percent) (Love and Mylenko 2003).
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Lack of access to credit information systems, for example, exposes 
MFIs and other fi nancial institutions to the risk of nonperforming loans 
because they are not able to accurately assess a borrower’s repayment 
capacity, thus increasing the risk of overindebtedness. In mature and 
dynamic microfi nance markets, lack of such information on microfi nance 
lending can have an impact on MFI portfolios. Access to inclusive credit 
information systems open to banks and MFIs, as well as to data from 
other providers such as nonbank fi nancial institutions and nontraditional 
data providers, can help to mitigate these risks of client overindebtedness 
and deteriorating portfolios. The fundamental value proposition for 
microfi nance credit reporting is to alleviate this credit risk problem 
 (Sankaranarayanan 2010). For regulated fi nancial institutions, public 
credit registries also play a critical role in prudential regulation, fi nancial 
sector supervision, and systemic-level risk monitoring. 
Collateral Registries and Secured Transactions Systems. Collateral regis-
tries and secured transaction systems represent another key building block 
of fi nancial infrastructure that is underdeveloped in emerging markets.11 
While 78 percent of the capital stock of the typical business enterprise in 
emerging markets consists of movable assets, such as machinery, equip-
ment, or receivables, fi nancial institutions are reluctant to accept movable 
property as collateral. Banks strongly prefer land and real estate as collat-
eral. This requirement constrains access to credit for individuals and 
SMEs. To address this constraint, modernizing secured transactions and 
collateral registries contributes to fi nancial inclusion by: 
•  Increasing the level of credit. In countries where security interests are 
perfected and there is a predictable priority system for creditors in 
case of loan default, credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP 
averages 60 percent compared with only 30 to 32 percent on average 
for countries without these creditor protections (Safavian, Fleisig, and 
Steinbuks 2006).
•  Decreasing the cost of credit. In industrial countries borrowers with col-
lateral get nine times the level of credit given their cash fl ow compared 
with borrowers without collateral. They also benefi t from longer 
repayment periods (11 times longer) and signifi cantly lower interest 
rates (50 percent lower) (Chaves, de la Pena, and Fleisig 2004). 
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Payment Systems and Advancing the 5x5 Remittances Goal. A safe and 
effi cient national retail payment system is a prerequisite for the promo-
tion of fi nancial inclusion. Infrastructure for retail payments systems 
includes a legal and regulatory framework and involves cooperation 
between various participants in the fi nancial system to build system 
rules, instruments procedures, standards, and other aspects to enable the 
transfer of money between various counterparties safely and effi ciently. 
Retail payment services are often the fi rst point of entry of the under-
served and unserved into the fi nancial sector.
One important form of retail payment services is remittance transfers—
cross-border person-to-person payments, typically of relatively low 
value; these transfers represent a lifeline for more than 700 million peo-
ple in developing countries.12 The World Bank estimates that remittances 
totaled US$420 billion in 2009, of which US$317 billion went to devel-
oping countries, involving some 192 million migrants or 3 percent of the 
world population. The money received is an important source of family 
(and national) income in many emerging markets, representing in some 
cases a very large percentage of the GDP of the receiving countries 
(World Bank 2010a). 
The average cost of sending remittances varies signifi cantly across 
country corridors, according to the World Bank’s Remittance Prices World-
wide data. Figure 10.11 lists the most and least costly country corridors. 
There is a unique opportunity for reducing the cost of remittances, 
resulting in more money for migrants and their families. Recognizing 
the importance of migrant remittances for the global development 
agenda, the G-8 announced the formation in February 2009 of a Global 
Remittances Working Group to facilitate the fl ow of remittances world-
wide. In July 2009 the working group secured the commitment of the 
G-8 heads of state to reduce the global average cost of transferring remit-
tances by 5 percentage points in fi ve years – “5x5” (box 10.2). If that 
commitment is met, remittance recipients in developing countries would 
receive up to US$16 billion dollars more each year than they do now. 
This added income could then provide remittance recipients with more 
disposable income resulting in higher rates of consumption, savings, 
and investment within local economies and higher levels of economic 
growth (World Bank 2010a).
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Figure 10.11. Remittance Cost across Selected Country Corridors
Most costly country corridors for sending $200 (cost in US$)
Least costly country corridors for sending $200 (cost in US$)
Australia to Papua New Guinea
United States to Brazil
United Kingdom to Rwanda
Brazil to Bolivia
United Arab Emirates to Sri Lanka















Source: World Bank Remittance Prices Worldwide database (1Q2010) (http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/). 
Note: The global average total cost is calculated as the average total cost for sending US$200 with all remit-
tance service providers (RSPs) worldwide; nontransparent RSPs (that is, RSPs that do not disclose the 
exchange rate applied to the transaction) are excluded as well as corridors from the Russian Federation, 
since in these cases the exchange rates were not provided and cost would be higher if data were complete. 
In the lists of most and least costly country corridors, the cost includes the transaction fee and exchange 
rate margin. Only those corridors with a sufﬁ cient degree of transparency (that is, all the relevant informa-
tion was provided by all RSPs) are featured. Corridor averages are unweighted and do not reﬂ ect the market 
shares of the different ﬁ rms that compose the average.
Box 10.2. G-8 Summit (L’Aquila, July 2009) to 5x5 Declaration
“Given the development impact of remittance ﬂ ows, we will facilitate a more efﬁ cient 
transfer and improved use of remittances and enhance cooperation between national 
and international organizations, in order to implement the recommendations of the 
2007 Berlin G-8 Conference and of the Global Remittances Working Group estab-
lished in 2009 and coordinated by the World Bank. We will aim to make ﬁ nancial ser-
vices more accessible to migrants and to those who receive remittances in the devel-
oping world. We will work to achieve in particular the objective of a reduction of the 
global average costs of transferring remittances from the present 10% to 5% in 5 
years through enhanced information, transparency, competition and cooperation 
with partners generating a signiﬁ cant net increase in income for migrants and their 
families in the developing world.”
Source: G-8 (2009).
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Delivery Mechanisms and Products
There is a near-universal need for safe and secure savings and payment 
products as well as a large unmet demand for insurance and credit 
 (fi gure 10.12). Financial services for the underserved are costly, time-
consuming, and unreliable. The needs of low-income households for 
fi nancial services are high—one study estimates that households in 
 Bangladesh are transacting about 60 percent of their annual income 
through fi nancial instruments (a combination of formal and informal) 
(Rutherford 2005). While the need for appropriate and effective credit 
products remains important, the focus of interventions is increasingly 
expanding to include additional product types covering savings, pay-
ment systems, and insurance. The following product snapshot highlights 
these additional three product types. 
Delivery mechanisms that leverage technology solutions for wider 
reach represent one of the key products and delivery innovations for 
expanding the fi nancial access frontier. The increasing role of technol-
ogy for the distribution of fi nancial services, greater product diversifi ca-
tion beyond the credit-only approach, increasing commercialization, a 
widening range of players investing in fi nancial inclusion, and the 
increasing importance of policy environments all help advance progress 












































Source: World Bank Group Team Analysis and analysis for the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.
Note: *Based on 1.64 billion working poor in developing countries.
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in improving fi nancial inclusion (fi gure 10.13). Delivering fi nancial ser-
vices to the unbanked using mobile banking technology holds signifi cant 
promise (box 10.3). An estimated 1 billion people in emerging markets 
have a mobile phone but no bank account, and it is expected that this 
number will reach 1.7 billion by 2012. Moreover, studies indicate that 
this segment represents a strong market opportunity with the potential 
for the delivery of mobile money services to the unbanked customers to 
generate annually US$5 billion in direct revenues and US$2.5 billion in 
indirect revenues for mobile operators (CGAP-GSMA 2009). Many 
product and service innovations that have changed the way that fi nancial 
services have been provided to low-income consumers are also to be 
found in the microfi nance industry (see annex). 
Figure 10.13. Global Trends Shifting the Financial Inclusion Frontier Forward
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Box 10.3. Case Study: M-Pesa (Kenya)
Perhaps the most commonly cited case study on the ability of branchless banking to 
transform the ﬁ nancial realities of a population is the case of M-Pesa, a mobile money 
service offered by Safaricom in Kenya. The service is very popular: as of April 2010, 9 
million Kenyans (40 percent of the population) owned an M-Pesa account. According 
to a 2009 CGAP brief, 77 percent of survey respondents believe that M-Pesa has raised 
their household income. Indeed, data show that money is remitted signiﬁ cantly more 
frequently and at lower cost compared with traditional options. Furthermore, since 
M-Pesa’s launch, the number of Kenyans considered ﬁ nancially included has almost 
doubled.
Source: CGAP 2009, FSD Kenya, Mas and Radcliffe 2010.
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Savings Products. The supply gap for savings products is larger than the 
supply gap for either credit or insurance products. Estimates indicate 
that the penetration gap in the supply of savings services is as wide as 
70 percent (see fi gure 10.12). As a result, initiatives that promote savings 
products for low-income households have begun gaining traction glob-
ally. These initiatives have gained attention in recent years as growing 
evidence shows that strong asset-building skills are key to poverty reduc-
tion. While not everyone can and should borrow money, everyone can 
save a small amount of money. The delivery channels for savings prod-
ucts are diverse and multiple, ranging from MFIs to commercial banks 
to savings and postal banks. 
Matched savings accounts, also known as individual development 
accounts, are an example of a savings product designed for low-income 
populations. Holders of these accounts receive matched savings contri-
butions, usually at the rate of 1-to-1 or 2-to-1, with the provision that 
the account must be used toward certain approved purposes. These pur-
poses may include funding a small business, purchasing a home, or pay-
ing for education. Benefi ciaries of matched savings accounts are also 
sometimes required to participate in fi nancial education training. Pilots 
in Peru, Taiwan, China, and Uganda have shown promising results. Child 
savings accounts are another new savings product sometimes combined 
with matched savings accounts.13 Countries such as the Republic of 
Korea, Singapore, and the United Kingdom are experimenting with or 
implementing child savings accounts. 
Payment Systems and Remittances Products. The potential for linking 
money transfers to fi nancial inclusion remains underexplored. Microfi -
nance institutions occupy a unique position in servicing those poor cli-
ents receiving remittances from abroad or within-country transfers. How 
microfi nance institutions could reduce transaction costs and increase the 
economic impact of those transfers is an area for innovation in the short 
and medium term. Using clients’ remittances histories to evaluate credit-
worthiness (World Bank 2010b) or designing client savings’ programs for 
remittances funds are examples to be further piloted. 
Governments are beginning to use government-to-person (G2P) pay-
ments in ways that promote fi nancial inclusion. Today, it is estimated that 
the number of low-income people receiving government social  protection 
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transfers (conditional or unconditional cash transfers14) is roughly the 
same as the number of microfi nance clients—about 170 million world-
wide (Pickens, Porteous, and Rotman 2009). While traditional G2P pay-
ments aim solely to supplement income and provide basic  poverty 
 alleviation, many governments are experimenting with the disbursement 
of funds electronically, often through mobile or card-based banking 
accounts. In many cases, payment recipients must have a bank account, 
which automatically places the benefi ciary in the fi nancial system and 
opens the door to additional formal fi nancial services. However, obstacles 
still exist with this model: for example, infrequent use of the savings 
account may nullify much of their benefi t and make them less profi table 
and therefore less attractive to banks. More pilot programs and research 
on how to link G2P to fi nancial systems is necessary to harness the poten-
tial for using transfer payments as a way to achieving fi nancial inclusion.
Microinsurance Products. With only 3 percent of the world’s low-income 
population covered by any form of formal insurance against life-cycle 
shocks or calamities that may affect a whole family, community, or region, 
microinsurance represents an emerging product frontier. Most people 
continue to manage risk through informal mechanisms, such as borrowing 
from friends and family and self-insuring, by investing in assets that can be 
sold in hard times. There is increasing interest in offering clients access to 
microinsurance products in partnership with insurance companies. Inno-
vation is taking place in the area of index-based risk transfer products—
fi nancial instruments that make payments based on realizations of an 
underlying index relative to a prespecifi ed threshold. The underlying index 
is a transparent and objectively measured random variable. Examples 
include area average crop yields, area average crop revenues, cumulative 
rainfall, cumulative temperature, fl ood levels, sustained wind speeds, and 
Richter-scale measures (Microinsurance Network 2010). The World Bank 
has launched the Global Microinsurance Benchmark Database to help pro-
vide information on the quality of microinsurance expansion in terms of 
products, market size, and fi nancial and operational performance.
Low-Cost, No-Frills Accounts. An additional product innovation refers 
to going “back to the basics” and developing simple, no-frills accounts 
that have the potential to reach a wide share of the unbanked segment of 
466 Postcrisis Growth and Development
the population. Many countries, including Brazil, Malaysia, Mexico, and 
South Africa, have encouraged or have rolled out such fi nancial products 
and services to expand the usage of formal fi nancial services. However, 
fi nancial inclusion products and policies that focus on targeting a single 
barrier to access, such as fees, will succeed only if that barrier was a bind-
ing constraint in the fi rst place. Basic accounts may not prove effective if 
distance and a lack of fi nancial capability deter their uptake and use. The 
behavior of the banks is another common theme: policies that banks see 
as requiring them to behave in a way they view as unprofi table will fail. 
To achieve fi nancial inclusion, political mandates to banks should be 
aligned with incentives (World Bank Group 2009). 
One example of a successful basic no-frills account that increased used 
of formal fi nancial services is the Mzansi account in South Africa. Mzansi 
is an entry-level bank account, based on a magnetic stripe debit card plat-
form, developed by the South African banking industry and launched col-
laboratively by the four largest commercial banks together with the state-
owned Postbank in October 2004. The Mzansi account was set up as a 
simple account with minimum, low-fee requirements. Since its introduc-
tion 6 million South Africans have become account holders (box 10.4). 
While not all Mzansi account holders are new to the banking system and 
not all the newly banked are Mzansi account holders, the percentage of 
Box 10.4. Mzansi Accounts (launched in 2004 in South Africa)
Features: No monthly fees
 No minimum balance
 One free monthly cash deposit
  Maximum account balance of US$1,875 beyond which clients must 
graduate to regular savings accounts
Results:  More than 6 million Mzansi accounts opened (by December 2008), a 
signiﬁ cant number out of a total of 32 million adult population. Two-thirds 
of the Mzansi account holders had been unbanked.
 At least one in ten South Africans has a Mzansi account
 One in six banked people are active Mzansi clients
 Banked population increased from 46 percent (2004) to 64 percent (2008)
Source: Bankable Frontier Associates and FinMark Trust 2009, World Bank Group (2009).
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adults banked in South Africa increased from 46 percent in 2004 to 64 
percent in 2008. Of the increase, the Mzansi fi rst-time banked contrib-
uted close to half: 8.2 percent of the 18 percent increase. 
Target Market Segment: Rural. Rural areas require special attention and 
tailored interventions because they represent low-fi nancial-access areas 
with the most concentrated poverty levels. Financial access is limited in 
most rural areas in developing countries because of high transaction 
costs and risks attributed to low levels of economic activity, poor infra-
structure, high levels of production and price risks in dominant rural 
economic activities such as agriculture, and poor public policies such as 
interest-rate caps and debt write-offs (Nair and Kloeppinger-Todd 2007). 
Financial inclusion strategies and interventions need to leverage the 
existing (even if limited) fi nancial infrastructure in rural areas (such as 
fi nancial cooperatives) and new technologies and designs (such as agent 
correspondent networks and branchless banking) to sustainably expand 
access to fi nance. 
Target Market Segment: Women. Women represent a key target segment 
for three reasons.15 First, women traditionally face greater access barriers 
to formal banking services and thus are also credit-constrained to a greater 
extent than men. Second, experience has shown that repayment is higher 
among female borrowers, mostly resulting from more conservative invest-
ments and lower moral hazard risk. The lower moral hazard risk might 
stem from lower mobility and higher risk aversion. Third, women’s access 
to fi nancial services has a high potential to yield positive effects because 
women seem to focus more on children’s health and education than men 
do. A study of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh fi nds that credit has a 
larger effect on the behavior of poor households when women are bor-
rowers (Pitt and Khandker 1998; Khandker 2003). Focusing on women 
may empower them in the intrahousehold decision process. The widely 
recognized empirical study on the link between microfi nance and wom-
en’s empowerment is Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin’s (2008) follow-up to their 
2006 study of commitment saving devices in the Philippines. 
In addition, women are among the poorest clients and make up a sizable 
and growing share of small businesses globally, currently representing an 
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estimated 25–38 percent of all registered small businesses worldwide. For 
example, in China women own one-third of small businesses, of which 
17 percent have more than 1,000 employees, and in Southeast Asia it is 
estimated that women make up more than 40 percent of the workforce 
and are starting businesses at twice the rate of men (GEM 2007). Because 
the poverty concentration is higher among women than men, many 
microfi nance pioneers (such as BancoSol and Grameen Bank) originally 
focused on serving women. While not all MFIs focus specifi cally on 
women, the Microcredit Summit Campaign counted that as of end 2007, 
70 percent of microfi nance clients worldwide were women (Daley-Harris 
2009). Among those customers classifi ed as the “poorest,” the share was 
even higher at 83 percent (Armendàriz and Morduch 2010). 
Responsible Finance/Customer Focus
Responsible fi nance is addressed by advancing three areas: fi nancial con-
sumer protection regulation, industry self-regulation, and fi nancial capa-
bility. Responsible fi nance practices are defi ned as those promoting more 
transparent, inclusive and equitable provision of fi nancial products and 
services. Achieving these practices requires action by three key stakehold-
ers (fi gure 10.14): the fi nancial services industry (through industry self-
regulation including codes of conduct and standards), governments 
(through consumer protection policies, regulation and institutional 
arrangements), and consumers (through enhanced consumer awareness, 
consumer advocacy, and fi nancial capability).
The current postcrisis environment is providing additional impetus 
to advance responsible fi nance as an element of fi nancial inclusion. 
Until the fi nancial crisis, an estimated 150 million new customers 
globally were buying fi nancial services each year. Global consumer 
debt was 12–14 percent of GDP in the fi rst half of the 1990s but 
increased to 18 percent in recent years. Mortgage debt rose still more 
rapidly—from 46 percent of GDP in 2000 to over 70 percent in 2007 
(Rutledge 2010). The crisis demonstrated the danger of overborrow-
ing, whether by individuals misled through predatory lenders or by 
overly optimistic individual or fi rm borrowers. For that reason, when 
discussing the big strides in fi nancial inclusion that many countries 
need to make, it is imperative to complement those efforts with key 
improvements in responsible fi nance practices. 
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Many of the lessons from the crisis in global fi nancial markets are well 
known. Key insights include:
•  The role that unscrupulous business practices played in the crisis 
(predatory lending, misleading product information, and fraud)
•  The lack of adequate oversight and consumer protection in an era of 
deregulation and the actual limits on the effectiveness of market 
forces for instilling discipline, especially when systemic failures 
emerge. The lack of transparency and disclosure made it diffi cult to 
evaluate and price risk throughout the fi nancial system.
•  The limited level of fi nancial capability in the population, even among 
relatively educated and “sophisticated” fi nancial consumers. When 
consumers did not understand credit terms, they too often became 
overindebted.
Other causes of the crisis included compensation schemes, misaligned 
incentives, explosion of new fi nancial products that were not adequately 
rated, and macroeconomic policy. Still, the fact that consumers became 
unwitting participants through their credit and investment decisions 
contributed to the spread and scale of the crisis.
Figure 10.14. Three Dimensions of Responsible Finance
Source: World Bank Group Team Analysis. 
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The mortgage crisis demonstrates the importance of responsible 
lending together with adequate risk management and funding instru-
ments and consumer protections. The subprime debacle in the United 
States shows that extending access can be extremely harmful to both 
borrowers and lenders if not done in a sound and responsible way. 
Households were lured to borrow against their own interest by securing 
loans based on the hypothetical and ever-increasing value of housing 
assets irrespective of borrowers’ capacity to repay; the originators of 
these loans had no incentives to manage credit risks prudently, and the 
broader housing market was fi nanced through complex and risky fi nan-
cial structures. The crisis led to a lasting mistrust among bond investors 
(mortgage portfolios no longer being perceived as safe collateral). Efforts 
to cater to underserved categories must rely on sounder principles such 
as borrowers’ capacity to repay, know-your-customer rules, proper risk 
management tools, tighter regulations, and robust funding mechanisms. 
A growing number of economies including middle-income countries 
are expressing urgent needs in that direction.
The fi nancial crisis has also served as an advance warning to potential 
microfi nance markets that are overheating. Several dynamic microfi -
nance markets (Bosnia and Herzegovina, India, Morocco, Nicaragua, and 
Pakistan) are showing symptoms of stress, demonstrated by deteriorat-
ing portfolio quality, increasing loan delinquencies, and perceived or real 
overindebtedness of clients. These symptoms are largely the result of 
inherent vulnerabilities in the market, such as concentrated market com-
petition and multiple borrowing, overstretched MFI systems and con-
trols, and an erosion of MFI credit discipline. To address these rising 
concerns, local and global initiatives (such as the SMART campaign) are 
focusing on responsible microfi nance.16
Consumer protection regulations and laws are necessary to level the 
playing fi eld between consumers and fi nancial services providers, min-
imizing the market failures that can arise from the frequent imbalance 
of power, information, and resources between the two parties. The gov-
ernment has a leading role to play in ensuring that appropriate con-
sumer protection regulation is tailored to promote fi nancial access and 
the fi nancial sector development of the country. Consumer protection 
regulation is closely associated with prudential regulation. Policy objec-
tives on these two fronts should therefore be aligned. Consumer 
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 protection implies that consumers should be provided with transpar-
ency (disclosure of full, simple, and comparable information), choice 
(fair, noncoercive, and reasonable marketing and selling practices; fair 
collections), redress (inexpensive and speedy mechanisms to address 
complaints and resolve disputes), and privacy (control over collection 
of and access to personal information) (AFI 2010; Rutledge 2010; 
World Bank Group 2009).
Financial capability is the combination of knowledge, understand-
ing, skills, attitudes, and especially behaviors that people need to make 
sound personal fi nance decisions, suited to their social and fi nancial 
circumstances (CGAP 2010). The need for building fi nancial capability 
is especially high in nascent low-access markets (box 10.5). The key 
objective of fi nancial capability programs is to raise fi nancial aware-
ness and improve fi nancial behaviors of consumers so that they can 
make the best-informed fi nancial decisions, given their economic and 
social circumstances. Financial capability programs can be delivered 
through multiple channels—fi nancial institutions themselves, the edu-
cation system (for example, through fi nancial education in school cur-
ricula), regulatory and supervisory agencies (central banks, banking or 
fi nancial regulators, consumer protection agencies), the media (news-
papers, radio, television, Internet), social marketing (road shows, street 
theatre, entertainment), nongovernmental organizations (consumer 
associations, debt counseling centers), and others.
Box 10.5. Lack of Financial Capability in Practice 
Selected Headline Statistics
Pakistan Only 3 percent of adults understand what is meant by mobile 
banking and mobile phone banking; 71 percent of adults think 
they can easily live their life without a bank account.
Mozambique 5 percent of adults have insurance products; half the adult pop-
ulation (50.2 percent) claims never to have heard of insurance or 
insurance products.
Tanzania Only 26 percent of people interviewed had heard of interest on 
savings accounts; none understood how this worked.
Source: FinScope. www.ﬁ nscope.co.za
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To advance responsible fi nance practices, fi nancial institutions should 
be driven by two principles: do no harm (protective element), and do good 
(ensuring and proving that their fi nance is pro-growth and pro-poor). 
Providers also stand to benefi t from responsible fi nance practices. The “do 
no harm” element rests on principles of transparency, disclosure, and 
improved risk management practices that protect the customer and the 
fi nancial institution. The “do good” element refers to the proactive 
approach by the industry or fi nancial institutions to support the positive 
impact of their fi nancial operations on individuals, communities, and 
countries in which they operate. 
To give substance to the “do good” element, private banks should 
develop and operationalize indicators and measures that give evidence of 
and motivate the positive impact of their businesses. Responsible fi nance 
initiatives for the microfi nance sector have been defi ned, and some are 
already in endorsement stage. Examples are the Social Performance Task 
Force, which aims to engage with microfi nance stakeholders to develop, 
disseminate, and promote standards and good practices for social per-
formance management and reporting, and the SMART Campaign, which 
promotes client protection principles.17 The campaign has about 1,000 
signatories and is already in the implementation stage.18 Responsible 
fi nance more broadly applied to the mainstream private banking sector 
is still being shaped at the multilateral and global level. 
Data and Measurement
Financial inclusion data is critical in supporting evidence-based policy 
making, helping inform the prioritization of efforts, and tracking prog-
ress of the proposed targets. Without standardized, comparable, and 
regularly updated data at the global and national level, progress tracking 
and target setting is suboptimal and lacking direction. Thus data and 
measurement are an indispensable area of work that requires defi ning 
measurable fi nancial inclusion dimensions and improving current and 
future data collection efforts and indicators toward the goal of establish-
ing an international fi nancial inclusion data platform.19 
Financial inclusion data are at an early development stage, where it is 
critical to ensure that the necessary indicators are covered and that the 
key data are collected and published annually so that progress can be 
tracked. Three sources of data can be used to measure and benchmark 
 Toward Universal Access: Addressing the Global Challenge of Financial Inclusion  473
fi nancial access and policy as well as barriers to fi nancial access: regula-
tors of fi nancial services (supply side); fi nancial institutions (supply 
side); and surveys of users—individuals or households and fi rms 
(demand side). Figure 10.15 outlines the major existing data reports cov-
ering fi nancial inclusion indicators. Currently, the World Bank Group 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) each do a survey that col-
lects global, comprehensive fi nancial access data on an annual basis. The 
other reports are focused on a specifi c dimension of fi nancial access. 
While the supply-side data from fi nancial institutions or regulators tend 
to be more cost-effective, they lack the power to reveal information about 
the client experience and the needs of nonconsumers that demand-side 
surveys can reveal. Thus, comprehensive, standardized demand-side data 
at the global level are also needed (AFI 2009).
Figure 10.15. Measuring Financial Access: Key Existing Reports 
Source: World Bank Group Team Analysis. 
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• statistics on financial access in 139 countries
• usage statistics: deposits, loans, branches
• policies and regulations: bank agents, postal networks,
  branch and credit regulations, consumer protection
• SME financing volume statistics added in 2010
• cross-country geographic and demographic outreach of
  financial services
• outreach: bank branch network, ATMs
• financial instruments: deposits, loans, debt securities,
  insurance
• comprehensive firm-level data in emerging markets,
  collected in 3–4 year rotation
• currently gathering data covering 122 countries
• household level indicators of access to finance
• World Bank’s household surveys
• global household survey (forthcoming)
• FinScope: 14 countries in Africa and Pakistan, focus on
  consumers’ usage and perception on financial services
• Doing Business indicators: Getting Credit (covering credit
  reporting and collateral registers in 183 countries)
• global payment systems survey (covering 142 countries)
• global remittance price database (launched in 2008,
  shows remittance data in 178 corridors)
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On the supply side, the World Bank Group has published Financial 
Access 2009 based on the results of a regulator survey (Kendall, Mylenko, 
and Ponce 2010). Building on earlier World Bank research (Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez Peria 2007, 2008), this initiative set out 
to collect core statistics on access to fi nancial services and to review 
policies supporting broader fi nancial access. Financial Access 2009 was 
the fi rst in a projected series of annual reports that publishes statistics 
on the number and value of deposit accounts and loans and retail loca-
tions in 139 countries. The report also collected information on sev-
eral broad policy topics including provision of fi nancial services 
through postal networks, the use of bank agents, regulations related to 
opening accounts, branch regulations, credit regulations, and trans-
parency and consumer protection. The Financial Access 2010 survey is 
under way, with the report expected in the fall of 2010. This year’s sur-
vey asks for information on SME fi nance in addition to updating the 
2009 information.
The IMF has recently launched a new online database of results from 
its inaugural Financial Access Survey, designed to underpin research on 
the provision of consumer fi nancial services worldwide. The database 
measures the reach of fi nancial services by bank branch network, avail-
ability of automated teller machines, and by four key fi nancial instru-
ments: deposits, loans, debt securities issued, and insurance.20, 21 
Supply-side fi nancial infrastructure indicators provide additional 
insight into discrete aspects of the enabling environment for fi nancial 
access. The 2010 Doing Business report released in September 2009 covers 
183 economies, the largest share of the globe since the report was fi rst 
published in 2004. Among the 10 indicators covered by the report, “Get-
ting Credit” is the most relevant one for assessing progress on reforms that 
support the development of credit information sharing systems, collateral 
registries, and secured transactions.22
Additional fi nancial infrastructure indicators are covered by the 
Global Payment Systems Survey and the Global Remittance Price Data-
base. To track progress toward the 5x5 goal, the World Bank launched 
the Remittance Prices Worldwide database in 2008.23 These narrowly 
focused indicators are especially useful as they are able to inform specifi c 
reforms needed to create a better enabling environment for fi nancial 
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access. However, they highlight only a part of the puzzle, and more of 
these specifi c indicators that easily link to reforms are needed. 
On the demand side, household and specialized surveys fi ll in the 
gaps on usage as well as provide rich demographic analysis. Household 
surveys such as the Living Standards Measurement Survey and special-
ized surveys such as World Bank Access to Finance surveys, FinScope’s 
FinAccess Surveys, and World Bank Group’s Enterprise Surveys are other 
sources that enrich the analysis. By allowing for sex-disaggregated analy-
sis, recent surveys have also highlighted women’s signifi cantly lower 
access levels in countries such as South Africa, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. 
In addition to gender-related aspects of fi nancial inclusion, household 
surveys can also provide rich data on geographical aspects of fi nancial 
inclusion, such as the rural-urban divide. The forthcoming global house-
hold survey spearheaded by the World Bank Group with the support of 
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation will provide a measure of use of 
different fi nancial services around the world. 
The regulators have a role to play in facilitating data collection efforts. 
Supervisors concerned with fi nancial stability often collect data on fi nan-
cial depth based on the aggregate value of deposits and loans as well as 
large loans. It is signifi cant, however, that less than 70 percent of the sample 
countries collect information on the number of bank deposits and a mere 
30 percent collect information on regulated nonbank deposit accounts. 
Data on loans are even more limited (Kendall, Mylenko, and Ponce 2010). 
There are multiple avenues to support data collection efforts. For 
example, the government of India encouraged measurement and report-
ing to track and advance its mission of increasing lending opportunities 
to women, which contributed to positive results (box 10.6). The Bank of 
Thailand recently made a clear case that it is in the interest of regulators 
and policy makers to monitor policy progress over time and to express 
demand for data. The Central Bank of Kenya was highly involved in the 
design and implementation of its national fi nancial surveys. In turn, this 
involvement emboldened policy makers to use the data from the Fin-
Scope survey conducted to make a key decision about how heavily to 
regulate the relatively new mobile payment system offered by M-Pesa 
(AFI 2009). Similarly, encouraging other stakeholders to make an invest-
ment in the study may promote wider usage. 
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The Way Forward to the G-20 Korea Summit
Advancing progress in fi nancial inclusion will mean reaching out to a 
signifi cant portion of the 70 percent of adults in developing countries 
that currently do not have access to fi nancial products and services. The 
global effort in fi nancial inclusion will be driven by setting global targets, 
focused not only on credit, which is only part of the needed portfolio of 
fi nancial services and products but on a range of fi nancial products and 
instruments including payments, remittances, savings, and insurance. 
Global goals will trigger an important focus on data collection and 
measurement for both individuals and fi rms. Data and measurement of 
the SME fi nance gap needs improvement and standardization in order to 
track progress. All of the data collection projects described here need to 
be supported and improved on an ongoing basis. 
To expand fi nancial inclusion and build the foundations for sustainable 
growth, the World Bank Group recommends that the G-20 convenes a 
global partnership with relevant stakeholders around common set of 
global fi nancial inclusion targets. The effort should focus not only on 
credit but on a range of fi nancial products: payments, savings, remittances, 
and insurance. The targets would step up pressure to close existing data 
gaps—in particular, the SME fi nance gap and policy-related indicators—
ensuring that the basic elements are in place to measure progress against 
the target on an annual basis. Key implementation pillars will include pol-
icy environment, fi nancial infrastructure, delivery mechanisms and prod-
ucts, responsible fi nance, data and measurement and, building on progress 
made by the Financial Inclusion Experts Group. The implementation will 
Box 10.6. Government-Led Initiatives in Data Collection in India
Following an Indian government directive and action plan to increase access to bank 
loans for women, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in 2000 asked public sector banks to 
disaggregate and report annually on the percentage of credit to women within their 
total lending. The directive urged banks to earmark at least 2 percent of their net bank 
credit for women and raise it to 5 percent in 5 years time. The aggregate net bank 
credit to women has since increased to 6.3 percent in 2009 with 25 banks reaching the 
target. Although the full impact of the policy requires further analysis, tracking the 
data has increased awareness of women’s low access levels.
Source: Reserve Bank of India 2009. 
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require an integrated and concerted effort leveraging four key drivers: the 
global development community, the fi nancial services industry, national 
governments, and centers for knowledge sharing and standard setting 
bodies. The G-20 is in a unique position to convene those forces for eco-
nomic development and to complement the effort with the creation of a 
funding mechanism to provide resources needed for the implementation 
of the fi nancial inclusion agenda.
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Annex The Microﬁ nance Industry
Evolution and Successes in the Industry
Microfi nance offers poor people access to basic fi nancial services.24 Now 
a key component of the global fi nancial inclusion effort, it emerged in the 
1970s with the provision of small, collateral-free or low-collateral loans 
to poor clients in developing countries.25 The core principles in micro-
lending have traditionally included group lending and liability, preloan 
savings requirements, progressive loan amounts, and the guarantee of 
access to future credit if the current loan is repaid promptly. The industry 
has matured and diversifi ed signifi cantly over the past several decades, 
going beyond credit-only to encompass a broad range of fi nancial prod-
ucts and services that also include savings, insurance, and remittance and 
cash transfer services to poor households and microenterprises. 
Recipients of microcredit are typically poor or low-income and lack 
access to formal fi nancial institutions. Microfi nance clients are a diverse 
group of people that require diverse types of products. With rare excep-
tions, typical microcredit clients do not come from the poorest 10 percent 
of the population, because the poorest often do not have the resources or 
the consistent income to make even minimum payments on a loan. Cli-
ents are also typically self-employed or entrepreneurs—often rural—
whose businesses involve a diverse array of products and services often 
sold from their home. Historically, most microfi nance clients were 
women, although this profi le is changing as men make up an increasing 
portion of client portfolios, which are often also aimed at youth, children, 
and the very poor.26
Microfi nance has become increasingly integrated in the formal fi nan-
cial system. Microfi nance expanded robustly between 2004 and 2008, 
when annual asset growth averaged 39 percent. The industry growth 
trend continued despite the economic turmoil of the past three years. 
Although considerable challenges have accompanied this growth, essen-
tially it has meant that millions more low-income citizens could become 
part of the formal fi nancial system (table 10A.1). Growth has been partly 
fueled by the emergence of new funders. Of the 61 microfi nance funders 
surveyed by CGAP in 2008, 38 were public donors and 23 were investors. 
The actual commitments provided by both were roughly equal in 2008, 
refl ecting the growing importance of funding from private funds. 
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The business model for fi nancial service delivery is disaggregating as 
new partnerships among MFIs, banks, and, more recently, telecommuni-
cations and credit card companies allow each actor to carry out the role 
in service delivery most suited to its comparative advantage. Moreover, 
technology-driven delivery models are spreading rapidly. 
Commercial banks, local and international, are recognizing the value 
proposition of lending to the poor, allowing microfi nance to grow far 
beyond what would likely have been possible through donor funds alone. 
Initial public offerings (IPOs) by microfi nance institutions are a relatively 
recent development in the industry’s path to commercialization. To date, 
three IPOs have occurred in microfi nance: Bank Rakyat Indonesia in 
2003, Equity Bank Kenya in 2006, and Banco Compartamos in 2007. The 
Banco Compartamos’ IPO marked the fi rst offering by an institution 
originally founded purely as a microlender. SKS, one of the leading MFIs 
in India, just recently launched an IPO.27 Many banks are now providing 
microfi nance either directly (examples are the ACLEDA Bank in Cambo-
dia and Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and XacBank and AgBank, 
both in Mongolia) or indirectly through links with MFIs.
As the microfi nance industry has grown, research on its impact and 
effi cacy has also been given more salience.28 While microfi nance 
expands the opportunities of the unbanked, ongoing research is help-
ing distill the welfare impact of microfi nance products on low-income 
populations. Unfortunately, scientifi c testing of the impact of microcre-
dit is surprisingly diffi cult. Qualitative research points to the benefi ts of 
microcredit, as refl ected in the voices and anecdotes of clients (Collins et 
al. 2009), whereas quantitative research using experimental research 
presents a more nuanced picture.29 A number of rigorous impact evalu-
ation studies are currently under way exploring how microfi nance affects 
different clients in different regions. There is an increasing recognition 
Table 10A.1. Microﬁ nance at a Glance, 2008
Gross loan portfolio (US$) 43.8 billion 
Deposits (US$) 23.8 billion 
Number of borrowers 83.2 million 
Average loan balance per borrower (US$) 536.6
Source: MIX data 2008; median indicators based on a sample of 1,870 MFIs. www.mixmarket.org
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and acceptance that microfi nance is an instrument for increasing access 
to fi nancial services rather than a tool that directly reduces poverty. 
Microfi nance should not be seen as a substitute for investments in basic 
education, health, and infrastructure (Helms 2006).
Microfi nance is high on many government agendas. The heightened 
interest has both up- and downsides. A more widespread understanding 
of what it takes to build sustainable access, more enabling legal and regu-
latory frameworks, and a greater focus on consumer protection and edu-
cation are welcome. The reintroduction of low interest rate caps and the 
creation of government-sponsored direct lending institutions in some 
countries are troubling developments.
The microfi nance industry is entering a new phase. While the focus in 
the fi rst decades of the industry’s evolution was on extending loans to 
the poor (focusing on microenterprise credit) and thus bringing as many 
low-access consumers as possible into the fi nancial system, the next 
period will likely focus on sustainable growth along with product inno-
vation to serve the very diverse fi nancial needs of poor people.30 Despite 
the considerable expansion and success, there are notable challenges to 
the microfi nance industry. Five such challenges stand out: local fi nancial 
market infrastructure (that is, local debt and equity markets, payments 
systems, rating agencies, and credit bureaus) and the regulatory and 
supervisory framework for microfi nance remains weak in many coun-
tries; inadequate attention has been given to the quality of client services 
and too few efforts made to better understand changing market condi-
tions and client needs; information is limited on the trade-offs between 
outreach, product offering, and profi tability; product diversity remains 
limited, especially well-designed deposit products and transaction 
accounts that could be the gateway product for other services; and gov-
ernment policies and regulation continue to hinder the development of 
microfi nance in many countries.
Financial capability training is beginning to take on a larger role as a 
key component of microfi nance for low-income populations. Financial 
capability is the combination of knowledge, understanding, skills, atti-
tudes, and especially behaviors which people need in order to make sound 
personal fi nance decisions, suited to their economic and social circum-
stances. The latest fi nancial capability initiatives have borrowed from 
ideas about behavior change in regards to fi elds like health. Two pilots are 
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underway in India: the SKS Foundation’s Ultra Poor Program in rural 
Andhra Pradesh has reached over 400 women who were too poor to qual-
ify for SKS’s microfi nance services.31 The goal of the program is to bring 
very poor benefi ciaries to a point where they can use their existing savings 
and assets to grow and diversify their capital base and potentially access 
microfi nance. To help these women to learn basic money management 
skills, SKS delivers practical and interactive fi nancial education modules 
during weekly group meetings. Another fi eld experiment, in Gujarat, 
involves 1,000 low-income microfi nance clients who receive approxi-
mately 10 hours of basic fi nancial literacy education over a six-week 
period. The sessions are built around videos, which are complemented by 
discussion groups. A similar initiative is looking at the impact of a fi nan-
cial education program designed for the specifi c needs of mineworkers in 
South Africa (Imali, Shastry and Shapiro forthcoming). Although fi nan-
cial capability is still a developing fi eld, the existing body of evidence sug-
gests that it could be a powerful tool towards increasing fi nancial inclu-
sion. Randomized control trials to ascertain the cost-effectiveness of this 
policy intervention and qualitative studies are under way.
Financial Crisis and Developments in the 
Microﬁ nance Industry
The microfi nance industry’s resilience to macroeconomic crisis was tested 
during the deepest global downturn in recent history. The crisis affected 
advanced and developing countries differently: while the fi rst contracted by 
3½ percent, developing countries appear to have weathered the crisis bet-
ter, in part because of developing countries’ limited integration in inter-
national fi nancial markets and the economic resurgence in Asia, led by 
China and India (IMF 2009). The microfi nance industry has had 15 years 
of continued growth and has been exposed to other crises (political 
upheavals, recessions, fi nancial sector breakdowns); however, those crises 
were confi ned to specifi c regions and countries. Microfi nance providers, 
unlike a decade ago, are today much more connected to international fi nan-
cial markets.
The fi nancial crisis has also helped to expose other important issues 
for the sustainability and proper functioning of the microfi nance indus-
try, including domestic savings mobilization and responsible fi nancial 
practices. The crisis has shown the importance of expanding deposit 
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mobilization among microfi nance providers as a safety buffer in times of 
liquidity constraints. The importance of safe savings products for low-
income people as a way to create wealth and move out of poverty is also 
being emphasized by donors and academia across the board. The increased 
emphasis on saving fi ts well with increased awareness of the need to pro-
mote responsible lending and borrowing among both providers and 
consumers. Worrying trends of overindebted clients or clients with 
Box 10A.1. Microﬁ nance amid the Financial Crisis
Providers’ Signs of Stress. Microﬁ nance institutions (MFIs) around the world appeared to face 
increased liquidity constraints in 2009. As expected, Tier II (assets between US$3–50 million) and 
III (assets below US$3 million) small MFIs in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia were more vulner-
able to liquidity shortages. The portfolio quality of MFIs deteriorated in 2009, especially in Europe 
and Central Asia, with PAR30 and loan loss provision increasing. Growth and proﬁ tability have 
slowed among providers but the fundamentals of the sector remain strong (see ﬁ gure below).






























































PAR 30 (R) ROE
MFI Clients Affected by the Global Crisis. Increased food and fuel prices, a slowdown in remit-
tances, and employment layoffs in industries linked to international trade (such as food process-
ing, textiles) negatively affected MFI clients’ economic well-being. The crisis has also revealed that 
microﬁ nance providers need to adopt better clientcentric policies and to measure the impact of 
their products on the welfare of clients. 
Microﬁ nance Donors and Investors. Despite the adverse context, investors in microﬁ nance have 
continued to support the industry but at a lower rate. Even during the ﬁ rst semester of 2009 micro-
ﬁ nance investment vehicle funds under management grew at an annualized rate of 16 percent. 
Retail-oriented private funds increased in 2009, demonstrating that the microﬁ nance sector remains 
attractive to private funding. The International Finance Corportation and KfW, the German devel-
opment bank, responded to the crisis by launching a Microﬁ nance Enhancement Facility designed 
to support sound microﬁ nance institutions facing funding shortfalls worldwide.
Loan Portfolio and Proﬁ tability Deterioration 
Sources: Median PAR drawn from sample of 50 Tier 1 MFIs. SYM50 from Symbiotics http://www.syminvest.com, 
CGAP 2009a.
 Toward Universal Access: Addressing the Global Challenge of Financial Inclusion  483
multiple loans, abusive MFI practices, and overconcentration of inves-
tors in small markets are to be closely monitored. 
Innovations for Scaling Up Microﬁ nance
Microfi nance is probably the socially responsible industry that has expe-
rienced the most development in terms of product and delivery innova-
tion. New products and services are emerging to promote fi nancial 
inclusion of low-income populations, moving beyond the credit only 
approach (for example, savings products, microinsurance, and govern-
ment to person payments). In particular, these products and services 
have tried to create new avenues to provide fi nancial services to the poor, 
strengthen the link between fi nancial services and more comprehensive 
measures of fi nancial inclusion, and empower the poor in their fi nancial 
lives by providing consumer protections and fi nancial capability. 
First, branchless banking represents a key delivery innovation that has 
broadened access to fi nancial services. Barriers such as distance to branches, 
cash crime, mistrust of fi nancial institutions, and the perception of being 
unwelcome in banks have impeded the poor from involvement in the tra-
ditional banking system. However, the recent expansion of cellular tech-
nology has given banking providers an unparalleled delivery channel for 
their services. Branchless banking—the delivery of fi nancial services out-
side of conventional bank branches by using information and communi-
cations technologies and nonbank retail agents—has shown promise for 
bringing fi nancial services to traditionally underserved markets. Given the 
reach of branchless banking, it has been employed as a delivery channel 
for products like conditional cash transfers. The convenience and lower 
costs of branchless banking have also been a boon for those seeking remit-
tance and other payment transfer savings. 
Second, initiatives to provide basic access to those at the very bottom 
of the pyramid have also gained momentum in recent years. These ini-
tiatives stem from the observation that traditional microfi nance does 
not reach the poorest members of a population, who often lack basic 
literacy skills and knowledge of money, which prevents them from using 
microfi nance. In addition, these individuals are often geographically 
isolated in rural environments, which compounds the challenge. An 
example of a program aimed at this issue is the CGAP-Ford Foundation 
Graduation Program, which focuses on providing tools for the poorest 
to graduate out of extreme poverty.32 The graduation model targets the 
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“ultra poor”—people who have no assets and are chronically food inse-
cure. The graduation program combines support for immediate needs 
with longer-term investments in training, fi nancial services, and busi-
ness development so that within two years program participants are 
equipped to help themselves “graduate” out of extreme poverty. 
Finally, information and communication technologies are also con-
tributing to expanding fi nancial access across the world, facilitating con-
nections between individual donors and poor people (person-to-person 
approach). Online marketplaces that connect individuals willing to 
donate or invest funds in intermediaries that channel funds to various 
undertakings of low-income people are becoming very popular (exam-
ples of such marketplaces are Kiva, Babyloan, MYC4, and Vittana). These 
are practical examples of how the goal of fi nancial inclusion can be sup-
ported with communications technology.
Endnotes
 1.  Note that the ordering of the stakeholders is not indicative of any priority order.
 2.  A snapshot for the FIEG pillar, which represents the ongoing work that origi-
nated from the G-20 Pittsburgh Summit, is not included; the details on work 
areas will be included in the FIEG G-20 Seoul Summit deliverables. 
 3.  Aligned with this estimate, an additional source that builds on datasets com-
piled from cross-country data sources on fi nancial access and socioeconomic 
and demographic characteristics fi nds that 2.5 billion adults do not use formal 
fi nancial services to save or borrow (Chaia and others 2009). 
 4.  World Bank Group 2009. 
 5.  A comprehensive review of the SME fi nance gap and its challenges, including an 
analysis of 163 cases of SME fi nance interventions compiled through a collective 
effort involving G-20 member countries, non-member countries, development 
fi nance institutions and private sector players, will be presented in the FIEG SME 
Finance Subgroup’s report to be delivered at the G-20 Seoul Summit in November.
 6.  Note that fi nancial depth is most often described or measured by the extent of 
private credit as a percentage of GDP. Financial development is broader, encom-
passing the development of the entire fi nancial sector. 
 7.  For a further discussion specifi cally related to the poor’s management of day-to-
day resources (benefi t 2), see Collins and others (2009), based on fi nancial dia-
ries conducted in Bangladesh, India, and South Africa.
 8.  The section is taken from Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Honohan (2009). 
 9.  Estimates of fi nancial infrastructure impact have been developed here based on 
data from several World Bank sources, including the Doing Business project, the 
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Global Payment Systems Survey, and the Remittance Prices Worldwide Data-
base, and from the IFC’s lending portfolio. 
 10.  Financial infrastructure is therefore part of the “soft” (intangible) infrastructure 
that consists of “institutions, regulations, social capital, value systems, and other 
social and economic arrangements.” In contrast, “hard” infrastructure consists 
of highways, port facilities, airports, telecommunication systems, electricity 
grids and other public utilities. For more detail, see Lin 2009. 
 11.  For a comprehensive account of the importance of collateral registries and 
secured transactions and the reform aspects of modernizing these mechanisms, 
see World Bank 2010c. 
 12.  Defi nition of remittance transfers are from World Bank/BIS, “General Principles 
for International Remittance Services.”
 13.  Child savings accounts teach asset building from a young age by providing free 
savings accounts to children at birth, often with the provision that the money 
cannot be withdrawn until a certain age. For more details on savings products 
and asset building (not exclusive to child savings), see Zimmerman and Baner-
jee 2009.
 14.  Such programs were fi rst popularized in Latin America and the Caribbean but 
have spread to Africa, Asia, and Europe. Although CCTs are still a relatively 
novel concept, evidence from Mexico’s Oportunidades program suggests that 
CCTs can increase savings and investment, promote banking, and create more 
responsible spending habits.
 15.  This paragraph relies on Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Honohan 2008 (p. 124, box 
3.6), with updates from Armendàriz and Morduch 2010 (ch. 7). 
 16.  For more information on the microfi nance crisis in these markets, see Chen, 
Rasmussen, and Reille (2010). 
 17.  For more information on the Social Performance Task Force, see http://www
.sptf.info. 
 18.  For a full list of campaign endorsers, see http://www.smartcampaign.org/about-
the-campaign/campaign-endorsers.
 19.  At the Alliance for Financial Inclusion First Annual Global Policy Forum, in 
Nairobi in 2009, the Bank of Thailand proposed to spearhead the effort of trans-
lating pressing policy questions into survey designs and working together with 
policy makers from many countries to pave the way for an international fi nan-
cial inclusion data platform.
 20.  The IMF “Access to Finance” data project is supported by Princess Máxima of 
the Netherlands, the UN special advocate, with the Netherlands providing fund-
ing for the fi rst project year. 
 21.  Announced in October 2009 (http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr 
09351.htm); the fi rst database was published online in June 2010. 
 22.  The Getting Credit ranking is composed of two measures: a measure of the legal 
rights of borrowers and lenders (the legal rights index), and a measure of the scope 
and quality of credit information systems (the depth of credit information index). 
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 23.  The database, available online, covers 178 country corridors worldwide origi-
nating from 24 major remittance sending countries to 85 receiving countries, 
representing around 60 percent of total remittances to emerging economies. The 
objectives of this database are to implement the General Principle 1 (from the 
General Principles for International Remittance Services issued by the Commit-
tee on Payment and Settlement Systems) on transparency and consumer protec-
tion and to provide a global benchmark to assess remittance price trends.
 24.  This annex was prepared by CGAP in April 2010 as background documentation 
for this report.
 25.  The ideas and aspirations behind microfi nance are not new. Small, informal 
savings and credit groups have operated for centuries across the world, from 
Ghana to Mexico to India and beyond. In Europe, as early as the 15th century, 
the Catholic Church founded pawn shops as an alternative to usurious money-
lenders. See http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.2715/Book_AccessforAll.pdf 
for more background. 
 26.  See CGAP work on graduation pilots for more information on borrowing con-
straints for the very poor. Microcredit is not always the answer. Other kinds of 
support may work better for people who are so destitute that they are without 
income or means of repayment.
 27.  http://www.microcapital.org/microcapital-story-indian-sks-microfinance-
plans-to-raise-13-billion-rupiah-usd-303-million-in-equity-possible-future-
ipo and “SKS Microfi nance Files for IPO”, Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2010: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487040941045751449242608833
44.html
 28. For a discussion on the impact of microfi nance, see Rosenberg 2010. 
 29.  Banerjee and others 2009; Karlan and Zinman 2009; and a meta-study of 
microloan impact evaluations through 2005 can be found in Goldberg 2005.
 30.  CGAP Focus Note: Growth and Vulnerability in Microfi nance. http://www.cgap
.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.9.42393/.
 31.  This pilot program is part of the CGAP-Ford Foundation Graduation Pro-
gram, a global effort to understand how safety nets, livelihoods, and microfi -
nance can be sequenced to create pathways for the poorest to escape from 
extreme poverty.
 32.  CGAP Brief, “Creating Pathways for the Poorest: Early Lessons on Implement-
ing the Graduation Model,” December 2009.
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Comments by Alfred Hannig
Alliance for Financial Inclusion
We at the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) believe that most of the 
successful policy solutions to increase access to fi nancial services for the 
poor have been innovated in developing countries. The recognition of 
fi nancial inclusion innovations spearheaded by developing-country pol-
icy makers from both G-20 and non-G-20 countries is therefore critical. 
We also welcome the particular emphasis the G-20 is putting on non-G-
20 developing countries.
We agree that peer learning, mutual exchange, and replication of suc-
cessful policy innovations play an increasingly fundamental role in 
expanding fi nancial inclusion within coordinated efforts of key stake-
holders.
For our members, AFI represents a global network or platform for 
peer learning. We would therefore urge some revision in the section 
regarding convening of key stakeholders. With regard to the suggested 
key working pillars, we would emphasize the following three pillars as 
the most relevant: policy environment, responsible fi nance/consumer 
focus, and data and measurement. This assessment is based on the fi nd-
ings of the recent AFI Financial Inclusion Policy Survey and the policy 
principles to be proposed by the G-20 Access though Innovation sub-
group.
Additional Lessons Learned
Additional lessons learned from the AFI Financial Inclusion Policy Sur-
vey can also help further inform this debate. Among the fi ndings:
•  There is a new openness and demand for technology solutions. Policy 
makers see the opportunities and want to familiarize themselves with 
the risk profi les of technology-enabled fi nancial services.
•  Public-private dialogue and consultation is critical for fostering 
access.
Comments on the paper “Toward Universal Access: Addressing the Global Challenge of 
Financial Inclusion,” by Peer Stein, Bikki Randhawa, and Nina Bilandzic in chapter 10 of 
this volume.
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•  Learning from the experience of others is most effective in spreading 
knowledge on what works. There are two-way learning opportunities, 
since policy makers often prefer to internalize messages from a mes-
senger facing similar realities, concerns, challenges, and pressures.
•  Developing countries increasingly move toward evidence-based pol-
icy through data for fi nancial inclusion and prefer to adopt self-set 
targets.
•  Developing-country demand can be roughly grouped into three cat-
egories: unlocking the knowledge of champions and experienced 
countries; providing opportunities for effective peer learning and for 
replication of successful solutions with modifi cation based on each 
country’s unique condition; and supporting capacity-building efforts 
of countries that are at the earlier stages of the learning cycle.
Polylateral Development
The emerging mode of collaboration in the fi nancial inclusion sphere 
refl ects the characteristics of a new development approach. We in AFI 
call this polylateral development. By polylateral development, we mean 
systematic and sustainable lateral fl ows of knowledge and resources 
among and led by developing countries, resulting in socioeconomic 
growth and development progress—and in our case specifi cally greater 
access to fi nance.
In the fi eld of fi nancial inclusion, we have seen successful examples 
over the years of peer-learning and South-to-South knowledge exchange 
in other fi elds. But polylateral development from AFI’s perspective is the 
comprehensive combination of several modes of delivery, some new and 
some not so new. The key success factor is that the developing country 
itself is in the driver’s seat, determining which activities it would like to 
undertake and for what purpose.
AFI is a living example of polylateral development in action. How 
does AFI bring polylateral development to life?
•  AFI has a country-led governance structure and membership base 
forming a global network focused on fi nancial inclusion. 
•  Activities and initiatives are not imposed on individual countries or 
the wider network; instead the countries must request and demand 
activities and operations. 
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•  AFI recognizes that developing countries have innovated some of the 
most successful solutions relating to increased fi nancial inclusion but 
that these experiences are often not widely available.
•  AFI has created a sustainable platform and conduit for developing 
countries to share their experiences and learn from each other so that 
solutions can be adapted or replicated by their peers through face-to-
face meetings and online knowledge exchange—and are supported by 
grants that the countries themselves request.
Possible Action Steps 
Let me conclude with three remarks regarding possible action items that 
the G-20 could take against the background of this approach:
We welcome the suggested Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion 
that lays out the way countries can act together in collaboration with the 
private sector to achieve sustainable and balanced growth through fi nan-
cial inclusion. Inherent in the design should be empowerment for emerg-
ing and developing countries.
The G-20 should create a global funding mechanism under the Global 
Partnership for Financial Inclusion. To create a funding mechanism that 
can serve the different needs of countries in a most effective way, the 
G-20 should call for self-set fi nancial inclusion targets among develop-
ing countries (G-20 and non-G-20 countries), which can be combined 
and used as global targets by 2020.
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Comments by Yongbeom Kim
Presidential Committee for the G-20 Seoul Summit 
Building on discussions that have already taken place regarding access to 
fi nance, the purpose of these comments is to focus discussions on why 
fi nancial inclusion should be a key agenda item for the G-20 this year.
Financial Inclusion Leads to Balanced Economic Growth
Financial inclusion is important because it leads to balanced eco-
nomic growth. As clearly articulated by the G-20 leaders in Pittsburgh, 
strong, sustained, and balanced economic growth is essential to ensure 
continued global economic recovery in the short term and durable 
global economic prosperity for all in the longer term. In this context, 
the potential for economic growth is maximized when existing 
resources are effi ciently and optimally allocated. At the same time, to 
achieve balanced growth, the current underserved population must 
have an opportunity to access and make use of the available resources 
in a safe environment. This will enable the poor to contribute to the 
overall growth. 
Financial Inclusion Facilitates Innovation
Financial inclusion also facilitates innovation. Innovation, often led by 
entrepreneurs and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) especially in 
the developing economies, is one of the key drivers of enhanced pro-
ductivity and growth. However, it is also these individuals and SMEs 
who often lack the credit history or collateral to secure fi nancing for 
those ideas and innovations. At the same time, various studies have 
shown that these segments of the population are very much in need of 
a safe place to save. An inclusive fi nancial system that goes beyond credit 
and includes access to a broad range of appropriate fi nancial services is 
one of the key conditions to unlocking the huge potential of currently 
untapped growth. 
Comments on the paper “Toward Universal Access: Addressing the Global Challenge of 
Financial Inclusion,” by Peer Stein, Bikki Randhawa, and Nina Bilandzic in chapter 10 of 
this volume.
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Financial Inclusion Facilitates Better Use of Existing Assets
There is also a substantial body of literature showing that fi nancial inclu-
sion is a cornerstone for economic development.1 For example, Her-
nando de Soto, in The Mystery of Capital, points out that the failure to 
achieve sustained and robust economic growth in many underdeveloped 
countries stems not so much from lack of resources but more from the 
lack of a cohesive legal and regulatory framework. This creates diffi cul-
ties in using existing assets to fi nance new projects. What is needed to 
facilitate economic growth in underdeveloped countries is not more 
capital but the transformation of so-called “dead assets” into “liquid 
capital” to provide better access to fi nance.
Financial Inclusion Provides the Counterbalance 
to Stricter Financial Regulation
Finally, fi nancial inclusion provides the counterbalance required against 
the tightening of fi nancial regulation that is currently under way. In 
response to the recent crisis, national regulators and international stand-
ard setters have been concentrating their efforts in tightening fi nancial 
regulations. However, there has also been some fundamental rethinking 
of the role of the governments in fi nance provision. This has provided 
opportunities to advance policy reforms aimed at increasing fi nancial 
inclusion. It is crucial to maintain the goal of fi nancial inclusion at a 
time when stricter regulation is being introduced so that the overall 
fi nancial system can balance the need for greater stability with the need 
to ensure greater accessibility. It is in this context that fi nancial inclusion 
is a timely issue for global discussion and coordinated international 
actions. There are many reasons why fi nancial inclusion is important to 
the G-20 and the global economy. 
How Financial Inclusion Can Be Improved
There is a need to increase the reach of traditional fi nancial services 
through development of a multilayered fi nancial industry architecture. 
A more nuanced and specialized market structure is needed that allows 
large, medium, and small banks and nonbank fi nancial institutions, 
such as credit unions and building societies, to cater to customers of 
different income brackets with affordable and tailor-made fi nancial 
products.2
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To make this happen, governments must establish appropriate com-
petition and licensing policies for the fi nancial industry, as well as more 
effective supervision. They must also determine the right manner in 
which access to fi nance should be broadened, taking care not to increase 
moral hazard and imprudent lending practices. 
Korea’s Example of Increasing Access to Finance
The Republic of Korea has had valuable experience in broadening access 
to fi nance for those in need. Since the 1970s Korea experienced rapid 
economic development and throughout this period, it has implemented 
various policy measures to increase SMEs’ access to fi nance. For exam-
ple, the Korean government established a program in 1976 to extend 
credit guarantees to SMEs that demonstrate growth potential but lack 
collateral. As of April 2010 credit guarantees were extended to 220,000 
SMEs, for a total value of US$33 billion.
Korea is also working hard to enhance low-income households’ access 
to fi nance. The Korea Post has been providing microinsurance services, 
and a Microcredit Bank was launched last year to support those who 
have minimal access to fi nance. 
Why Financial Inclusion Should Be on the G-20 Agenda 
The fi nancial inclusion issues are best addressed at the G-20 level because 
the G-20 is the premier forum on international economic cooperation. 
It is currently exploring various policy options to bring the global econ-
omy closer to the objectives of strong, sustainable, and balanced growth. 
On top of this, Korea is fi rmly determined to set development as one of 
the key agenda items for the G-20 Seoul Summit. Financial inclusion 
perfectly complements our growth-oriented approach on development, 
which is why Korea is so committed to this issue. 
By bringing the issue of inclusive fi nance to the G-20 table, Korea 
hopes to foster international cooperation to overcome common diffi -
culties in designing and implementing necessary reforms—at both 
national and multinational levels—to increase fi nancial inclusion in a 
responsible and effective manner. The World Bank’s proposal to estab-
lish a Collaborative Diamond Model for Financial Inclusion 2.0 and to 
launch a global partnership for fi nancial inclusion is an excellent exam-
ple of fostering international cooperation. The Bank’s efforts should be 
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commended. Similarly, Korea will also seek active participation of non-
G-20 countries through networks such as the Alliance for Financial 
Inclusion and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, to maximize 
the impact of global initiatives on fi nancial inclusions. We hope that the 
G-20 Seoul Summit will serve as an important stepping stone in realiz-
ing these important initiatives.
Korea is committed to ensuring meaningful dialogue and, ultimately, 
to achieving concrete deliverables to increase fi nancial inclusion at the 
Seoul Summit. 
Notes
 1.  Rajan and Zingales (2003) explain that capital accessibility is a critical factor to 
higher production capacity. They explain that the differences in national wealth 
and how well capitalism settles in a system depend on how much of a strangle-
hold the establishment, such as large banks, has on capital fl ow. If access to 
capital is limited, low-income individuals, who have only hard labor as their 
production factor, would be left with no means to raise capital to enhance their 
production capacity. They must put in a hard day’s labor just to survive. If they 
had easier access to capital they could use in their production activities, they 
would be able to lay the foundation for stable economic growth. This is why the 
discussion on access to fi nance is so relevant.
 2. See Lin, Sun, and Jiang (2009) for a good survey of this point. 
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Chair’s Summary by Princess Máxima of the 
Netherlands
UN Secretary-General’s Special Advocate for Inclusive Finance for Development
Financial inclusion was cited as a critically important component of sta-
bility, equitable economic growth, and poverty reduction. Financial 
inclusion means universal access, at a reasonable cost, to a wide range of 
fi nancial services for everyone needing them, provided by a diversity of 
sound and sustainable institutions. Two-thirds of the adult population 
in developing countries (2.7 billion people) lack access to basic formal 
fi nancial services. A similar gap in access impacts small and medium 
enterprise (SMEs), which are engines of job creation and growth.
Opening
I commended the G-20 for its leadership on fi nancial inclusion. At the 
Pittsburgh Summit, the G-20 leaders recognized the huge impact that 
the gap in access has on households, businesses, and economies around 
the world. They mandated a Financial Inclusion Experts Group to iden-
tify lessons learned about innovative approaches for improving access 
and to focus on access by SMEs. Innovations in the fi eld are already dras-
tically reducing the costs of delivery and creating products catering to 
the unbanked. Services like M-Pesa in Kenya, which uses mobile phones 
to make payments and deposit small savings, demonstrate that fi nancial 
services that poor individuals and businesses need can be delivered in an 
affordable and sustainable manner. I stressed the need to talk in a com-
mon language that creates a continuum of access to fi nance across the 
value chain, from individuals through microenterprises to SMEs, and 
the need to engage all the stakeholders who can help to improve access. 
Presenter
Peer Stein, gave an overview of fi nancial inclusion. Empirical evidence 
suggests that improved access is pro-growth and pro-poor. Financial 
Comments on the paper “Toward Universal Access: Addressing the Global Challenge of 
Financial Inclusion,” by Peer Stein, Bikki Randhawa, and Nina Bilandzic in chapter 10 of 
this volume.
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inclusion needs to go beyond credit: there is a near-universal need for 
safe and secure savings and payment products and international remit-
tance payment systems. While several emerging markets have demon-
strated national commitment and urgency to advancing inclusion, more 
remains to be done, especially at the global level. Inclusion needs to 
leverage all service providers, as well as recent innovations that deliver 
services outside bank branches. Financial inclusion must happen in a 
responsible manner, with appropriate consumer protection regulations, 
industry practices, and fi nancial literacy efforts. To make progress and 
build the foundations for sustainable growth, the presenter recom-
mended that the G-20 convene a global partnership with the relevant 
stakeholders around a common global fi nancial goal. Implementation 
would focus on policies, fi nancial infrastructure, delivery mechanisms, 
products, responsible fi nance, and data. The G-20 is in a unique posi-
tion to bring together major drivers of fi nance—the fi nancial services 
industry, national governments, the global development community, 
and centers for knowledge sharing—and complement implementation 
with political and policy leadership and the creation of a funding mech-
anism to support different needs of countries. 
Discussants
Alfred Hannig,  agreed on the importance of peer learning and involving 
non-G-20 countries and other stakeholders. AFI’s experience points to 
an increasing openness and demand for technology solutions and for 
knowledge sharing, especially from country champions such as Brazil, 
Kenya, and the Philippines. He emphasized the importance of policies, 
consumer protection, and data and measurement. Drawing on insights 
from an AFI survey, Dr. Haning recommended a new “polylateral devel-
opment” approach. Possible actions include fi nancial inclusion targets 
self-set by countries and new funding mechanisms that can serve the 
different needs of countries.
Yongbeom Kim, underscored the importance of fi nancial inclusion 
in the G-20 context of recovery, fi nancial stability and economic growth, 
and the way forward to the Seoul Summit. He stressed the role of gov-
ernment and the policy environment and shared insights from the 
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Korean experience on microinsurance. Mr. Kim concluded by welcoming 
the idea of the global partnership for fi nancial inclusion, and ensured 
Korea’s full commitment in delivering concrete outcomes at the Seoul 
Summit. 
Key Issues Raised in Discussion
•  The role of the G-20. The G-20 is in a unique position to compel action 
by convening stakeholders, providing political and policy support for 
national goals, and providing adequate resources for fi nancial infra-
structure, technical assistance, and peer-to-peer learning. The G-20 
should focus on issues that need strong international cooperation 
and leadership, including monitoring overall progress, and not dupli-
cate existing efforts. 
•  The role of government. Governments can advance inclusion through 
policies, regulations, and the enabling environment, and by support-
ing innovative business models. Public-private partnerships are key 
to advancing the fi nancial inclusion agenda. 
•  Inclusion goals. Bottom-up and top-town approaches to target-setting 
have different advantages to motivate progress. Many global targets have 
faced diffi culties in implementation. To be successful, implementation 
requires country-specifi c targets and working groups, coordination and 
engagement of all stakeholders, conducive policy environments, and 
funding.
•  Approaches for advancing fi nancial inclusion. Diversity of approaches 
and delivery means is essential. Solutions need to be sustainable and 
provide accessible and affordable fi nancial products that poor clients 
and SMEs need. 
•  Best practices and learning. There was widespread agreement that 
developing a successful global mechanism for cross-country learning 
is important. 
Concluding the session by underscoring the importance of G-20 
leadership, I noted that fi nancial inclusion requires long-term commit-
ment by all the stakeholders. The policy environment, public-private 
partnerships, and funds to support infrastructure and peer learning are 
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all important for advancing inclusion. Three issues merit particular 
attention: savings, rural fi nance, and insurance. I reminded advocates 
to engage all the stakeholders who can deliver these and other needed 
services and improve fi nancial inclusion, including policy makers, fi nan-
cial institutions of all kinds, mobile phone operators, the rural sector, 
investors, multilateral agencies, and nongovernmental organizations.
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Appendix A 
Matrix of Proposed Policy 








Based on the Korea-World Bank High Level Conference on Postcrisis Growth and Development
Pillar Proposal Explanation
Aid for Trade Bolster monitoring and evaluation 
of the effectiveness of aid for 
trade
Create a G-20 “strategic action plan” to provide dedicated ﬁ nancial support for a concerted 
program of monitoring and evaluation of aid for trade anchored in systematic data 
collection and research.
Complete Doha Development 
Round negotiations
Complete the Doha Development Round before moving on to a new trade agenda. 
Reaching an agreement would improve market access, strengthen the international 
trading system, constrain future increases in tariffs and subsidies, and provide a needed 
boost to keep international markets open. 
Extend duty-free, quota-free 
trade access to least-developed 
countries with liberal rules of 
origin
Complement the ﬁ nancial aid for trade provided by high-income G-20 members with 
market access reform by middle-income G-20 members to lower barriers to exports from 
poor countries so as to expand South-South trade. Extending duty-free, quota-free 
access for least-developed countries to all G-20 members, with minimal exceptions, 
would constitute a concrete initiative that would directly promote the trade and 
development prospects of the poorest countries in the world.
Establish a platform for capacity 
building and transfer of knowl-
edge
Establish a G-20 platform for capacity building and transfer of knowledge on policies and 
regulatory options to improve the efﬁ ciency of producer services and the operation of 
network infrastructure. A coordinated program of assistance and knowledge exchange 
could do much to increase the rate of return on aid-for-trade investments in hard 
infrastructure by creating a mechanism for strengthening capacity to put in place the 
associated complementary “software” inputs.
Harness the private sector as a 
source of knowledge, capital, and 
information and create a new “aid 
for trade public-private partner-
ship”
Create a new “aid-for-trade public-private partnership” to leverage the dynamism in the 
private sector for strengthening trade capacity in the countries that most need it. The 
World Bank is developing a new Public-Private Partnership on Aid for Trade Facilitation as 
a platform for an exchange of information and learning in the area of trade facilitation. 
A broader effort along such lines could be considered by the G-20. 
Improve data collection Launch a G-20 strategic global initiative to provide dedicated ﬁ nancial support for the 
collection of cross-country data sets that will allow more effective monitoring and 
evaluation of aid for trade.
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Support regional cooperation 
and integration of markets
The G-20 can make directly support regional integration through knowledge exchange and 
capacity building led by the middle-income developing countries. Working with 
established regional groups, the G-20 can place new emphasis on knowledge transfer to 




Facilitate more infrastructure 
investment
Increase ﬁ scal space for public investment through improved revenue collection and lower 
subsidy expenditures; expand private and other investments to complement the public 
sector through improvements in investment climate, as well as access to new sources of 
ﬁ nance and nondistorting risk sharing, including potential investment by national wealth 
funds, without impinging on national sovereignty.
Encourage better infrastructure Increased and better-targeted infrastructure investments are badly needed both to achieve 
development objectives and to move toward cleaner, lower-carbon, and more 
resource-efﬁ cient economies.
Support cleaner infrastructure Striking the appropriate balance between environmental beneﬁ ts and costs in planning 
infrastructure investments depends on a number of complementary policy issues. These 
include establishment of sound environmental performance standards and the removal 
of environmentally damaging subsidies that affect infrastructure demands (especially in 
energy and water). Enact subsidy reforms to reduce environmental impacts and lower 
barriers to access to green technologies.
Develop an action plan for 
increasing public and private 
ﬁ nancing of infrastructure, 
as well as improving its 
efﬁ ciency
Develop an action plan for increasing public and private ﬁ nancing of infrastructure, as well 
as improving its efﬁ ciency and environmental sustainability. Key components of the 
action plan would include increasing public sector ﬁ scal space; improving the investment 
climate for private sector ﬁ nancing and reducing its cost; and better incorporating 
environmental costs and beneﬁ ts into infrastructure investment planning. A particular 
focus should be on regional infrastructure. 
Develop an action plan for 
providing increased technical 
and ﬁ nancial assistance to 
improve infrastructure efﬁ ciency
Develop an action plan for providing increased technical and ﬁ nancial assistance to develop-
ing countries in their efforts to improve infrastructure efﬁ ciency, enhance investment 
climate, and integrate environmental with economic concerns. A platform for enhanced 








Promote collaborative efforts to 
increase and improve collection 
and sharing of data on infrastruc-
ture investment and its impacts
Promote collaborative efforts to collect and share data on infrastructure coverage and 
quality as well as on investments and their impact. A detailed methodology has been 
developed and ﬁ eld tested in the context of the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnos-
tics that was launched after the G-8 Gleneagles summit of 2005. And the IMF’s 
government ﬁ nancial statistics are being revised and could be modiﬁ ed to include 
information relevant to infrastructure concerns.
Food Security Conclude Doha Development 
Round negotiations
Successful conclusion of the Doha Round of trade negotiations is essential for lowering 
cereal price volatility and ensuring long-term food security. Competitive markets lower 
the cost of basic staples to consumers and also provide a variety of food types that 
permit, if not ensure, dietary diversity. At the global level, a comprehensive and ambitious 
conclusion of the Doha Development Agenda would strengthen the international trading 
system, considered essential for lowering cereal price volatility and long-term food 
security. From the food security perspective, grain-based biofuel mandates, export bans 
on cereals, and similar policy interventions that reduce the ability of international markets 
to stabilize domestic markets in import-dependent countries should be on the agenda 
for discussion.
Strengthen multilateral approach Greater multilateral action is needed to improve aid effectiveness in the agriculture and 
food area. There is no standing bilateral or multilateral pool of sectorally targeted capital 
available to adequately support and complement what countries are asking donors as a 
group to do for agriculture and food security. The Global Agriculture and Food Security 
Program was recently created for this purpose. 
Review organizational mandates Review mandates of organizations working on food security with a view toward improving 
overall governance. Consider establishing supragovernance body that could direct global 
response.
Invest in access, safety nets, and 
nutrition programs that are 
essential for food security
Invest in the safety nets and nutrition programs that are essential for food security. 
Vulnerable individuals require special attention to ensure that they are able to consume a 
sufﬁ ciently nutritious diet. Interventions to increase female income, including through 
access to safety net programs, have been shown to be effective at achieving a better 
quality of diet for children in the household, especially the provision of fortiﬁ ed foods.













Invest in agricultural productivity 
growth to ensure food availability 
and stability
More investment is needed in agricultural productivity growth to improve climate resilience 
and supply. For major cereals like rice, wheat, and maize, the growth rates of yields in 
developing countries have slowed considerably since the 1980s. The International Food 
Policy Research Institute estimated the global incremental public investment in 
agriculture required—the additional amount necessary to meet the MDGs by 2015—to 
be US$14 billion annually for all developing countries.
Inclusive Finance Go beyond access to credit Financial inclusion needs to go beyond credit: there is a near-universal need for safe and 
secure savings and payment products and a high demand for insurance and international 
remittance payment systems.
Convene a global partnership 
around a common global ﬁ nancial 
goal
The G-20 should consider convening a global partnership with the relevant stakeholders 
around a common global ﬁ nancial goal. The efforts should focus not only on credit but 
also on a range of ﬁ nancial products: payments, savings, remittances, and insurance. The 
target would step up pressure to close existing data gaps—in particular the SME ﬁ nance 
gap and policy related indicators—ensuring that the basic elements are in place to 
measure progress against the target on an annual basis. Key implementation pillars will 
include the policy environment, ﬁ nancial infrastructure, delivery mechanisms and 
products responsible ﬁ nance, data and measurement and will build on progress made by 
the Financial Inclusion Experts Group. 
Close gaps in data on ﬁ nancial 
inclusion
Step up pressure to close existing data gaps—in particular the SME ﬁ nance gap and 
policy-related indicators—ensuring that the basic elements are in place to measure 
progress against the target on an annual basis. Financial inclusion data are critical in 
supporting evidence-based policy making, helping inform the prioritization of efforts, 








G-20 and Global 
Development
Test innovative ﬁ nancing 
approaches
The tighter outlook for private capital ﬂ ows and the ﬁ scal stress in donor countries imply 
the need for supplementing traditional ﬁ nancing with innovative forms of ﬁ nance. These 
include, for example, risk-mitigation guarantees; sovereign wealth fund investments; 
innovations that support global public goods in health; public-private partnerships in 
development-linked global programs, such as for food security; carbon ﬁ nance; and 
South-South investments. The scale of resource needs calls for both a renewed 
commitment by G-20 members to key global programs and renewed vigor and creativity 
in exploiting the potential of innovative approaches that leverage private capital.
Improve public resource 
management and investment 
climate in developing countries
The ﬁ nancing outlook also implies the need for stronger domestic resource mobilization by 
developing countries, including continued efforts to improve public resource manage-
ment and the climate for private investment. There is a need to strengthen developing 
countries’ own ﬁ nancial systems. Expanded technical and capacity-building assistance to 
ﬁ nancial sector reforms in developing countries can be a key area for G-20 collective 
action. It is also important to ensure that ﬁ nancial system regulatory reforms in advanced 
economies do not have unintended adverse effects on ﬁ nancial ﬂ ows to developing 
countries.
Refrain from enacting 
protectionist measures
G-20 leaders can boost market conﬁ dence by renewing their commitment to refrain from 
protectionist measures. An even stronger signal would be a collective pledge to unwind 
the protectionist measures that have been put in place since the onset of the crisis.













Table B1. G-20 and Non–G-20 Countries at a Glance, 2008
millions
Gross national income Gross domestic product per capita
 thousands of 
square kilometers
billions of current 
U.S. dollars
Purchasing power parity 
(billions of current 




G-20 1 4,120 46,281 51,728 11,164 12,512 75,446
High Income 825 34,744 31,921 41,577 38,204 29,832
Australia 21 969 798 47,370 38,784 7,682
Canada 33 1,487 1,290 45,070 39,078 9,094
France 62 2,876 2,136 44,508 33,058 548
Germany 82 3,709 2,952 44,446 35,374 349
Italy 60 2,268 1,843 38,492 31,283 294
Japan 128 5,063 4,494 38,455 34,129 365
Korea, Republic 49 935 1,353 19,115 27,658 97
Saudi Arabia 25 479 604 19,022 23,991 2,000
United Kingdom 61 2,732 2,225 43,541 35,468 242
United States 304 14,227 14,227 46,350 46,350 9,162
European Union 497 18,245 15,147 36,705 30,544 4,181
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Argentina 40 321 558 8,236 14,313 2,737
Brazil 192 1,540 1,934 8,205 10,304 8,459
China 1,325 4,358 7,967 3,267 5,971 9,327
India 1,140 1,153 3,342 1,017 2,946 2,973
Indonesia 227 460 818 2,246 3,994 1,812
Mexico 106 1,071 1,525 10,232 14,570 1,944
Russian Federation 142 1,630 2,194 11,832 15,923 16,378
South Africa 49 268 477 5,678 10,116 1,214
Turkey 74 735 992 9,942 13,417 770
Memo item: G-7 2 731 32,361 29,166 43,662 39,368 20,052
Non–G-20 2,577 14,074 17,533 5,650 7,006 54,166
High Income 243 8,535 7,828 36,956 33,461 3,722
Developing Countries 2,334 5,668 10,061 2,408 4,371 50,443
Middle Income 1,358 5,094 8,746 3,714 6,547 31,711
Low Income 976 558 1,323 578 1,352 18,732
Source: World Development Indicators.
Notes: The income classiﬁ cation used corresponds to the World Bank July 2010 classiﬁ cation.
1. The G-20 aggregate excludes the European Union.







Table B2. Share in the World Economy
Gross domestic product (% of world)
In constant 2000 U.S. dollars In constant PPP international 2005 dollars
Average Years Average Years
1980s 1990s 2000s 1980 1990 2000 2008 1980s 1990s 2000s 1980 1990 2000 2008
G-20 1 79.9 81.7 80.9 79.5 81.7 81.4 80.2 69.1 75.1 74.8 68.2 74.6 75.3 74.3
High Income 70.6 70.1 66.8 70.5 70.9 68.9 63.7 53.8 53.7 49.5 54.1 54.0 52.6 45.6
 Australia 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2
 Canada 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.1 1.9
 France 4.7 4.3 4.0 4.8 4.5 4.1 3.8 4.1 3.8 3.4 4.2 4.0 3.6 3.1
 Germany 6.5 6.3 5.5 6.9 6.4 5.9 5.2 5.8 5.7 4.8 6.2 5.7 5.3 4.3
 Italy 4.0 3.7 3.2 4.2 3.9 3.4 2.9 3.9 3.6 3.0 4.0 3.8 3.3 2.6
 Japan 16.1 16.3 13.8 15.7 17.0 14.6 12.8 8.5 8.6 7.0 8.3 9.0 7.6 6.2
 Korea 0.9 1.5 1.8 0.7 1.2 1.7 1.9 1.0 1.7 1.9 0.8 1.4 1.8 1.9
 Saudi Arabia 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.3 0.9 0.9 0.8
 UK 4.9 4.6 4.6 4.9 4.8 4.6 4.4 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.3
 US 29.3 29.5 29.8 28.8 29.1 30.5 28.6 22.3 22.6 21.9 22.0 22.3 23.1 20.2
European Union 28.1 27.1 25.7 29.1 28.1 26.5 24.7 26.2 26.0 23.7 27.2 27.0 25.1 22.1
Developing Countries 9.3 11.6 14.1 9.0 10.8 12.5 16.4 15.3 21.4 25.3 14.1 20.6 22.7 28.7
 Argentina 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.2 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 1.1 0.7 0.8 0.8
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 China 1.4 2.8 5.0 1.0 1.8 3.7 6.5 2.7 5.2 9.0 2.0 3.5 7.1 11.4
 India 1.0 1.3 1.7 0.9 1.1 1.4 2.0 2.5 3.2 4.2 2.3 2.9 3.7 4.8
 Indonesia 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.2 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.3
 Mexico 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.7 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.7 2.3 2.5 2.2
 Russian Federation 1.7 1.0 0.9 .. 1.6 0.8 1.1 5.5 3.4 2.9 .. 5.2 2.6 3.2
 South Africa 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7
 Turkey 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4
Memo item: G-7 2 67.8 66.8 63.1 67.7 67.9 65.4 59.9 50.6 49.9 45.5 50.8 50.5 48.7 41.6
Non–G-20 20.1 18.3 19.1 20.5 18.3 18.6 19.8 30.9 24.9 25.2 31.8 25.4 24.7 25.7
High Income 12.0 12.0 12.4 12.2 11.9 12.3 12.4 12.0 11.9 11.9 12.3 11.9 12.1 11.5
Developing Countries 8.1 6.3 6.8 8.2 6.3 6.3 7.5 19.1 13.3 13.6 19.5 13.8 12.9 14.6
 Middle Income 7.3 5.6 6.0 7.5 5.6 5.6 6.6 17.5 11.7 11.9 17.9 12.2 11.3 12.7
 Low Income 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.9
World 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: World Development Indicators.
Notes: The income classiﬁ cation used corresponds to the World Bank July 2010 classiﬁ cation.
1. The G-20 aggregate excludes the European Union.







Table B3. Economic Growth
 Gross domestic product % growtha
In constant 2000 US$ In constant 2005 US$ In constant PPP international 2005 dollars
Average Years Average Years
1980s 1990s 2000s 2006 2007 2008 2009 1980s 1990s 2000s 2006 2007 2008
G-20 1 3.3 2.7 2.8 3.8 3.5 1.5 –2.1 4.3 2.8 3.7 4.8 4.8 2.7
High Income 3.0 2.5 2.1 2.8 2.3 0.2 –3.3 3.1 2.6 2.2 2.7 2.4 0.5
 Australia 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.0 3.3 2.4 1.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.0 3.3 3.7
 Canada 3.0 2.4 2.7 2.8 2.7 0.4 –2.6 3.1 2.4 2.7 3.1 2.7 0.4
 France 2.3 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.2 0.1 –2.5 2.4 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.3 0.4
 Germany 2.0 2.3 1.4 2.9 2.5 1.0 –4.9 2.0 2.3 1.4 3.0 2.5 1.3
 Italy 2.6 1.4 1.2 1.8 1.5 –1.3 –5.1 2.5 1.4 1.2 2.0 1.6 –1.0
 Japan 3.7 1.5 1.5 2.4 2.1 –1.2 –5.2 3.8 1.5 1.5 2.0 2.4 –0.7
 Korea, Republic 7.7 6.3 4.8 5.2 5.1 2.3 0.2 8.7 6.3 4.8 5.2 5.1 2.2
 Saudi Arabia –0.6 3.1 3.9 3.2 3.3 4.3 0.1 –1.4 3.1 3.9 3.2 3.3 4.4
 United Kingdom 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.9 3.0 0.5 –4.9 3.0 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.0 0.7
 United States 3.1 3.1 2.3 2.9 2.0 0.4 –2.4 3.4 3.1 2.3 2.8 2.0 0.4
European Union 2.5 2.4 2.2 3.1 2.9 0.6 –4.2 2.5 2.6 2.3 3.3 3.1 1.0
Developing Countries 5.7 3.9 6.5 8.1 8.6 6.1 2.3 8.3 3.4 6.8 8.6 9.1 6.4
 Argentina –0.7 4.5 3.9 8.5 8.7 7.0 –1.2 –1.3 4.5 3.9 8.5 8.7 6.8
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 China 9.8 10.0 10.0 11.6 13.0 9.6 8.7 10.0 10.0 10.0 11.6 13.0 9.0
 India 5.7 5.6 7.1 9.7 9.1 5.1 7.7 5.6 5.6 7.1 9.7 9.1 6.1
 Indonesia 6.4 4.8 5.2 5.5 6.3 6.0 4.5 6.1 4.8 5.2 5.5 6.3 6.1
 Mexico 2.3 3.4 2.8 4.8 3.2 1.8 –6.5 1.5 3.4 2.8 4.8 3.2 1.8
 Russian Federation .. –4.9 6.9 7.4 8.1 5.6 –7.9 .. –4.9 6.9 7.7 8.1 5.6
 South Africa 2.2 1.4 4.1 5.6 5.5 3.7 –1.8 1.7 1.4 4.1 5.3 5.1 3.1
 Turkey 4.1 4.0 4.7 6.9 4.6 0.7 –4.7 4.8 4.0 4.7 6.9 4.7 0.9
Memo item: G-7 2 3.0 2.4 2.0 2.7 2.2 0.1 –3.5 3.1 2.4 2.0 2.6 2.2 0.3
Non–G-20 2.0 2.9 3.8 4.9 4.9 2.4 –2.1 0.8 2.4 4.4 5.7 5.7 3.2
High Income 2.9 3.0 3.2 4.2 4.1 1.4 –3.2 2.8 2.9 3.4 4.6 4.3 1.1
Developing Countries 0.8 2.7 5.0 6.7 6.7 4.7 0.4 –0.2 2.0 5.4 6.7 7.0 5.1
 Middle Income 0.6 2.6 4.9 6.7 6.7 4.6 0.1 –0.4 1.9 5.3 6.7 6.9 5.0
 Low Income 3.5 3.1 5.6 6.3 6.1 5.8 4.4 3.5 3.1 5.9 6.4 6.9 6.2
World 3.0 2.7 3.0 4.0 3.8 1.7 –2.1 3.2 2.6 3.9 5.0 5.0 2.8
Source: World Development Indicators. Growth rate for years 2006–2009 in constant 2005 US$ from World Bank Development Prospects group.
Notes: The income classiﬁ cation used corresponds to the World Bank July 2010 classiﬁ cation.
a. Growth rates are computed as the percent difference in GDP between two consecutive years.
1. The G-20 aggregate excludes the European Union.







Table B4. Integration with the Global Economy
Share of world merchandise exports
% of world
current U.S. dollars




1980 1990 2000 2008 1980 1990 2000 2008
G-20 1 60.6 62.7 62.3 59.2 76.6 66.3 59.7 58.6
High Income 54.5 56.1 50.4 40.6 67.1 61.0 52.9 38.0
 Australia 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.2 3.5 4.0 0.9 2.6
 Canada 3.4 3.7 4.3 2.8 10.8 3.7 4.4 2.5
 France 5.8 6.2 5.1 3.8 6.1 6.5 2.8 5.5
 Germany 10.6 12.1 8.5 9.1 0.6 1.5 13.8 1.2
 Italy 3.9 4.9 3.7 3.3 1.1 3.1 0.9 0.8
 Japan 6.5 8.3 7.4 4.9 0.5 0.9 0.5 1.3
 Korea, Republic 0.9 1.9 2.7 2.6 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.1
 Saudi Arabia 5.5 1.3 1.2 2.0 -5.9 0.9 -0.1 1.2
 United Kingdom 5.5 5.3 4.4 2.8 18.8 16.4 8.0 5.1
 United States 11.3 11.3 12.1 8.1 31.5 23.7 21.1 17.5
European Union 41.1 44.5 38.0 36.7 40.0 47.9 55.1 37.4
Developing Countries 6.2 6.5 11.9 18.5 9.5 5.3 6.8 20.6
 Argentina 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.3 0.9 0.7 0.5
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 China 0.9 1.8 3.9 8.9 0.1 1.7 2.5 8.1
 India 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 2.3
 Indonesia 1.1 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.5 -0.3 0.5
 Mexico 0.9 1.2 2.6 1.8 3.9 1.2 1.2 1.2
 Russian Federation .. .. 1.6 2.9 .. .. 0.2 4.0
 South Africa 1.3 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5
 Turkey 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.0 0.3 0.1 1.0
Memo item: G-7 2 47.0 51.9 45.6 34.8 69.5 55.8 51.6 34.0
Non G-20 39.4 37.3 37.7 40.8 23.4 33.7 40.3 41.4
High Income 23.9 27.0 27.8 28.0 16.1 27.4 36.5 29.2
Developing Countries 15.9 10.1 9.9 12.9 7.3 6.3 3.7 12.2
 Middle Income 14.9 9.4 9.1 11.9 6.4 5.7 3.4 10.7
 Low Income 1.0 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.3 1.5
World 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: World Development Indicators.
Notes: The income classiﬁ cation used corresponds to the World Bank July 2010 classiﬁ cation.
1. The G-20 aggregate excludes the European Union.







Table B5. Population Size and Child Mortality
Population
% of world
Under-ﬁ ve mortality rate
per 1,000 live births
Years Years
1980 1990 2000 2008 1990 2000 2008
G-20 1 65.7 64.3 63.0 61.5 68 55 39
High Income 15.2 13.8 12.9 12.3 11 8 7
 Australia 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 9 6 6
 Canada 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 8 6 6
 France 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 9 5 4
 Germany 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.2 9 5 4
 Italy 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.9 10 6 4
 Japan 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 6 5 4
 Korea, Republic 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 9 6 5
 Saudi Arabia 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 43 23 21
 United Kingdom 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.9 9 7 6
 United States 5.1 4.7 4.6 4.5 11 8 8
European Union 10.3 8.9 7.9 7.4 12 7 5
Developing Countries 50.5 50.5 50.1 49.2 77 63 45
 Argentina 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 29 21 16
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 China 22.1 21.5 20.8 19.8 46 36 21
 India 15.5 16.1 16.7 17.0 116 94 69
 Indonesia 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 86 56 41
 Mexico 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 45 26 17
 Russian Federation 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.1 27 24 13
 South Africa 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 56 73 67
 Turkey 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 84 42 22
Memo item: G-7 2 13.8 12.3 11.5 10.9 10 7 6
Non–G-20 34.3 35.7 37.0 38.5 122 108 93
High Income 4.5 4.0 3.7 3.6 12 8 6
Developing Countries 29.8 31.7 33.3 34.8 129 114 97
 Middle Income 18.5 19.3 19.7 20.3 100 87 75
 Low Income 11.3 12.4 13.6 14.6 173 148 127
World 100 100 100 100 92 81 67
Source: World Development Indicators.
Notes:  The income classiﬁ cation used corresponds to the World Bank July 2010 classiﬁ cation.
1. The G-20 aggregate excludes the European Union.







Table B6. Participation in Education
Net enrollment ratio 
% of relevant age group
Gross enrollment ratio
% of relevant age group
Primary Secondary Tertiary
1991 2000 2007 2000 2007 1991 2000 2007
G-20 .. .. .. .. .. 15 19 29
High Income 95 97 94 90 92 48 59 72
 Australia 98 94 97 90 88 39 65 75
 Canadaa 98 99 .. 95 .. 95 59 62
 France 100 99 99 93 98 40 53 55
 Germany 84 99 98 .. .. 34 .. ..
 Italy 98 99 99 88 92 32 49 67
 Japan 100 100 100 99 98 30 48 58
 Korea, Republic 99 99 99 94 96 38 78 96
 Saudi Arabiab 59 .. 84 .. 73 10 22 30
 United Kingdom 98 100 97 94 91 29 58 59
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European Union .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Developing Countries .. .. .. .. .. 7 11 22
 Argentinac 95 99 99 79 79 39 53 68
 Brazil .. 92 93 68 77 .. 16 30
 China 97 .. .. .. .. 3 8 22
 India .. 79 90 .. .. 6 10 13
 Indonesia 98 94 95 50 70 10 .. 18
 Mexico 98 97 98 57 71 15 20 26
 Russian Federationd 99 .. .. .. .. 52 66 75
 South Africae 90 90 87 62 72 12 15 ..
 Turkeyf 89 94 94 .. 71 13 23 37
Non–G-20 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Source: World Development Indicators.
Notes: 
a. Data for Canada tertiary education is not available for 2007. We use 2004 data.
b. Data for Saudi Arabia tertiary education is not available for 2007. We use 2008 data.
c. Data for Argentina primary education is not available for 2000 and 2007. We use 2003 and 2005 data. Data for tertiary education is not available for 2007. We use 2006 data.
d. Data for Russia tertiary education is not available for 2000. We use 2003 data.
e. Data for South Africa tertiary education is not available for 2000. We use 1998 data.







Table B7. Science, Technology, Communications, and Trade






Container port trafﬁ c TEU: 
20 foot equivalent units 





ﬁ led by residents 
% of world
2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 2008 2006 1997 2006
G-20 1 14.3 61.9 8.2 27.6 61.5 58.5 2.0 94.1 95.5
High Income 49.1 101.5 33.9 71.2 36.6 27.1 2.5 89.2 79.2
 Australia 44.7 103.2 46.8 70.8 1.6 1.3 2.2 0.3 0.3
 Canada 28.4 66.3 42.2 75.3 1.3 1.0 2.0 0.5 0.6
 France 49.3 93.1 14.4 67.9 1.3 0.9 2.1 1.9 1.5
 Germany 58.6 128.5 30.2 75.5 3.4 3.5 2.5 6.4 4.9
 Italy 74.2 151.0 23.2 41.8 3.1 2.2 1.1 .. ..
 Japan 52.6 86.4 30.0 75.2 5.8 3.9 3.4 50.5 35.1
 Korea, Republic 57.0 93.8 40.5 75.8 4.0 3.7 3.2 9.7 12.7
 Saudi Arabia 6.7 146.1 2.2 31.5 0.7 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 United Kingdom 73.8 126.0 26.8 76.0 2.9 1.5 1.8 2.6 1.8
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European Union 54.1 122.2 20.7 61.8 21.1 17.4 1.9 14.3 10.2
Developing Countries 5.4 51.9 1.7 16.7 24.9 31.4 1.1 4.9 16.3
 Argentina 17.6 116.6 7.0 28.1 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.1 ..
 Brazil 13.3 78.5 2.9 37.5 1.1 1.4 1.0 0.4 0.4
 China 6.8 48.4 1.8 22.5 18.2 23.6 1.4 1.8 12.4
 India 0.4 30.4 0.5 4.5 1.1 1.4 0.8 0.3 0.5
 Indonesia 1.8 61.8 0.9 7.9 1.7 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Mexico 14.4 70.8 5.2 22.2 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.1
 Russian Federation 2.2 140.6 2.0 31.9 0.1 0.7 1.1 2.2 2.8
 South Africa 19.0 92.4 5.5 8.6 0.8 0.8 1.0 .. ..
 Turkey 24.3 89.1 3.8 34.4 0.7 1.1 0.6 0.0 0.1
Memo item: G-7 2 49.9 100.5 34.0 72.2 30.4 21.2 2.5 79.2 66.2
Non–G-20 8.6 59.2 .. .. 38.5 41.5 .. .. ..
High Income 52.0 120.8 18.3 54.6 .. .. .. .. ..
Developing Countries 2.6 51.4 1.1 12.2 .. .. .. .. ..
 Middle Income 3.8 66.8 1.7 17.9 .. .. .. .. ..
 Low Income 0.3 22.0 0.1 2.1 .. .. .. .. ..
World 12.3 60.8 6.8 23.9 100 100 2.1 100 100
Source: World Development Indicators.
Notes: The income classiﬁ cation used corresponds to the World Bank July 2010 classiﬁ cation.
1. The G-20 aggregate excludes the European Union.







Table B8. Poverty Rates
 Poverty rates at international poverty lines
Population below $1.25/day (%) Population below $2.00/day (%)
1981 1990 1999 2005 1981 1990 1999 2005
G-20 
Developing Countries 61.5 47.0 34.2 23.1 79.1 71.1 60.2 46.4
 Argentina (urban) 0.0 0.4 1.8 4.5 1.2 3.9 8.9 11.3
 Brazil 17.1 15.5 11.2 7.8 31.1 27.8 23.0 18.3
 China (rural) 94.1 74.1 50.9 26.1 99.4 93.0 79.4 55.6
 China (urban) 44.5 23.4 7.1 1.7 91.5 62.3 27.9 9.4
 India (rural) 62.5 53.9 47.4 43.8 88.5 85.5 82.1 79.5
 India (urban) 51.0 43.5 37.7 36.2 80.4 74.1 68.4 65.8
 Indonesia (rural) 73.8 57.1 53.4 24.0 92.8 87.9 88.0 61.1
 Indonesia (urban) 63.8 47.8 39.4 18.7 87.7 77.0 72.1 45.8
 Mexico 9.8 5.4 6.4 1.7 24.1 16.1 16.4 5.9
 Russian Federation 0.7 1.4 2.3 0.2 5.9 5.9 10.5 1.5
 South Africa 34.7 22.1 25.1 20.6 51.2 38.8 42.2 37.0
 Turkey 4.5 1.5 1.6 2.7 18.6 7.8 8.0 9.0
Non–G-201
Developing Countries 36.2 34.9 34.5 29.9 54.8 53.6 54.6 50.2
 Middle Income 12.8 10.4 10.3 8.2 28.6 24.7 24.6 19.8
 Low Income 56.8 54.4 53.0 45.3 77.8 76.7 77.4 71.8
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on PovcalNet.
Notes: The income classiﬁ cation used corresponds to the World Bank July 2010 classiﬁ cation.
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“During the run-up to the 2010 Seoul G-20 Summit, Korea was remarkably effective in forging a new 
consensus that development policy issues must be central to the G-20 deliberations. Postcrisis Growth 
and Development identiﬁ es these issues and documents a unique moment in international relations when 
powerful developing countries are taking their rightful place at the table in the planet’s top economic 
steering group.”
NANCY BIRDSALL, President of the Center for Global Development
 “Postcrisis Growth and Development should be in the hands of every G-20 minister at the Seoul Summit 
and be a primary source of analytical evidence that development issues are, in fact, globally relevant and 
must be tackled at the international level if gaps in humankind’s progress are to be closed. The focus on 
non-G20 developing countries is particularly welcome, considering their potential to contribute to global 
economic growth.”
BENNO NDULU, Governor of the Bank of Tanzania
“Korea has been an exceptional leader on many fronts, including the ideas behind its extraordinary growth 
and development over many decades and more recently for its pioneering role in equipping the country for 
the two industrial revolutions that are currently taking place: in information and communication technology, 
which is in full swing, and in low-carbon development, which is just beginning. Korea has also been a leader
in the G-20, especially in the implementation of its Green Growth policy, both for the ﬁ scal stimulus over
the last few years and for the medium and long term. And Korea has been a champion of the interests of
the developing world as a whole. Postcrisis Growth and Development clearly conveys why the development
of energy-efﬁ cient infrastructure in low- and middle-income countries is critical to prevent ‘locking in’ 
carbon-intensive infrastructure, to manage the huge risks of climate change, and to gain the great beneﬁ ts
of the new green industrial revolution in driving the growth story of the future.”
LORD NICHOLAS STERN, IG Patel Professor of Economics and Government, 
Chair of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change 
and the Environment at the London School of Economics
“Developing countries, especially those that are G-20 members, are increasingly contributing to global 
growth and are helping to sustain postcrisis recovery. Postcrisis Growth and Development makes a strong 
case for incorporating pressing development issues—trade, infrastructure, food security, and ﬁ nancial 
inclusion—in the G-20’s agenda.”
JERE BEHRMAN, W.R. Kenan Jr. Professor of Economics and Director 
of the Population Studies Center at the University of Pennsylvania
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